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HEFT 38

ELI FRANCO

DHARMAKĪRTI ON COMPASSION AND REBIRTH



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN
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HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
ERNST STEINKELLNER

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CONTENTS

Introduction

The *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, is unique in Dharmakīrti's writings. Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660) is the sort of author who writes on the same issue several times, elaborating and refining his thoughts in the process, sometimes modifying them radically. Of course, the major and general subjects of classical Indian epistemology, namely, perception and inference, are treated in one form or another in all of Dharmakīrti's writings, but there are also some specific topics, such as the determination of *vyāpti*, that run like a leitmotif through his work.[1] In stark contrast, religious issues are dealt with nowhere else but in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter. This chapter, therefore, stands apart as representing the only period, early in his career,[2] in which Dharmakīrti wrote on religious issues (albeit in a philosophical manner) such as karma and rebirth, modes of meditation, the four noble truths, the Buddha's compassion, the path to enlightenment, etc.

Although two monographs and a number of important papers have been written on the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter,[3] it has received far less attention than Dharmakīrti's work on inference, on which Steinkellner published his path-breaking editions, translations and studies in the sixties and seventies,[4] influencing decisively the course of Dharmakīrtian studies for many years to

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[1] Cf. Steinkellner, "Remarks on *niścayagrahaṇa.*"

[2] Regarding the possible sequence of Dharmakīrti's works, I rely on Frauwallner's "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's."

[3] Cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika,* and van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority.* A number of papers mostly dealing with the initial verses of the chapter appeared in Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition.* In this connection one should also mention the pioneering work of Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti.*

[4] Cf. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ.* Teil I. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrittext. Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen; *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya.* 2. Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I. Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte. Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. On the other hand, the *pratyakṣa* chapter is relatively neglected at present, and I know of no one currently working on it.

come. I hope, therefore, that the present monograph will advance our knowledge of the religious background of Buddhist logic and epistemology.

Pramāṇasiddhi 34-131ab, our subject matter here, can be considered structurally as a commentary on a single compound, *jagaddhitaiṣin* ("seeking the benefit of all living beings"), in the *maṅgalaśloka* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* thematically as forming a *paralokasiddhi* treatise, and philosophically as dealing above all with the two fundamental problems of the immortality of the mind and of the mind-body relationship. Contrary to what one might expect, Dharmakīrti's purpose in these verses is not to prove that the Buddha seeks the benefit of all living beings, nor even that the Buddha was compassionate. That proof, as I try to show in chapter I,[5] is accomplished by establishing direct and indirect relationships among certain properties of the Buddha. Dharmakīrti and his commentators suggest a relatively large number of schemes as to how one Buddha-property might be derived or deduced from another. I present six such schemes, and a seventh one in an addendum, without claiming to be exhaustive. Further, I try to show that behind these seemingly endless arrangements and rearrangements of Buddha-properties lies a genuine philosophical problem concerning the relationship between faith and reason in the Buddhist tradition. Since we have not attained enlightenment, we (presumably including Dharmakīrti) do not remember our past lives and do not understand how the law of karma operates in detail. Therefore, these intriguing parts of the Buddha's teaching, which are not accessible to us through perception or inference and which, according to Dharmakīrti, are *not* essential to the teaching, have to be accepted on faith. The truthfulness of these statements of the Buddha can only be inferred indirectly from the reliability of the person. Thus, by proving that the Buddha is a trustworthy authority in these matters, i.e., that he knows the truth and has no reason to lie to us, one can also establish the authority and trustworthiness of his teachings. But how do we know that the Buddha is a reliable person? Dharmakīrti's answer to this question hinges on his interpretation of the Buddha's properties mentioned by Dignāga and their relationship.

In the second part of this chapter I also try to show that the problem of religious authority and reliability was by no means confined to the Buddhist tradition alone. Interestingly enough, the solution proposed by Dharmakīrti

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[5] This chapter is a revised and augmented version of my paper "Yet Another Look at the Framework of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika.*"

for establishing the authority of the Buddha is structurally similar to Vātsyāyana's proof of the authority of the Vedas and to the proof of Śiva's authority put forth by the Tantric author Sadyojyotis. Thus, we deal here with a topic that cuts across the boundaries of different religious traditions and various philosophical schools.

The concept of authority/means of knowledge *(pramāṇa)* forms the subject matter of chapter II.[6] In this chapter I try to argue that contrary to previous interpretations, the initial verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter should not be taken as intending a general definition of the means of knowledge, but, in compliance with the general purport of the chapter, only as arguing that the Buddha is a means of knowledge. This analysis is supported by the observation that up to Dharmakīrti's time no philosopher tried to define the means of knowledge in general, and therefore one need not expect Dharmakīrti to do so either. It seems that Dharmottara was the first to have focused on a doctrine of general validity and to have made it the important topic that we know it to be from later works, for even Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are still concerned above all with the issue of extrinsic vs. intrinsic validity.

I also try to show in this chapter that Dharmakīrti's commentators, including Devendrabuddhi, misunderstood him on this point. This conclusion has important methodological implications for me which determine the way I use the commentaries: No commentary is *a priori* correct or better *in principle* than any other commentary, including the earliest commentary by Devendrabuddhi which was supposedly approved by Dharmakīrti himself. For every verse, or even part of a verse, the evaluation of the respective merits of diverging interpretations (when there are any) starts from zero and does not take into consideration such criteria as the date of a commentary or how often its interpretations prove to be superior to the other commentaries. I have not hesitated to follow Manorathanandin, the last commentator, who lived hundreds of years after Dharmakīrti, when his interpretation made better sense to me than those of the other commentators.[7] In all cases of disagreement among the commentators I try to explain why a certain

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[6] This chapter corresponds essentially to my paper "The Disjunction in Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter 5c," with one important modification for which I would like to thank Prof. John Taber, Albuquerque.

[7] As a rule Manorathanandin follows Prajñākaragupta. If he follows Devendrabuddhi instead or disagrees with both of them, he usually has good reasons for doing so.

interpretation seems better to me; I also present as clearly as I can the other interpretations, and sometimes even provide more than one translation of the verse according to the respective commentaries.

Chapter II was written at a time when I still planned to include a translation of vv. 1-33 in this book. However, when I heard that Motoi Ono had written his dissertation on these verses, soon to be published in the WSTB, I gladly reduced the scope of this book to avoid overlapping with his work.

As mentioned above, Dharmakīrti's purpose in vv. 34-131ab was not to prove that the Buddha was compassionate. Rather, he sets out to prove the preconditions that would make the Buddha's compassion possible. Broadly speaking there are two such preconditions: 1) the existence of an infinite number of past lives, and 2) the possibility of an infinite increase of mental properties like compassion.

The necessity of both these conditions is quite obvious. The first condition is necessary because an infinite compassion like the Buddha's could not possibly have been accumulated during a single life-time. It had to be practised repeatedly and intensively during an infinite number of lives. Thus, vv. 34-119 form a kind of *Paralokasiddhi,* a proof that the "other world" (that is, life before birth and after death, not necessarily in any other world than our own) exists.[8] These verses are dealt with in the last three chapters.

Chapter III is an attempt to unfold Dharmakīrti's doctrine of rebirth.[9] Unfortunately, Dharmakīrti has very little to say on the subject and, on the whole, he is much more elaborate in criticizing his opponents than in expounding his own doctrine. In this connection I discuss not only topics that are directly connected to the subject of rebirth, such as the nature of the intermediary state of being *(antarābhava)* and the role of karma, but also the ontological presuppositions of the doctrine of rebirth, i.e., whether rebirth takes place within the framework of a realistic or idealistic ontology. This, in its turn, leads me to consider the question of Dharmakīrti's school-affiliation. I argue in favour of the traditional interpretation that affiliates

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[8] On the topic of *paralokasiddhi* cf. above all several publications by Steinkellner, of which I want to mention specifically *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi* and "Anmerkungen zu einer buddhistischen Texttradition: Paralokasiddhi." Cf. also Namai, "Two aspects of *paraloka-sādhana* in Dharmakīrtian Tradition."

[9] In this chapter I incorporate materials from my "*Ālayavijñāna* and *kliṣṭamanas* in the Pramāṇavārttika?"

Dharmakīrti with both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra school and try to show how a shift from a realistic to an idealistic interpretation of the text can be conceived not only at the level of individual verses, but also at the level of an entire chapter.

Chapter IV is the longest, and in a way, it constitutes the heart of the book. In classical India in general and in Dharmakīrti's time in particular, the only philosophical school that denied the possibility of rebirth was the Lokāyata. Therefore, it is not surprising that this school or philosophical system formed the main target of Dharmakīrti's arguments, though not the only target as sometimes assumed. My purpose in this chapter is twofold. First, it is to reconstruct the materialist position that forms the target of Dharmakīrti's arguments; I show somewhat tentatively that the main arguments are directed against the Cārvāka philosopher Kambalāśvatara of whose writings, unfortunately, only a few fragments survive. Second, it is to present Dharmakīrti's proof of rebirth that is based above all on proving the autonomy of the mind from other factors considered necessary for consciousness, namely, body, breath and sense faculties.

Chapter V[10] deals with the identity of the so-called Hindu opponents. It is the most technical, and I am afraid it may prove unpalatable to the general reader. However, if we want to make sense of Dharmakīrti's arguments, we have to know against whom he is arguing. When arguing for the independence of the cognition (or mind) from other factors such as body, senses, breaths, etc., Dharmakīrti was in fact defending the Buddhist position against attacks from different quarters. The "Hindu" schools, namely, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, were as vehement in their criticism of the Buddhists as was the iconoclastic Lokāyata school. *Prima facie* it does not make sense to try to establish the doctrine of rebirth against the opinion of the former schools, for they all admit rebirth. For this reason modern scholars, as well as the Tibetan tradition of Dharmakīrti exegesis, assume that the materialists are Dharmakīrti's sole opponents in these verses. In chapter V I try to show that this is not the case. As already demonstrated in chapter IV, the arguments of the Lokāyata on the one hand and of the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā on the other converge in denying that the cognition can shift from one body to another. The materialists claim that consciousness is destroyed with the destruction of the body, whereas the "Hindu" schools claim that

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[10] This chapter is based on my paper "Vaiśeṣika or Cārvāka? The Mysterious Opponent in Pramāṇavārttika 2.63-72."

rebirth is impossible without the assumption of a permanent soul *(ātman)*. Chapter V attempts to identify the opponents behind two groups of verses that deal with the body as determined by the three humours and with the relationship between support and supported. The examination of the first group of verses does not lead to definite conclusions. This is a useful reminder, however, of the fact that our knowledge of Lokāyata, which is almost exclusively derived from other sources, is extremely uncertain. More specifically, I show how the so-called Cārvāka doctrine of humours, for which we have what appears to be genuine fragments, is passed on from one Buddhist author to another and then on to a Jaina author who attributes it to the Cārvākas without relying on any Cārvāka source. We seem to be dealing here with a case of "invention of tradition." The investigation of the second group of verses clarifies that considerable portions of the proof of rebirth address the Nyāya school, more specifically, Uddyotakara or someone philosophically close to him.

The second precondition for the possibility of the Buddha's compassion referred to above, namely, the possibility of an infinite increase of mental properties like compassion, presupposes the first. Even if we assume that the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is correct, it does not follow that compassion can increase to an infinite degree. Dharmakīrti's opponent claims that there are natural limits to mental properties or moral excellences, just as to physical achievements: no matter how long and how intensively one practises jumping, one will never jump for several miles; similarly one cannot heat water beyond a certain temperature and turn it into fire. In the same manner, no matter how long the Buddha may practise compassion towards all living beings, he will never attain the infinite compassion postulated by the Buddhists.

According to Dharmakīrti, there are only two conditions that may prevent an unlimited increase of special properties: 1) the special property depends on repeated effort *(punaryatna)*, and 2) the special property has an unstable support *(asthirāśraya)*. If these two conditions do not obtain, then cultivated properties become the own nature of the person, which means that they "proceed by their own essence" *(svarasena pravartante)*, that is, they reproduce themselves (or more precisely: moments of their own kind) automatically, without any further effort, in the next moments of the succession of constituents that form a person. In the case of jumping and heating water, however, the means that are employed in the past are powerless in respect to jumping and heating water in the future. After one jump is effected, the

next jump depends on another effort, and one does not start where the previous jump has stopped. In the case of heating water the support is unstable, and when the contact with fire is gone the water cools down. Therefore, in such cases the increase is limited to a certain degree.[11]

On the other hand, when something is or becomes the own nature of something and its maintenance does not depend on any further efforts, then further effort produces further increase in the special property and the process can go on indefinitely. This holds good not only for mental properties like compassion, but also for physical processes, like burning wood, or certain chemical reactions. When fire creates a special property in wood, such as black colour, etc., this property proceeds by its own essence because it does not require repeated effort to be maintained. Similarly, oxidation *(jāraṇa),* certain chemical reactions with mercury *(cāraṇa),* properties created in gold by *puṭapāka* (i.e., a certain method of preparing drugs: various substances are wrapped in leaves, covered with clay and heated in fire), etc.,[12] all proceed by their own essence because they do not depend on repeated effort. What distinguishes properties which become the own nature of something from those which depend on repeated effort is that the former are not reversible; once the wood has been blackened by fire it will not regain its original colour.[13]

Furthermore, the level of compassion reached in the past is not only maintained effortlessly; it also tends to increase naturally. Compassion grows out of its own seed. It does not depend on anything external to it in order to grow. For instance, it does not depend on gratitude *(pratyupakāra),* nor on the proximity of an object, that is, one does not really have to see that all living beings suffer in order to develop compassion towards them; it suffices to hear about it and think or meditate on it. Thus, since compassion etc., do not have a natural limit, they will keep increasing indefinitely. Jumping, on the other hand, does not arise from jumping. And because its two causes,

[11] Cf. vv. 120-122; cf. also *TS* 3167, 3420, 3423ab, and *NKan* 467.7-468.8.

[12] Cf. P 106.25.

[13] Cf. vv. 123-124; cf. also *TS* 3421.

strength and effort, cannot increase indefinitely, jumping too is limited to a certain degree.[14]

If, however, the quality of jumping does not increase by jumping, then how is it that an experienced jumper jumps better than a beginner? Dharmakīrti's theory of sports, in a nut-shell, is that training does not contribute directly to performance. Rather, the body of the beginner is deficient, and the repeated practice of jumping gradually removes its deficiency. Jumping depends on the strength of the body, not on the previous practice of jumping; nor does the strength of the body depend on jumping. The practice of jumping only removes the imperfections of the body that impede its strength.[15]

However, if compassion, etc., grow out of their own seed, then, since *saṃsāra* has no beginning, everyone should have become a Buddha by now. This would indeed be the case if the same did not apply to the opposite negative properties as well. Just as compassion arises from its own seed, so do hatred or aversion *(dveṣa)*, etc. Thus, compassion and aversion obstruct each other's development. It is for this reason that great effort is needed to suppress aversion, etc., with their antidotes so that compassion can flow unhindered and reach its utmost degree, as in the case of the Buddha.

* * *

Since Dharmakīrti's verses are extremely difficult, rich and suggestive, I had to face the problem of how to organize the materials and comments necessary for an understanding of the simple wording, of the philosophical implications of the arguments and of their historical background. It seemed impractical to compress all this into footnotes to the translation of the verses, especially when the broader context of a large group of verses had to be dealt with. Nor did I think it desirable to discuss variant readings and philological problems in the footnotes to a philosophical and historical study. The solution I opted for was to present the discussion of philological issues in the form of notes to the translation of the verses, and the historical and philosophical issues in the form of a long introduction that grew over the years to the size of the present monograph in five chapters. I am fully aware that there is no

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[14] Cf. vv. 125-127; cf. also *TS* 3413, 3423cd.

[15] Cf. v. 128; cf. also *TSP* 1080.11-16.

definite boundary in our discipline between philology and philosophy, and that the choice of a variant reading is often the choice of one philosophical interpretation over another. Thus, ideally the translation and the respective introductory chapters should be read in tandem.

The content and purpose of the introductory chapters has been briefly reviewed above. The structure of the "translation" part is as follows. Each unit contains a verse or a group of verses according to the division of the *kārikās* in Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (= P). The choice to follow Prajñākaragupta was an easy one, for Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (= D) and the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin (= M) do not quote the full verses and thus do not provide us with an arrangement of the *kārikās*, whereas the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Ravigupta (= R) almost always follows P.[16] The verses are edited on the basis of three editions, namely, the so-called critical edition of Miyasaka (= Mi) and the *kārikā*-versions that are found in P (= PV_P) and M (= PV_M).[17] In addition, the Tibetan translation by Sa skya paṇḍita and Śākyaśrībhadra (= PV_{Tib}) has proved most helpful. I have also systematically taken into consideration the Tibetan translations of the *kārikās* as found in the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi (= PV_D) and Ravigupta (= PV_R). However, they are usually not noted separately unless they deviate from PV_{Tib}, that is, if only PV_{Tib} is referred to, this means that PV_D and PV_R are identical to it regarding the particular reading referred to, though not necessarily regarding the entire verse. The edition of the verses is followed by a translation that is quite literal, but which is not as laconic as the original. The translation is followed by notes mainly of a philological nature which also discuss the different interpretations of the verses by the different commentators, that is, when there is a difference, or more precisely, when I noticed a difference. On the whole, there is a strong unity among the commentaries. Only the direct commentaries of Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta and Mano-

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[16] Although "P," "D," "M" and "R" are used as abbreviations of texts, I do not italicize them because they are derived from the names of their respective authors.

[17] It may be noted that the *kārikās* found in M are not an original part of Manorathanandin's commentary, but were added to its edition by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Variants of the verses in Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition (= $PV_{M(S)}$) are only referred to when there is a difference from PV_M. Pandeya's edition of the verses, together with Manorathanandin's commentary, does not offer anything new and seems only to reproduce Shastri's edition without any changes. It is, therefore, not referred to.

rathanandin are taken into account. The sub-commentaries of Śākyabuddhi, Yamāri and Jayanta were not used. The strong unity among the direct commentaries can be explained by the fact that Ravigupta practically always follows Prajñākaragupta, as does Manorathanandin in the vast majority of the cases. M is also extremely useful in showing how Prajñākaragupta's general comments can be read into a literal interpretation of the verses. Thus, when there are differences in the interpretation of the verses, they are usually to be found in the different interpretations of D and P, while R and M are in line with the one or the other, usually with P, except for those cases when Prajñākaragupta's interpretation is too extravagant and far-fetched.[18]

When a particular verse has been translated before, notably by Vetter,[19] Nagatomi[20] and Hayes,[21] a reference is given in the notes, and if my interpretation differs I explain in what manner. However, there are two complete English translations of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter that are not referred to.[22] The first is Nagatomi's famous Ph.D. dissertation (Harvard 1957). This was a pioneering work on Dharmakīrti, but since it was never published I assume that Nagatomi does not consider it a public document. I mention it here only to acknowledge that I used it in the initial stages of my work and found it very useful. Another complete translation of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter was published recently (1993) by R. Jackson. It is not taken into account because its value is negligible. In a lengthy review of this work[23] I have explained what, in my opinion, went wrong with this translation, and I therefore feel that I need not justify here why I ignore it.

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[18] Cf. for instance P on vv. 34 and 46.

[19] A substantial number of verses have been translated or paraphrased by him in *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*.

[20] I refer only to those verses translated in his *"Mānasa-pratyakṣa."*

[21] Cf. his paper "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth."

[22] There are also a complete Japanese translation of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter by Toshihiko Kimura and a Chinese translation from the Tibetan by Fa Tsun; cf. Steinkellner and Much, *Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule*, pp. 25 and 27, 7.1.S14.(tw.) and 7.1.c1. Unfortunately I cannot read these languages.

[23] Forthcoming in *JIABS* 1997.

The final note in each section usually[24] contains a complete translation of Prajñākaragupta's commentary, except for one digression which I consider too interesting to be buried in a note and to which I hope to return on a different occasion. The footnotes to this translation mainly deal with textual problems, point out some important parallel passages in the other commentaries and emphasize interesting or original philosophical ideas of the author. A large number of additions in square brackets, meant to make the terse text more explicit, as well as brief explanations in round brackets have been inserted in the translation; they should function as a running commentary. The translation presupposes a minimum acquaintance with Buddhist epistemological texts: well-known technical terms like *svabhāvahetu, vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi,* etc., are translated but not explained. The reader is referred here once and for all to the works of Steinkellner on which I myself rely heavily. To facilitate the recognition of the *pratīkas* italics are used. When Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of a verse is different from mine, the *pratīkas* are translated according to his understanding and may thus differ from the wording of the translated *kārikā* itself.

A word of justification is perhaps needed for my leaving aside of the subcommentaries by Jayanta and Yamāri while I worked on the translation. Undoubtedly they may lead to a better understanding of certain extremely difficult points, and they are certainly crucial for the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra.*[25] I decided not to use them mainly for two reasons, the one structural, the other practical. The structural reason is obvious. This is, after all, a book about Dharmakīrti's philosophical defense

[24] Sections from the other commentaries are translated only rarely, either when Prajñākaragupta does not comment on certain verses (e.g., 70-72) or when they contain important additional information. My focus throughout, however, has been on Prajñākaragupta.

[25] Nevertheless, Prajñākaragupta's text, although most difficult, is understandable on its own. In this respect it is a different kind of composition than the *PV,* which at times is so laconic as to make it almost impossible to understand without a commentary. I suspect that the *PV* was written with the intention of its being supplemented by written or oral commentary; reading its verses alone would be comparable to reading the verses of the *PVin* without the prose that accompanies them. P on the other hand was not written with an additional commentary in mind, but was supposed to be understood on its own by an intelligent and informed reader. We experience difficulties with the text because Prajñākaragupta's thought is sometimes extremely subtle and sometimes we (scil. I) do not possess the background he takes for granted.

of central religious issues in Buddhism; the translation and study of the corresponding *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra,* important as I think it is, is subordinate to the book's main purpose, and I therefore did not extend my view toward these additional sources. The practical reason is that the study of the commentaries by Jayanta and Yamāri for the present book would have delayed its publication for at least another three or four years. Yet another reason for not undertaking the tremendous effort involved in studying especially Yamāri's extensive commentary is the existence of its Sanskrit original reported recently by Steinkellner and Much.[26] Like all scholars interested in Indian philosophy and the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, I hope to see the day when this and many other reported manuscripts, maybe even additional manuscripts of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra,* become available to the scholarly community. This day, if and when it comes, will bring about a new era in Buddhist *pramāṇa* studies that could certainly render some of our previous efforts obsolete or at least cause them to appear preliminary.

I don't think that there is much need to justify an extensively annotated translation of about thirty densely printed pages of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. This text is by far the most detailed, the most interesting and original (unfortunately, also the most difficult) among the four existing commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Its importance for the intellectual history of Buddhism not only in India, but also in Tibet[27] is widely acclaimed, yet so far this commentary has hardly been used in modern studies of Dharmakīrti. This is partly due to the rather sorrowful state of the only existing edition that abounds in typographical and other mistakes.[28] Fortunately, however, we possess an excellent Tibetan translation by the renowned rṄog lo-tsā-ba Blo ldan śes rab. This translation is not as polished as the translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* itself, which was revised several times by several teams of

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[26] Cf. Steinkellner and Much, *Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule,* p. XX.

[27] Cf. van der Kuijp, *Contributions*, pp. 29ff., and Jackson, *Entrance Gate*, pp. 127ff. and 165ff.

[28] This is not meant to detract from the glorious achievements of Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Buddhist *pramāṇa* studies would hardly be feasible without the precious manuscripts, photographs and hand-copies he brought from Tibet (for a survey cf. Much, *A Visit to Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's Collection of Negatives at the Bihar Research Society*). Further, Professor Nagasaki, Kyoto, tells me that Sāṅkṛtyāyana proofread the text while in prison for political agitation against the British – hardly a congenial environment for this daunting task.

scholars, but on the whole it is an admirable and authoritative work. It is only because of this translation that I was able to translate and understand with reasonable confidence such large portions of the text without taking into consideration the original manuscript, which was inaccessible to me. The numerous suggestions for the emendation of the text, presented and discussed in the notes, are based almost entirely on the Tibetan translation. They are brought together, without further comments and justifications, in Appendix I for the convenience of those readers who wish to gain an independent idea of the Sanskrit text first, without taking immediate recourse to my translation. Appendix II provides a concordance between the Sanskrit text of the translated portion of P on the one hand and the Tibetan text according to the Peking and Derge recensions on the other (= $P_{(Pe)}$ and $P_{(De)}$).

The remaining two appendices are meant to further and facilitate the additional study of the treated *kārikās* themselves. Appendix III presents a concordance of the relevant Tibetan text of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* according to the Peking and Derge recensions (= $D_{(Pe)}$ and $D_{(De)}$). Appendix IV lists corrections and further variants to Miyasaka's edition of the Tibetan translation of the *kārikās*.

CHAPTER ONE

The Framework and Proof-Strategy of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-Chapter[1]

> Vālmīki dammed the sea with rocks
> put into place by monkeys,
> and Vyāsa filled it with the arrows shot by Pārtha;
> yet neither is suspected of hyperbole.
> On the other hand, I weigh both word and sense
> and yet the public sneers and scorns my work.
> Oh Reputation, I salute thee!

As is well-known, the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* is construed as a loose commentary on the five epithets of the Buddha mentioned by Dignāga in the *maṅgalaśloka* of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya: pramāṇabhūtatva* (being a means of knowledge, or authority) *jagaddhitaiṣitā* (seeking the benefit of all living creatures), *śāstṛtva* (being a teacher), *sugatatva* (being one who has "gone well") and *tāyitva* (being a protector).[2]

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[1] The following is a revised and augmented version of my paper "Yet another look at the framework of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika.*"

[2] To mention but a few of the most important publications on the subject: Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's"; Nagatomi, "The Framework of the Pramāṇavārttika Book I"; Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception,* p. 74f.; Steinkellner, "The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism"; Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika;* Inami and Tillemans, "Another Look at the Framework of the Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter of Pramāṇavārttika"; R. Jackson, "The Buddha as *Pramānabhūta";* Ruegg, *"Pramāṇabhūta, Pramāṇa(bhūta)-puruṣa"* (cf. also his "La notion du voyant et du 'connaisseur suprême' et la question de l'autorité épistemique," which covers largely the same ground). Among studies that concern above all the Tibetan tradition, but are also relevant to the Indian tradition, cf. Steinkellner, *"Tshad ma'i skyes bu.* Meaning and historical significance of the term"; Tillemans, *Persons of Authority;* D. Jackson, "The Status of Pramāṇa Doctrine."

However, the complex relations among the properties of the Buddha referred to by these epithets, as construed by Dharmakīrti in several contexts, remains hitherto largely unexplored. In the following I shall point out several possible schemes for the arrangement of the epithets without, however, arguing for any one "definitive arrangement"; on the contrary, I shall try to show that Dharmakīrti allows almost free permutations among four of the epithets. I shall conclude this chapter by proposing a new reading of the general purport of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter in the context of non-Buddhist philosophical traditions.

The relationship among the five properties is described by Dignāga as follows:

> At the beginning of the treatise, here [in this verse], I express praise in honour of the Worshipful [Buddha] in order to produce in [the hearts of men] faith in Him who, because of His perfection in cause *(hetu)* and effect *(phala)*, is to be regarded as the personification of the means of cognition *(pramāṇabhūta)*.[3] There [in the above statement],

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[3] As pointed out by Steinkellner, "Miszellen VII," p. 181, one has to translate *pramāṇabhūta* differently in different contexts: "who is *pramāṇa*" in Dignāga's *maṅgalaśloka*, but "who has become *pramāṇa*" in the *PV* and the later Dharmakīrtian tradition in conformity with *PV* II 7bc: *abhūtavinivṛttaye bhūtoktiḥ*. On Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of *bhūta*- as "truth" cf. the translation of the verse in the next chapter. In this connection one has to disagree with Steinkellner's interpretation of Jinendrabuddhi's analysis of the compound as a *dvandva*. The fragment reads (cf. also "Some Sanskrit-Fragments of Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*," p. 100): *pramāṇaṃ cāsau bhūtaś ceti pramāṇabhūtaḥ*. This is the usual analysis *(vigraha)* of *karmadhāraya* compounds, and it seems to me that *pramāṇabhūta*, no matter whether one takes *-bhūta* as "is" or "has become," is indeed a *karmadhāraya* compound. *pramāṇa* in this context, as pointed out by Steinkellner and others, does not mean "a means of knowledge" like perception or inference (clearly the Buddha was neither perception nor inference), but "authoritative/trustworthy/reliable person." More recently, Ruegg suggested that *pramāṇabhūta* may be understood as "like *pramāṇa*" (cf. his *"Pramāṇabhūta,"* p. 309ff.). This suggestion is based on various sources in the grammatical tradition, beginning with Yāska's *Nirukta* 3.16: *meṣa iti bhūtopamā*. Cf. also Durga's commentary *ad loc.* (vol. I, p. 308): *meṣa ity eṣā bhūtaśabdenopamā* | ... *meṣo bhūtaṃ: meṣa iva*. Both these and further sources are quoted by Bronkhorst in *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*, p. 111, n. 11.

In spite of the above evidence, I fail to see anything in the semantic field of √*BHŪ* to allow for the meaning of "similarity" or "likeness." It seems to me, therefore, that the notion of similarity is due to the adjectifying function of *-bhūta* and to a transfer of part of the meaning of the whole compound to one of its parts. For instance, "metallic" can mean

"cause" means perfection in intention *(āśaya)* and perfection in practice *(prayoga)*. Perfection in intention means the [Buddha's] taking as his purpose the benefit of [all] living beings *(jagaddhitaiṣitā)*. Perfection in practice means [His] being the [true] teacher *(śāstṛtva)* because he teaches all people. "Effect" means the attainment of his own objectives *(svārtha)* as well as those of others *(parārtha)*. Attainment of His own objectives is [evidenced] by [His] being *sugata* in the following three senses: (i) that of being praiseworthy *(praśastatva)*, as in a handsome person *(surūpa)*, (ii) the sense of being beyond return [to *saṃsāra*] *(apunar-āvṛtty-artha)*, as one who is fully cured of fever *(sunaṣṭa-jvara)*, and (iii) the sense of being complete *(niḥśeṣārtha)*, as a jar is wholly filled *(supūrṇa-ghaṭa)*. These three senses [of His title *"sugata"*] distinguish the Buddha's attainment of his own objectives from that of non-Buddhists of subdued passions *(vīta-rāga)*, from the attainment of those who are undergoing religious training *(śaikṣa)*, and from that of those who are no longer in need of religious training *(aśaikṣa)*. Attainment of the objectives of others is [seen from His]

"similar to metal," but -ic does not necessarily mean "similar." On the other hand, even if *-bhūta* did not mean "similar," once authoritative treatises state that it does, it acquires this meaning for the readers who are acquainted with these treatises.


Yet another question is whether commentaries in the Dharmakīrtian tradition interpreted *-bhūta* in *pramāṇabhūta* in the sense of "similar" against Dharmakīrti's explicit statement. Ruegg's assertion (p. 311) that "the use of *-bhūta* in the meaning 'like' ... is found even in some of the post-Dharmakīrti commentaries" still remains to be proved. The passages he quotes from Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*, Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, Yamāri's commentary thereon, etc., do not prove that their authors understood *-bhūta* as "similar," because they refer to, or in the case of Jinendrabuddhi could refer to, the comparison in v. 7a: *tadvad bhagavān pramāṇam*, not to *bhūtoktiḥ* in 7c.

Especially problematic is Ruegg's treatment of P 32.5 (significantly on 7a, not on 7c!): *pratyakṣarūpa eva bhagavān pramāṇam*. Ruegg's translation: "[T]he Bhagavant being similar to (or: of the nature of) *pratyakṣa* is *pramāṇa*." It is possible that Ruegg read *iva* instead of *eva*. However, such an emendation is neither supported by the Tibetan translation (quoted by Ruegg, n. 40) nor by Prajñākaragupta's own comments. Interestingly enough, Prajñākaragupta interprets *-vat* not as the comparative suffix, but as the possessive suffix. It is possible, therefore, that he read *tadvān* instead of *tadvat;* cf. P 32.5: *tadvān iti kṛtvā*.

being a protector *(tāyitva)* in the sense of [His] saving the world.[4]

The above can be conveniently presented as follows:

Table 1



——> stands for explicit relation, - - -> stands for implicit relation.[5]

Dignāga does not explain whether "because" (i.e., the instrumental and the ablative case endings)[6] should be understood as referring to a logical or ontological cause. He seems to think primarily of a cause in the logical sense, but unlike Dharmakīrti (cf. below) he does not seem to intend formal reasons of inferences; he also does not seem to exclude an overlapping or

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[4] The translation is quoted from Hattori, *Dignāga,* p. 23.

[5] Although it is not explicitly stated by Dignāga, I think it is highly probable that perfection in effect arises from perfection in cause. In *AKBh* 415.14f. on *AK* 7.34 Vasubandhu explains the similarities and dissimilarities among the different Buddhas. The similarities consist in the accumulation of all merit and knowledge, in having the *dharmakāya,* and in being helpful to all living beings. These three are called *hetusampat, phalasampat* and *upakārasampat.* Dignāga must have been inspired by and invokes this or a similar division when composing his introductory verse, although a one-to-one relationship, especially regarding the sub-divisions of the three perfections, is difficult, not to say impossible, to establish.

[6] Cf. the partially reconstructed Sanskrit text in Hattori, *Dignāga,* after p. 237.

coinciding of logical and ontological causality. However, at least from a later perspective, i.e., from Dharmakīrti's time onwards, the distinction is important, and to make the difference clear I shall use hereafter "cause" for ontological cause or *causa fiendi* and "reason" for logical cause or *causa cognosciendi*.

The *maṅgalaśloka* has been subject to conflicting interpretations; on the one hand it has been considered by Steinkellner as a stroke of genius and the cornerstone that marks the border between the dialectical and truly epistemological period of Buddhist philosophy,[7] on the other hand it has been described by van Bijlert as being rather unimportant.[8] The truth must be somewhere in-between, but is probably closer to the former opinion, for van Bijlert does not take into consideration the autocommentary thereon which elaborates on these epithets in some detail; consequently it is unlikely that the verse was conceived as a mere perfunctory invocation. Nevertheless, van Bijlert is right to emphasise Dharmakīrti's contribution to the verse's subsequent glory. One of Dharmakīrti's main innovations in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter was to use the four epithets in a formal proof for the Buddha's authority. In such a proof, however, cause and reason could not overlap, for according to Dharmakīrti's own theory of inference one may infer the cause from the effect, but not the effect from the cause. Thus, the properties referred to by the epithets could not be both cause and reason for the Buddha's being a means of knowledge. Consequently, Dharmakīrti has modified the relationship between the properties, understanding each property as a necessary condition for the subsequent one: The Buddha is full of compassion - this is Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *jagaddhitaiṣitā* - and wants to become a protector, but before becoming a protector he has to acquire the adequate knowledge, i.e., to become *"sugata";* the root *GAM* is interpreted by Dharmakīrti in the meaning of "knowing," not in the usual meaning of "going," and in consideration of the three meanings of *su-*, *sugata* is said to state that the Buddha's knowledge is true, definitive and complete. That this was not Dignāga's intention becomes quite clear when

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[7] Cf. Steinkellner, "The Spiritual Place," p. 7.

[8] Cf. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, p. 117: "[T]he verse still does not say much more than that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* and possesses four other qualities"; p. 171: "To me it seems that this 'important' verse (or rather half-verse) is made important by the earliest and most important commentary on it, Pramāṇa-siddhi chapter, being Pramāṇavārttika II."

one remembers that for Dignāga *sugatatva* is equivalent to *svārthasampat* ("attainment of *his own* objectives").[9] For Dharmakīrti it means the attainment of knowledge for the sake of *others,* i.e., all living beings. In order to acquire such an outstanding knowledge one has to practice various ways and methods towards liberation for a long time - this is Dharmakīrti's unlikely interpretation of "being a teacher" *(śāstṛtva)* as *upāyābhyāsa.*[10] Finally, to practice in such a strenuous way requires compassion.

Having established the causal connection among the properties, Dharmakīrti can now infer them in reversed order, from effect to cause: Because the Buddha is a protector, which consists in his revealing the way to liberation or the four noble truths, he is *sugata,* i.e., has much more knowledge than is necessary for becoming an *arhat,* etc.; because he is *sugata,* he is (or was) a "teacher," i.e., must have exerted himself to obtain knowledge for the sake of other living beings; and because he is a "teacher," he seeks the benefit of all living beings, i.e., is full of compassion.[11] And from all four taken together, one can infer that he is a means of knowledge

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[9] Besides, √*GAM* in the meaning of "going" is intransitive and thus *gataḥ* can be translated as "he who has gone," but √*GAM* in the meaning of "knowing" is usually transitive and often used with *upasargas* like *adhi, ava,* etc. Thus, *gataḥ* in this meaning would normally be translated as "he who is known," not "he who has known." Still Dharmakīrti's interpretation is not entirely impossible, for one can interpret *gataḥ* as "he who has gone [in his mind/ thoughts to the objects]." None of the dictionaries available to me, however, records *gataḥ* in this meaning, either alone, or compounded as *tathāgata* or *sugata.*

[10] Cf. v. 138ab: *upāyābhyāsa evāyaṃ tādarthyāc chāsanaṃ matam.* "This very same repeated practice of means [as explained above] is meant by teaching (i.e., the epithet *śāstṛtva),* because [the practice of means] aims at this [teaching]."

[11] Cf. vv. 280-281:


tāyāt tattvasthirāśeṣaviśeṣajñānasādhanam I
bodhārthatvād gamer, bāhyaśaikṣāśaikṣādhikas tataḥ II
parārthajñānaghaṭanaṃ tasmāt tacchāsanaṃ, dayā I
*tataḥ parārthatantratvaṃ siddhārthasyāvirāmataḥ** II

* Note the pun on the Buddha's personal name.

Not only the interpretation of the properties as such, but also of their causal relationship seems unfaithful to Dignāga's intention. Dignāga's commentary gives the impression that *jagaddhitaiṣitā* is a cause of *sugatatva,* and *śāsṛtva* of *tāyitva.*

or an authority *(pramāṇabhūta).* All this results in the network of relation ships as illustrated in table 2.

Table 2



——> stands for cause, ——≫ stands for reason.

This interpretation, however, which is endorsed by Vetter[12] and to which I have also subscribed previously,[13] is based on Prajñākaragupta's and Manorathanandin's commentaries.[14] Indeed, each property represents a necessary condition for the subsequent one, but do we need them all in order to infer the Buddha's authority? A closer look at Dharmakīrti's text (v. 282) seems to indicate that three properties would suffice for the purpose:

> *dayayā śreya ācaṣṭe, jñānād bhūtaṃ,*[15] *sasādhanam* ǀ
> *tac cābhiyogavān vaktuṃ yatas tasmāt pramāṇatā* ǁ
>
> Because of compassion he proclaims salvation, because of knowledge [he proclaims] truth, and because he exerts

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[12] Cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 169, n. 1.

[13] Cf. Franco, "Was the Buddha a Buddha?" p. 83.


[14] Cf. P 165.28: *yataḥ kāraṇacatuṣṭayaṃ tasmāt pramāṇatā;* M 96.22-23: *tasmāt kāruṇikatvāt, sugatatvāc, chāstṛtvāt, tāyitvāc ca bhagavataḥ pramāṇatā.* (Note the unusual order of the properties.) Devendrabuddhi's interpretation differs; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 141a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 121a6: *gaṅ phyir de ltar legs pa daṅ bden pa ston par mdzad pa daṅ* ǀ *de 'chad pa la brtson pa daṅ ldan pa* ($D_{(De)}$: *na)* ǀ *de phyir tshad ma yin* ǀ.

[15] v.l. *satyaṃ.*

himself to tell that[16] with [its] means, he is a means of knowledge.

Equating *dayā* with *jagaddhitaiṣtā*, *jñāna* with *sugatatva* and *sasādhanaṃ tac cābhiyogavān vaktum* with *tāyitva*, we have to modify table 2 by dropping *śāstṛtva* from the reasons for *pramāṇabhūtatva;* it still remains, of course, a cause of *sugatatva* and a reason for *jagaddhitaiṣitā*. Why *śāstṛtva* may be left out is easily explained, since according to Dharmakīrti it is only a preliminary step towards *sugatatva* and does not consist in the actual teaching, which has to be subsumed under *tāyitva*. Thus, we arrive at table 3.

Table 3



However, v. 282 is not the only verse that proves the authority of the Buddha. There are at least two more verses which adduce a reason for *pramāṇabhūtatva,* and each implies a different arrangement of the epithets than the one suggested above. The first verse (v. 34a: *sādhanaṃ karuṇā)* simply states that compassion is the proof (for the Buddha's being a means of knowledge). None of the other properties is mentioned in this context, as if they played no role in the proof. How can this statement be compatible with the one in v. 282? One possible solution is to understand compassion in a very broad manner as implying all the other properties.[17] Prajñākara-

[16] Truth or salvation? Vetter, following Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, relates *tat* to *jñāna.*

[17] Cf. M 93.15 on v. 284 (= 282): *jagaddhitaiṣitvasya sugatatvaśāstṛtvatāyitvasahitasya prāmāṇyasādhanatvam āha – yato dayayā jagaddhitaiṣitvena śreya ācaṣṭe.*

gupta and Manorathanandin clearly maintain that "compassion" comprises all the products which it entails.[18] Thus, Prajñākaragupta says:

> [Objection:] Even if [we admit that the Buddha has] compassion, nevertheless, how is it possible [to affirm that his] being a means of knowledge/reliability [is proved] from that [compassion]?
>
> [Reply:] It is possible, because
>
> 377. Compassion is the wish that someone else [would be] disconnected from the cause of suffering as well as from suffering [itself]. The mind of someone who has this [compassion] is, therefore, [set] on procuring the means for that [disconnection].
>
> For, as we shall show later on, [a person] who has the wish to disconnect someone else from suffering necessarily seeks the means for that.
>
> Or *compassion is the proof* [for the Buddha's being a means of knowledge].[19] For a compassionate [man] is not without helping others. Because he teaches for the sake of others for this [reason] (i.e., in order to help them), [the Buddha is] a means of knowledge [by way of his teaching]. [Alternatively, compassion is the proof, because] a compassionate [man] applies himself to the means [for ending suffering], and this means [as practiced by him] is the proof that he himself [and not only his teaching] is a means of knowledge (i.e., is reliable or is an authority).[20]

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[18] Devendrabuddhi differs again; cf. his definition of compassion in $D_{(Pe)}$ 18a1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 16a4: *sems can thams cad la sñoms pa śin tu sdug bsṅal daṅ bral par 'dod pa'i rnam pa can źe sdaṅ med pa ni thug rje yin te | de ni sgrub pas* ($D_{(De)}$: *par) byed pa'o* ‖ "Sameness towards all living beings that takes the form of a desire/wish that [they would be] absolutely free from suffering, without [any] hatred, is compassion. That [compassion] is the proof."

[19] This refers to an alternative division of words; in my opinion to the correct one, in v. 34a. According to the previous interpretation one has to read *sādhanaṃ karuṇābhyāsāt.*

[20] Cf. P 53.10-14: *yadi nāma karuṇā tathāpi tataḥ prāmāṇyam iti kuto 'sya sambhavaḥ? asti sambhavo, yataḥ*

Manorathanandin conveys basically the same idea, but partly relies in his wording on Devendrabuddhi's commentary:

> That [compassion arises] from repeated practice. Some great being develops an eagerness for compassion, because [he is born in] a special family, because [he] associates with a friend of virtue [and] because [he] sees [evil] propensities.[21] Prompted by compassion that has become natural [to him] by attentive[22] repeated practice which has taken place in an uninterrupted succession of many lives, he desires to teach for the sake of the cessation of suffering, by the cessation of [its] arising, of all living beings and for the sake of making [them] obtain the suppression [of suffering] by the cultivation of the [eightfold] path. And he visualises (or: has direct experience of) *(sākṣātkaroti)* the four noble truths, because in the teaching of something that was not visualised by oneself deceit can be imagined. Thus, in [the case of] the Buddha compassion is the proof for being a means of knowledge.[23]

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duḥkhahetos tathā duḥkhād viyogecchā parasya yā I
sā kṛpā, tadvatas tena tadupāyārjane matiḥ II377II
avaśyaṃ hi paraduḥkhaviyogecchāvatas tadupāyaparyeṣaṇam iti paścāt pratipādayiṣyate. athavā sādhanaṃ karuṇā. karuṇāvān hi paropakāravirahito na bhavati. tataḥ parārthadeśanayā pramāṇam. karuṇāvān upāye pravartate. tadupāyaś ca svaprāmāṇyasādhanam.


[21] Cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 18a3-4 = $D_{(De)}$ 16a5: *yon tan la chags pa las sam* I *sems can gyi khyad par las sam* I *gźan gyi don la 'jug pa gźan dag gi byed pa las sam* I *d<g>e bsñen pa las sam* I *bdag ñid 'dod pa las goms par byas nas* I ... .

[22] Vibhūticandra (in M(S) p. 21, n. 4) points out a certain incompatibility between this statement and a passage in *PV* I 110.27f. (translated by Vetter, *Der Buddha*, p. 110, n. 1): *vṛttis tu nirupadravabhūtārthasvabhāvasyety atrokto.* I am not quite sure what he means; he seems to interpret attentiveness as distress or affliction.

[23] Cf. M 20.12-17: *abhyāsāt sā. gotraviśeṣāt kalyāṇamitrasaṃsargād anuśayadarśanāt kaścin mahāsattvaḥ kṛpāyām upajātaspṛhaḥ sādaranirantarānekajanmaparamparāprabhavābhyāsena sātmībhūtakṛpayā preryamāṇaḥ sarvasattvānāṃ samudāyahānyā duḥkhahānāya mārgabhāvanayā nirodhaprāpaṇāya ca deśanāṃ kartukāmaḥ svayam asākṣātkṛtasya deśanāyāṃ vipralambhasambhāvanāc caturāryasatyāni sākṣātkarotīti bhagavati sādhanaṃ kṛpā prāmāṇyasya.*

The shift from compassion to the other three epithets is quite clear in both commentaries, even though Prajñākaragupta's first interpretation emphasises the search for means *(śāstṛtva)* at the expense of the others,[24] whereas the second interpretation stresses the teaching *(tāyitva,* not *śāstṛtva).* The reason why compassion is said to prove authority is that it necessarily entails all the other properties. This can be presented as in table 4.

Table 4



——≫ stands for explicit reason, - - -≫ stands for implicit reason.

This may look quite similar to table 2, but there is one important difference. The relationship between the last four properties is reversed: there, as well as in table 3, ——> stands for cause as a necessary condition; here it stands for cause as a sufficient condition. This means that one cannot infer *jagaddhitaiṣitā,* etc., from *tāyitva;* rather, one must infer *tāyitva* from *jagaddhitaiṣitā,* etc. In order to avoid a contradiction, one may assume that each property is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the next. If this is the case, then no matter which one of the four properties one starts with, one can infer the other three directly or indirectly from it. Using Dharmakīrti's terminology, we may say that the inference of any one of the four properties is based on a *svabhāvahetu,* rather than on a *kāryahetu* as in table 2 or 3.

If the above assumption is correct, we can account for yet another arrangement of the epithets to be found in the commentaries to verses 145-146a:


> *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir, vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam* |
> *dayālutvāt parārthaṃ ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ* ||
> *tataḥ pramāṇam*

[24] This is due to the reading *sādhanaṃ karuṇābhyāsāt;* cf. above and also the note on the translation of v. 34 below.

> Protecting [consists in] stating the way [to liberation] that was seen by [the Buddha] himself. He does not speak untruth, because there is no gain [for him to tell a lie], because he is full of compassion, and because he applies himself in all [his] undertakings for the sake of others.[25] Because of this, he is a means of knowledge.

I am not at all sure how, if at all, the four epithets can be read into the above verse. Devendrabuddhi makes no attempt to identify various elements with the epithets and explains *tataḥ* with a paraphrase of *svadṛṣṭamārgoktiḥ* and *vakti nānṛtam.*[26] According to Prajñākaragupta,[27] followed by Ravigupta,[28] *tataḥ* refers to *tāyin* and *sugata.* When we combine this assertion with his introduction to v. 145,[29] and since Dharmakīrti explains *śāstṛtva* as *upāyābhyāsa,* we get the following arrangement:

Table 5



[25] The relationship between the three reasons is not obvious. Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 52, takes the second reason as a reason for the third. In my opinion this renders the particle *ca* somewhat problematic.

[26] $D_{(Pe)}$ 70a8f. = $D_{(De)}$ 61b3-4: *de phyir tshad yin | gaṅ gi phyir ji ltar sku ñams su bltar* ($D_{(De)}$: *bstar) pa phyin ci ma log pa de don du gñer ba la ston par mdzad pa de'i phyir de'i de la de tshad ma yin no źes bya ba ni rigs pa yin no* ‖.


[27] Cf. P 118.15-16: *tatas tāyī sugata iti pramāṇam.*

[28] Cf. R 357a3 = 313.3: *de'i phyir bde bar gśegs pa skyob pa ñid tshad ma yin no* ‖.

[29] Cf. P 118.8-9: *karuṇāvaśād upāyābhyāsāc ca tāyitā bhagavataḥ.*

However, Manorathanandin's interpretation of the verse is somewhat different, for according to him *tataḥ* (or *tasmāt* in his reading) refers to *tāyitva* alone.[30] According to this interpretation one would have to arrange the epithets as in table 6.

Table 6



The reason why I combine *jagaddhitaiṣitā* and *śāstṛtva* is because compassion is said to prove that the Buddha tells the truth (i.e., *tāyitva)* particularly or especially *(viśeṣataḥ);* to this the exertion in his repeated practice (i.e., *śāstṛtva)* for the sake of others is added,[31] which implies that *sugatatva* is the general reason for his telling the truth. I am not entirely sure what Manorathanandin means by "particularly"; probably he means that *sugatatva* is a characteristic of persons telling the truth in general, while *jagaddhitaiṣitā* and *śāstṛtva* are special to the Buddha. Whatever the right interpretation of the logical relations among the epithetical properties may be, the description of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter as a mere commentary on these epithets is rather "thin."

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[30] Cf. M 54.18-19: *tasmāt tāyitvāt pramāṇaṃ bhagavān.*

[31] Cf. M 54.13f.: *ātmasukhādyabhilāṣādinā kaścid asatyaṃ vadaty, ajñānād vā; prahīṇātmadarśanasya sākṣātkṛtatattvasya tadubhayaṃ nāsti. viśeṣataḥ satyābhidhānahetur eva kṛpāstīty āha – dayālutvāc ca parārthaṃ ca sarvasya mārgābhyāsāder ārambhe 'bhiyogataḥ parārtham evoddiśya bhagavān abhisambuddhaḥ, kathaṃ tasya mithyābhidhānena sattvavañcanāśaṅkāpi!*

In the course of his reflections on what (Rodin's) *Le Penseur* is doing, Gilbert Ryle made up a story about two boys who swiftly contract the eyelids of their right eyes.[32] In the first boy this is only an involuntary twitch, but the second boy is winking conspiratorially to an accomplice. From the camera point of view the two movements are exactly alike; yet there is an immense unphotographable difference between a twitch and a wink. The little story is spun out further: Suppose the second boy winks rather slowly. A third boy maliciously parodies the clumsy wink, again by contracting his right eyelids. The third boy is not simply twitching or winking; he tries to look like the second boy trying to signal to an accomplice by contracting his right eyelids. Now, suppose the third boy is uncertain of his parodying talents and practices at home in front of a mirror, in which case he is trying to get ready to try to look like the second boy ... etc. The thinnest description of what the rehearsing parodist is doing is roughly the same as the involuntary twitch, but its thick description is a "many-layered sandwich."

The image of the twitching–winking–fake–winking–rehearsing boys has been convincingly adopted by Clifford Geertz to describe the work of the ethnographer who tries to interpret other cultures. The object of ethnography lies between the thin and thick descriptions in a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures – "piled up structures of inference and implication through which the ethnographer is continually trying to pick his way."[33] Obviously the above description is not, nor was it probably meant to be, limited to ethnography alone. There is hardly any field, certainly not in the humanities, where one is not faced with "a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he [the ethnographer] must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render."[34]

The *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter has been the object of several "thick descriptions." It has been regarded as providing the religious background to Buddhist logic and epistemology, as outlining the Buddha's philosophical

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[32] Cf. Ryle, "The Thinking of Thoughts. What is 'le Penseur' doing?"; cf. also the earlier version, "Thinking and Reflecting."

[33] Cf. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture,* p. 7.

[34] *Ibid.,* p. 10.

biography or his career as a religious teacher, as an application of the doctrine of inference to prove the Buddhist religious tenets (this is sometimes adduced as the reason for the unusual order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika),* as showing the compatibility of Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge with the Buddha's teaching, as showing the final aim of the practice alluded to in general terms in the other works of Dharmakīrti,[35] etc. What is common to these approaches is that they all read the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter from "inside" the Buddhist tradition. Without denying the validity of such a reading, I would like to add another dimension, or another layer of interpretation, to the text. In the next chapter I will show in some detail that the initial verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter admit of a double reading, namely, that they could be acceptable in one sense to a Buddhist of Dignāga's school and in another sense to a Naiyāyika and a Mīmāṃsaka, and further that Dharmakīrti tries to bridge the gap between the various schools and argue from some common ground (i.e., with arguments established for both parties, *ubhayasiddha).* Here I want to push this interpretation further and claim that the same kind of double entendre applies to the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter as a whole. In other words, we can read the text as a proof that the Buddha is *pramāṇabhūta* in the Buddhist or more specifically in Dignāga's sense, but also as a proof that he is an *āpta* in a Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya–Yoga sense. Taking the text as a proof of the Buddha as an *āpta* or that the Buddha's teaching constitutes an *āptavacana* - both in the "Hindu" sense - will shed, I believe, a new light on several crucial points, both in the general strategy of this proof and the explanation of its details.

First, let it be noted that we have a purely terminological justification to interpret *pramāṇabhūta* as *āpta.* At least one text, which - conveniently for our purpose - dates from the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, namely, the *Yuktidīpikā,* clearly presents the two terms as interchangeable: *āptavacanaṃ tu pramāṇabhūtadvārako 'tyantaparokṣe 'rthe niścayaḥ.*[36] "The statement of an *āpta* is the determination of an absolutely non-perceptible object through a *pramāṇabhūta."* It is possible, therefore, that already before Dharmakīrti's time the *maṅgalaśloka* of Dignāga was understood as proving that the Buddha is an *āpta.* Further, though this in itself is not conclusive,

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[35] For the last two interpretations cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha*, pp. 15, 16-17.

[36] Cf. *YD* 31.20-21 on *SK* 4.

non-Buddhist texts sometimes emphatically deny that the Buddha is an *āpta*.[37] Finally, Dharmakīrti himself uses *āptavacana* as an equivalent for *āgama*, and the latter is used regularly, though not exclusively, for the Buddhist *āgama*.

Once we move the text into the semantic field of *āptavacana*, we can explain a number of things. For instance, we can explain the interpretation of *jagaddhitaiṣitā* as *karuṇā*. That this is not a faithful interpretation of Dignāga's intention is quite obvious; *karuṇā* could be understood at most as a cause, a reason or a motivation for *jagaddhitaiṣitā*, but not as its simple equivalent. On the other hand, compassion appears as one of the most common and important characteristics of an *āpta*, notably in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, one of the few texts that can be said with certainty to have been in Dharmakīrti's mind while he composed the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter. Vātsyāyana names three characteristics of an *āpta* which constitute his authority: having direct knowledge of things *(sākṣātkṛtadharmatā)*, compassion towards living beings *(bhūtadayā)*, and the desire to teach things as they are *(yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā)*. Considering the correspondence in the case of compassion, one wonders whether further epithets of the Buddha could be matched with the *āpta's* characteristics. Vātsyāyana describes the interplay of the three characteristics as follows:

> The *āptas who* have direct knowledge of things[38] [that consists in the following]: "This should be avoided/got rid of, this is the cause for avoiding it, this should be obtained for

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[37] E.g., *NVTṬ* 173.23-24, *NVTP* 374.24 and *PYBhV* 30.25. These texts, however, are much later than the *PV*. For the dating of the *PYBhV* cf. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*, ch. 6.

[38] In translating *dharman* as "thing" I follow Junankar, *Gautama: The Nyāya Philosophy*, pp. 147, 160-161, and van Bijlert against Oberhammer and Chemparathy (cf. note 40; especially Oberhammer, p. 50, n. 29). The reason why I side with the former is that while commenting on *NS* 1.1.7 Vātsyāyana explains *sākṣātkṛtadharma* as a general characteristic of an *āpta* applying to *mlecchas* as well; further, he seems to use *artha* as an equivalent for *dharma (NBh* 174.2): *sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptiḥ*. Ruegg, *"Pramāṇabhūta,"* p. 308, points out that the expression *sākṣātkṛtadharman* appears already in Yāska's *Nirukta* 1.20 and that Durga's commentary thereon interprets *dharman* as thing. However, Ruegg stops short of endorsing this interpretation, and says only that (n. 17) "it is not established that *dharma(n)* here has the meaning of duty or virtue."

On the misinterpretation of this passage in "Neo-Hinduism" (Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan) cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, pp. 236-237.

> this [person?], this is the cause for obtaining it,"[39] have compassion for the living beings [thinking]: "Indeed, for these living beings who do not understand by themselves there is no other cause (or: means) of understanding/knowledge except instruction [by us]. And if [they] don't understand, [they will] not desire [what has to be obtained] nor avoid [what has to be avoided], and without having acted [towards this avoiding and obtaining] there is no well-being. Nor is there another [person] to assist [them]. Come, we [will] instruct them [about the things] the way we saw [them], the way [they] are. After hearing, they [will] understand [and consequently] they will avoid what has to be avoided; they will obtain what has to be obtained." Thus, the instruction of the *āptas*, encircled (i.e., accompanied) by this threefold authoritativeness of *āptas*, accomplishes [its] goal when being enacted. Thus, the instruction of the *āptas* is a means of knowledge. Thus, the *āptas* are a means of knowledge.[40]

On the basis of the above we can establish a correspondence between the epithets of the Buddha and the characteristics of the *āpta*. The correspondence between *pramāṇabhūta* and *pramāṇa* is obvious, since Vātsyāyana too

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[39] Note the similarity with the four noble truths as presented by Dharmakīrti in *PV* I 217: What should be avoided is suffering; the cause for avoiding it is the destruction of its cause; what should be obtained is the destruction of suffering; the cause of obtaining is the eightfold path. Cf. van Bijlert, *Epistemology*, pp. 143-145, where this similarity with the introduction to the *NBh* is already noted. Cf. also Wezler, "On the Quadruple Division," especially p. 325ff.

[40] Cf. *NBh* 566.2-567.7: *āptāḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa idaṃ hātavyam idam asya hānihetur idam asya(?) adhigantavyam idam asyādhigamahetur iti bhūtāny anukampante* [.] *teṣāṃ khalu vai prāṇabhṛtāṃ svayam anavabudhyamānānāṃ nānyad upadeśād avabodhakāraṇam asti. na cānavabodhe samīhā varjanaṃ vā, na vākṛtvā svastibhāvaḥ, nāpy asyānya upakārako 'py asti. hanta vayam ebhyo yathādarśanaṃ yathābhūtam upadiśāmaḥ* <.> *ta ime śrutvā pratipadyamānā heyaṃ hāsyanty adhigantavyam evādhigamiṣyantīti. evam āptopadeśa etena trividhenāptaprāmāṇyena parigṛhīto 'nuṣṭhīyamāno 'rthasya sādhako bhavati; evam āptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam. evam āptāḥ pramāṇam.*

Cf. also Oberhammer, "Die Überlieferungsautorität im Hinduismus," especially pp. 50-51; Chemparathy, *L'Autorité du Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*, pp. 23-24; van Bijlert, *Epistemology*, pp. 32, 161, 166-167.

calls not only the teaching, but also the person a *pramāṇa;* the correspondence between *jagaddhitaiṣitā* and *dayā* is also clear, for this is how Dharmakīrti interprets it. There is also a correspondence between *sugatatva* and *sākṣātkṛtadharmatā,* because Dharmakīrti interprets √*GAM* in the sense of "knowing," not "going"; moreover, we can see a clear correspondence between the general formulation of the *āpta's* knowledge and the four noble truths. Finally, we can discern a similarity between *tāyitva* and *yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā;* the correspondence here is not so smooth, because for Dharmakīrti being a protector consists not in the desire to teach, but in the actual teaching. But it is obvious that for Vātsyāyana, too, things do not stop with this desire and the *āpta* goes on to teach. Further, Dharmakīrti and Vātsyāyana share the view that teaching is the best way, or in fact the only way, to help people.[41] What is missing in this scheme of correspondences is an equivalent for *śāstṛtva,* but we saw that for Dharmakīrti *śāstṛtva* is

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[41] As Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 18, puts it: "Man kann sie [andere Personen] ja nicht einfach beim Schopf packen und aus dem Ozean des Leids herausziehen."

In this connection one may raise the question whether *tāyin* actually means protector. Edgerton, *BHSD, s.v.,* p. 251, points out that it is "originally Prakritic for Pāli tādi(n) = Skt. tādṛś." Similarly, Lüders/Waldschmidt, *Über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons,* p. 92: "Es [i.e., *tāyi,* 'ein So-Gearteter'] geht natürlich auf Sk. *tādṛś* zurück; von dem Nom. *tādi* = *tādṛk* aus ist das Wort in die Flexion der *-in* Stämme übergeführt worden." Both Edgerton and Lüders/Waldschmidt assume that the meaning "protector" is due to Tibetan translators who misunderstood the word; cf. *BHSD,* p. 252: "It is true that Tib. (see on Mvy below) interprets tāyin as if for trāyin, rendering *protector* or the like; ... Tib doubtless has a secondary popular etymology." Cf. also *Sprache des Urkanons,* p. 93: "Ebensowenig geht es auf *trāyin* zurück, obwohl die tibetischen Übersetzer es später so aufgefasst haben." However, as Roth convincingly argued, the interpretation of *tāyin* as "protector" is attested in Jaina and Buddhist sources much earlier than the Tibetan translations and is due to the association of *tāyin* with √*TĀY* meaning "to protect" (and "to spread"); cf. *Dhātupāṭha* I 518, p. 65*: *tāyṛ santānapālanayoḥ.* Roth assumes that the meaning of the term changed to "savior"or "protector" around the 7th or 8th century; cf. "A Saint like That," p. 61. There is no doubt, however, that already Dignāga understands *tāyin* as "protector." In a fragment quoted by P, identified by Hattori, *Dignāga,* p. 74, n. 1.2, he explains: *jagattāraṇāt tāyitvam.*

Yet another question is how Dharmakīrti understands *tāyitva.* His definitions in *PV* II 145-146 do not have an obvious connection to "being a protector": *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktiḥ ... tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam.* "*tāya* [means] saying (i.e., communicating) the way seen by himself ... . Or *tāya* [means] revealing the four [noble] truths." Both definitions would also make sense if Dharmakīrti were to use *tāya* in the sense of "spreading" [the word]; cf. *santāna* above, cf. also *PW, s.v., tan* 4): *tanvānaḥ priyavacanāni,* "freundliche Worte verbreitend, d.h. sprechend."

omitted from the proof of *pramāṇabhūtatva* (cf. table 3). All this does not mean that Dharmakīrti is simply repeating Vātsyāyana's statements, and the differences between the two schemes are equally important. For Vātsyāyana, compassion arises subsequent to the knowledge of things in a more or less accidental manner, whereas for Dharmakīrti it is the condition *sine qua non* for the whole process. Nor is the long and painful process of acquiring this knowledge mentioned in any way, because for Vātsyāyana the *āptas* par excellence are the *ṛṣis*.[42] Further, the *āptas* have direct knowledge of things, whereas Dharmakīrti seems to have conceived of the Buddha as using both perception and inference, as e.g., the *āpta* in the *Yogabhāṣya*.[43]

Furthermore, the proof-strategy seems to be similarly designed. There are basically two ways to prove the validity of a statement made by a reliable person. Either the reliability of the person making the statement is established, or the truthfulness of the statement is directly perceived or inferred. Ideally the statement should be directly confirmed, but in the case of the Veda this is not possible, for the truthfulness of a Vedic statement is often beyond the realm of examination by normal human beings, e.g., a statement concerning heaven, etc. Vātsyāyana's proof is based on the fact that the different parts of the Veda have the same authors.[44] The statements of the Āyurveda and magical spells *(mantra)*, which according to Vātsyāyana form a part of the Veda, have visible results. For instance, when certain spells that are intended to remove poison are uttered, the poison is actually removed. Further, certain parts of the Veda proper also have visible results, e.g., "One

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[42] Cf. Chemparathy, *L'Autorité du Veda*, pp. 26-27.

[43] Cf. *YBh* 30.2-3 (on *YS* 1.6-7): *āptena dṛṣṭo 'numito vārthaḥ paratra svabodhasaṅkrāntaye śabdenopadiśyate*. Strictly speaking Dharmakīrti insists that the Buddha uses inferences and that his teachings contain, at least implicitly, a doctrine of inference (which is, of course, identical to the one propounded by Dharmakīrti); cf. *PV* II 283d-285. I am not certain whether this presupposes that the Buddha obtained his knowledge partly through inference or that he only used inferences to instruct his hearers about knowledge originally gained by perception. In *PV* II 133, Dharmakīrti attributes to the Buddha the use of both *yukti* and *āgama*, but in my opinion this verse refers to the time before he was a Buddha, i.e., to his previous lives as a *bodhisattva*. Note that the verse occurs in the section on *śāstṛtva!* Cf. also M 51.13-14: ... *kālena bahunāsya bodhisattvasyābhyasyataḥ* ... . If we assume that according to Dharmakīrti the Buddha inferred some of his knowledge, this may be at odds with Dignāga's point of view - he seems to attribute the Buddha's knowledge to *yogipratyakṣa*.

[44] Cf. *NBh* 568.4: *draṣṭṛpravaktṛsāmānya;* cf. also *NV* 568.13: *ekakartṛtva*.

desirous of a village should perform a sacrifice" *(grāmakāmo yajeta)*. Vātsyāyana's inference of the validity of the Veda runs as follows: From the visible results of parts of the Veda one infers the trustworthiness of its authors (qualified by the three characteristics mentioned above), and because these are the same trustworthy authors as those of the rest of the Veda, the validity of the latter can be inferred.[45]

Dharmakīrti's inference of the validity of the Buddha's teachings is, at least on the surface, very similar to Vātsyāyana's proof of the validity of the Veda. From certain teachings, i.e., the four noble truths, one infers the Buddha's properties, which as we saw are similar to the characteristics of the *āptas*. And from the properties one infers the Buddha's reliability or his being a means of knowledge, which tautologically implies the validity of his teachings. But the resemblance between the two proofs could break down at its very basis. Are all the Buddha's teachings or only some of them supported by perception and inference? If they all are, the whole proof becomes either superfluous or constitutes at best a short-cut. One need not examine the entire corpus of the Buddha's teaching: After examining the four noble truths, the rest of the teachings can be accepted by trust in his authority. If, on the other hand, only the essential part of the Buddha's teachings is corroborated by perception and inference, Dharmakīrti, just like Vātsyāyana, can prove the rest of them on the basis of the Buddha's qualities.

Tilman Vetter has pointed out a certain discrepancy between the *Pramāṇasiddhi-* and *Svārthānumāna*-chapters concerning the scope of inference or reasoning. His general impression is that in *PV* II Dharmakīrti tries to prove everything proclaimed by the Buddhist tradition *(āgama)*, whereas in *PV* I there is a realm, namely, that of the results of good and bad actions, which is beyond the scope of reasoning[46]: "Die erste Erklärung [by Prajñākaragupta of *PV* II 132cd] reserviert für Āgama einen eigenen Bereich übersinnlicher

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[45] Cf. *NBh* 568.4-5: *draṣṭṛpravaktṛsāmānyāc cānumānam. ya eva āptā vedārthānāṃ draṣṭāraḥ pravaktāraś ca ta evāyurvedaprabhṛtīnām ity āyurvedaprāmāṇyavad vedaprāmāṇyam anumātavyam iti.* Cf. also *NV* 568.13-14: *ekakartṛkatvena vā mantrāyurvedavākyāni pakṣīkṛtyālaukikaviṣayapratipādakatvena vaidharmyahetur vaktavyaḥ.* Note that this is the second proof adduced by Vātsyāyana; the first proof is very similar, but infers the validity of the parts of the Veda concerning invisible results from other parts which have visible results, like the Āyurveda. In other words, the first proof is based on the unity of the text, whereas the second is based on the unity of the authors.

[46] Cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 40, n. 1.

Gegenstände. Der Grund für meine Entscheidung, die zweite Erklärung von P zu nehmen, liegt in dem allgemeinen Eindruck, dass Dharmakīrti in PV II nach Möglichkeit alles beweisen will, was die Überlieferung für seine Zwecke anbietet. In PV I (Gn 108,3-4)[47] wird allerdings ein Gebiet sichtbar, das sich dem Nachdenken entzieht: das gute oder schlechte Resultat bestimmter Werke. Dharmakīrti scheint mir in PV II die Gewichte anders zu verteilen, was nicht sagen will, dass sich seine Argumente für die buddhistischen Lehren überall von der buddhistischen Überlieferung emanzipiert haben und von jedem Aussenstehenden akzeptiert werden können. Ein direkter Konflikt mit der in PV I stehenden Auffassung wird übrigens in unserem Teil von PV II vermieden, weil er sich hier auf die Essenz der buddhistischen Überlieferung, welche die Lehre von den vier edlen Wahrheiten ist, konzentriert und nicht auf diesen besonderen Fall der Vergeltung der Werken eingeht."

If Vetter is right, then the entire discussion of the epithets becomes superfluous. If everything offered by the Buddhist tradition can be proved by reasoning, the personal properties of the Buddha become irrelevant for that proof. In other words, if the Buddha's teachings can be judged by their own merit, why should they be judged indirectly by the merits of their speaker? However, as far as I can see, Vetter's general impression is based above all on v. 257:

> *āgamasya tathābhāvanibandhanam apaśyatām* |
> *muktim āgamamātreṇa vadan na paritoṣakṛt* ||
>
> The one who proclaims liberation on the basis of *āgama* alone does not satisfy those who do not see the reason for the *āgama* being so (i.e., the way it is).

As is often the case, Dharmakīrti formulates his statement vaguely enough to allow several interpretations: does the rule hold only for liberation, while other topics can be proclaimed on the basis of *āgama* alone? Whatever the case may be, if it is not satisfactory to proclaim liberation by *āgama* alone, then this naturally implies that liberation should be proclaimed partly by *āgama*, partly by reasoning. But if so, what does "partly" mean? Obviously not that reasoning covers the entire scope of *āgama*. Vetter is, therefore,

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[47] This passage is translated by van Bijlert, *Epistemology*, p. 119.

quite right to hesitate and refrain from seeing a direct conflict between the two chapters.

On the other hand, I fail to see which arguments of Dharmakīrti he has in mind that could not be accepted by non-Buddhists. Even in those rare cases where Dharmakīrti explains that there are no contradictions between his doctrine and certain canonical passages, the explanations are meaningful for both Buddhist and non-Buddhist audiences. Concerning the first chapter, it seems to me that Vetter has missed the point; or at least it is misleading to say that certain parts of the tradition are beyond reasoning without adding at the same time that their validity can nevertheless be indirectly inferred. In *PV* I Dharmakīrti gives two arguments for the validity of *āgama,* the second of which concerns us here:

> 217. Or because the correctness of what has to be avoided and what has to be appropriated as well as [the correctness of] the means [thereof] is well-established, one infers [the truth] in other [matters] because the main object does not belie.
>
> What has to be avoided, what has to be appropriated and the means thereof that are taught by that [trustworthy person] do not belie, [i.e.] are not contrary [to reality]; just as the four noble truths in the manner which will be stated [in chapter 2, vv. 147ff.]; because this very [speaker] who exerts himself for the sake of [other] people, who is capable of applying himself, does not belie, it is observed to be so with regard to another object too; [he does not say anything] in order to deceive, because the speaker does not conceal [the truth] and because it is futile [to make] false statements without [any] motivation.[48]

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[48] Cf. *PV* I, 109.13-19:

> *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ* I
> *pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā* II217II

heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṃvādo yathā caturṇām āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā, tasyāsya puruṣārthopayogino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād, viṣayāntare 'pi tathātvopagamo, na vipralambhāya, anuparodhān niṣprayojanavitathābhidhānavaiphalyāc ca vaktuḥ.

This alternative comes close to the strategy in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter.[49] Dharmakīrti's statement is quite clear: On the basis of the most important part *(pradhānārtha)* of the Buddha's teaching, namely, the four noble truths that are well-established, one can infer the truthfulness of other parts, e.g., as Vetter rightly observed, the result of actions. The four noble truths (which, let it be remembered, are not even mentioned by Dignāga) are well-established *(prasiddhi),* i.e., are the visible and inferable basis upon which the Buddha's authority rests. They occupy a place similar to that of the Āyurveda and *mantras* in Vātsyāyana's proof of the validity of the Veda. But unlike Vātsyāyana, Dharmakīrti feels that he has to prove the four noble truths, which indicates that Dharmakīrti writes also, or perhaps primarily, for a non-Buddhist audience.[50] And to do this convincingly, he has to argue in some detail - something that Vetter finds surprising or puzzling.[51] It seems, therefore, somewhat inaccurate to say that Dharmakīrti avoids a direct

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49 Note the close similarity with v. 145 quoted above.

50 Therefore, the following suggestion by Ingalls (in Hattori, *Dignāga*, p. vi) is highly unlikely: "Indian philosophers [at least till some centuries after Dignāga's time] were banded together in small groups of teachers and pupils, following set rituals of worship and well-established regimens of exercise and meditation. Their writings are directed inward, are addressed to a narrow circle of colleagues and pupils, or, in rare cases of outward direction, are concerned with refuting the views of other tightly knit groups." This description does not seem to be based on any external or internal evidence and goes quite contrary to the external evidence, such as the reports by the Chinese pilgrims, as well as the internal evidence which clearly shows that Indian philosophers were well informed about each other. This in turn presupposes, at least on a relative scale, a free circulation of manuscripts and access to well equipped libraries, which could only be found in larger monasteries or at kingly courts. It is only because Indian philosophers were well informed and openly engaging in a dialogue with rival philosophers, that Indological scholarship has been able to establish a quasi unshakable relative chronology for almost all Indian philosophers of the first millineum A.D., even though there are practically no biographical data for any of them, nor, with very few exceptions, any external evidence for an absolute dating.

51 Cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha*, p. 15: "Erstaunlich ist aber, dass hierin auf das Thema der buddhistischen Lehre viel ausführlicher eingegangen wird als nötig scheint, um unter Buddhisten zu verteidigen, dass sich die jetzt vertretene Erkenntnislehre mit der Lehre des Stifters verträgt." Cf. also p. 16 where the seemingly unnecessary carefulness (nicht nötig erscheinende Sorgfalt) with which the Buddha's teaching is described and defended is felt to be a problem.

conflict between the two chapters; rather, there is no conflict and there is nothing to avoid.

In an age that has little faith in philosophical reasoning and its capacity to convince anyone of anything, Dharmakīrti's ambitious attempt to "sell" the authority of the Buddha to Brahminical philosophers may seem over-optimistic. And posterity tells us that the success Dharmakīrti enjoyed within the Buddhist tradition was diametrically opposed to the repudiation and criticism by Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina and Cārvāka philosophers. This is perhaps the reason why modern scholars read the text as addressing a Buddhist audience alone. Yet such a reading seems to be conditioned to some extent by a distorted and anachronistic perception. Up to the seventh c. the boundaries between the various philosophical schools, or what later became schools, were not water-tight, and, side by side with strong polemics, free borrowings from one school to another are rather unexceptional. The facts are well-known, but are not integrated into a more general apprehension of Indian philosophy in its making. Let me just mention a few of them: the common background of the *vāda* tradition; the influence of Buddhism on the *Yogabhāṣya* and on the soteriology of the *Nyāyabhāṣya;* the process of the adaptation of Vaiśeṣika categories in Nyāya, which starts already in the *sūtra* (especially the "inner" books 2-5) and is greatly accelerated by Uddyotakara; the influence of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika on the Mīmāṃsā, which starts before Śabara, with the various Vṛttikāras, and culminates with Prabhākara and Kumārila; the influence of Sāṅkhya epistemology on Dignāga; and, of course, the tremendous influence of Dignāga on all schools in matters of epistemology. This state of affairs indicates that the task undertaken by Dharmakīrti was not unreasonable; at least it can explain why Dharmakīrti tried to reach a common ground shared with Brahminical philosophers upon which to base his reasonings.[52]

However, unlike Dignāga, Dharmakīrti was perceived as too sectarian and too polemical by Brahminical philosophers. Rather than being persuasive, his teachings caused a strong negative reaction that seems to have contributed strongly to the formation of what can be called philosophical systems now, with strong, rigid boundaries between them. At some stage of his life Dharmakīrti may have been aware of this failure. There is a famous poem attributed to him in which he laments his lack of success in comparison to

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[52] For an interpretation of the initial verses from this point of view, cf. the next chapter.

Vālmīki and Vyāsa, even though the latter indulged in sheer exaggerations.[53] The bitterness and frustration accompanied by, or caused by, the inner certainty of being an unrecognized genius seem to be typical of Dharmakīrti's image of himself.[54] The same mood of frustration, complaint and self-proclaimed greatness are clearly seen in the famous opening and concluding verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika.*[55] Dharmakīrti's bitter verses are usually said to indicate his lack of success in Nālandā. But it seems to me that his aspirations were greater than that. If we take the comparison with Vyāsa and Vālmīki seriously, and I see no reason why it should not be taken seriously, Dharmakīrti's ambition, and by the same token his intended public, went far beyond local success in Nālandā, or even among Buddhist monks in general, who were not likely to hold Vyāsa and Vālmīki in such high esteem anyway.[56]

To conclude, I have tried to show that there are strong resemblances and parallelisms between Dharmakīrti's proof of the validity of the Buddhist *āgama,* which is based on the Buddha's being *pramāṇabhūta,* which is based in its turn on the establishment of the four noble truths, and Vātsyāyana's

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[53] Cf. *SRK* p. 297, 50.29 (1726):

> *śailair bandhayati sma vānarahṛtair vālmīkir ambhonidhiṃ*
> *vyāsaḥ pārthaśarais tathāpi na tayor atyuktir udbhāvyate* |
> *vāgarthau ca tulādhṛtāv iva tathāpy asmannibandhān ayaṃ*
> *loko dūṣayati prasāritamukhas tubhyaṃ pratiṣṭhe namaḥ* ||

The translation quoted in the beginning of the chapter is taken from Ingalls, *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry,* pp. 444-445.

[54] Kosambi in *SRK,* p. lxxxi, does not want to attribute this poem to Dharmakīrti the logician on the purely formal, to my eyes not conclusive, ground that the poet and the logician are referred to as Dharmakīrti and Dharmakīrtipāda respectively. However, Kosambi himself states that Vidyākara's attributions are not always reliable, and that a certain confusion has arisen between Dharmakīrti and Bhartṛhari. Nagatomi, *"Mānasa-Pratyakṣa,"* pp. 258-259, tacitly accepts this verse as by Dharmakīrti the author of the *PV.*

[55] Cf. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge," pp. 150-151 (= *Kleine Schriften,* pp. 685-686).

[56] Cf. for instance the following appreciation in the *Mahāvibhāṣā,* translated in Watanabe, "The Oldest Record of the Rāmāyaṇa in a Chinese Buddhist Writing," p. 99: "As for a book called the Rāmāyaṇa, there are 12,000 ślokas. They explain only two topics, namely: (1) Rāvaṇa carries Sītā off by violence, and (2) Rāma recovers Sītā and returns. The Buddhist scriptures are not so simple. Their form of composition and meanings are respectively immeasurable and infinite."

proof of the validity of the Veda, which is based on its composition by *āptas*, whose status is based in its turn on the effectiveness of the statements of the Āyurveda, the *mantras*, etc. I would even go so far as to say that although structurally the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is construed as a commentary on the five epithets of the Buddha, the interpretation of the epithets and the general strategy employed to prove the validity of the Buddhist teachings owe more to Vātsyāyana than to Dignāga. However, one should not forget that the allusions to and imitations of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* are only one layer of that most allusive and elusive "many-layered sandwich." The text still has to be read against the background of early Buddhist writings, notably Abhidharma literature, where the topic of personal reliability is dealt with.[57] Parallels to the Jaina proofs of omniscience, which are directly criticised in *PV* I (vv. 220ff.),[58] should also be investigated. Certain similarities are also apparent with the Sāṃkhya concept of *āpta*;[59] the Sāṃkhyas usually characterise the *āptas* only negatively as *kṣīṇadoṣa* or by similar expressions, yet they too assume that compassion was the starting motivation that set their tradition going.[60] Then there is, of course, the special case of Kumārila whom

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[57] The topic was already dealt with in the "Spitzer-Manuskript" = SHT 810 = K 941, which is the oldest extent philosophical Sanskrit manuscript dated to the second or third century A.D. Cf. Schlingloff, "The Oldest Extant Parvan-List of the Mahābhārata," p. 334, who dates it "some centuries older than ... the Mahāvibhāṣā."

Waldschmidt, *Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, p. 19, quotes Frgm. 89 - Bl. 230, R 2-3:

2 *vato ye hīnadoṣāḥ <kṣīṇadoṣāḥ?> te ta(s)y.* ///
3 *ye ca pramāṇaṃ lokasya te bha[g].* ///

[58] The issue of personal reliability was topical in Jaina literature before Dharmakīrti's time as is evident from the title of Samantabhadra's work *Āptamīmāṃsā*. However, only the first few verses of the work deal with this topic summarily (cf. *ĀM* 1-6); the rest of the work is an exposition of Jaina philosophy that does not bear directly on the subject. The discussion in a later text like *Āptaparīkṣā* is naturally much more developed. It is interesting to note that Vidyānanda uses *(a)pramāṇabhūta* as a qualification of *āgama;* cf. *ĀP* 8.19-20: *na cāpramāṇabhūtenāgamena prakṛtaḥ pakṣo bādhyate hetuś ca kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ syāt.*

[59] Cf. the following verse quoted by Gauḍapāda *(SKBh* p. 9) and other commentators on *SK* 4 with *PV* II, v. 145 quoted above:

āgamo hy āptavacanam āptaṃ doṣakṣayād viduḥ |
kṣīṇadoṣo 'nṛtaṃ vākyaṃ na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt ||

[60] Cf. *SK* 70ab: *etat pavitram agryaṃ munir āsuraye 'nukampayā pradadau.* Cf. also the short

Dharmakīrti never lets out of his sight for very long.[61] To the above one may add the non-philosophical literature of Vyākaraṇa,[62] Dharmaśāstra,[63] Āyurveda,[64] etc., of which Dharmakīrti was probably aware, and some of which may have exercised a direct influence on Vātsyāyana.[65]

Reading through the various texts, one encounters a large number of variations, nuances, permutations, combinations and justifications of the essential properties of authoritative or reliable persons. They can, I think, be typologised and reduced to three: they have to know the truth, they have to be without personal faults or desires so that they lack motivation for lying, and they have to have a positive motivation, like compassion, grace *(anugraha)*, etc., not to keep the truth to themselves.[66] Reading the *Pramāṇasid-*

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but dramatic dialogues, set a thousand years apart, between Kapila and Āsuri in the *JM* 118, *ad loc.*

[61] Kumārila is criticised in detail in *PV* I vv. 227ff. For a general presentation of Kumārila's position cf. D'Sa, *Śabdaprāmāṇyam in Śabara and Kumārila,* especially pp. 187-189. Note also that according to a later commentator Kumārila's analysis of the validity of human statements refers to statements made by a *pramāṇabhūta;* cf. *NR* 49.21 on *ŚV, Codanā* 64a: *pramāṇabhūtapauruṣeyavacasi.*

[62] The term *pramāṇabhūta* itself may have been borrowed by Dignāga from *MBh* 39.10, where Pāṇini is thus called. Cf. also the discussion in Ruegg, "*Pramāṇabhūta,*" p. 309ff.

[63] Cf. Oberhammer, "Die Überlieferungsautorität," p. 41ff.

[64] Cf. *CS, Sū* 1.28ff.: *maharṣayas te dadṛśur yathāvaj jñānacakṣuṣā* | ... *atha maitrīparaḥ puṇyam āyurvedaṃ punarvasuḥ* | *śiṣyebhyo dattavān ṣaḍbhyaḥ sarvabhūtānukampayā* ‖30‖... In 35 Agniveśa, etc., are said to be *sarvabhūtahitaiṣin.*

[65] Cf. Wezler, "On the Quadruple Division," p. 336. Cf. also the previous note.

[66] This does not mean, of course, that all three conditions are always explicitly present. The third is often omitted, for if a certain teaching is available, the positive motivation of its author to communicate it is obvious. One only has to make sure that there is no negative motivation behind it. Similarly, the second condition may be omitted if compassion, etc., are considered sufficient to ensure that the person in question would not deceive his followers. Cf. for instance, *SBhT* 35.9-10: *atha teṣāṃ sarvārthadarśitvāt kāruṇikatvāc cāyuktam anṛtavaktṛtvam.* "Because they see all things and because [they] are compassionate, it is not correct [to assume] that [they] do not tell the truth." In this context, however, it is not the truthfulness which is intended, but that compassionate men cannot be silent about it. That is, if they do not pronounce it, it simply does not exist, like the horn of a horse. One may add that Sadyojyotis'

dhi-chapter as related to such a broad background and taking the concept of *pramāṇabhūta* not as isolated, but as forming part of a cluster - *pramāṇabhūta, āpta, sarvajña, śiṣṭa,* etc., - is not meant to dilute Dharmakīrti's brilliant, though perhaps incomplete,[67] achievement in this chapter. A philosophical work, like a work of art, is a crossroads, and the number of paths which meet in it seem to be closely related to its greatness.

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
arguments for Śiva's authority or reliability bear a strong similarity to those used by Vātsyāyana and Dharmakīrti; cf. *ibid.*, 86.6-8: *katham <tar?> hi tadvacas pramāṇam? yasmād asau vimalo nirāmayaḥ sarvārthaviṣayajñānopetānugrāhakaprabhuḥ. dṛṣṭārthāni ca tadvacāṃsi phalavanty upalakṣyāṇy, adṛṣṭārthāni tathaiva phalavantīti anumīyate.* "Why is the word of [Śiva] authoritative? Because he is a pure, infallible,* gracious lord endowed with knowledge that extends to everything. And his words whose objects are seen can be perceived as fruitful. [Therefore] it is inferred that [his words] whose objects are not seen are fruitful in exactly the same manner."
* Filliozat understands *nirāmaya* as "sans souillure" which makes the qualification somewhat redundant after *vimala;* for the meaning of "infallible" cf. *PW, s.v.*, c): "keinem Misslingen unterliegend, unfehlbar."

[67] The question whether the verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter in particular, and of the *Pramāṇavārttika* in general, were meant to be supplemented by a prose commentary will have to be addressed in future research. The *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter itself cannot be used for such an investigation, at least not primarily. Only the *Pratyakṣa*- and *Parārthānumāna*-chapters are suitable for that purpose, because they can be compared with the corresponding chapters in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* on the one hand, and with the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* on the other.

Addendum

In the above we dealt with inference of the Buddha's authority from his other four properties. We may add one more arrangement of the epithets, which starts where the others end, i.e., once the notion of authority/being a means of knowledge is established; cf. M 96.24-25: *evaṃ cānumānānumeyavyavahāre sthite prāmāṇyāt tāyitvaṃ hitaiṣitvād upāyābhyāsāc ca sugatatvaṃ bhavatīty uktam.* "And thus, when everyday practice of inference and inferred object is established, being a protector arises from being a means of knowledge, being *sugata* arises from seeking the benefit [of the world] and from repeated practice of the means." Graphically we may represent the relationship as in table 7.

Table 7



The arrow stands for a causal relation.

CHAPTER TWO

The Initial Verses: On the Absence of a Definition of Means of Knowledge in Dharmakīrti's Writings[1]

> If the sense requires it: words in the present tense include the future tense; in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter gender; in the singular number include the plural number; and in the plural number include the singular number; "and" may be read "or" and "or" may be read "and". (Texas Securities Act 581-4(J))

It is often assumed that the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter contains two definitions of means of knowledge: 1) a cognition which does not belie [its promise][2] *(avisaṃvādi jñānam)* and 2) illumination of a [previously] unapprehended object *(ajñātārthaprakāśa).* My contention in this chapter is to argue that Dharmakīrti did not use these qualifications as a formal definition of the *pramāṇas.* In other words, I claim that there is no concomitance *(vyāpti)* between these qualifications, as presented by Dharmakīrti, and the concept of *pramāṇa.* To substantiate this claim, there is no need to deal with the qualifications themselves; rather, we have to investigate their logical relationship, which is expressed by the disjunctive particle *vā.* This disjunction seems to have puzzled not only modern scholars, but also the Buddhist

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[1] This chapter is practically identical to my paper "The Disjunction in *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter Verse 5c," except for one important modification for which I would like to thank Professor J. Taber, Albuquerque.

[2] I translate *avisaṃvāda* as "non-belying" in order to account for the primary meaning of the word as well, that is, not belying one's promise, not breaking one's word (cf. *PW, s.v. visaṃvāda,* "Wortbruch").

philosophers and commentators of the Dharmakīrti school in both its Indian and Tibetan traditions;[3] and so far, at least to the best of my knowledge, no satisfactory explanation of it can be found in any of the commentaries or the subcommentaries, nor in modern studies. Therefore, the question I would like to raise and try to answer here is: Why should Dharmakīrti propose these two qualifications alternatively?

Manuals of modern logic usually distinguish between exclusive and inclusive "or." The first alternative, namely, to take the *vā* as an exclusive "or," can be immediately rejected. For it is easy to see that the two definitions of *pramāṇas* were not meant to exclude each other. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a cognition from being both non-belying and able to illuminate an unapprehended object. Furthermore, attention may be drawn to the fact that some modern logicians call the exclusive "or" a myth, by which they mean that there is no such operator in natural languages. In other words, if a proposition contains an exclusive alternative "either A or B, but not both," the exclusiveness is not due to the operator "or," but to the disjuncts themselves. When we are asked "Tea or coffee?", the only reason to take this as an exclusive alternative, that is, the only reason for the asking person to be surprised if we answer "both," is the somewhat arbitrary custom we have of not putting tea in our coffee. Were we to be asked "Coffee or cognac?", the choice may very well lose of its exclusiveness. Therefore, neither internal reasons concerning the disjuncts, nor formal reasons concerning the logical operator would favour the assumption of an exclusive "or."

One could try, therefore, to interpret the disjunction as an inclusive "or." This means that a *pramāṇa* can be either non-belying, or illuminating an unapprehended object, or both. The trouble with this interpretation is that a cognition that belies its promise, but apprehends an unapprehended object, as well as a cognition that does not belie, but apprehends an apprehended object, would have to be considered as *pramāṇa*. Two inadmissible consequences that follow immediately from this interpretation are that hallucination of an entirely new object on the one hand, and memory or recollection on the other hand, would become means of knowledge.

Therefore, what we expect Dharmakīrti to do is to relate his qualifications not with a disjunctive *vā*, but with a conjunctive like *ca*. This is also what

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[3] For the interpretations proposed by the Tibetan tradition, especially by mKhas grub, cf. Dreyfus, "Dharmakīrti's Definition of *Pramāṇa* and its Interpreters."

the commentators expected him to do, and for this reason, as I will try to show later on, they had some trouble to explain the disjunction. It is true, of course, that a disjunction does not exclude a conjunction, and in many cases the two are interchangeable. For instance, "Travel by plane or by car is dangerous" means that travel by plane and by car is dangerous. Nevertheless, if we maintain that in every single case the cognition, in order to be a means of knowledge, must be both non-belying and apprehending an unapprehended object, then no matter how weakly interpreted, the disjunctive *vā* is inadequate to express the logical relationship between the two definitions. For if each of the two definitions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for validity, they must be connected by a conjunctive particle; there is no other alternative.[4] However, since the disjunction is there, as is clearly testified by all Sanskrit editions, Tibetan translations,[5] as well as the commentaries that discuss it, and since Dharmakīrti would be the last person to be suspected of expressing himself sloppily and disregarding the logical and semantical difference between "and" and "or," the above interpretation of the qualifications, which is explicitly or implicitly assumed in most, if not all Dharmakīrti studies, must be wrong. But before proposing my own interpretation, let us have a look at what the *Pramāṇavārttika* commentators have to say on this point. Devendrabuddhi does not have much to say on our subject matter here, but it is clear that he takes the two qualifications as two independent definitions, stating that 5c should be understood as another, second definition of *pramāṇa.*[6] However, already at this early stage, the problem mentioned above was seen. If a cognition illuminating a unapprehended object is

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[4] The suggestion offered by some scholars in the discussion that took place at the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, namely, that *vā* simply means "and" here, seems unacceptable to me. Cf., however, the Texas Securities Act, as amended in 1975, Article 581-4(J), quoted by Clayton, "Thomas Jefferson and the Study of Religion," p. 34, and quoted here at the beginning of this chapter.

[5] Cf. PV_{Tib} 5c: *ma śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ.* Note that the Tibetan *kyaṅ* usually translates *api* ("also"). This does not necessarily deform the intention: either A or B is the definition of *pramāṇa* = A is the definition of *pramāṇa* and B also is the definition of *pramāṇa.* However, it is quite possible that the Tibetan translators deliberately chose a word which is ambiguous enough in this context to allow both interpretations, i.e., both as a conjunction and as a disjunction. PV_R (in R 303b4 = 606.4) reads *'aṅ* instead of *kyaṅ,* which is equally ambiguous.

[6] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 6b1 = $D_{(De)}$ 5b5-6: *mi śes don gyi gsal byed kyaṅ ǁ gźan mtshan ñid gñis pa yin noǁ* **ajñātārthaprakāśaṃ vā, anyad dvitīyaṃ lakṣaṇam.*

pramāṇa without further qualification to guarantee its correctness, then the illusion of a new object would be *pramāṇa.* Devendrabuddhi explains that such a case is excluded from the realm of the definition because of the word *artha,* which means both object and thing. The object of illusion such as the double moon is not a thing.[7] This explanation is indeed ingenious. However, Devendrabuddhi does not solve the problem completely, for one still expects him to keep the symmetry and explain how the first definition would do without the qualification offered by the second. As far as I can see, he is silent on that point.

Prajñākaragupta as well, who knew, of course, Devendrabuddhi's comments, takes the two qualifications as independent of each other.[8] He also repeats Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of *artha.*[9] But for Prajñākaragupta the matter does not end here. Devendrabuddhi remarks *en passant* that the validity in the case of the second definition is also derived from non-belying in respect to a purposeful action *(*arthakriyāvisaṃvāditvāt).*[10] This remark becomes a problem for Prajñākaragupta, for doesn't this mean that the second definition amounts, in fact, to the first?

> [Objection:] The fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing is known by non-belying. And consequently only "a cognition which does not belie" is the definition [of *pramāṇa*]. How [could 5c] be another definition?
>
> [Reply:] No, because what is indicated by capacity (i.e., by implication) is not a definition.
>
> 223. What is apprehended by the capacity of what is said is not a definition; [for if it were] so, something else as well, such as the reality [of the cognition] *(vastutva)* [could] be the object of the definition (i.e., the defining property).

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[7] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 6b2-3 = $D_{(De)}$ 5b6-7: *don smos pas mi zla ba gñis la sogs par snaṅ ba tshad ma ñid ma yin par bśad de* |.

[8] Cf. P 30.3: *athavā – idaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇam.*

[9] Cf. P 30.7-8: *nanu yady avisaṃvādam antareṇājñātārthaprakāśanaṃ pramāṇaṃ, dvicandrādyākārasyāpi pramāṇatāprasaṅgaḥ. na, arthagrahaṇāt. asau hi nārthaḥ.*

[10] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 6b2 = $D_{(De)}$ 5b6: *don byed par mi slu ba ñid kyi phyir de daṅ de rtogs par bya'o* ||.

For a definition is only that by which [the defined] is directly appropriated. On the other hand, that by which the definition is realized (or: proved), that is not a definition just because it is possible (i.e., capable of being included in the definition). Otherwise, the reality, etc., [of the cognition] would [also] be [included in the definition].

[Objection:] The reality is not serving any purpose there [in the definition], either directly or otherwise. Non-belying, however, serves a purpose in making known that [the object of the cognition is] a real thing.

[Reply:] This is true, but even so [the second definition is not superfluous, for] by employing [the word] unapprehended object, the cognition that apprehends an apprehended object can be rejected [from the realm of the definition, but] not by employing [the word] non-belying, because non-belying is apprehended even in [the case of a cognition that apprehends an apprehended object]. Nor is the fact that [the object of the cognition] is a real thing apprehended by [the cognition's] non-belying, because [things] which exist empirically *(saṃvṛtisat)* are not established as real even though [their cognitions] do not belie.

[Objection:] Then how is the fact of being real apprehended?

[Reply:] We should think that it is by deliberation *(parāmarśa)*.[11]

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[11] Cf. P 30.8-18: *nanv arthatvam avisaṃvāde (na) ca jñāyate.* tataś cāvisaṃvādi jñānam iti tad eva lakṣaṇam iti kathaṃ lakṣaṇāntaram? na, sāmarthyākṣiptasyālakṣaṇatvāt.*

uktasāmarthyato yasya pratītis tan na lakṣaṇam I
tathānyasyāpi vastutvaprabhṛter lakṣaṇārthatā I223I

lakṣaṇo hi yadupāttaṃ sākṣāt tad eva. yena tu tal lakṣaṇaṃ sādhyate, tad api sambhavitvamātreṇa na lakṣaṇam. anyathā vastutvādikam api bhavet.

*athāpi syāt – na vastutvaṃ tatropayogi sākṣād anyathā vā. avisaṃvādas tūpayogy arthatvajñāpane. satyam etat. tathāpi ajñānārthagrahaṇena** gṛhītagrāhi*** pratyayaḥ śakyaḥ parihartuṃ, nāvisaṃvādigrahaṇena tatrāpy avisaṃvādagrahaṇāt. na cāvisaṃvādenārthatvagatir, avisaṃvāde 'pi saṃvṛtisatām arthatvasyāsiddheḥ. kathaṃ tarhy arthatvagatiḥ? parāmarśād iti mantavyam.*

* Read *avisaṃvādena jñāyate.*

What happened to Devendrabuddhi's suggestion that the word *artha* guarantees the validity and independence of the second definition? At first sight it seems to be entirely dissolved in Prajñākaragupta's arguments and counter-arguments. But in the final analysis it still stands. If we feel uneasy with Prajñākaragupta's elaborate explanation, it is not because he rejects Devendrabuddhi's interpretation altogether, but because he deforms his intention and gives a new perspective to the discussion. Not only are the two definitions independent of each other, they are also relegated to different planes or levels. The first definition is meant for empirical reality, the second for the absolute. This is perhaps only implicit in the above quoted discussion, but it becomes entirely clear in the next passage, where Prajñākaragupta proposes another explanation of the definition:

> Or by the word *artha* absolute reality *(paramārtha)* is expressed. [Thus,] illumination of an unapprehended object means illuminating absolute reality. And absolute reality consists in [the cognition's] having a non-dual nature *(advaitarūpatā)*. ... This (i.e., illumination of an unapprehended object) is the definition of the means of knowledge relating to absolute reality, whereas the previous one (i.e., a cognition that does not belie) is [a definition] of [the means of knowledge] relating to the conventional *(sāṃvyavahārika)*.[12]

Thus, just like Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta too interprets the disjunction *(vā)* as pointing at independent definitions. However, the relationship between the two definitions is explained in an entirely different manner. For Devendrabuddhi, there were two alternative definitions presumably for the same thing. For Prajñākaragupta, the two definitions are no longer independent alternatives, for they are no alternatives at all. It is like saying "Means of knowledge is A, **or**, if we take means of knowledge in a different sense, it is B." But even if we accept this not really convincing interpretation, we are still faced with the same problem as in Devendrabuddhi's

** Read *ajñātārtha-*.

*** Read *grāhī* or in a compound with *-pratyayaḥ*.

[12] Cf. P 30.19-22: *atha vārthaśabdena paramārtha ucyate. ajñātārthaprakāśa iti paramārthaprakāśa ity arthaḥ. paramārthaścādvaitarūpatā ... tatra pāramārthikapramāṇalakṣaṇam etat. pūrvaṃ tu sāṃvyavahārikasya.*

commentary. For if the second definition is reserved for absolute reality, we are left with only one definition for everyday practice, which means that the apprehension of an apprehended object, at least in everyday practice, would be a means of knowledge.[13]

Ravigupta follows Prajñākaragupta very closely, mostly word for word, and as far as I can see, he does not add anything new to what was already stated by his *kalyāṇamitra*.[14]

A solution to this problem can be found not in any of the direct commentaries on the *PV*, but is implied in Dharmottara's commentary on *NB* 1.1. Commenting on the word *samyagjñāna* he says:

> A valid cognition is a cognition that does not belie. For among the people, [a person] who makes one obtain a previously indicated object is called "one who does not belie." In the same manner, a cognition too is said to be non-belying inasmuch as it makes one obtain the object indicated by [the cognition] itself. And to make obtain [means] only to induce to action towards the indicated object, nothing else. For the cognition does not make one obtain the object inasmuch as it produces it, but rather makes obtain the object inasmuch as it induces a person to act towards the object. To induce to action, in its turn, [means] only to indicate the object of action. For the cognition cannot induce a person to act by force. And precisely for this [reason] only the apprehension of the object is the result of the means of knowledge *(pramāṇaphala)*. For when the object is apprehended, the person is induced to act and the object is made to be obtained. And when this is the case, the activity of the means of knowledge is finished/accomplished with the apprehension of the object. And precisely for this [reason] a means of knowledge has an unapprehended object. For by whatever cognition the object is apprehended for the first time, by that very [cognition] the

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[13] This also goes directly against *PV* II 3a: *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtam.*

[14] Cf. R 303b4f. = 606.4f. Ravigupta is often said to have been Prajñākaragupta's disciple, but in the colophon to the Tibetan translation he refers to Prajñākaragupta as his *kalyāṇamitra*, which implies a different kind of relationship.

> person is induced to act and the object is made to be obtained. And in respect to that object, what else could be done in addition by another cognition? [Nothing!] Therefore, [the cognition] whose object is [already] apprehended is not a means of knowledge.[15]

What Dharmottara suggests is a sort of equation among the following concepts: *samyagjñāna, avisaṃvādakajñāna, pradarśitārthaprāpaka, pradarśitārthapravartaka* and *pravṛttiviṣayapradarśaka*. This equation, or perhaps better, implication of each term by the previous one, allows Dharmottara to derive or deduce the second definition from the first. A cognition that does not belie is a cognition that can make the cognizer obtain the apprehended object by showing the object of activity to him. This is the reason why the result of the means of knowledge is nothing but the apprehension of the object and not its actual obtainment. Consequently the second cognition of the object is not a means of knowledge, for the capacity to obtain the object is already produced by the first cognition, and, therefore, it cannot be reproduced by the second cognition. Thus, according to Dharmottara, there are not two definitions of means of knowledge, but only one, for the second definition is included in or implied by the first. If we apply Dharmottara's statements to the *Pramāṇasiddhi-chapter* v. 5c and try to read it into the disjunction, we get the following interpretation: Dharmakīrti had only one definition of the means of knowledge, but this definition can be formulated in two different ways. One can say "non-belying cognition" *or* "an apprehension of an unapprehended object," but in fact one is referring to different aspects of one and the same thing.

The last commentator I would like to consult is Manorathanandin. He was acquainted with all the different interpretations I tried to sketch above, and

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[15] Cf. *NBṬ* 17.1-19.4: *avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyagjñānam. loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam arthaṃ prāpayan saṃvādaka ucyate. tadvaj jñānam api svayaṃ pradarśitam arthaṃ prāpayat saṃvādakam ucyate. pradarśite cārthe pravartakatvam eva prāpakatvaṃ, nānyat. tathā hi na jñānaṃ janayad arthaṃ prāpayati, api tv arthe puruṣaṃ pravartayat prāpayaty artham. pravartakatvam api pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvam eva. na hi puruṣaṃ haṭhāt pravartayituṃ śaknoti jñānam. ata eva cārthādhigatir eva pramāṇaphalam. adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tathā ca saty arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ. ata eva cānadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam. yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthas, tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ, prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tatraiva cārthe kim anyena jñānenādhikaṃ kāryam? ato 'dhigataviṣayam apramāṇam.*

perhaps with others that are unknown to us; thus it is interesting to see which solution he thought best. Like Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, Manorathanandin also starts his comments on 5c by introducing the definition as an independent alternative,[16] and on the whole he follows Prajñākaragupta very closely. The word *artha* serves to reject the cognition of the double moon, and the word *ajñāta* serves to reject the cognition of empirical reality that consists in conceptually combining a colour/form, a flavour, etc., which were separately perceived before, into a whole.[17] He also repeats with some modifications Prajñākaragupta's arguments about what can be included in a definition. The perspective, however, somewhat changes, and typical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology is used. Even though it is accepted that illumination of a non-apprehended object is known by non-belying (this was accepted only provisionally by Prajñākaragupta and in the final analysis rejected), not everything which can be said about the definiendum should be included in the definition. For instance, the Nyāya practice of *uddeśa,* that is, naming by a technical term that refers to a property common to all individuals of a certain class,[18] is not considered as a definition. Otherwise, one would have to add the fact of being a cognition, the fact of existing, etc., to the definition.[19] So far, Manorathanandin does not introduce any significant change to what was already said by Prajñākaragupta, and one could expect him to follow Prajñākaragupta in the remainder of his commentary, as he usually does. But at this point the argument collapses and Manorathanandin concedes that the two definitions cannot be independent of each other:

> [Objection: A cognition] is known as illuminating an unapprehended object by the fact of non-belying, etc., but not by the fact of being a cognition, etc. Thus the definition de-

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[16] Cf. M 8.6: *tad evam avisaṃvādanaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇam uktam. idānīm anyad āha ... .*

[17] Cf. M 8.7-9: *arthagrahaṇena dvicandrādijñānasya nirāsaḥ, ajñātagrahaṇena sāṃvṛtasyāvayavyādiviṣayasya, pṛthag gṛhītānām eva rūpādīnām ekatvena vikalpanāt.*

[18] Manorathanandin seems to refer to the relatively new definition of *uddeśa* as it appears, for instance, in *NM* 29.15: *sāmānyasañjñayā kīrtanam uddeśaḥ.* Cf. also *NKan* 21.6-7.

[19] Cf. M 8.12-15: *nanv avisaṃvādād evājñātārthaprakāśo jñātavyaḥ, anyathā pītaśaṅkhajñānam api pramāṇaṃ syāt. tathā cāvisaṃvāditvam eva pramāṇam astu, kim anenābhihitena? syād etad yadi sambhavitvamātre lakṣaṇaṃ syāt. kiṃ nūddiṣṭatvena. anyathājñānatvasattvādikam api lakṣaṇaṃ syāt.*

pends on the former (i.e., non-belying), but not on the latter. Thus, there is a difference [between the two].

[Reply:] If so, then non-belying too depends on the illumination of an unapprehended object, [for] otherwise it is impossible to exclude [the cognition] relating to things that are [only] empirically real. Therefore, both should be known as definitions dependent on each other.[20]

I cannot see how this interpretation should be read into the disjunctive *vā*. Manorathanandin does not say anything else on this matter, and it seems to me that he has given up the attempt to make sense of the disjunction. He simply states what should have been there, but isn't. And so we are back at our starting point.

Whatever the respective merits of the above interpretations may be, and I would be the last to deny their ingeniousness, elegance, shrewdness and/or charm, they fail to convince me as being faithful to Dharmakīrti's original intention. Rather, they impress me as skillful but cunning commentators' tricks. Let me, therefore, take a fresh look at Dharmakīrti's definitions in their own context, leaving aside all that has been said so far.[21] The chapter

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[20] Cf. M 8.16-19: *nanv avisaṃv<āditv>ādibhyo 'jñātārthaprakāśakaṃ jñāyate, na tu jñānatvādibhya iti pūrvasyāpekṣaṇīyatā lakṣaṇena, na tu pareṣām iti viśeṣaḥ. yady evaṃ, tadāvisaṃvāditve 'py ajñātārthaprakāśanam apekṣyata eva, nānyathā sāṃvṛtasya nirāsaḥ śakyaḥ kartum. tasmād ubhayam api parasparasāpekṣam eva lakṣaṇaṃ boddhavyam.*

[21] Cf. *PV* II 1-5b: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam, arthakriyāsthitiḥ* |
avisaṃvādanaṃ, śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt ||1||
vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate |
prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya, nārthatattvanibandhanam ||2||
gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ, dhīpramāṇatā |
pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni ||3||
viṣayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo 'dhigamabhedataḥ |
bhāvād evāsya tadbhāve, svarūpasya svato gatiḥ ||4||
prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa, śāstraṃ mohanivartanam |

"(1) A means of knowledge is a cognition which does not belie. Non-belying [means] to stand firm in respect to purposeful action. [Non-belying may occur] in verbal cognition too, because it communicates the intention [of the speaker]. (2) The validity of a word relates to the thing that forms the object of the speaker's activity, [and] that appears in the cognition [of the hearer]; it does not depend on the reality of [that] object. (3) [Cognition] relating to empirical reality [such as 'This is a pot'] is not admitted [as a means of knowledge] because it appre-

starts with the definition of *pramāṇa* as a non-belying cognition, and non-belying is explained, in its turn, as standing firm in respect to purposeful action. Then follows what seems to be a short digression on the validity of words, which appears odd at first sight, for this subject has already been discussed, and in far greater detail, in the previous chapter on *svārthānumāna.*[22] Next it is explained that the cognition itself is the means of knowledge because it is most important for the activity in respect to objects to be rejected or appropriated. This statement is too laconic to enable us to determine with certainty whether Dharmakīrti means objects to be rejected or obtained in general, i.e., objects in everyday life, or whether they are to be taken in a soteriological sense. However, a similar formulation towards the end of the *pramāṇabhūta*-section indicates that Dharmakīrti has in mind, at least as one possible interpretation, the four noble truths,[23] and in this case the object to be avoided is suffering and the object to be adopted is the cessation of suffering, or Nirvāṇa. This interpretation is also corroborated by the concluding sentence of this section which states that a (religious)[24] treatise stops delusion *(moha).* Thus, when Dharmakīrti, in the immediately

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hends a [previously] apprehended [object]. The cognition [itself] is the means of knowledge, because (A) the [cognition] is the most important factor for the activity in respect to a thing to be adopted or rejected, (4) and (B) because the difference in apprehension is due to the difference in the objective form of the cognition, for the [apprehension] takes place [only] when the [form of the object] is present. The [cognition's] own form is apprehended by [the cognition] itself. (5a) [Its] validity [is determined] by everyday practice. A [religious] treatise stops delusion."

These verses have been translated and commented on by van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*; the above translation, however, is my own.

[22] Cf. Frauwallner, "Beiträge zur Apohalehre. I. Dharmakīrti."

[23] Cf. *PV* II 32: *heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ* I
yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ II
Cf. also P 52.16-17: *tatra heyopādeyatattvaṃ duḥkhanirodhasatye. abhyupāyatattvaṃ tayor eva duḥkhanirodhasatyayoḥ kāraṇaṃ samudāyamārgasatye.*

[24] *Prima facie* at least three interpretations are possible for the word *śāstra:* 1) any science or scientific work; 2) *pramāṇaśāstra;* 3) *paralokaśāstra.* I opted for the third alternative because *moha* has strong connotations of a metaphysical illusion rather than denoting a simple error. This is also the reason why I translate *nivartana* as "stops'"and not as "keeps back from" or "prevents," because in this case the delusion is not something we can fall into, but a state in which we already are.

preceding sentence, speaks about validity as determined by everyday practice he must refer to the validity of the Buddha's word. Then follows the second definition:

ajñātārthaprakāśo vā, svarūpādhigateḥ param ॥5॥
prāptaṃ sāmānyavijñānam, avijñāte svalakṣaṇe ।
yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ ॥6॥
tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān, abhūtavinivṛttaye ।
bhūtoktiḥ, sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā ॥7॥
nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ naivāsti prāmāṇyād vastusadgateḥ ।
jñeyānityatayā tasyā adhrauvyāt, kramajanmanām ॥8॥
nityād utpattiviśleṣād apekṣāyā ayogataḥ ।
kathañcin nopakāryatvād, anitye 'py apramāṇatā ॥9॥

Or [a means of valid cognition is] illumination of an unapprehended object.

[Objection:] The cognition of the universal that is subsequent to the apprehension of the own form [of the particular] would be [a means of knowledge].

[Reply: No,] because [in the above definition we] intend [only] the cognition in respect to an unapprehended particular, for the particular is examined [here]. (7) The Exalted One is such a means of knowledge. He proclaims the truth in order to dispel error. (Or[25]: [Dignāga] says *"-bhūta"* in order to exclude something that has not become [a means of knowledge].) Thus, the fact that [the Buddha] is a means of knowledge is correctly [established] in dependence on a proof. (8-9) Something eternal [such as God, the Veda, etc.] is not a means of knowledge, (A) because validity [appertains] to a cognition of an [object] that exists as a real thing, [and the cognition of a real object cannot be eternal], for inasmuch as the object to be cognized is not eternal, it (i.e., its cognition) too does not last, (B) because [cognitions] which arise successively cannot be produced by something

[25] This is the interpretation favoured by Devendrabuddhi, Manorathanandin as well as all modern scholars, and it is indeed more probable. Cf., however, P 32.10 (on *abhūtanivṛttaye)*: *bhrāntinivṛttyartham.*

> eternal, for the dependence [of an eternal cause on co-producers] is impossible, since something eternal cannot be helped in any way. Even if [God, etc.] were not eternal, they are not a means of knowledge.

Dharmakīrti goes on to refute arguments for the existence of God,[26] but the above quotation is sufficient to make the context clear. Dharmakīrti's purpose in this passage is not to develop a general theory of means of knowledge, but rather to prove that the Buddha, and not God or any other eternal entity, is the only true means of knowledge. This also explains the short digression on the validity of words, for whatever the source of the Buddha's knowledge may be, his teaching consists in, or must take the form of, words. Further, as is also well-known, the word *pramāṇa* in the title of the chapter does not refer to means of knowledge such as perception and inference, but to the Buddha's epithet *pramāṇabhūta* that appears in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya.* If we bear this in mind, the disjunction is easily understandable. Dharmakīrti wants to check whether the Buddha is *pramāṇa,* and this checking may be done according to one characteristic *or* according to another. Dharmakīrti shows that no matter which characteristic we take, the Buddha (and not God or the Veda) deserves the title of *pramāṇa.* If this interpretation is accepted, it modifies our understanding of the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi-chapter,* not so much in terms of the general purpose, but in terms of structure and content. For it has been generally assumed that before explaining or proving that the Buddha is *pramāṇa,* Dharmakīrti first defines *pramāṇa* in general.[27] According to my interpretation there are no two stages of discussion, and there is no attempt to define the means of knowledge in general.

I have claimed that, taken in its context, the disjunction can be easily understood. The question which arises next is of course: Why didn't any of the traditional commentators understand it in this manner? I do not wish to speculate as to whether this solution did not occur to them, or whether it occurred to them and was deliberately rejected. Intuitively I opt for the

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[26] For more details cf. Kano, "On the Background of PV II 12ab."

[27] Cf. for instance R. Jackson, "The Buddha as *pramāṇabhūta:* Epithets and Arguments in the Buddhist 'Logical' Tradition," p. 342f., and van Bijlert, *Epistemology,* pp. XXI, 119. The same has been repeated more recently by van der Kuijp in his review of Steinkellner 1991, p. 605.

second alternative, but this is irrelevant here. What should concern us here is the following question: What led the commentators to interpret the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter as a general theory of *pramāṇa,* as containing some sort of *pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇa,* a general definition of means of knowledge? The answer is, I think, that this is the most suitable passage, in all of Dharmakīrti's writings, to be interpreted as incorporating such a definition.

Dharmakīrti himself, it is interesting to note, never defined the means of knowledge in general, unless one understands his statement that there are only two means of cogntions as amounting to a definition.[28] Surely, one may argue that the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, or the *Pramāṇavārttika* in general, is not the appropriate place for such a definition, for it is, after all, a kind of commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* and Dignāga too did not define means of knowledge in general, but was content with saying that there are only two. Nor should such a definition be expected in the treatises devoted to special problems such as *Hetubindu,*[29] *Sambandhaparīkṣā, Santānāntarasiddhi,* or *Vādanyāya.* However, there are two systematic works, namely, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and its simplified version *Nyāyabindu,* where a general definition of *pramāṇa* is conspicuously missing. There too Dharmakīrti contents himself with limiting the number of *pramāṇas* to two, without attempting any general definition. One can safely conclude, therefore, that Dharmakīrti did not see the need for a general definition of *pramāṇa;* the commentators, on the contrary, did feel such a need and read a general definition into the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter.

This conclusion may seem surprising. In all probability, Dharmakīrti spent most of his life working on epistemological problems. He certainly attached great importance to the formulation of correct definitions of the means of knowledge, perception and inference, and, when necessary, did not hesitate

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[28] Dharmottara claims that the enumeration is an integral part of the definition, but I do not think that Dharmakīrti would agree. In any case it cannot be taken as a complete definition. Cf. *NBṬ* 36.3: *tato lakṣaṇakathanāṅgam eva saṅkhyābhedakathanam;* cf. also Steinkellner and Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs,* p. 72.

[29] Professor S. Katsura, Hiroshima, has kindly drawn my attention to *HB* 2*.18-19: *tatra yad ādyam asādhāraṇaviṣayaṃ darśanaṃ tad eva pramāṇam.* A closer look at the context, however, makes clear that this statement was not intended as a definition of *pramāṇa,* but rather answers the question as to which cognition is *pramāṇa* for the determination *(niścaya)* of the inferential sign *(liṅga).*

to modify Dignāga's definitions. Why didn't he think it necessary or worthwhile to suggest any definition for the means of knowledge in general? Did he think that it was impossible to define them in general? Or did he think that limiting their number to two might serve as a definition? Or are we asking perhaps the wrong question?

Indeed, why should Dharmakīrti give a general definition? I mentioned that Dignāga did not. Nor did Vasubandhu, at least not in the remaining fragments of his epistemological works.[30] The Nyāya, at least in the texts which have come down to us, that is, *Nyāyasūtra, Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Nyāyavārttika,* does not present any general definition of *pramāṇas;* the older school was obviously content with the simple enumeration. The same is true for the Vaiśeṣika. No definition of the means of knowledge is to be found in the *Vaiseṣikasūtra* or the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.* The case of the Sāṅkhya is not entirely clear, but even if such a definition was proposed by Vindhyavāsin,[31] it does not seem to have been generally accepted, and neither the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* nor the *Yuktidīpikā* or other early commentaries refer to it. The same is true for Yoga, even though the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* is supposed to be heavily influenced by Vindhyavāsin. Vedānta was practically non-existent in Dharmakīrti's time. The only exception, I thought, would be the definition of *pramāṇa* in *Ślokavārttika, Codanā* 80. However, Professor John Taber, one of the foremeost Mīmāṃsā specialists, kindly informs me: "I do not think that Kumārila really considered that [statement in *Codanā* 80] to be a definition of *pramāṇa.* Rather it is a statement of when a cognition is true. Kumārila himself seems reluctant anywhere to define *pramāṇa.* In the discussion of perception, he rejects the interpretation of Bhavadāsa of *MS* 1.1.4 as a definition of perception. Rather, he claims, the *sūtra* merely stresses that feature of perception which precludes it as a means of knowing *dharma.* Likewise, *śabda* is nowhere given a general definition by Kumārila. In the *Śabdapariccheda* he defends the failure of the *Bhāṣya* to give a general definition of *śabda* – it only defines *śāstra,* a specific *kind* of *śabda.* And he

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[30] Cf. the fragments collected by Frauwallner in "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam," and "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ."

[31] The information comes from a rather late Jaina source, and I have some doubts about its authenticity. Cf. *PKM* I 19.3 and *NKC* I 41.10-11: *indriyavṛttiḥ pramāṇam.* Vācaspatimiśra, for instance, knows nothing about it; cf. his somewhat clumsy attempt (*STK* 78.18-19) to read a definition of *pramāṇa* into *SK* 4.

suggests that this is in accord with the statement of the Vṛttikāra, that, since the *pramāṇas* are already well known, it is not necessary to investigate them (see *ŚV, Śabda* 7-14, and the very beginning of the Vṛttikāra passage: *pratyakṣādīni hi prasiddhāni pramāṇāni. tadantargataṃ śāstram. atas tad api na parīkṣitavyam.).*"

Therefore, we can safely conclude that the definition of *pramāṇa* in general, unlike the definition of each *pramāṇa* in particular, was not undertaken by any Indian philosopher before Dharmakīrti's time. Consequently, there is no reason why one should expect Dharmakīrti to do so.

During the time which separates Dharmakīrti from his commentators,[32] some change in the philosophical requirements must have occurred that produced the expectation of a general definition of *pramāṇas.* What brought about this change, whether it should be attributed to the development in other philosophical schools, or whether it was the result of the natural drive toward systematization from within the Buddhist school, cannot be decided. Nor do I want this "or" to be understood as an exclusive "or." Further, one has to note that this development did not happen immediately after Dharmakīrti's time.[33] So far, we do not have any evidence for a systematic treatment of the subject before Dharmottara's time.[34] Furthermore, if my interpretation is accepted, it implies that Devendrabuddhi, just like the other commentators,

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[32] If Devendrabuddhi was indeed a younger contemporary of Dharmakīrti, then the time in question must be the period before the second oldest commentary, that of Prajñākaragupta, was written.

[33] It is interesting to note that even in what seems to be a later work, namely, the *Tattvasaṅgraha,* the definition of *pramāṇa* appears only as an aside in the detailed discussion of *svataḥ* and *parataḥ prāmāṇya;* cf. *TS* 2958:

ucyate vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyam abhidhīyate |
tasya cārthakriyābhāsajñānād anyan na lakṣaṇam* ||

* The Skt reads *-ābhyāsa-,* but *TS*(Tib) 129a2 *(snaṅ ba)* confirms the emendation. Cf. Krasser, "On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla," p. 156, n. 22.

It is also remarkable that Śāntarakṣita does not include the second characteristic *(ajñātārthaprakāśa)* into his definition. Had he understood it as a formal definition, or as part of a definition, of *pramāṇa,* he would certainly have included it in his definition or would have explained why it need not be included. This supports the hypothesis that Dharmottara was the first to have developed the topic of validity in general.

[34] This is also implied by Krasser, *Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung,* vol. II, pp. 7-9.

misunderstood and misinterpreted Dharmakīrti. In this case the Tibetan story that Devendrabuddhi's commentary was approved by Dharmakīrti himself[35] is discredited and can no longer be taken as referring to a historical event. This in itself is hardly surprising. Frauwallner mentioned in his "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic" the tendency to rally the famous philosophers in a *guruparamparā* among the main sources of error in dating Indian philosophers: "Special attention is to be paid to certain sources of error which lead again and again to the distortion of tradition. For example, we observe very often that in course of time unimportant persons are forgotten and only the memory of really important personalities is preserved. The gaps in the tradition thus created are bridged in such a way that the persons who are still remembered are brought into relation with each other. In our field this is especially observed in the relation of teacher and pupil. If, therefore, a famous author is said to be the pupil of another famous man, it is a priori suspicious."[36]

To come back to our subject matter, if, as I argued above, Dharmakīrti did not attempt a general definition of the *pramāṇas*, but only wanted to prove that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*, it would be reasonable to assume that he would take ready-made or generally accepted characteristics of *pramāṇa*

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[35] Cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, *Tāranātha, History of Buddhism in India,* p. 239; Obermiller, *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston,* Part 2, p. 154f.

[36] Cf. Frauwallner, "Landmarks," p. 126 (= *Kleine Schriften,* p. 848). Of course, one can imagine different scenarios to accommodate the tradition that Devendrabuddhi was a personal disciple of Dharmakīrti with the fact that he sometimes seems to misunderstand him. For instance, one may assume that Dharmakīrti died when Devendrabuddhi was still a beginner, that they did not read the *PV* together, etc. The point I am concerned with is not the absolute or relative chronology of Devendrabuddhi's work, but the status of his commentary, which, I am quite sure (from observation in other cases as well), could not have been approved by Dharmakīrti himself.

This conclusion has been recently challenged by van der Kuijp in his review of Steinkellner 1991, p. 605. However, he seems to misunderstand the main argument. If, as he claims, Devendrabuddhi understood Dharmakīrti correctly, then he has to show that Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of the disjunction in 5c is correct. Yet he does not even try to show that. Of course, such an issue should not be decided on the basis of the interpretation of a single verse and a more systematic investigation is called for before a definitive conclusion can be reached. Some observations in my notes to the translation can be considered as preliminary steps in this direction.

and test whether the Buddha fulfills their requirements. Now, what are the precedents for Dharmakīrti's definitions?

The apprehension of an unapprehended object seems to have been widely accepted as a characteristic of *pramāṇa* even before Dharmakīrti, and as an immediate antecedent we may mention Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. It is true, as Steinkellner and Krasser pointed out,[37] that it appears in a fragment of the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, but in fact it is already explicitly stated in the *Ślokavārttika* as a characteristic of all *pramāṇas*.[38] Further, in some form or another,[39] this characteristic was accepted by, or acceptable to, all Brahminical schools like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya, for none of these schools admitted memory or recollection as a means of knowledge.

Was this characteristic also acceptable to the Buddhists, and more specifically to Dignāga? In a well-known objection it is claimed that the mention of the apprehension of an unapprehended object is superfluous, implying that this characteristic is unacceptable as a formal definition in a system which professes the momentariness of all things; for if a different object arises each moment, one cannot apprehend the same object twice anyway.[40] Further, there is a famous passage in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* to which one usually refers in order to show that that Dignāga already accepted that a *pramāṇa* apprehends a new object. The passage itself, however, is not unambiguous: "Such mental faculties as recollection, desire *(icchā)*, anger *(dveṣa)*, etc., since they operate on an object once cognized, are not independent means of valid cognition."[41] All Dignāga says is that *smṛti* is not

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[37] *Dharmottaras Exkurs*, p. 3, n. 2.

[38] Cf. *ŚV, Autpattika* 12ab: *sarvasyānupalabdhe 'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ smṛtir anyathā.*

[39] The Naiyāyikas, for instance, at least in a later period, refused to incorporate this characteristic into their definition, because they felt that it might endanger the validity of the continuous cognitions *(dhārāvāhijñāna)*, not because they accepted recollection as *pramāṇa;* cf. *NM* I 57.10ff., especially 59.8-9, and *PrP* 42.15-20.

[40] Cf. for instance, *TAV* 56.6-7: *kṣaṇe kṣaṇe 'nyatvopapatter apūrvādhigamalakṣaṇam aviśiṣṭam.* "As [things] are established as different/other at every moment, the definition [of *pramāṇa]* as apprehension of a new [object] is not good." Cf. also Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, p. 82, n. 1.24.

[41] Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga*, p. 25. The Sanskrit reconstruction in *DANC, Bhoṭapariśiṣṭam* 101.3

an independent or different *pramāṇa;* he does not say that recollection is not a *pramāṇa* at all. This statement could imply, for instance, that the second cognition of the same object does not involve any other means of knowledge except the one by which the object was cognized for the first time, or, to account better for the context, that the second cognition of the same object does not involve any other means of knowledge except perception and inference, just as recognition or the cognition of colour as non-eternal do not involve any other means of knowledge. Finally, one may argue that Dharmakīrti, as a good debater and not without a certain irony, takes his opponents' notion of *pramāṇa* and shows that it is not applicable to God, the Veda, etc., but only to the Buddha. In order to do so, he need not accept the definition himself, but only adapt it for the sake of argument. For, as I claimed above, his purpose was not to define *pramāṇa,* but only to prove that the Buddha is one. Such an interpretation, however, which would be adequate in the case of a Mādhyamika or a philosopher like Jayarāśi, seems unlikely in Dharmakīrti's case. For if he wanted to argue not only negatively that God, etc., are not *pramāṇas,* but also positively that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa,* he could not have relied on definitions which are unacceptable to himself.[42] As for Dignāga's formulation, which admittedly is a bit odd, it seems to have been determined by the context in which Dignāga aims at the restriction of the *pramāṇas* to two. It is not very likely that he would argue that recollection is reducible to perception or inference or to a combination of both. Unlike the European philosophical tradition where memory and history were considered among the chief means of knowledge, all Indian schools, the Jainas excepted,[43] did not allow recollection as a *pramāṇa.* Finally, the alleged incompatibility between the definition and the theory of momentariness is based on a deliberate or innocent misunderstanding. The purpose of the definition is not to exclude a further apprehension of the same object, but to exclude recollection from the realm of the *pramāṇas.* Therefore, we can conclude that the apprehension of an unapprehended object is a characteristic

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seems better: *yathā smṛticchādveṣādi pūrvādhigatārthe na pramāṇāntaraṃ, tadvat.* Cf. also Franco, *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief,* n. 156, pp. 413-414.

[42] Cf. also Iwata, *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgasādhana,* p. 19ff.

[43] Cf. *PM* 38.3 on 2.3: *sā [smṛtiḥ] ca pramāṇam avisaṃvāditvāt svayaṃ nihitapratyunmārgaṇādivyavahārāṇāṃ darśanāt.* Cf. also *JTBh* 5.21-6.15, translation pp. 41-43.

of *pramāṇa* that is acceptable both to Dharmakīrti and to his opponents *(ubhayasiddha).*

The same pattern can be seen in the case of the first characteristic as well, though here things had to take a different form. Unlike in the case of the second characteristic, where common ground could be reached, in the case of *avisaṃvādin* Dharmakīrti and his opponents had radically different theories of truth. The idea of correctness was, of course, always associated with the *pramāṇas*. However, the choice of the word *avisaṃvādin* was probably not accidental. We find it in Kumārila's characterisation of *pramāṇa,*[44] where *na visaṃvādam ṛcchati* means something like *abādhita* (not sublated). The same word is used by Dignāga to designate the validity of inference and verbal testimony.[45] What Dharmakīrti obviously needed was a word that did not have the connotation of truth or correctness in the strong sense of the term, but which would allow a looser, more pragmatic, notion of truth. Otherwise, inference and verbal testimony, which admittedly apprehend only conceptual constructions, could not retain their status of *pramāṇa.*[46] On the other hand, he also needed a word acceptable to (at least some of) his opponents, for otherwise they could argue that the Buddha, just like inference, is an erroneous *(bhrānta)* means of knowledge, not communicating the absolute truth. The use of the word *avisaṃvādin* by both Dignāga and Kumārila made it the perfect candidate to bridge the gap between the opposing schools.

Thus we see that the same tendency recurs. In both cases Dharmakīrti tried to reach a common ground with his opponents. However, while the second characteristic was indeed acceptable to both parties, the different

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[44] *ŚV, Codanā* 80:

> *tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannaṃ na visaṃvādam ṛcchati* |
> *jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṃ tat pramāṇaṃ pratīyatām* ||

The variant *nāpi saṃvādam ṛcchati* seems unlikely to me; if adopted, one may translate "the cognition which does not obtain [its] confirmation by another cognition," but does this mean that a false cognition is confirmed by another cognition?

[45] Cf. *PS* II 5ab: *āptavākyāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā;* cf. Randle, *Fragments from Dignāga,* Fragment E, pp. 17-18. Also quoted by Dharmakīrti, *PVSV* 108.1, translation in Hayes, "Dignāga's Views on Reasoning," p. 252. Cf. also *ŚV, Śabda* 23, 47.

[46] To designate "true" in the stronger and more usual sense Dharmakīrti uses the word *abhrānta.*

concepts of truth did not allow the same in the case of the first characteristic. What Dharmakīrti did was perhaps the second best thing. He chose a *word* which was acceptable to the Buddhists and their opponents - in one sense to the Buddhists and in another sense to their opponents.

This double entendre can also be seen in the second word of the alleged definition *-jnāna*. Scholars usually maintain (following the commentators) that the word *jñāna* (cognition) was introduced into the definition in order to indicate the ontological identity between the means of knowledge and its result *(pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala),* as propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. However, one can also define *pramāṇa* as *jñāna* without accepting such an identity, e.g., when the cognition is considered to be *pramāṇa* and the obtainment of a desirable object or the avoidance of an undesirable one is considered to be *pramāṇaphala*. In this respect, the definition is acceptable to the Naiyāyikas,[47] the Mīmāṃsakas[48] and the Sāṅkhyas.[49]

This interpretation of *avisaṃvādi jñānam* sheds new light on, and is itself substantiated by, the reasons advanced by Dharmakīrti as to why the cognition is the means of knowledge. Two reasons are raised - one acceptable to opponents, the other conveying Dharmakīrti's own point of view: "The cognition is the means of knowledge, (1) because it is the most important [factor] for the activity in respect to things to be adopted or rejected, and (2) because the difference in apprehension (= *pramāṇaphala)* is due to the cognition's having a different form of object." The first reason is clearly acceptable to the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and perhaps the Sāṅkhyas as well; it also clearly alludes to the grammarians' definition of

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[47] Cf. *NBh* 87.1 on 1.1.3: *yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṃ pramitir, yadā jñānaṃ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam.*

[48] Cf. *ŚV, Codanā* 80, quoted above, and *Pratyakṣa* 78cd: *pramāṇatvaṃ bhavej jñāne pramāṇe tu paraṃ phalam.* Cf. also *ŚVV* 139.9: *jñānapramāṇapakṣe 'pi hānādīnāṃ phalatvād asty eva pramāṇaphalayor bhedaḥ.*

[49] Cf. *YD* 35.10-11: ... *etat pramāṇam. anena yaś cetanāśakter anugrahas tat phalam.* Cf. also 35.17: *buddhyāśrayaṃ hi pramāṇam adhyavasāyākhyaṃ, puruṣāśrayaṃ phalam anugrahalakṣaṇam.*

instrument as *sādhakatama*.[50] The second is basically the Sautrāntika definition, and it appears as an alternative in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[51]

Finally, let it be remembered that the concept of *arthakriyā* is not exclusively a Buddhist concept, and that it was used by Naiyāyikas before and after Dharmakīrti's time.[52] Of course, there are important differences in the way they use this concept. For Dharmakīrti a purposeful action does not prove the reality of the object, whereas for the Naiyāyikas it does. Nevertheless, in deriving validity from everyday practice *(vyavahāra)* Dharmakīrti follows, at least to a certain extent, the Naiyāyikas.[53] It should also be borne in mind, as Kano has pointed out,[54] that the concept of *arthakriyā* was already used in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and in a context which is directly connected to our subject matter here.

To conclude, if there is a "pun" in the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, as suggested by Lindtner,[55] I would say that it consists in correlating properties of the Buddha with characteristics of *pramāṇa* that are acceptable in one sense to opponents like Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas and in another sense to Dharmakīrti himself. Further, this kind of double entendre (unlike the pun proposed by Lindtner) is not restricted to the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter. Elsewhere as well, as we shall see in the next chapter, Dharmakīrti formulates his sentences ambiguously enough to be interpreted both from the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra point of view.

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[50] Cf. *AA* 1.4.42: *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam.* Cf. also Hattori, *op. cit.*, p. 98; Matilal, "The Doctrine of *karaṇa* in Grammar and Logic."

[51] Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga*, p. 29. I cannot undertake here a discussion of the different interpretations of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* in the *PS.* Professor L. Schmithausen, Hamburg, suggested (in a personal communication, cf. Franco, "Once again," p. 85) that the *Vṛtti* was written later than the *kārikās,* and that Dignāga had changed his mind on several topics in the meantime. The discussion of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* seems to be one of these topics. Cf. also Iwata, *Sahopalambhaniyama,* pp. 1-4.

[52] Cf. *NBh* 394.4 on 1.2.12 and 900.6 on 3.2.60; *NM* I 450.11-12 uses *arthakriyā* as a quasi-synonym of *pravṛttisāmarthya.*

[53] Cf. Steinkellner and Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs,* p. 3.

[54] Cf. Kano, "On the Background," p. 122.

[55] Cf. Lindtner, "The Initial Verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter," pp. 156-159.

CHAPTER THREE

Towards a Reconstruction of Dharmakīrti's Doctrine of Rebirth and its Metaphysical Presuppositions

> "But how shall we bury you?" "However you please," Socrates replied, "if you can catch me and I do not get away from you." And he laughed gently ... (*Phaedo* 115c)

In a typology of Western doctrines of immortality, Antony Flew distinguished three basic models.[1] The first is the Platonic, which is characterized by the assumption that we are composite beings; besides the more familiar corporeal element, the body, there is also something else different in kind, the incorporeal element, usually called soul, mind, or psyche, which is somehow attached to the body for the duration of a life. Though the soul is incorporeal, it is a substance in the sense that it exists on its own, independently from the body or anything else. The second sort of doctrine consists in "the resurrection of the body" or the reconstitution of the person. It recognizes that to be truly a human person one has to have a human form. Flew illustrates the doctrine by the famous epitaph inscribed on Benjamin Franklin's grave:

> The body of B. Franklin, Printer, Like the Cover of an old Book, Its Contents torn out, And stript of its Lettering and Gilding, Lies here, Food for Worms. But the Work shall not be lost; for it will, as he believ'd, appear once more in a

[1] Cf. Flew, *Body, Mind and Death,* pp. 4-6; cf. also his "Immortality."

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The third kind of doctrine is based on the claim that the person is really a kind of shadow man. The shadow man, like the astral body, or the *sūkṣma-śarīra* of the Sāṅkhya, is thought of as both sufficiently human and corporeal to overcome the problem of identification with the flesh-and-blood person and sufficiently aetherial and elusive to escape unnoticed when the earthly body is destroyed.

According to all these doctrines, immortality[2] is understood as personal survival, that is, the surviving element must be the person, or at any rate the real or essential person. "For unless I am my soul," says Flew, "the survival of my soul will not be my survival. Unless this is established ... [t]he information that my soul would last for ever could then be of no more personal interest to me than the news that my appendix is to be preserved eternally in a bottle."[3]

Can we subsume Dharmakīrti's doctrine of life after death under any of the three kinds of doctrines mentioned above, or is it different enough to form a fourth category? It is easy to see that it cannot be classified as a doctrine of resurrection. This doctrine, probably the most widely spread among Jews and Christians, did not find, to the best of my knowledge, even a single supporter among Indian philosophers. The idea as such is not unknown, of course, but it seems to be confined to stories and legends. Perhaps the most famous variant, which also raises the problem of personal identity, is the sixth episode of the *Vetālapañcaviṃśati,* which inspired Thomas Mann to write *Die vertauschten Köpfe.*

On the other hand, if we disregard the problematic concept of the person in the Buddhist context and take things less anthropocentrically to apply to living beings in general, most if not all animals included,[4] the other two

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[2] The word is, of course, slightly misleading; it does not mean that one does not die, but that there is life after death.

[3] Flew, *ibid.*, p. 5.

[4] Although stated in a Vedāntic context, the following observation by Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection,* p. 281, is essentially relevant for the Buddhist doctrines too: "But man's true identity is not his role as reasoning, reckoning, planning animal rationale, nor is it anything specifically or uniquely human. His identity is that of the self *(ātman),* which he shares with

doctrines could be said, in a sense, to be both endorsed by Dharmakīrti, depending on whether he is arguing from the Sautrāntika or the Yogācāra point of view.

According to the Sautrāntikas, an intermediary state of being connects the moment of death in a previous life to the moment of birth in the next life, not to be confused with the actual birth.[5] The five *skandhas* form an uninterrupted (temporal)[6] series, or proceed in succession, and cannot cover the space between two points without passing through all the intermediary points, just as rice transported from one village to another has to pass through all the villages in between. These five *skandhas* constituting the intermediary state of being could be called "the intermediary being." Arriving at its new place of birth *(gati)* the intermediary being has to wait for the right moment when the prospective parents unite. It then enters the womb, the five *skandhas* "harden" *(ghanībhavanti),* and the intermediary state comes to an end giving birth to the first stage of the embryo *(kalala).* Although they can move through solid objects, the intermediary beings always enter the womb through the vagina; this is why when twins are born, the one who comes out last is the eldest. There is no fixed rule as to how long it takes to reach a destiny and penetrate into a womb; in the meantime the intermediary beings survive by eating odours: the higher intermediary beings eat pleasant odours, the lower, unpleasant odours. Unlike in various theories of astral bodies, etc., the form *(ākṛti)* of the intermediary state of being is the same as that of the future state of being between birth and death *(pūrvakālabhava),* because they are produced by the same karma. The size of the intermediary beings is that of five or six year old children. In the *rūpadhātu,* on the other hand, their size is fully developed and they wear clothes, which implies that in our sphere they are naked. The intermediary

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all creatures and which is neither the subject nor the object of planning and reasoning." In the Buddhist context the notion of *ātman* is rejected, of course, but whatever the identity of man may be, it does not set him apart from other living beings.

[5] "Birth" *(janman)* precedes the various stages of the embryo and should be equated with the first moment of life in the womb.

[6] The word *santāna* is often translated as "series," and this translation functions well in most contexts. It has to be noted, however, that the word is used, at least by Vasubandhu, only in a temporal sense, and never, to my knowledge, to denote a spatial series; cf. *AKBh* on 3.12b, dLVP, vol. 3, p. 35.

beings are invisible to all creatures but themselves; they have a supernatural capacity to cross space swiftly, and nothing can stop them on their way, not even the Buddhas. They move effortlessly through the densest objects.

The above is a summary of the doctrine as presented in the *AKBh,* which Dharmakīrti presumably follows, but in fact he has disappointingly little to say on the subject: A living being who has love for the Self *(ātmasneha)* appropriates for himself an inferior place like the womb, not because he is led there by anyone else (e.g. by God), but because he is motivated by the desire to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. Thus, the false cognition of the womb, etc., as sources of pleasure and the desire to obtain pleasure are the binding causes of rebirth. He who lacks these two is not reborn. One does not see the intermediary being coming from the previous life or going to the next life, not because it does not exist, but because the senses are not sharp enough, just as a person who has weak eyes does not see thin smoke.[7] Even though the intermediary being is corporeal *(mūrta),* it can penetrate solid things, because it is delicate *(tanu),* just as water penetrates clay and quicksilver penetrates gold.[8]

Dharmakīrti's statement that the appropriation of an inferior place like the womb is due to the desire for pleasure seems to presuppose that transmigration is performed by free will. Even if God could play a role in the process, he could not force living beings to be reborn, but only induce them to action by deluding them to think that the womb, etc., are agreeable places. However, as Prajñākaragupta (P 89.1) points out, living beings are perfectly capable of this error by themselves, and therefore the assumption of God is superfluous.

None of Dharmakīrti's commentators is specific about the desires in respect to the womb, but Vasubandhu describes it in surprisingly Freudian terms.[9] The intermediary being has a divine eye with which it sees the place of its future birth even if it is far away. It sees its future parents copulating.

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[7] P 89.21-22 adds that the bodies in the intermediary state of being, which arise from the capacity of karma, are not seen because they are transparent *(svaccha),* but that they can be seen by yogis.

[8] Cf. vv. 80-83.

[9] The text as printed in Pradhan's edition contains a lacuna here; cf. *AKBh(S)* on 3.15ab, dLVP, vol. 3, p. 50: *tatrāsya pitros tāṃ vipratipattiṃ dṛṣṭvā puṃsaḥ sataḥ pauṃsno rāga utpadyate mātari, striyāḥ satyāḥ straiṇo rāga utpadyate pitari. viparyayāt pratighaḥ.*

If the intermediary being is a male, a masculine desire *(paumsna rāga)* for his mother and repulsion *(pratigha)* for his father arise in him; if it is a female, she has a feminine desire for her father and repulsion for her mother.

Dharmakīrti mentions only two causes of rebirth *(viparyāsamati = avidyā* and *tṛṣṇā)*, but shouldn't karma be subsumed thereunder as the commentators claim? Prajñākaragupta, who is the most elaborate among them, explains karma as the capacity of going (P 88.30-31): "The capacity *(śakti)* of karma is such that the living being goes in this manner without being led by anyone else, [i.e.] independently." In other words, it is the force of karma which enables the living being to move into the empty womb, but the fact that he makes use of this capacity is due to the desire to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. It is like a brahmin entering the house of a female slave *(śrotriyasya dāsīveśmapraveśavat* = entering a brothel?).[10] The fact that he can enter the house depends on his capacity of going, but the fact that he actually enters this particular house instead of another depends on his desire for the female slave. This seems like an interesting inversion of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine according to which thirst is responsible for the fact that one is reborn at all, whereas karma determines where and how one is reborn.[11] Although the commentaries take the notion of karma to be implied on several occasions, Dharmakīrti himself never uses the word in his proof of rebirth (vv. 34-119).[12] Perhaps the closest he gets to implying the notion is in v. 41 where he says that the mental cognition which is observed throughout one's lifetime to be "flinging," "casting," or perhaps better "projecting/propelling" *(ā-√KṢIP)*, will do so at the moment of death as well, i.e., it will produce senses, cognition, etc., in another body. *ā-√KṢIP* is usually used in the sense of producing karma as well as - in the passive voice - of being produced by

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[10] For the example cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 42a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 37a3-4.

[11] Cf. Schmithausen, "Critical Response," pp. 205-206; cf. also *AKBh* 333.10f. on 6.3, dLVP, vol. 6, p. 137f. Yet Vasubandhu too describes the move towards a specific new life as a voluntary act. To avoid a contradiction, perhaps one has to assume that it is karma which causes the attraction to a certain place of birth and the illusion that a dreadful place like the womb, or even hell, could be a source of pleasure.

[12] The only place where the word actually appears, v. 84, is not an exception, for it refers to the movement of parts and whole, not to karma in relation to rebirth.

karma.[13] More specifically, it can be used in relation to a special kind of karma which entails *(ā-√KṢIP)* a new existence, as opposed to another kind of karma which supplements *(paripūrayati)* this new existence by pleasant or unpleasant features.[14] However, the verb is not always employed in this special sense and can also be used in the sense of "to produce" in general.[15]

It seems, therefore, that Dharmakīrti is trying to prove rebirth without having recourse to the notion of karma, perhaps because it was unacceptable to the Cārvākas. It is mainly towards the end of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, in the context of the path to liberation, that we can find a few remarks on karma. Dharmakīrti's main point is that karma does not form a part of the way, that is, does not constitute an object of the meditational practices necessary for stopping the process of rebirth and attaining liberation - the term *nirvāṇa* is never used; Dharmakīrti prefers *mukti* and *mokṣa.* Acts done cannot be undone. Nor can they be suppressed, because there is no antidote *(vipakṣa)* to neutralise them. Even if there were an antidote, it would not be a definitive cure because as long as desire is present, karma would arise again. Moreover, acts are of various natures, and no single means, such as *tapas,* could be employed to neutralise them all.[16]

Yet the role of karma in rebirth is certainly not denied. It is responsible, for instance, for bodily characteristics such as beauty (v. 149). It projects *(ā-√KṢIP)* the life span of the body, which goes on existing for a while even after the desires have been vanquished (v. 192). Karma is not mentioned in the four noble truths, not because it is not a cause, but because it is not a sufficient cause, for when desire is absent, there is no rebirth in spite of past karma. The moral implications of this doctrine have been present in Buddhism from its very beginning. One does not have to experience the consequences of all evil (or good) acts committed in the past. By cutting off desire, one cuts off the capacity of the acts to produce their results. Yet until this stage is reached, karma is said to be one of the three causes of rebirth, together with thirst and the body (v. 272). Verse 261, on the other hand,

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[13] Cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 94 and note.

[14] Cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna,* p. 136.

[15] Cf. v. 99; cf. also *AKBh* 203.7-8.

[16] Cf. vv. 272ff., translated by Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 163ff.

refers to only two causes, *mithyājñāna* (i.e., *avidyā)* and *tarṣa (= tṛṣṇā),* but that does not exclude karma, because the two mental acts *(cetanā)* that are connected with them are themselves karma, i.e., according to Vetter, karma at the time of its ripening (Vollzug).[17]

Such statements of Dharmakīrti's probably led Vetter to assume that the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter in general and the section on the final stages of the way to liberation in particular were written from a realistic point of view. This interpretation, if accepted, will also shed new light on the order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. For unlike Frauwallner, who saw a strong break between the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter and the other three chapters, Vetter would thus closely relate the first two chapters (at least as far as the commitment to realism goes) and assume a strong break between the second and the third chapter. It seems to me, however, that a closer reading of some verses does not warrant such an interpretation.[18] At least three closely related questions, or sets of questions, are relevant to the subject matter: 1) How does Dharmakīrti describe the mind-body relationship? 2) Does he admit a single-layered or a multiple-layered series of cognition and does he accept the *ālayavijñāna* and the *kliṣṭamanas?* 3) What are the ontological presuppositions of his concept of the final stages of the way to liberation?

It is convenient to tackle these questions in this order, for once we establish the possibility of an idealistic reading of the mind-body relationship according to Dharmakīrti, it is meaningful to ask what kind of idealism was professed by him. And once this is established, we can address Vetter's claim that Dharmakīrti describes the way to liberation from a realistic point of view.

Our starting point is the tradition that claims that Dharmakīrti wrote his works from both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra point of view. The authenticity of this tradition is quasi unshakable, for this interpretation is already explicitly mentioned by Vinītadeva,[19] that is, a generation or so before Dharmottara. And even Vinītadeva refers to this fact as a matter of

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[17] Cf. v. 262. On *cetanā* as karma cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 112, n. 2; cf. also *The Ideas,* p. 52 and n. 8.

[18] In what follows I sometimes repeat, sometimes summarize and sometimes develop, sections of my "*Ālayavijñāna* and *kliṣṭamanas* in the *Pramāṇavārttika?*".

[19] Cf. *NBṬ*$_{Vi}$ on 1.1 and 1.4.

course, which means that the tradition has certainly not originated with him. Besides, the simplicity of his comments in general makes it very improbable that this rather sophisticated interpretation originated from his pen. This takes us very close to Dharmakīrti's lifetime. Such a tradition, which is also repeated by several other sources,[20] can in no way be compared in its reliability to the bogus classification of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika by a late doxographer like Jitāri, or by Tibetan *grub mtha'* texts.[21] I do not suggest, of course, that this or any other tradition should be accepted blindly, but that if it concurs with our text and comes from a reliable source, and we have no compelling reason to reject it, it is more reasonable to accept it. In Vinītadeva's case, the reliability rests above all on his proximity to Dharmakīrti's time and on the simplicity or lack of originality of his commentary. However, absolute certainty in such matters cannot be achieved, and we should not forget that Dharmakīrti himself does not mention in any of his writings an affiliation to any Buddhist school.

As a rule in the verses under consideration here, Dharmakīrti is more elaborate in arguing against his opponents than in making positive assertions about his own doctrine. Yet he does make positive statements at least twice, and on both occasions he presents his doctrine in two alternatives. I will try to show that the two alternatives correspond to the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra points of view. In the first case (vv. 39f.), Dharmakīrti argues that the senses are not the support *(āśraya)* of the mental cognition *(manomati),* but the other way round, because even when every single one of the senses is damaged or destroyed, the mental cognition is not destroyed, whereas when the mental cognition is destroyed, the senses are destroyed. Therefore, the senses arise from cognition. Although the type of mental cognition is not further specified by Dharmakīrti, it is most probable that he does not have in mind the empirical mental cognition, for when this kind of mental cognition is destroyed or damaged, the senses are usually not affected. Although we cannot be sure whether the "mental cognition" can be identified with the *ālayavijñāna* or the *kliṣṭamanas* (cf. below), we can still maintain that vv. 39-41 have a strong and unmistakable Yogācāra "flavour." This is further corroborated by the second half of v. 41, which raises an argument

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[20] E.g. by Dharmottara in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā,* cf. Steinkellner and Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs,* p. 92; cf. also *DhPr* 42.18, 44.18-20, *NBṬṬ* 19.10-11, etc.

[21] Cf. the discussion in Steinkellner, "Was Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?".

in order to avoid a contradiction with the Buddhist scriptures which say that the "mind" (or the cognition) is supported by the body. Which scriptures exactly Dharmakīrti had in mind is unfortunately not clear.[22] In any case he claims that such statements do not contradict his position, because what is meant there by the word "body" is not the body, but the cognitions of the body. Here again, it is not impossible to interpret this statement from a realistic point of view. But it is equally possible, and in fact much more probable, to take this statement as a reference to the Yogācāra doctrine that the body is just an image in the *ālayavijñāna.*[23] I would go even further and claim that this statement can be used as a key with which the entire *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter could be read from an idealistic point of view.

Further, the interpretation of vv. 39-41 as representing the Yogācāra point of view is strengthened by the fact that these verses present only the first of two alternatives, and that the second alternative (v. 42) is clearly a realistic one and is formulated as a concession: Even if there is no cognition without senses, there are no senses without cognition either; therefore, senses and cognition are mutual causes and have mutual causes. This can be understood as a concession either to the Sautrāntika or to the Cārvāka, for Dharmakīrti's primary purpose in these verses is not to establish the nature of cognition, but to establish rebirth. And although his main strategy in the proof of rebirth is to establish the independence of the mind from body, breaths and senses, he thinks that he can prove rebirth even without this assumption, as long as senses and cognition are considered causes of each other.

A somewhat similar pattern appears in vv. 117-118, but here the senses are the topic. Dharmakīrti argues first that the senses must arise from senses and thus the senses in the first moment of this life arise from the senses in the previous life. If the opponent wants to avoid this consequence and claim that the senses do not arise from senses, then what could they arise from? Not from the body, because an inadmissible consequence, which we need not

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[22] Devendrabuddhi ($D_{(Pe)}$ 24b1 = $D_{(De)}$ 21b7) quotes an unidentified *siddhānta: lus daṅ sems dag ni phan tshun rjes byed pa can ñid śes bya ba'i grub pa'i mthas ... .* The same is repeated by Prajñākaragupta (59.30-60.1): *anyonyānuvidhāyitvaṃ kāyacittayoḥ.* "Body and mind conform to each other." (Manorathanandin 23.13-14 also repeats the quotation, but with *manas* instead of *citta.)* In *AKBh* on 2.44d, dLVP, p. 212, Vasubandhu quotes a very similar statement which he attributed to "previous teachers": *anyonyabījakaṃ hy etad ubhayaṃ yad uta cittaṃ ca sendriyaś ca kāya iti pūrvācāryāḥ.* Yaśomitra does not identify these teachers.

[23] Cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna,* p. 91f., and nn. 729, 769.

specify here,[24] would follow. As a final resort the opponent may claim that the senses arise from the cognition. But in this case, says Dharmakīrti, let it be assumed that the senses and also the body arise from the cognition.

Thus, in both cases Dharmakīrti professes as an acceptable alternative a doctrine of the mind-body relationship which can be termed hypophenomenalism - a somewhat unappealing term which stands for the doctrine that the body, here represented by the material senses, is an effect depending on the mind. To the best of my knowledge, such a doctrine cannot be attributed to the Sautrāntika, but it certainly fits smoothly with the Yogācāra. As far as the Sautrāntika doctrine is concerned, one expects the senses (which are *upādāyarūpa)* or matter *(rūpa)* to be the material cause of the senses and the efficient cause of the cognition. This doctrine is compatible with v. 42 above, and it is even more clearly implied in v. 115ab.

We may conclude that certain verses in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter are formulated from the Sautrāntika point of view, while others seem to represent the Yogācāra. Yet the verses are ambiguous enough to be read either way. For instance, when Dharmakīrti says that the mind is not affected by the body, but only by the cognitions of the body, one can still interpret this statement from a realistic point of view and suppose that first sense cognitions of the body arise from the body as object, and only these can affect the mental cognition. Similarly, when he says that the senses arise from cognition rather than the other way round, one can understand this realistically as following the order of the *pratītyasamutpāda,* and not necessarily as referring to the senses as seeds in the *ālayavijñāna.* On the other hand, by saying that "body" means the cognition of the body, Dharmakīrti opens the way for an idealistic reading of all statements which would seem at first sight to be formulated from a realistic point of view. It seems, therefore, that Dharmakīrti's "perspectivism" operates on two levels. On the first level, certain verses can be read as representing the Yogācāra point of view, others as representing the Sautrāntika. On a second level, one can also interpret the verses that represent the Yogācāra point of view on the first level as conveying the Sautrāntika position and vice versa, and thus generalize and assume that the entire work can be read from the one or the other point of view.

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[24] There is some disagreement among the commentators concerning the inadmissible consequence.

The same reading holds good, I believe, for the issue of the *ālayavijñāna* and *kliṣṭamanas*. I have already discussed this topic in some detail elsewhere,[25] and it is enough to repeat only the main points here. In a highly original and influential paper, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā," Schmithausen has pointed out a number of peculiar traits in Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* which set these works apart from other Yogācāra works attributed to Vasubandhu, notably, the commentaries on works by Asaṅga and Maitreyanātha. The most important of these traits is that the idealism in the *Viṃśatikā* (unlike in the *Triṃśikā* as well) is based on a single-layered series of cognition ("einschichtiger Erkenntnisstrom"). In other words, unlike what one may call "mainstream" Yogācāra works, according to which up to eight cognitions can be present at the same time for one and the same living being, i.e., the five sense cognitions, the empirical or conscious mental cognition, and two subconscious mental cognitions, the *ālayavijñāna* and *kliṣṭamanas*, the *Viṃśatikā* presupposes a series in which cognitions arise only one at a time, as is the case in the Sautrāntika and almost all other Hīnayāna schools, with the notable exception of the Mahāsāṅghika.[26] This important observation, which was presented and argued for with great care, had far-reaching consequences. It allowed Schmithausen to link the author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Karmasiddhi* to the author of the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*, and with that to provide invaluable support for Frauwallner's hypothesis of two Vasubandhus, which until that time had met with rather sceptical and incredulous reactions.[27] It also established a link between the *Viṃśatikā* and the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and in doing so

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[25] Cf. my paper mentioned in n. 18.

[26] Cf. de La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi*, pp. 184, n. 2, 186, 411, n. 1; Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen," p. 113, n. 19.

[27] Cf. Schmithausen, *ibid.*, p. 110, nn. 4-6. I could not find any explicit statement concerning the attribution of the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* to the younger Vasubandhu in Frauwallner's *Life of Vasubandhu*. Curiously enough, in *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* these two works are translated under the heading of the older Vasubandhu, yet in the introduction, p. 351, Frauwallner says that in his opinion they should be attributed to the younger Vasubandhu. If so, why does he translate them as the only specimen for works of the older Vasubandhu? It seems that Frauwallner reached the conclusion that both works are by the younger Vasubandhu only after the main body of the book was typeset and could no longer be changed; in the "Ergänzende Bemerkungen" (to the third edition), p. 425, he refers to Schmithausen's paper saying that it confirms his attribution of the two works to the younger Vasubandhu.

it articulated for the first time a doctrinal difference between Yogācāra proper and what is elsewhere called Sautrāntika-Yogācāra.[28] A further important consequence of that study was the showing of a significant gap between the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśika* and of important systematic differences between the two works.[29] Finally, the nature of the transformation of cognition in these works was explained differently than had been done before by Frauwallner, Hacker and Ruegg.[30]

Schmithausen only showed that Vasubandhu did not use the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Viṃśatikā;* he did not raise the question of whether Vasubandhu accepted or rejected it. As a supplementary clarification to his study, I tried to show that Vasubandhu left the door open for a traditional Yogācāra reading of the *Viṃśatikā,* and suggested that the fact that the *ālayavijñāna* was not mentioned might have been due the polemical nature of the work, which is directed mainly against the Sautrāntika. Clearly, if we assume that while writing the *Viṃśatikā* Vasubandhu did not accept the *ālayavijñāna* and the multiple-layered series of cognition which it entails, and given that *Karmasiddhi, Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* were composed in this order, we will have to assume that he accepted the *ālayavijñāna* in the *Karmasiddhi,*[31] rejected it in the *Viṃśatikā,* and re-accepted it in the *Triṃśikā.* Nor would it be of any help to argue that the *Karmasiddhi* was composed after the *Viṃśatikā,* because in this case we will have to assume that Vasubandhu accepted idealism in the *Viṃśatikā,* rejected it in the *Karmasiddhi,* and re-accepted it in the *Triṃśikā.*

Leaving aside the case of Dignāga, which deserves a separate study, we can observe that there is some evidence for the acceptance of the *ālayavijñāna* and the multiple-layered series in the *Pramāṇavārttika.* As is well-known, the term *ālaya(vijñāna)* appears in *PV* III.522, but so far the prevailing opinion among scholars has been that Dharmakīrti did not refer

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[28] However, I did not come across this distinction in any Indian text. Professor K. Mimaki, Kyoto, kindly informs me that it is also absent in the Tibetan *grub mtha'* texts, and that he suspects that the term was invented by Stcherbatsky.

[29] Cf. Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen," p. 130 and n. 67.

[30] Cf. Schmithausen, *ibid.*, pp. 130-131 and n. 69.

[31] Cf. *KS* §§ 38-39.

to it as his own doctrine. Thus, Ruegg points to this verse saying that it forms only an apparent exception to the general observation that Dharmakīrti did not admit the *ālayavijñāna.*[32] Unfortunately, he does not explain why the exception is only apparent; perhaps he means that the term *ālaya* in this verse does not refer to the *ālayavijñāna,* but this is highly unlikely. In any case, as evidence for his statement he gives a reference to a late Tibetan *grub mtha'* text, which can hardly be considered authoritative in a historical sense.

Schmithausen makes a much stronger case for his position by translating the verse and suggesting in his discussion that the argument was only meant to show that an actual or empirical *samanantarapratyaya* is also necessary from the Yogācāra point of view. Therefore, the argument does not commit Dharmakīrti to Yogācāra presuppositions.[33] The verse reads as follows:

> *sakṛd vijātīyajātāv apy ekena paṭīyasā* ।
> *cittenāhitavaiguṇyād ālayān nānyasambhavaḥ* ॥
>
> Even though [cognitions] of different kinds arise at the same time [from the *ālayavijñāna],* because the *[ālayavijñāna]* is rendered ineffective by one intensive cognition [of a specific kind] another [cognition of that kind] does not (or: cannot) arise from the *ālaya[vijñāna].*

In other words, if one constantly looks at a blue object, a cognition of a red object cannot arise, i.e., the *ālayavijñāna* cannot produce it, but it can produce (at the same time!) cognitions of a different kind, such as of smell, touch, etc. Nevertheless, even if my translation and interpretation of the

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[32] Cf. Ruegg, *Tathāgatagarbha,* p. 435: "Comme Dignāga dans son *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* Dharmakīrti ne semble pas avoir admis *l'ālayavijñāna* dans son *Pramāṇavārttika,"* and n. 2 thereon: "V. la discussion dans le *Grub mtha' chen mo* ṅa, f. 63a-b. Le vers 3.522 n'est qu'une exception apparente."

[33] Cf. Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen," p. 128: "Dieser Vers soll aber, wie aus dem Zusammenhang klar hervorgeht, lediglich zeigen, dass man auch auf der Basis des Yogācārasystems und seines Erkenntnisstrom-Komplexes nicht ohne die Kausalität der vorhergehenden (empirisch fassbaren) aktuellen Erkenntnis – *"samanantara-pratyaya"* – auskommt. Daraus folgt aber keineswegs, dass Dharmakīrti selbst diese Voraussetzung des Yogācāra billigt." I agree wholeheartedly, but I would like to add that the opposite does not follow either, i.e., it does not follow that Dharmakīrti does not accept this Yogācāra presupposition.

verse, which differ slightly from Schmithausen's,[34] are accepted, it would not affect Schmithausen's thesis, because one could still follow his above-mentioned explanation.

Taken by itself, *PV* III 522 is therefore not entirely conclusive, but if it is read together with, or in the light of, *PV* III 133, it makes a much stronger case:

> *manaso*[35] *yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpāvikalpayoḥ* ।
> *vimūḍho laghuvṛtter vā tayor aikyaṃ vyavasyati* ॥

> Because conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions evolve from the "mind" at the same time, or because they evolve quickly [one after the other], the confused [cognizer erroneously] determines the two as one.

As far as I can see, Dharmakīrti does not argue here from someone else's presuppositions; even if he did so, this would only be the case in the second alternative. It seems therefore that Dharmakīrti did endorse, at least as an acceptable alternative, a multiple-layered series of cognition, and consequently he must have accepted the *ālayavijñāna* and the *kliṣṭamanas* as well. At least it would seem odd that he should accept a multiple-layered series constituted by *pravṛttivijñānas* alone, even though, of course, such a possibility cannot be absolutely excluded. It is interesting to note that the commentaries on vv. 39-41 of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter identify the mental cognition *(manomati* in 39b, *buddhi* in 40, *manas* in 41d), which entails a new existence or which projects a beginningless uninterrupted series of lives *(anādijanmaprabandha),* as the apprehension of the Self *(bdag tu 'dzin pa, ātmagraha, ahaṅkāralakṣaṇamanas),* and in Yogācāra it is the *kliṣṭamanas* which apprehends mistakenly the *ālayavijñāna* as the Self.[36] I have no doubt

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[34] For a slightly different interpretation cf. Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen," p. 127. However, according to Schmithausen too, there would be a series of more than one cognition at the same time, namely, the *ālayavijñāna* and the single cognition which arises from it.

[35] Miyasaka conjectures *manasor* on the basis of the Tibetan translation: *rtog bcas rtog pa med pa'i yid.* Even if the conjecture is accepted (the Tibetan translation is, on the whole, very reliable), this would not affect the statement that two cognitions arise at the same time.

[36] Cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna,* pp. 147, 150ff.

that Prajñākaragupta understood the verses in this manner, even though the term itself appears only later on (P 66.4 on 48): *na kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ kāyāśritaṃ tataḥ.*[37] However, Dharmakīrti's verses themselves are ambiguous, and even if one assumes that he refers to the apprehension of the Self, this can still be interpreted as a Sautrāntika type of *satkāyadṛṣṭi.* In any case, a multiple-layered series certainly seems to be an acceptable alternative for Dharmakīrti, and we may adduce as additional, though not decisive, evidence that this was obviously interpreted in the same way by the authors of the *TS(P).*[38] Besides, it remains unclear why Dharmakīrti (or Dignāga, for that matter) would follow a subtle implicit position of the *Viṃśatikā* - for no one had noticed the single-layered series there before Schmithausen did, neither modern scholars nor, to the best of my knowledge, any ancient Buddhist author - against the explicit doctrine of the *Triṃśikā.*

Finally, we may consider the discussion of the final stages of the way to liberation. Here too, the same tendency as pointed out above can be observed, for neither the terminology nor the argumentation are specific enough to commit Dharmakīrti to a single school. If, as I believe, this reflects a conscious decision, Dharmakīrti's task was greatly facilitated by what one may call a terminological conservatism, that is, the fact that even the most innovative ideas in Buddhism tended to be expressed in older terms. The shift of meaning of key terms like *nairātmya* and *śūnyatā* is well-known and need not be repeated here. On the whole, the soteriologically relevant terms used by Dharmakīrti are general and uncontroversial, and could be endorsed by any Buddhist school in one meaning or another, for instance, *śūnyatādṛṣṭi, nairātmyadṛś, saṃskāraduḥkhatā, avidyā, kleśa, mala, doṣa, tṛṣṇā, vairāgya,* etc. The argumentation, too, is kept on such a level of abstraction that almost every Buddhist school could recognize in it its own doctrine. Consider for instance the following two verses, which are a masterpiece of concision and comprise the entire Buddhist philosophy in a nut-shell:

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[37] Cf. the similar formulation in P 60.2-3 on v. 42: *ahaṅkāralakṣaṇaṃ mano na cakṣurādīndriyāśritaṃ na dehāśritam.* Cf. also P 59.20, also on v. 42: *manomater aham ityevamātmakalpanārūpāyāḥ.*

[38] Cf. *TS(P)* vv. 1246ff., notably *TSP* 460.11f.: *yadaiva nartakīm utpaśyati, tadaiva gītādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti, karpūrādirasam āsvādayati, nāsikāpaṭuvinyastakusumāmodaṃ jighrati, vyajanānilādisparśaṃ ca spṛśati, vastrābharaṇādidānādi ca cintayati.*

saṃskāraduḥkhatāṃ matvā kathitā duḥkhabhāvanā |
sā ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nairātmyadṛgāśrayaḥ ||252||
muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭes tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ |
anityāt prāha tenaiva duḥkhaṃ duḥkhān nirātmatām ||253||

"The meditation on suffering was pronounced [by the Buddha] having in mind the painfulness of the conditioned (i.e., *saṃskāraduḥkhatā* as opposed to *duḥkhaduḥkhatā* and *pariṇāmaduḥkhatā).* And this [painfulness] is, according to us, the dependent origination *(pratyayotpatti = pratītyasamutpāda);* it is the basis for seeing Selflessness.

As for liberation, [it arises] from seeing emptiness. All the other meditations have that [seeing] as their purpose. Precisely for this [reason], [the Buddha] said that suffering is due to impermanence and Selflessness is due to suffering.

That Dharmakīrti keeps the discussion on a very general and abstract level can also be explained by the assumption that he wanted to present a common front of essential Buddhist doctrines against the Brahminical schools, for the notion of a permanent Self is repeatedly criticized as the source of all evil. If this is the case, it will corroborate the reading suggested above in chapter I, namely, that the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter was intended also, or perhaps even primarily, for a non-Buddhist audience. However, there are two major soteriological concepts employed by Dharmakīrti which do seem to have a sectarian basis: *āśrayaparivṛtti* and *prabhāsvaracitta.* In the very first line of the section on the path *(mārga),* Dharmakīrti declares: *ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate* |(205ab) "The path was mentioned [above].[39] By practicing it, the basis transforms."

Prajñākaragupta explains that "basis" refers either to the series of cognitions or to the *ālaya(vijñāna),* and that the transformation consists in becoming pure.[40] One would be tempted, of course, to take the first alternative as referring to the Sautrāntika point of view and the second as referring

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[39] Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 105, refers to v. 135cd; cf. also M 71.23: *śāstṛpadavyākhyāvasare;* Dwarikadas Shastri thereon refers to v. 140 (= 138). Cf. also $D_{(De)}$ 87a4: *ston pa'i tshig bśad pa'i skabs su.* Additionally one could also refer to v. 145a.

[40] Cf. P 142.30: *tasyābhyāsād āśrayasya cittasantānasyālayasya vā pariśuddhatvaṃ bhavati.*

to the Yogācāra. However, so far I have not come across a Sautrāntika doctrine in which the series of cognition is considered as a basis which transforms. Schmithausen sees in this explanation an alternative between the single-layered series of cognitions (distinctive of Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presuppositions) and the *ālayavijñāna.*[41] But this is not the only possible interpretation, since the *ālayavijñāna* too can be part of the mentioned series that in this case would be a multiple-layered series. In other words, the word *āśraya* could apply either to the (multiple-layered) series as a whole, or to its central part, namely, the *ālayavijñāna.*

Yet another interpretation of Prajñākaragupta's statement is implied by Manorathanandin's commentary, namely, that "basis" refers to the series of cognitions that is nothing but the *ālayavijnāna.* The particle *vā*, in this case, is not used to express an alternative, but to rephrase[42] (M 71.23-24):

> *tasyābhyāsād āśrayaḥ kleśavāsanābhūtam ālayavijñānaṃ parivartate kliṣṭadaśānirodhāt kleśavisaṃyuktacittapraban-dhātmanā pariṇamati.*
>
> By practicing that [way], the basis, [i.e.] the *ālayavijñāna* which consists in impressions of (or: and?) defilements, transforms, [i.e.] because of suppression of the defiled state[43] it transforms into [something] that has the nature of a series of cognitions which is disconnected from defilements.

Thus, it is certain that we can interpret the "transformation of the basis" as reflecting the Yogācāra point of view, but can we also interpret it from the Sautrāntika point of view? Except in Yogācāra texts, the term is used to designate a sexual transformation, usually of women to men, but also the other way round. It appears often enough in *Abhidharma* texts, *Mahāyāna-sūtras* and narrative literature *(avadānas)* etc., but not as a philosophical or

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[41] Cf. Schmithausen, "Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen," p. 129.

[42] On Prajñākaragupta's use of *vā* not as a disjunction, but to indicate a rephrasing, cf. for instance P 53.6: *kutaḥ sādhanaṃ ko vā hetuḥ;* cf. also P 55.28: *pariṇatiḥ paramparāviśeṣo vā.*

[43] It is interesting to note that one of the meanings of *daśā* is "mind" (cf. *MW, s.v.;* cf. also *PW, s.v.:* Geist *(cetas)),* in which case *kliṣṭadaśā* would be the *kliṣṭamanas.* However, this meaning is so far only lexicographically attested.

soteriological term.[44] Sakuma, who undertook the most thorough investigation to date of the concept *āśrayaparivṛtti,* says (and these words have all the authority of Schmithausen behind them): "Dieser Begriff [*āśrayaparivṛtti*] scheint in der Pāli-Tradition gänzlich zu fehlen und ist in der Sarvāstivāda-Überlieferung nur vereinzelt bzw. spät greifbar, u. zw. ausschliesslich im Kontext der Beseitigung der *kleśas* durch den überweltlichen Weg."[45] In fact, the term appears only once in the *Abhidharmasārabhāṣya,* and that only in one of its three Chinese translations, and twice in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.*[46] Thus, if Dharmakīrti had wanted to keep a perfect balance between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, he could have chosen a different mode of expression.[47] Still, it is not impossible to read the statement in v. 205ab also from a Sautrāntika point of view, in which case the transformation of the basis would not relate to the *ālayavijñāna* (or its elimination?[48]) or to the series of cognitions, but to the body of the Arhat or to the psycho-physical basis of existence. This meaning is also related to the well-attested usage in early Yogācāra where "basis" refers also to the *ṣaḍāyatana.*

In his excellent study of the concept of *āśrayaparivṛtti,* Sakuma distinguishes between two models of transformation: replacement and elimination. In the first case, attested for instance in the *Śrāvakabhūmi,* an old basis afflicted with "badness" *(dauṣṭhulya)* is replaced by a new basis filled with ease *(praśrabdhi).* In the second case, attested e.g., in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi,* there is only elimination of badness, and no replacement of it by ease. We

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[44] Cf. Lamotte, *Vimalakīrti,* pp. 280-281, n. 37.

[45] Cf. Sakuma, *Āśrayaparivṛtti,* p. 45.

[46] Cf. *Abhidharmasārabhāṣya* (Taisho 1551) 906a18-19, *AKBh* 63.20-23 and 232.25-233.2, quoted by Sakuma, *ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

[47] He may have said, for instance, that the defilements are removed. On the other hand, it is possible that precisely the use of the term *āśrayaparivṛtti* in the *Kośa,* certainly not in the meaning of the transformation of the *ālayavijñāna,* prompted Dharmakīrti to make use of this word as a "non-sectarian" term.

[48] Unlike in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* where the transformation or purification consists in the elimination of the *ālayavijñāna* (cf. Sakuma, *Āśrayaparivṛtti,* pp. 104-108, 125-135), according to Prajñākaragupta, followed by Manorathanandin, the *ālayavijñāna* itself seems to become purified.

cannot be certain as to which model of transformation was envisaged by Dharmakīrti, but it is probable that he would opt for the second one. In view of v. 208ab it seems that Dharmakīrti understood the transformation of the basis as the complete elimination of all the defiled *dharmas* which are not the own nature of the cognition, but which are accidental to it; the cognition itself is pure and luminous:

> *prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ* |
>
> By its own nature, this cognition is luminous; the defilements are adventitious.

It is easy to show that the doctrine of the "luminous mind" is compatible with Yogācāra. The most important passages have been conveniently assembled by Ruegg.[49] However, does the doctrine of the *prabhāsvaracitta* fit into the framework of Sautrāntika? Prima facie we may consider that in one form or another, this is a general doctrine accepted by all schools, since it appears already in *Aṅguttaranikāya* 1.6,[50] of which Dharmakīrti's half-verse is almost a quotation:

> *pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ. taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ.*
>
> O bhikṣus, this cognition is luminous, but it is indeed defiled by adventitious defilements.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of the luminous cognition seems to have been rejected by the Sautrāntika, assuming that "Sautrāntika" refers at all to a specific school.[51] In a sketch of the concept of *citta* in Buddhist philosophy,

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[49] Cf. Ruegg, *Tathāgatagarbha*, pp. 425-428.

[50] Cf. *AN*, vol. I, p. 10.

[51] As pointed out by Schmithausen in a personal communication, the term "Sautrāntika" is highly problematic. Considerably different positions are associated with the "Sautrāntikas"; this could be accounted for by assuming that not a specific school, but a general attitude is denoted by the term, namely, the acceptance only of the Buddha's sermons, i.e., the *sūtras* and *sūtrāntas*, as authoritative. Similarly, the term "Vibhajyavādin" as a designation of a member of a specific school was highly doubted by Frauwallner. Schmithausen considers that this term could have been used as a blanket term for all schools, with the exception of the Sarvāstivāda, that make distinctions in doctrinal matters, or to designate those individuals or

Lamotte points out that certain sects of the Hīnayāna, namely, the Mahāsāṅghikas[52] and the Vibhajyavādins,[53] as well as the *Śāriputrābhidharma,*[54] while referring to the above passage of the *Aṅguttaranikāya,* maintain that thought *(pensée)* (i.e., cognition) is originally and naturally luminous, but can be sullied by defilements *(kleśa)* or liberated from them. The defilements are not the original nature of cognition and are therefore adventitious *(āgantuka).* These sects, as well as the Andhakas,[55] conclude that it is cognition which obtains liberation. Just as a crystal is coloured by the colour of the object it covers, similarly pure cognition, when defiled by desire, is called "accompanied by desire" *(sarāga),* and later on becomes liberated: *sarāgaṃ cittaṃ vimuccati.*

This doctrine, however, was rejected by the major schools of the Hīnayāna, including the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. "Les grandes écoles du Petit Véhicule rejettent à la fois la thèse et son corrollaire. Non, la pensée n'est pas naturellement et originellement pure: elle est au contraire souillée par la passion et par l'acte."[56] The Vaibhāṣikas (and presumably the Sautrāntikas as well) argue against the Vibhajyavādins that the originally luminous cognition cannot be defiled by adventitious defilements. Otherwise, one could also assume that desires would become pure by their association with a pure cognition. Or even if they remained impure, the cognition would not be defiled by them.[57] Cognition, therefore, is not originally pure; first, the last connection with desires has to be severed. Once this happens, cognition arises as the cognition of an Arhat. As formulated by Vasubandhu: *vimucyate*

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schools that decide on doctrinal matters in a differentiating way; in the latter case the designation could be used for a specific school, but in a specific context only, and for another "differentiating" school in another context.

[52] Cf. Lamotte, *Vimalakīrti,* p. 53, Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques,* pp. 67-68, No. 44.

[53] Lamotte, *loc. cit.*, Bareau, *ibid.*, p. 175, No. 23. Cf., however, n. 50 above.

[54] Cf. Lamotte, *loc. cit.*, Bareau, *ibid.*, p. 194, No. 6.

[55] Cf. Lamotte, *loc. cit.*, *Kathāvatthu,* pp. 238-241.

[56] Cf. Lamotte, *loc. cit.*

[57] Cf. Lamotte, *ibid.*, p. 54, summarizing *Vibhāṣā* (Taisho 1545) k. 27, p. 140 b-c.

jāyamānam aśaikṣaṃ cittam āvṛteḥ.[58] "Being produced [in or immediately after the *vajropamasamādhi* where the possession of *kleśas* ceases] the cognition of the Aśaikṣa (= Arhat) is free from [any] obstacle."

There is no need to go into further detail here. The above, I believe, makes it probable that by using the phrase *prakṛtyā prabhāsvaraṃ cittam* Dharmakīrti opts for a doctrine which is unacceptable to the Sautrāntikas. However, even here it is possible to read Dharmakīrti's statement from the opposite perspective. In fact, Schmithausen relates Dharmakīrti's statement to the doctrine of the Vibhajyavādins, mentioned above, who took the luminous cognition as a soteriological statement about the series of normal momentary cognitions. Dharmakīrti's doctrine may have been an epistemological twist *(Wendung)* of the Vibhajyavādin's statement: The formula that the cognition is luminous by its nature means that perceptions and cognitions tend to grasp their object correctly as it really is and are only hindered from doing so by external causes.[59] (Is this a *svataḥ prāmāṇyam* theory in disguise?) If this is the case, and the context certainly supports Schmithausen's interpretation, then one may consider that Dharmakīrti employs a typical Yogācāra term and gives it a Sautrāntika content.

It appears, therefore, that even in the case of those passages that seem to show a preference for the Yogācāra soteriology, the genius of Sanskrit, or the genius of Dharmakīrti, makes it possible to read them also from the Sautrāntika point of view. However, by examining the concepts *āśrayaparivṛtti* and *prabhāsvaracitta* separately and by looking at things from the Sautrāntika versus Yogācāra perspective, we may be reducing Dharmakīrti's originality or missing the nuances of his text. In Dharmakīrti's text the two concepts are closely related to each other, and when we take this into account, a somewhat different picture emerges. For the fact that the concept of *āśrayaparivṛtti* is associated with that of *prabhāsvaracitta* seems to point at the Tathāgatagarbha school. In Yogācāra texts the two concepts do not seem to be associated with each other. To judge by Sakuma's study, in the *Yogācārabhūmi āśrayaparivṛtti* is never associated with *prabhāsvaracitta,* and in the

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[58] Cf. *AK* 6.77ab, dLVP, vol. 6, p. 288. Read *jāyamānam* as in *AKBh(Ś)* 1029.10 instead of *jāyamānas.*

I assume that this opinion reflects the Sautrāntika position too, as no dissenting Sautrāntika opinion is mentioned in the commentary to this *kārikā.*

[59] Cf. Schmithausen, "Zu D. Seyfort Rueggs Buch," p. 141.

Siddhi of Hsuan Tsang the latter is even explicitly rejected.[60] There may be exceptions, of course, but they seem to be rather rare. Among the passages dealing with the *prabhāsvaracitta* in Yogācāra (Vijñānavāda) texts assembled by Ruegg, there is only one, in Sthiramati's *Abhidharmasamuccayaṭīkā* (= *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya)*, which mentions the two together.[61] It would be interesting to check whether the doctrine of *prabhāsvaracitta* in Yogācāra appears only in Maitreyanātha texts (and of course in commentaries thereon), and if so, whether this could be explained by the fact that Maitreyanātha and his tradition were strongly influenced by Tathāgatagarbha ideas. However, the substantiation of such a hypothesis is beyond the range of this study.[62]

In the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, on the other hand, the doctrine of *prabhāsvaracitta* is closely associated with the concept of *āśrayaparivṛtti*. It has to be noted, though, that this may be a later development, for it appears only in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā,* and not in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* itself. As Ruegg already observed, "[c]'est en relation avec la luminosité naturelle de la Pensée et de la pureté du *tathāgatadhātu* au point de vue de sa connection avec le plan du Fruit que la *RGVV* fait état de la transmutation de la Base psychique, cette *āśrayaparivṛtti* correspondant ainsi á l'épuisement des impuretés."[63]

Furthermore, a Tathāgatagarbha influence on Dharmakīrti's verses becomes even more plausible because of the use of the word *garbha* in v. 209: The defilements cannot increase indefinitely in a thing *(vastu)* whose embryo is (i.e., which contains/is filled with) the capacity for the arising of that which sublates these defilements *(bādhakotpattisāmarthyagarbha)*, like fire on oozing earth. What is this embryo? Can it be identified with the

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[60] Cf. de La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi,* pp. 111-112.

[61] Cf. Ruegg, *Tathāgatagarbha,* p. 427 (quoting the *Abhidharmasamuccayaṭīkā*, at that time not yet edited, from Liebenthal, "Notes on the 'Vajrasamādhi,'" p. 369). The comment in *ASBh* 93.15-17 is on *cittāśraya[pra]<pari>vṛtti* in *AS* 77.3: *cittāśrayaparivṛttir dharmatā - cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvarasyāśeṣāgantukopakleśāpagamād yā parivṛttis, tathatāparivṛttir ity arthaḥ.*

[62] Professor Schmithausen has kindly checked for me a few additional passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which the concept of *āśrayaparivṛtti* is mentioned; in none of them this concept is associated with that of *prabhāsvaracitta.*

[63] Cf. Ruegg, *Tathāgatagarbha,* p. 421.

tathāgatagarbha? If so, what is the referent of the word *vastu?* It must be the cognition, in this context the defiled cognition before liberation. In a different context (v. 194) Dharmakīrti uses *vastu* for the cognition after liberation.

The possibility that certain Tathāgatagarbha doctrines are reflected or alluded to in Dharmakīrti's verses was already pointed out by Ruegg and Vetter.[64] But if Dharmakīrti's doctrine is identified as belonging to the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, what are the implications for his affiliation to Yogācāra? Does it mean that the assumption of his affiliation to Yogācāra is wrong? Should one use weaker terms such as "influence by" and "tendency towards," or stronger ones such as "commitment to" the Tathāgatagarbha tradition? Does affiliation to one school exclude another?[65] Are Yogācara and Tathāgatagarbha really two different schools? What does the word "school" mean in this context? To begin with, it is not entirely clear whether the Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra are two different schools. Lamotte, for instance, considered the two as one, and referred to the *tathāgatagarbha* "as described by certain Sūtras and Śāstras of the idealistic school of the Yogācāra."[66] Lamotte's opinion was probably based on the Tibetan tradition which attributes the composition of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* to Maitreya, and that of the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* to Asaṅga. Lamotte was criticized by Ruegg who preferred to follow one of the Chinese traditions in this respect and maintained that the theory of *tathāgatagarbha* is a "distinct tendency."[67] Ruegg has probably used the somewhat weak or vague word "tendency"

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[64] Ruegg, *Tathāgatagarbha,* p. 437, does not commit himself, but says that it is remarkable that what is called *garbha* in v. 209 fulfills the same function as the *tathāgatagarbha,* namely, it is capable to produce the suppression of faults (more precisely: it is this capacity), and that the epithet *nirupadrava* reminds one of *sukha* which qualifies absolute reality and the *tathāgatagarbha.* Further, on p. 423, he observes a comparable use of *āśrayaparivṛtti* in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and in the *Ratnagotravibhāga(vyākhyā).* Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 32, suggests that the doctrine of the luminous cognition may have been borrowed from the *Ratnagotravibhāga* or some older Yogācāra work.

[65] As Professor Schmithausen reminded me, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* was already in existence at Dharmakīrti's time and can serve as an example for a possible connection of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha.

[66] Cf. Lamotte, *Vimalakīrti,* p. 55.

[67] Cf. Ruegg, *Tathāgatagarbha,* p. 412, n. 4.

(rather than calling it a "distinct school" as it would appear from the Chinese tradition that takes it as "cycle distinct de la prédication"), because, under the influence of the dGe lugs pas, he presented the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine of the absolute very much like that of Madhyamaka. Ruegg was criticized, in his turn, by Schmithausen, who convincingly showed that there are major philosophical differences between the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the Madhyamaka texts, thus reverting to Frauwallner's opinion that the Tathāgatagarbha ideas form a separate school, although he does not use the word "school," but rather speaks of the Tathāgatagarbha-"Richtung," "System," "Texte" and "Lehre."[68] Frauwallner, however, does not use Tathāgatagarbha as the name of the school, but calls it "the school of Sāramati."[69]

Most scholars today follow Frauwallner, though not in his specific designation, in considering the Tathāgatagarbha ideas as constituting a distinct school; but in what sense is the word "school" used in this context? It is easy to see how it is not used. It is obviously not used in the original meaning of "leisure," nor does it refer to a place, as in European antiquity, where philosophers taught their hearers, nor does it refer to a specific organization or institution, nor to a system of training, nor to a group of people who have been taught by a particular master. As far as I can see from recent publications, most scholars seem to use the term loosely as referring to a group of people following more or less the same doctrine. Therefore, it would be perhaps more meaningful to raise the question how the Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha and Madhyamaka *schools* were referred to in Dharmakīrti's time. Our main source of information about that period are the reports of the Chinese pilgrims, but I, for one, was surprised to find out that neither Fa Hien nor Hsuan Tsang, at least as far as I could tell from the translations, ever refers to any of these schools. Hīnayāna schools like the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas, etc., are referred to often enough, but Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha are never mentioned; only Mahāyāna is mentioned. I-Tsing, on the other hand, mentions Madhyamaka and Yogācāra twice. In the first case he presents them as the only two kinds of "the so-called Mahāyāna."[70] In the second case, they appear as two out of

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[68] Cf. Schmithausen, "Zu D. Seyfort Rueggs Buch."

[69] Cf. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, p. 255.

[70] Cf. Takakusu, *I-Tsing, A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, p 15: "There are but two kinds

four areas of knowledge, the other two being *hetuvidyā* and *abhidharma.*[71] The word Tathāgatagarbha is also mentioned once, but not as referring to a school or doctrine or even text, but as the personal name of a distinguished teacher met by I-Tsing in the "southernmost district" of India.[72] Further, Sanskrit sources which mention Yogācāra or Madhyamaka never use, to the best of my very limited knowledge, the old terms that are used to designate the Hīnayāna schools, i.e., *nikāya, ācariyavāda* or *samaya.*[73] These terms refer to a body of people who follow the same rules or the teachings of the same master. They are not used, again to the best of my knowledge, for any Mahāyāna "school," or even for the Mahāyāna as a whole. When Yogācāra or Madhyamaka are referred to as "schools," the terms used are usually *mata* or *darśana,*[74] which point at a different concept than *nikāya* or *samaya.* They refer to a (philosophical) point of view and lack any implication of an organized or structured body of people. They can be used narrowly to designate a doctrinal statement,[75] more broadly to refer to a philosophical

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of the so-called Mahāyāna. First, the Mādhyamika; second, the Yoga. The former profess that what is commonly called existence is in reality non-existence, and every object is but an empty show, like an illusion, whereas the latter affirm that there exist no outer things *in reality,* but only inward thoughts, and all things exist only in the mind (lit. 'all things are but our mind')."

[71] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 184: "When they [i.e. the distinguished teachers met by I-Tsing in India and Sumatra] have understood the arguments of Hetuvidyā (logic), they aspire to be like Jina (the great reformer of logic) [i.e. Dignāga]; while tasting the doctrine of Yogācārya they zealously search into the theory of Asaṅga. When they discourse on 'non-existence' they cleverly imitate Nāgārjuna; whilst when treating of the 'existence' they thoroughly fathom the teaching of Saṅghabhadra."

[72] Cf. *loc. cit.*

[73] Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes,* p. 7: "Nous appellerons *secte* ou *école* ce que le Bouddhisme Sanskrit dénomme *nikāya* et le Bouddhisme pāli *ācariyavāda.* Un *nikāya* est un group de personnes soumises au même regles." For the term *samaya* cf. such titles as *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* of Vasumitra and *Samayabhedoparacanacakrasyanikāyabhedopadarśananāmasaṅgraha* of Vinītadeva.

[74] On the meaning and the usage of these and related terms, cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe,* ch. 15.

[75] For a remarkable analysis of the concept of doctrine and its application to Buddhist texts cf. Griffiths, *On Being a Buddha,* ch. 1.

system, or even more broadly to comprise Buddhist philosophy as a whole irrespective of inner divisions.[76] In the final analysis, there is little more we can say about Yogācāra, etc., as "school" designations except that they are components of the more or less systematic Tibetan and Chinese classifications of Mahāyāna texts. One would be inclined to think that more is involved here, but the specifics are as yet elusive. It is also doubtful to what extent Yogācāra and Madhyamaka can be called systems, if the term means an ordered and coherent assemblage of principles forming one comprehensive whole. The philosophical fluctuations within the different texts are so strong that one is justified in talking about the Yogācāra or Madhyamaka as "systems" only based on the fact that there is a family resemblance among the respective texts.

Dharmakīrti has recently been subject to some revisionistic interpretations which classify him as a Mādhyamika or which view him as simply unclassifiable. The above is not meant as yet another revisionistic attempt to affiliate him with the Tathāgatagarbha "school," for there is a difference between influence and affiliation; otherwise we would also have to affiliate Maitreya with that school. Nor do I suggest that we should dispense with the notion of schools altogether. Even though this notion is problematic, it is not entirely arbitrary either. For me at least, the problem is not whether Dharmakīrti wrote from both the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika point of view – there is sufficient evidence for the fact that he did – but why he chose to do so. Presumably, he was following Dignāga; but why did Dignāga write from two clearly contradictory points of view? And why exactly these two? Our present knowledge does not seem to provide for any satisfactory answer, but the fact that this was possible at all indicates that these two schools, or two philosophies, have some mysterious bond between them, the nature of which still has to be worked out.

Although I have tried to discuss all the relevant material on Dharmakīrti's doctrine of rebirth in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, the above does not amount to a systematic or complete presentation of this doctrine. This is hardly surprising, for Dharmakīrti is not writing a scholastic Abhidharma treatise on rebirth, but tries to prove it philosophically while arguing against rival schools. In other words, his purpose is not descriptive, but argumentative, and his arguments necessarily concern only certain limited and disputed aspects of the doctrine of rebirth; they were not meant to form a systematic

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[76] Cf. for instance the expressions *bauddhadarśana* and *bauddhamata* in *ṢDS* vv. 3-4.

and detailed description. One is almost tempted to look at him through Kantian lenses and attribute to him the question: How is rebirth possible? Or more precisely, what are the conditions which make rebirth possible? His answer would be, and this would show his Yogācāra leanings, that the mind is completely autonomous, and therefore does not cease to exist when other factors such as body, breaths or senses cease to exist. The fact that the mind is temporarily associated with a certain body is almost accidental; the two happen to be found for a while in the same causal complex - presumably for karmic reasons, but that is not a constitutive part of the argumentation. However, the body is never the material cause for the mind and may influence it only in a non-essential manner, just as fire may produce liquidity in copper as long as they happen to be together, but copper is neither produced by fire nor ceases to exist when fire is extinguished. To make his point, Dharmakīrti argues mainly negatively, and on two intricately connected levels: on the one hand, against the materialists who claim that consciousness arises from the body, on the other hand, against the Brahminical schools that claim that it is a quality of the soul. The two claims are intricately connected because they converge inasmuch as according to both cognition cannot leave a body to move on to another body. In the next two chapters I will try to identify Dharmakīrti's opponents, reconstruct their doctrines and objections, and present his arguments against them.

Addendum

If the assumption of a single-layered series of cognition is not to be accepted as the definitive position for the works of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, should Schmithausen's thesis of Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presuppositions be abandoned? I think that the thesis is strong enough to survive even without this assumption. The difference in the status of the mental *dharmas* can be used as a criterion to distinguish between the two types of Yogācāra. In Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presuppositions (or *vijñapti-mātratā*, or whatever other term one chooses to designate this trend of thought), the mental *dharmas* are the absolute final reality. This tenet, unlike that of the single-layered series, holds good for both the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā*. In other Yogācāra works, such as those ascribed to Maitreyanātha, even the mental *dharmas* are in the final analysis unreal, dissolved into the deeper monistic reality of *tathatā*.[77]

The essential difference between these two types of Yogācāra can be observed in the different interpretations of the term *dharmanairātmya*. According to the usual Yogācāra interpretation, all the *dharmas* (including the mental ones) are unreal. In the *Viṃśatikā*, on the other hand, the term is explained as meaning that the cognition is free from the plurality of apprehending, apprehended, etc. (cf. *Viṃś* 6.9-11). Similarly, expressions like *abhūtaparikalpa* (cf. *TrBh* 35.13 and 39.25) can sometimes be used as a criterion. If they are used in the sense of conceptual construction of something unreal, they may indicate the point of view of Yogācāra with Sautrāntika presuppositions; if they are used in the sense of unreal conceptual construction, they must indicate the regular Yogācāra point of view.

[77] A possible reference to these two types may be found in Jayarāśi's analysis of conceptual construction (*kalpanā*): Is *kalpanā* an apprehension of an unreal object, or is it itself unreal? Cf. Franco, *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief*, p. 192f. (= *TUS* 4.18f.) and 447f. Professor Schmithausen kindly informs me that he was arguing along similar lines in a lecture given in Calgary and Copenhagen more than ten years ago. Unfortunately, this lecture remains (yet?) unpublished.

CHAPTER FOUR

Critique of the Materialist Position

As already mentioned in the introduction, Dharmakīrti's purpose in *PV* II 34-131ab is not to prove that the Buddha is infinitely compassionate.[1] Rather, he sets out to prove that infinite compassion is possible. According to Dharmakīrti, there are two necessary but not sufficient conditions that have to be fulfilled if one is to argue that certain persons like the Buddha "seek the benefit of all living beings." The first, and to judge by the space allotted to it, the more important one, is the existence of an infinite number of previous lives, for an infinite compassion like the Buddha's could not be practised and accumulated during a single lifetime. Thus, the Buddha's compassion presupposes the existence of past lives.

In Dharmakīrti's time the doctrine of rebirth was already widely established and was accepted in one form or another by all major religions and philosophical schools. The only important school that denied this doctrine was the Lokāyata. It is not surprising, therefore, that in trying to establish past lives Dharmakīrti considered the Lokāyatikas to be his main opponents (though not the only opponents, as I shall try to show) and that his refutation of the Lokāyata doctrines forms the core of his proof of rebirth. The elucidation of Dharmakīrti's controversy with his materialist opponents, the reconstruction of their doctrine and their identity, is the subject matter of this chapter.

The programmatic verse 34 comprises the entire discussion in a nut-shell: The proof for the Buddha's authority or reliability is compassion, and this compassion arises from repeated practice. The materialist opponent objects that repeated practice for more than one life is impossible because the body is the support *(āśraya)* of cognition and consequently, when the body is destroyed, the cognition is destroyed too. Dharmakīrti rejects the objection by denying the very notion of support, or at least that the relationship between support and supported obtains between the body and cognition.

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[1] That proof, as we saw in chapter I, is established by the relationship between the different properties of the Buddha.

Commenting on this statement, Devendrabuddhi, who is followed on this point by Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin,[2] explains the relationship of support and supported as a general term that can be analyzed into three different relations:

1) a relation between substance and quality,
2) a relation between cause and effect,
3) a relation between capacity *(śakti)* and possessor of capacity.

The first two relations presuppose that the relata are ontologically different; the third, that they are not.[3]

> If [the body and the cognition] are different, [the cognition] rests on the body inasmuch as the cognition is a quality *(*guṇa)* of the body, like the white [colour] of a cloth and the sweet [taste] of sugar. Or [the cognition] rests on the body, because it is an effect *(*phala)* of the body, like light *(*prabhā)* [rests] on a lamp *(*pradīpa)*. If, on the other hand, [the cognition and the body] are not different, [i.e., the cognition] is a capacity *(*śakti)* that has the nature of the body ... .

Manorathanandin conveniently construes three inferences for the three interpretations of support.[4]

1) The cognition rests on the body,
because it is its effect,
like light rests on a lamp.
2) The cognition rests on the body,
because it is its capacity,

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[2] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 18a7 = $D_{(De)}$ 16b1, P 53.21, R 317a1 (= 633.1) and M 20.18-20.

[3] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 18a7f. = $D_{(De)}$ 16b1f.: *don gźan ñid yin na blo ni lus kyi yon tan yin pa de ltar na lus brten pa yin te | dper na ras kyi dkar po daṅ bu ram gyi mṅar ba lta bu'o || yaṅ na lus kyi 'bras bu ñid yin pa'i phyir lus la brten pa yin te | dper na sgron ma la 'od lta bu'o || don gźan ma yin na yaṅ lus kyi bdag ñid du gyur ba'i nus pa yin pa ... .*

[4] Cf. M 20.18-21: *buddhir deham āśritā kāryatvāt, pradīpa iva prabhā, śaktirūpatvād vā, madyam iva madaśaktiḥ, guṇatvād vā, paṭam iva śuklatā. tredhāpy āśrayavināśe tasya nāśāt kuto janmāntarāṇi, kathaṃ vā teṣv abhyāsaḥ kṛpādeḥ? iti cārvākāḥ.*

like the capacity of intoxication rests on the intoxicating substance.
3) The cognition rests on the body,
because it is its quality,
like whiteness rests on a cloth.

The upshot of these inferences is, of course, that in all three modes when the support is destroyed the supported is destroyed with it. Therefore, when the body is destroyed the series of cognitions is interrupted.

Prajñākaragupta quotes (or paraphrases) some Cārvāka examples to illustrate the point:[5]

> Thus, a mural does not last without a wall, nor step over to another wall, nor come from another wall. Or [it is] similar to [the case of] the colour that arises from the ripening of the mango fruit, etc. [which does not last without the fruit, does not go to another fruit, nor come from another fruit]. Or [it is similar to the case of] smoke that is the product [of ignition or the igniter?], does not come from another fire, nor sets out to another fire. As for the power of intoxication *(madaśakti),* it rests on the intoxicating [substance], [and] it does not exist before liquids like *kaṣāya,* etc., are mixed [with that substance], [but] is manifested [only afterwards]. When the [power of intoxication] is disappearing [in a certain intoxicating substance], it does not take another intoxicating [substance] as its support. In the same manner, senses, special features of consciousness [etc., rest on a body and when destroyed in that body, do not go to another body, etc.].

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[5] Cf. P 53.29-54.2: *tato na citraṃ kuḍyavirahitam avatiṣṭhate, kuḍyāntaraṃ vā saṅkrāmaty āgataṃ vā kuḍyāntarāt. āmraphalādipākarūpavad vā. kāryaṃ vā dhūmo na dhūmadhvajāntarād āgacchati. nāpi dhūmadhvajāntaraṃ prayāti. madaśaktis tu madyāśritā kaṣāyādirasasamparkād apūrvā prādurbhavati. vilīyamānā na madyāntaram avalambate. tathendriyacetanāviśeṣāḥ.*

Note, however, that Prajñākaragupta formulates these examples in the context of a theory in which it is claimed that the body of the parents is the support of the cognition of the newborn. This theory must have been formulated some time after Dharmakīrti and is also unknown to Devendrabuddhi; cf. *TS* 1892 and Steinkellner, *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi,* p. 11, where, however, the cognition (not the body) of the parents is considered to be the cause.

Even though the threefold interpretation of support is endorsed by all the commentaries, it is nowhere apparent in Dharmakīrti's verses themselves. Furthermore, the question arises to what extent it represents a genuine Cārvāka position. As far as I know, we do not have any evidence for a Cārvāka analysis of 'support,' either as threefold or otherwise. However, at least two of the relations are well-attested as Cārvāka docrines, in the sense that they can be easily and naturally understood from the *Bṛhaspatisūtra*. *BS* A5 describes the phenomenon of life as the capacity of the four material elements, comparing it to the power of intoxication that arises from ferment, etc. *(kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat)*. No further explanation about this concept is given in the few fragments which survive from this text. And given its laconic *sūtra* style, it is not likely to have had one in the first place. Yet if Devendrabuddhi is right in his interpretation, the Cārvākas did not consider the capacity of the elements to be something different from the elements themselves, or at least the elements when transformed into the form of a body. In this case, they may have used the term 'capacity' in a manner similar to its modern usage.[6] That is, to say that something has capacity, power or disposition means that whenever a particular set of conditions occurs, there is a change of a particular kind in a state of affairs. For instance, solubility in water is a power or a capacity of sugar. Power or capacity or ability is not an event, and therefore can never be a cause. It is not the solubility of sugar which causes sugar to dissolve when placed in water. Rather, capacity stands for a more or less abiding causal connection between events of particular kind. Thus, when certain circumstances occur, i.e., when the elements are transformed into the form of a body, consciousness arises.

However, other *sūtras* of Bṛhaspati describe the relationship between body and consciousness as a causal relation, for instance *BS* A9: *śarīrād eva;* cf. also *BS* A4: *tebhyaś caitanyam.* If a causal relation obtains between the two, then, as Devendrabuddhi pointed out, this presupposes that body and consciousness are different entities. In this case the Cārvāka position can be labeled epiphenomenalism, which means that the mind is an effect or by-product of the body, but never its cause. The same position is sometimes called "the-halo-over-the-saint-doctrine,"[7] the halo being an automatic

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[6] Cf. Ducasse, *Belief in a Life after Death*, p. 52.

[7] Cf. Ducasse, *op. cit.*, p. 75ff.

effect of saintliness, but never its cause. The doctrine of epiphenomenalism is associated mainly with T.H. Huxley and S. Hodgson. The latter describes the mind-body relationship as "the foam thrown up by and floating on a wave,"[8] an image which immediately evokes *BS* A6: *jalabudbudavaj jīvāḥ.* But the comparison should not be pushed too far.

Unlike the above, the third possible relationship between body and cognition in terms of substance and quality does not seem to appear in any of the Cārvāka fragments known to me, and I would not assume that it represents a genuine Cārvāka doctrine without some independent corroboration. The state of affairs as described by Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita seems much more probable. According to their presentation there were two current interpretations of *BS* A4: *tebhyaś caitanyam.* Certain commentators *(vṛttikāra)* explained it as consciousness produced from special material elements *(bhūtaviśeṣa);* others asserted that consciousness is manifested from them.[9] This does not mean, of course, that Devendrabuddhi's interpretation could not have been endorsed by certain Cārvākas. The names of Bhāvivikta and Aviddhakarṇa come to mind, since these two philosophers are known to have composed both Nyāya and Cārvāka tracts, and one could imagine that they adopted Vaiśeṣika categories to update the somewhat archaic doctrine of the four elements.[10] However, the few fragments that survive from their works do not give any support to this supposition.

On the other hand, it is quite possible that in evoking the *guṇa-guṇin* relationship Devendrabuddhi did not consider the Cārvākas as the sole target of these verses. Even though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas admitted the doctrine of rebirth, they nevertheless criticized the Buddhists with arguments that bear a baffling resemblance to those of the Cārvāka. More specifically, I am thinking of *ŚV, Ātmavāda* 59-62 (repeated later on by Jayanta, *NM* II 345.4f.):

dehāntare ca buddhīnāṃ sañcāro nopapadyate |
pūrvadehād bahirbhāvo na ca tāsāṃ pratīyate ||
vāyunā preryamāṇaṃ hi jvālādy anyatra sañcaret |

[8] Quoted by Ducasse, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

[9] Cf. *TSP* 633.22f. on *TS* 1858: *tebhyaś caitanyam iti. tatra kecid vṛttikārā vyācakṣate - utpadyate tebhyaś caitanyam. anye - abhivyajyata ity āhuḥ.*

[10] Cf. the discussion the next chapter.

buddheḥ kāraṇadeśāt tu preraṇaṃ nāsti kenacit ॥
amūrtatvāt svayaṃ nāsāv utplutyānyatra gacchati ।
jīvaddehe 'pi tenāsyā gamanaṃ nopapadyate ॥
antarābhavadehas tu niṣiddho vindhyavāsinā ।
tadastitve pramāṇaṃ hi na kiñcid avagamyate ॥

Moreover, the shift (or: transition) of cognitions [from one body] to another body is not possible. Nor is it apprehended that [cognitions] come out from the previous body.

For a flame, etc., may shift to another [place] when driven forth by wind. But nothing prompts the cognition to move from the place of its cause.

Because it is not corporeal, the [cognition can] not leap up and go elsewhere by itself. For this [reason], the movement [of cognition] is not possible even in a living body.

As for the body in the intermediary state of being, it was refuted by Vindhyavāsin. For no proof whatsoever is apprehended for its existence.[11]

It is interesting to note that the subsequent arguments against the possibility of cognitions in an embryo in *ŚV ātmavāda 65-67* are quoted as Cārvāka arguments in *TS* 1864-1866. It seems that the most orthodox and the most heterodox schools have joined forces to criticize the Buddhists. Unlike the Cārvāka, the Mīmāṃsaka admits rebirth, but maintains that it is not possible without the assumption of an *ātman.* They both deny that a series of cognitions can shift from one body to another. Yet the question arises whether these are Mīmāṃsā arguments adopted by the Cārvāka or vice versa. It seems to me that the latter is the case, because these arguments are disjointed from their surroundings in the *ŚV,* whereas they form a coherent whole with their immediate context in *TS* 1863. After presenting the Cārvāka tenet that consciousness arises from the body alone - a tenet which significantly enough is attributed to Kambalāśvatara (cf. below) - an opponent objects that this cannot be the case because the embryo has cognitions, but

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[11] According to Vindhyavāsin the senses are omnipresent *(vibhu),* and therefore the assumption of the subtle body *(sūkṣmaśarīra)* is superfluous; cf. *YD* 121.13-14. Cf. also Preisendanz, *Studien,* p. 452.

at this stage the body is not yet completed; upon this the Cārvāka denies that the embryo has cognitions (*TS* 1864-1866 = *ŚV, Ātmavāda* 65-67):

> *kalalādiṣu vijñānam astīty etac ca sāhasam* |
> *asañjātendriyatvād dhi na tatrārtho 'vagamyate* ||
> *na cārthāvagater anyad rūpaṃ jñānasya yujyate* |
> *mūrcchādāv api tenāsya sadbhāvo nopapadyate* ||
> *na cāpi śaktirūpeṇa tadā dhīr avatiṣṭhate* |
> *nirāśrayatvāc chaktīnāṃ sthitir na hy avakalpate* ||
>
> And [to say that] the cognition exists in [the embryonic stages of] *kalala,* etc., is foolhardy. Since [the embryo is something] whose senses are not yet (entirely?) produced, an object is not apprehended there.
>
> Nor can the cognition have a form different from the apprehension of the object. For this [reason] the existence of a [cognition] is not possible in [a state of] swoon, etc., either.
>
> Nor does the cognition subsist in a potential form at that time (i.e., at the time of the state of an embryo and in a swoon). For the existence [of the capacities] is not possible, since the capacities have no support.

On the other hand, if this is a Cārvāka argument, why does Śāntarakṣita quote from the *ŚV* rather than from an original Cārvāka source? Perhaps both Śāntarakṣita and Kumārila are quoting from the same source. However, stylistically - if I may use such an intuitive and unreliable criterion - these verses seem to have been composed by Kumārila himself. I tend to assume that Kumārila put the Cārvāka arguments into verse and that it was simply easier for Śāntarakṣita, who knew that they were Cārvāka arguments, to quote them in an already versified form.

The result of our analysis so far is that Dharmakīrti's main opponent is the Cārvāka, but while arguing against the Cārvāka he keeps in the back of his mind further opponents, notably Kumārila, and, as I shall try to show in the next chapter, some Nyāya–Vaiśeṣikas. Further, we can now tentatively identify Dharmakīrti's Cārvāka opponent as Kambalāśvatara. Even though none of the direct commentaries identifies the opponent by name, the verse referred to above (*TS* 1863) bears an unmistakable similarity to the Cārvāka doctrine criticized by Dharmakīrti. In v. 35 Dharmakīrti argues that exhalation, inhalation, senses and cognition do not arise from the body alone

independently of causes of their own kind *(prāṇāpānendriyadhiyāṃ dehād eva na kevalāt | svajātinirapekṣāṇāṃ janma ...)*.[12] The transition from v. 34, where only body and cognition are mentioned, to v. 35 is not obvious. How are we to integrate the additional factors of breaths and senses into the relationship of support and supported between body and cognition? The order of the elements of the compound is probably not arbitrary, but points at a temporal sequence, also for a purely grammatical reason: *dhī*, being the shortest word, should have been placed at the beginning rather than the end of the *dvandva*. Besides, in view of the general notions about the development of the embryo, the assumption that breaths, senses and cognition arise from the body at the same time seems highly unlikely. Theoretically, several models could be conceived as the position of Dharmakīrti's opponent: either the body produces breaths, which produce senses, which produce cognition; or the body alone produces breaths, senses and cognition; or all previous elements jointly produce the subsequent, i.e., the body produces breaths, the body with breaths produces senses, and the body with breaths and senses produces cognition. If Kambalāśvatara was indeed Dharmakīrti's opponent, then the third alternative is the most probable one. This still leaves open the question as to the exact nature of the causal connection (e.g., are the breaths assisting causes *(upakāraka)* for the body while producing the senses?). Whatever the case may be, the parallel in *TS* 1863 is, in my opinion, close enough to justify the assumption that Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita refer to the same specific Cārvāka doctrine:

> *kāyād eva tato jñānaṃ prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt |*
> *yuktaṃ jāyata ity etat kambalāśvataroditam ||*
>
> It has been said by Kambalāśvatara: The cognition can arise from the body alone, which is inhabited (or governed) by exhalation, inhalation, etc.

Kamalaśīla *(TSP ad loc.*, p. 635) reiterates the identity of the opponent: *tathā ca sūtraṃ kāyād eveti kambalāśvataroditam.* This passage has often been assumed to refer to a certain *Kambalāśvatarasūtra.*[13] However, this

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[12] Note that in the subsequent discussion Dharmakīrti basically argues only for the dependence of the cognition on its similar cause; the dependence of the breaths and the senses on their similar causes is of no real interest to him.

[13] Cf. Namai, "Bārhaspatya Philosophy," p. 42: Kambalāśvatara no sūtra ... Kambalāśvatara

would be somewhat disconcerting, for the same *sūtra,* with the insignificant variant *śarīrād eva,* is a well-known *Bṛhaspatisūtra* (A9). Is Kambalāśvatara just another name of Bṛhaspati? What does the name mean? A blanket-mule? Ch. Sharma suggests "the man with a blanket and a mule,"[14] but this seems grammatically improbable.

The identification of Kambalāśvatara with Ajita Keśakambalin, as suggested by Tucci and Bhattacharya, can be safely discarded.[15] However, there is no necessity to read the statement in the *TSP* as referring to a different *Sūtra;* it should rather be understood as referring to a commentary on the *Bṛhaspatisūtra* A9: "And in this way the *sūtra* 'from the body alone' has been taught by Kambalāśvatara." In other words, according to Kambalāśvatara the *sūtra* "From the body alone" does not really mean from the body alone, but from the body with the breaths and the senses *(-ādi* in *TS* 1863) which have been previously produced by the body. In this case there is some probability that the passage quoted in the same context by Prajñākaragupta is in fact a fragment of Kambalāśvatara's commentary on the *Bṛhaspatisūtra.*

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to iu sūtrakāra." Warder, *Outline of Indian Philosophy,* p. 34, goes even further and claims that the passage in the *TS(P)* "names Kambalāśvatara as its (i.e., *Lokāyata Sūtra's)* author." and adds that "[p]erhaps this name is a form of Keśakambalin, and perhaps it is just another form of Bṛhaspati, but at present we do not know."

[14] Cf. A *Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy,* p. 41.

[15] Cf. Tucci, *Linee di una Storia del Materialismo Indiano,* p. 140: "Il ricordo del suo nome (scil. Ajita Kesakambalin) e della sua teoria é conservato dalla tradizione buddhistica fino ai tempi relativamente recenti: ché infatti nel *Kambalāśvatara* ricordato da Śāntarakṣita, śl. 1864, [= 1863 in Dvārikadās's ed.] é evidente che occore vedere lo stesso Ajita Kesakambalin di cui il *Dīghanikāya* fa menzione." Cf. also Bhattacharya's Foreword to *TS*(GOS), pp. XXXVIII-IX. Bhattacharya identifies Kambalāśvatara also with the music teacher mentioned in the *Saṅgītāloka.* D. R. Shastri distinguishes between Ajita Keśakambalin and Kambalāśvatara, but assigns the latter also to the Buddha's time, without any justification; cf. his A *Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism,* p. 396.

Cf. P 54.2-8:[16]

tathā cāha - pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni. pṛthivyādīny eva tattvāni, tattvāny eva pṛthivyādīni. nākāśādīni, na kṣaṇikatvādīni. tathā tattvāny eva, na vijñānamātraṃ, nāpi sakalam eva śūnyaṃ, sarvatra pramāṇābhāvāt. tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñā. mahābhūtānām evāparimitaḥ pariṇativiśeṣaḥ samudāyaḥ śarīrādivyapadeśaviṣayaḥ. tebhyaḥ śarīrendriyaviṣayebhyaś caitanyaṃ, yathā kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktiḥ. tasmān madaśaktivad vijñānam. na paralokād āgacchat pratisandhimat. madaśaktivad iti copalakṣaṇaṃ citravad dhūmavad iti ca. na khalv ete sañcāriṇo dṛṣṭāḥ.

And thus he says: The principles are earth, water, fire, and wind. [To wit,] the principles are only earth, etc., [and] earth, etc., are the(?) only principles. (Or perhaps: earth, etc., are only principles, i.e., are not the actual earth, etc., which are only a manifestation or a transformation of the principles.) Neither ether, etc., nor momentariness, etc., [are principles]. Thus, there is nothing but [these] principles. Neither is [everything] cognition only *(vijñānamātra),* nor is everything empty *(śūnya).* For there is no proof for any of these (or: no proof at all). The terms body, sense and object [apply] to their aggregate. [To wit,] aggregate [means] a special transformation of the great elements themselves which is immeasurable [inasmuch as its forms like bodies and objects are infinite]; [it is] the object of the designation as body, etc. From these, [i.e.] from body, sense and object, consciousness [arises], just as the power of intoxication [arises] from ferment, etc. Therefore, the cognition [is said to be] like the power of intoxication. [The cognition] is not linking [to another cognition in another body in another life] inasmuch as it comes from another world (i.e., from a previous life). And [saying that it is] like the power of intoxication implies [by analogy that it is] like a mural and

[16] The text as quoted here differs from the one in the printed edition in some minor points. For a list of emendations and conjectures cf. Appendix I; cf. also the notes to the translation below.

> like smoke. Indeed, these are not seen to pass (or: shift) [from one wall or one fire to another].

Unfortunately, this passage does not contain a commentary on *BS* A9 *(śarīrād/kāyād eva),* and therefore we cannot be entirely sure that we are dealing with one and the same text. Yet the following is obvious. Both Kambalāśvatara's text and the one quoted by Prajñākaragupta are commentaries on the *Bṛhaspatisūtra* (the text in P quotes *BS* A2, A3, A4 and A5). Further, both passages provide a somewhat unusual interpretation of certain *sūtras.* The case of A9 was pointed out above; here A4 is clearly understood in an unusual manner, for *tebhyaḥ* in *tebhyaś caitanyam* is usually taken as referring to the principles earth, etc., and not to body, sense and object. Finally, in both passages we see the tendency to expand the causal complex from which consciousness arises. Both specify that it is not the body alone or the material elements alone which bring about consciousness, but the body together with the senses. The difference in both texts, namely, that in one case the breaths are mentioned in addition, in the other the objects, may well be due to the different contexts, that is, the different *sūtras* which are commented upon.

Dharmakīrti rejects the Cārvāka's position because it is absurd to assume that at the time of birth, breaths, senses and cognition can arise from the body alone, independent of their similar causes. Unfortunately, he does not explain what the absurd or inadmissible consequence would be, as is usually the case when *atiprasaṅga* (and not *prasaṅga)* is used. Devendrabuddhi explains in his gloss that if life would arise from the material elements alone, it would arise everywhere where they are present; it would exist also in stones and water.[17]

Prajñākaragupta is perhaps less certain and gives two interpretations. The first is that the assumption that breaths, etc., arise independent of similar causes implies that all causal relationships without exception would

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[17] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 20a3 = $D_{(De)}$ 18a1: *thal 'gyur phyir rdo daṅ chu la sogs pa dag la yaṅ thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro.*

crumble.[18] The second alternative (P 55.25-27)[19] is very close to Devendra buddhi's interpretation:

> *athavā, atiprasaṅgād iti yadi janmāntarād āgatim antareṇa tebhya eva mahābhūtebhyaś caitanyaṃ kāryam udbhavati. kiṃ na sakalaṃ prāṇimayaṃ bhavati. pariṇativiśeṣasadbhāvād iti cet, sa eva pariṇativiśeṣaḥ kasmān neti samānaḥ paryanuyogaḥ.*
>
> Or *"atiprasaṅgāt"* [implies the following:] If the effect, [i.e.] consciousness, arises from these alone, [i.e.] from the great elements, without coming from another life, why does not everything arise having the form of a living being? If [the Cārvāka says that this is so because life is not] due [to the elements as such, but] to the occurrence of a special transformation [of the elements], the same question [arises]: Why does the special transformation not [arise everywhere]?

Similarly Manorathanandin says in M 21.6-7:

> If the arising of exhalation, etc., obtains *(graha)* from the great elements alone, then they would arise from everything. Thus, the whole world would have the nature of a living being.

Considering the above interpretations, one could say that the inadmissible or absurd consequence refers to the restriction or limitation of life to certain places. However, such an interpretation seems to be contradicted by the immediate context of the verses, for in v. 37 Dharmakīrti says that there is no part of the earth, etc., where living beings are not born by way of the various modes of birth, such as from moisture, from eggs, etc. The Cārvāka

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[18] Cf. P 55.2: *sarva eva kāryakāraṇabhāvo viśīryeta.* The same is repeated verbatim by Ravigupta; cf. R 317b2 = 634.2: *rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i dṅos po thams cad ñid ñams par 'gyur ro.*

[19] This alternative is also followed by Ravigupta; cf. R 317b6 = 634.6: *yaṅ na thal ches par 'gyur te | gal te lus 'ba' źig las 'byuṅ 'jug la sogs pa 'byuṅ ba de'i tshe sa la sogs pa las dbugs 'byuṅ bar 'gyur te | 'byuṅ ba ñid du khyad par med pa'i phyir ro ||.* "Or *'atiprasaṅga'* [means that] if exhalation and inhalation, etc., arise from the body alone, then breath would arise from earth, etc., because there is no difference [between animate and inanimate matter, each] being an element."

claims that consciousness, etc., arise from the great material elements, and not from causes of the same kind. But the material elements as such do not produce life; rather only a special transformation of the elements into the form of a body is said to give rise to consciousness. Thus, only certain parts of the elements that undergo this transformation produce consciousness, just like certain stones are the seed of gold, while others are not.[20]

However, the Cārvāka cannot explain the phenomenon of life by assuming special transformations of the elements or special properties of the elements that could correspond to the various classes of living beings, such as creatures born from moisture, from eggs, etc.[21] The materialists used the appearance of maggots in rotting matter as proof for the spontaneous, non-karmic origination of life directly from matter, as shown already by the macabre experiments of king Paesi (Pāyāsi).[22] But as far as I know, this is the first time that the very same phenomenon is used as an argument against the materialists.[23]

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[20] Cf. note 3 to the translation of v. 37.

[21] On the biological or zoological classification of living beings according to their mode of origin cf. Halbfass, "Karma, *Apūrva,* and 'Natural' Causes," pp. 292-294 and further references therein; cf. also his *Tradition and Reflection,* ch. 9. Various schemes are found already in the Upanishads (cf. *Chāndogya* 6.3.1, *Aitareya* 3.3; cf. also *Manu* 1.43 ff.) The most common is probably the fourfold classification into *saṃsvedaja* (moisture-born), *udbhijja* (i.e., seed-born or sprout-born?), *aṇḍaja* (egg-born) and *jarāyuja* (chorion-born). On plants as sentient beings cf. Schmithausen, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Early Buddhism;* Das, *Vṛkṣāyurveda,* p. 269f. and further references therein; Wezler, "Naturbeobachtung."

Dharmakīrti probably follows Vasubandhu in this matter. *AK(Bh)* 3.8cd enumerates four "wombs" *(yoni)* or classes of beings: *aṇḍaja, jarāyuja, saṃsvedaja* and *upapāduka* ("Etres apparitionels"). The latter are born at once with all their senses and members fully developed (116.1: *avikalā ahīnendriyāḥ sarvāṅgapratyaṅgopetāḥ sakṛd upajāyante).* They include the gods *(deva),* the infernal beings *(nāraka)* and the beings of the intermediate state *(antarābhava),* and some *pretas;* the *pretas,* however, may also be born from the chorion. Human beings may be born in all four modes, though the possibility of birth other than from the chorion is restricted, of course, to special cases; for illustrations cf. dLVP, vol. 3, p. 28, nn. 3-8.

[22] Cf. Leumann, "Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu anderen Literaturkreisen Indiens," summarized by Frauwallner, *GiPh,* vol. II, p. 297ff.

[23] For a considerably later example cf. *TRD* 224-225: *mṛtāvasthāyāṃ vāyutejasor abhāvena caitanyābhāvo 'bhyupagamyate, tarhi mṛtaśarīre kiyadvelānantaraṃ samutpannānāṃ kṛmyā-*

In any case, the argument in v. 37 seems to indicate that the interpretation of *atiprasaṅga* in v. 35 as understood by Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, and – as a second choice – by Prajñākaragupta and Ravigupta, does not correspond to Dharmakīrti's original intention, and that Prajñākaragupta's first interpretation is to be preferred.[24] The absurdity is not that life would arise everywhere, but that its diversity, and the regularity within its diversity, would be unexplainable if life arose from the material elements alone.[25] The same idea is poetically expressed by Prajñākaragupta while commenting on v. 37:[26]

> [Further] how could there be diversity in colour and structure among the living beings?
>
> 399. To explain: [Some] living beings, aquatic, etc., are seen to have red heads *(raktaśiras)*, others to have yellow bodies *(pītakāya)*, etc. From what does that form arise?

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dīnāṃ kathaṃ caitanyam?
"It is admitted that in the state of the dead [body] there is no consciousness because wind and fire are absent. How then do the worms, etc., that have arisen after some time in a dead body have consciousness?"

[24] Note, however, that this interpretation has to be divorced from its context in P, for the Cārvāka doctrine in which it is assumed that the parents of the newborn are the source of its consciousness is unknown to Dharmakīrti (and Devendrabuddhi) and must have been developed sometime between Devendrabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita, perhaps as a direct response to Dharmakīrti's arguments.

[25] For a different interpretation of this argument cf. Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 119: "The physical elements themselves can be compared to a seed; in the same way that there can be no plant without a seed, there can be no consciousness without the physical elements. But a seed cannot grow into a tree all by itself; it requires the help of other factors. And similarly, the physical elements cannot produce consciousness by themselves but must be aided by other non-material factors." I fail to understand how he arrives at this interpretation.

[26] P 57.26-31: *kuto varṇasaṃsthānavailakṣaṇyaṃ prāṇinām?*
tathā hi raktaśirasaḥ pītakāyādayaḥ pare |
jalādiprāṇino dṛṣṭāḥ sa ākāraḥ kuto bhavet ||399||
tadrūpabījāt kamalādibhedaḥ kiṃ dṛṣṭa iṣṭo niyataḥ kadācit |
na prāṇibhedo niyato 'sti bījāt santy atra karmāṇi niyāmakāni ||400||

400. Is the difference [of form] among lotuses, etc., admitted to be seen as determined at any time by a seed which has that form? There is no difference [of form] among living beings which is determined by the seed (i.e., by the form of their seminal material cause); the acts *(karman)* are the determining factors in all cases.

Even though the establishment of future life is not thematic to our present context, for strictly speaking the proof of the Buddha's compassion depends on past lives alone, it is obvious that proof of future life is equally necessary; otherwise any religious exertion would become futile. As the *Bṛhaspatisūtra* puts it, "liberation is simply death" (A12: *maraṇam evāpavargaḥ).* However, this causes a special problem within Dharmakīrti's epistemological teachings, for according to Dharmakīrti one can infer the cause from its effect, but not the effect from its cause. In other words, even if one can infer from the first cognition, senses, etc., their similar causes, that is, the last cognition, etc., of the previous life and so on until the beginninglessness of life is established, this does not guarantee the production of cognition in the next life, and thus all activities towards liberation may be pointless. The inference of future life cannot be based on a *kāryahetu* and, therefore, must rely on a *svabhāvahetu.*[27] According to all four commentaries, the purpose of v. 36 is to establish future life, unlike the purpose of the previous argument (in v. 35) which established past life.[28] No such distinction is apparent from or explicit in Dharmakīrti's verses themselves, but the reading of v. 37 as pointing to the future is all but natural. Dharmakīrti asks rhetorically: "That which was seen to have the capacity of linking, what did it have [before] that it does not have later on, by virtue of which it no [longer] has the [capacity of] link-

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[27] These two inferences of past and future lives may correspond to historically different trends of thought in the Buddhist religion; cf. Namai, "Two aspects of *paralokasādhana."* It is quite possible, of course, to infer both past and future lives with a *svabhāvahetu;* cf. for instance, *TSP* on 1896 and 1898. Ratnakīrti, on the other hand, infers future lives with a *svabhāvahetu,* but past lives with a *kāryahetu;* cf. *SS* 3.8f., and Bühnemann, *Der allwissende Buddha,* p. 7; cf. also *TBh* 63.9, Kajiyama's translation p. 139.

[28] $D_{(Pe)}$ 20a6 = $D_{(De)}$ 18a3: *ci źig yod par 'gyur | ma 'oṅs ba'i skye ba yoṅs su len pa na | gaṅ med pa yin ...|*; P 56.3: *bhavatu kāryāt kāraṇānāṃ siddhiḥ pūrvajanmabhāvināṃ, parajanminām tu katham anumānam? tad āha ...;* R 318a2 = 635.2: ... *ma 'oṅs ba'i skye bar 'jug par ji ltar grub |*; M 21.10: *bhāvijanmaparamparāsiddhyartham apy āha ...* .

ing?"[29] In other words, if something is observed to have a certain capacity, one can assume that it will continue to possess and exercise that capacity unless some additional factor prevents it from exercising that capacity. How such an argument can be formalized as an inference is not entirely certain. It could probably take the following form: A causal complex has the capacity to (actually) produce its effect, because it is complete in all its parts and unhindered by any disturbing factor. This is what Manorathanandin suggests:[30]

> In order to prove also the succession of future lives [Dharmakīrti] says: That, [i.e.] exhalation, inhalation, etc., which was observed to have the power to produce exhalation, etc., in the intermediate state (i.e., between birth and death), what did it have additionally then, at the time of linking, which it does not have at the time of death, by virtue of which, [i.e.] because of its absence, it does not have [the capacity of] linking then? The meaning is that the linking [to future life] takes place because the cause is complete and not obstructed *(samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇatva).*

Devendrabuddhi, however, presents the inference in a somewhat different manner:[31]

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[29] On linking *(pratisandhāna, pratisandhi)* in the sense of "conception," "rebirth," cf. *AK*, dLVP, vol. 3, p. 14, n. 2; Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna* acc. to Index *s.v.*, esp. pp. 127-128. This is a good example for the double use of *pratisandhāna:* by "later on" Dharmakīrti certainly means at the time of death, i.e., a karmic linking to the next life, but "before" refers to linking in the intermediate state between birth and death, i.e., linking within the same life without karmic connotations.

[30] M 21.10-13: *bhāvijanmaparamparāsiddhyartham apy āha - yat prāṇāpānādi madhyāvasthāyāṃ prāṇādīnām utpādaśaktiyuktaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tasya kim āsīt pratisandhānakāle 'dhikaṃ yat paścān maraṇakāle nāsti yena tadvaikalyāt tadā na sandhimat. samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇatvāt pratisandhānaṃ prāptam ity arthaḥ.*

Cf. also Iwata, "Pramāṇaviniścaya III 64-67," pp. 167-168.

[31] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 20a7f. = $D_{(De)}$ 18a3f.: *sbyor ba yaṅ gaṅ źig gaṅ yod na rgyu daṅ bral ba ma yin pa de ni mi 'gyur ba ni ma yin te | dper na myu gu raṅ gi bdag ñid thob par bya ba la rgyu daṅ ma bral ba can* ($D_{(De)}$: *rkyen) yin pa lta ba'o ‖ 'chi ba las dus phyis dbaṅ po la sogs pa'i bdag ñid kyi ṅo ba la yaṅ | rgyu daṅ bral ba yod pa ma yin no ‖ źes bya ba ni khyab byed*

> As for the formal inference (*prayoga): What is not without a cause when something [else] is present, is not non-arising. For instance, in [a case when] a sprout (*aṅkura) is about to arise, it is not without a cause. Also in [the case of] something which has the nature of the senses, etc., at the time after death, there is no absence of cause. Thus, the contradictory to the pervader is apprehended (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi).[32] Nor is [our reason] unproved, because if [the breaths, senses, etc., arise] from the body alone, an inadmissible consequence [follows] (cf. vv. 35-36a), and because they are established as something which has a cause of its own kind (*samānajātīyahetuka).

Prajñākaragupta refrains from presenting a formal inference, but rather comments as follows:[33]

> Therefore, that which was observed in the respectively previous [moments] to have the capacity of linking, what did it have [before] in addition that it does not have later on, due to the absence of which it does not have [the capacity of] linking later on? For the effect does not arise when the cause is incomplete. But when the cause is complete, [i.e.] possessing all its parts (kalāvat), it is contradictory [to say] that the effect does not arise.
>
> [Objection:] What is the contradiction here [in this case]?

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pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o ‖ ma grub pa yaṅ ma yin te lus yan gar ba las skye na thal 'gyur ba'i phyir daṅ | ris mthun pa'i rgyu can ñid yod pa ñid du grub pa'i phyir ro ‖

[32] Cf. *NB* 2.38.

[33] Cf. P 56.21-26: *tasmād yat pratisandhānaśaktimat pūrvapūrvam upalabdhaṃ tasya kim āsīd adhikaṃ yat pascān nāsti yadabhāvāt paścād asandhimat? kāraṇavaikalye hi kāryasyābhāvaḥ, sakale tu kalāvati kāraṇe kāryam anutpattimad iti vyāhatam. nanu ka ivātra vyāghātaḥ? nanv ayam eva vyāghāto yaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvābhāvaḥ.*

sarvāvasthāsamāne 'pi kāraṇe yady akāryatā |
svatantraṃ kāryam evaṃ syān na kāryaṃ tat tathā sati ‖396‖

kāraṇaparatantraṃ hi kāryam. tat samarthaṃ kāraṇaṃ haṭhād eva janayati. tathāpy abhāve na kāryaṃ bhavet.

[Reply:] Surely, precisely this is the contradiction, namely, the absence of relationship between cause and effect.

396. If the effect does not arise, even though the cause is the same [as before] in all its aspects, [then] in this manner the effect would be independent [of the cause]. In this case it would not be an effect.

For the effect depends on the cause. A cause which is capable of that [effect] produces it necessarily *(haṭhāt)*. If [the effect] is absent even so (i.e., even when the capable cause is present), it would not be an effect.

But Prajnākaragupta probably felt uncomfortable with the fragility of this argument, and in a different context he makes an interesting attempt to establish future rebirth with a *kāryahetu.*[34] Probably for this reason he relativizes the whole issue towards the end of the discussion. First, he denies any universal concomitance between cause and effect (P 56.27f.); then he concludes (57.6-8):

na paraloko nehaloko na paralokasādhanaṃ na sandeho na mahābhūtapariṇatir ityādi vijñā<a>ptimātrakam eva. athāpi vyavahārād etat. evaṃ paraloko 'pīti.

yady advaitena toṣo 'sti mukta evāsi sarvathā |
vartate vyavahāraś cet paraloko 'pi cintyatām ||398||

'There is no other world, there is no world here,[35] there is no proof of the other world, there is no doubt [about it], there is no transformation of the great elements,' etc. – [all this] is cognition only.

[Objection:] This (i.e., all of the above) is based on everyday practice.

[Reply:] So is also the other world!

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[34] Note that the term *svabhāvahetu* does not appear in the present context, but it does seem to be implied.

[35] This is an allusion to the famous Cārvāka saying: "This is the world, there is no other" *(ayaṃ lokaḥ paraṃ nāsti).*

> 398. If [you are] satisfied with non-duality *(advaita),* you are already liberated in every respect. If everyday practice holds good, the other world as well should be thought upon.

Verse 38 seems to conclude the discussion: Therefore, if senses, cognitions, etc., were produced from the material elements alone, without causes of their own kind, then just as the elements are transformed into the cause of life somewhere (i.e., where they take the form of a body), the same would happen everywhere because the cause of the transformation is the same, i.e., is present everywhere; for the Cārvāka does not admit anything over and above the elements.

However, here too there is some difference of opinion among the commentators. In presenting the verse as a conclusion, I followed P, or more precisely, the Tibetan translation of P, which identifies its purpose as *saṅgraha (bsdu ba).*[36] But as pointed out above, all four commentators are unanimous in distinguishing three types of relationship between support and supported, for the latter can be a capacity, a quality, or an effect of the former. How should this division be correlated to the four arguments in vv. 35-38? Does each argument refute the notion of support in all three modes? Or are all the arguments directed against a single type of support? Or is each argument directed at a different type of support? And are the arguments against the different types of support intended to imply a proof with a temporal connotation, i.e., intended to prove past or future life?

Prajñākaragupta and Ravigupta do not allocate different arguments to different kinds of support. Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin consider that it is feasible to read such a division into the text, but they disagree with each other on the details. Thus, according to Devendrabuddhi v. 38 refutes support as capacity-possessor (which is understandable, since as such it is not different from the capacity), whereas according to Manorathanandin it refutes support as capacity-possessor and by implication as substance.[37] Verse 35, on the other hand, refutes support as cause.[38] Thus, according to Manorathanandin the following structure emerges: vv. 35-36a_1 criticize support as cause

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[36] On *saṅgrahaśloka* cf. Mimaki, "Sur le rôle de *l'antaraśloka* et du *saṃgrahaśloka."*

[37] Cf. M 22.11, 14: *śaktipakṣaṃ niṣeddhum āha ... ata eva hi prasaṅgād guṇapakṣo 'pi boddhavyaḥ.*

[38] Cf. M 20.23: *tatra kāraṇatvaṃ pratiṣeddhum āha ...* .

(and at the same time prove past lives), v. $36a_2$-d proves future lives (no subdistinction of support intended here), v. 37 is a digression to reply to the Cārvāka objection that the diversity among the elements can account for the diversity of life, and v. 38 refutes support as capacity-possessor and substance. Devendrabuddhi's analysis is similar, but he takes vv. 35-$36a_1$ as refuting the position of consciousness as quality and effect,[39] and v. 38 as refuting the position of consciousness as a capacity of the body.[40] Unfortunately, Dharmakīrti's verses themselves are far too laconic to allow a determination one way or the other.

So much for the negative aspects of these verses. However, Dharmakīrti is not merely criticizing the Cārvāka without making a positive claim. How should the dependence on causes of their own kind be understood? Does each factor depend only on its similar cause, viz., breaths on breaths, senses on senses, cognition on cognition, or should these be taken as forming a group of mutual causes? We know that Dharmakīrti had the doctrine of *antarābhava* in mind.[41] And according to this doctrine, we can assume a constant association between senses and cognition, for in the *antarābhava* all the senses are present.[42] However, does the living being in the intermediate state breathe? To this point I have failed to find a definite answer to this question, but my guess is that he/she/it does not breathe and that there is no continuous association between cognition and breaths, because the embryo (*kalala*, etc.), at least according to Abhidharma, does not breathe.[43] Exhalation and inhalation were considered part of the body,[44] and they are not *vipākaja*, i.e.,

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[39] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 18b8f. = $D_{(De)}$ 17a1f.: *don gźan ñid ma yin pa'i phyogs ... phyis 'gogs par 'gyur rol lhag ma yon tan gyi phyogs sam | 'bras bu'i phyogs la yaṅ blo'i rten lus ma yin na ...* .

[40] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 22a5-6 = $D_{(De)}$ 19b6-7: *de la phyogs gsum po'i naṅ nas nus pa'i phyogs la blo'i rten lus ma yin pa ...* .

[41] Cf. ch. III above.

[42] Cf. *AK* 3.14c_1: *sakalākṣa.*

[43] Cf. *AKBh* 340.18 on 6.13a: *ārūpyakalalādigatānām [ānāpānayor] abhāvāt.*

[44] Cf. *AKBh* 340.17: *kāyaikadeśatva.*

do not depend on the fruition of *karma*.[45] It seems, therefore, that as far as Buddhist dogmatics is concerned, we are dealing with two groups, exhalation and inhalation on the one hand, and senses and cognition on the other hand; the latter go together because even if cognition may be without senses, the senses are never without cognition.

After he has shown that the material elements cannot account for the phenomenon of life, or more precisely, for the diversity of life, and claimed that senses, cognition, etc., cannot arise from the body alone independently of causes of their own kind (vv. 35-38), Dharmakīrti proceeds to establish the independence of cognition from the senses. However, since I have discussed these verses from another perspective in chapter III above, they will not be dealt with here; rather let us move on to the next Cārvāka argument. Like every other school of Indian philosophy, the Cārvāka could not remain indifferent to the revolutionary impact of Dignāga's ideas on the doctrine of *pramāṇas* in general and of inference in particular, and ever since Dignāga's time quite a few of the Cārvāka arguments, at least in the fragments that reached us, were formulated in the form of formal inferences, many of them quite humorous.[46] Dharmakīrti refers to one such inference in v. 45[47]: Every cognition at death (i.e., every final cognition in life) does not link to another cognition (i.e., does not produce a first cognition in a next life), because it is a cognition at death, just like the last cognition of the Arhat; cf. M 24.13: *maraṇacittatvāc cittāntarāpratisandhānam arhaccarama-cittavat* (note the alliteration).[48] Thus, everyone is liberated after death, just like the Arhat.[49]

The earliest occurrence known to us of this argument is in the works of Bhāviveka, also known as Bhāvaviveka, Bhavaviveka, Bhavya, Bhavyaka,

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[45] Cf. *AKBh* 341.3.

[46] Cf. Tillemans, "Dharmakīrti on some Sophisms."

[47] Cf. fragment F3 in Namai's "A Survey of Bārhaspatya Philosophy."

[48] On the last cognition of the Arhat cf. *PVin* II_2, pp. 89-93, and Steinkellner's notes thereon; cf. also Schmithausen, "Zum letzten *citta* des Arhats nach den Sarvāstivādins," *ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

[49] Cf. P 63.18: *pradīpasyeva nirvāṇaṃ vimokṣaḥ tasya cetasaḥ;* cf. also *BS* A12: *maraṇam evāpavargaḥ.*

Bhavyakāra, Bhavyaviveka, Bhāvivikta and Bhagavadviveka.[50] Cf. *MHK* III 202, p. 318:

> *bālasya cyuticittaṃ cet sādhyate 'pratisandhikam* |
> *nāstikaiś cyuticittatvād arhaccaramacittavat* ||

The same argument appears in *PP* 204a4-5 on *MMK* 16.1 (= F3 in Namai's enumeration): *lhas byin gyi 'chi ka'i sems ni sems gźan daṅ ñin mtsams* (read: *ñiṅ mtshams) sbyor ba med de, 'chi ka'i sems yin pa'i phyir, dper na dgra bcom pa'i 'chi ka'i sems bźin no. *devadattasya maraṇacittaṃ cittāntaraṃ na pratisandhatte, maraṇacittatvād, arhanmaraṇacittavat.* This Cārvāka syllogism has been repeatedly referred to and criticized by Buddhist authors up to Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta.[51] Until now, the fragment has been considered anonymous, but I would like to attribute it, at least as a working hypothesis, to Kambalāśvatara. This attribution is based above all on the following presentation of Kamalaśīla:[52]

> Thus, first of all, the negation of past lives was accomplished. Now, in order to negate future lives, he says *"sarāgasya,"* etc., [i.e.] the cognition at death of [a person] who has desires does not link to another cognition, because it is a cognition at death, just like the last cognition of the Arhat. Thus, the contradictory to the pervader [in the Buddhist inference] is apprehended. [The word *tat* in the example] *"vītakleśasya tad yathā"* [refers to] the cognition at death. [If so,] then whence does the cognition arise? As [a reply to this] he says "From the body alone," etc. And in this way the *sūtra* "From the body alone" has been taught by Kambalāśvatara.

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[50] Cf. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness*, p. 5.

[51] Cf. *SS* 3.8f., Bühnemann's translation p. 7; *TBh* 63.3f., Kajiyama's translation p. 138.

[52] Cf. *TSP* 635.14f. on *TS* 1862-1863: *evaṃ tāvad atītajanmaniṣedhaḥ kṛtaḥ. sāmpratam anāgatajanmaniṣedhāyāha – sarāgasyetyādi. sarāgasyamaraṇacittaṃ cittāntaraṃ napratisandhatte, maraṇacittatvād, arhanmaraṇacittavad iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ. vītakleśasya tad yatheti maraṇajñānam* ‖1862‖ *kutas tarhi cittasyotpattiḥ? ity āha – kāyād evetyādi. tathā ca sūtraṃ – kāyād eveti kambalāśvataroditam iti* ‖1863‖

I think that it is natural to take the two statements referred to in this passage as belonging to the same person. This assumption is also corroborated by the presentation in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter where the two Cārvāka statements appear in the same context, although in reversed order. If this supposition is accepted, we can reasonably date Kambalāśvatara's work to c. 540.[53]

The above syllogism seems to satisfy the three conditions necessary for a valid reason: the reason is obviously present in the subject, it is present in the similar instance, and one can easily construe a dissimilar instance (e.g., a cognition which links to another cognition and which is not a cognition at death). Dharmakīrti rejects the syllogism with two arguments, the one directed against the reason, the other against the example. First, there is no contradiction whatsoever between the cognition at death of an Arhat and the production of a further cognition. Rather, it is the disconnection from the defilements *(kleśavisaṃyoga)* which prevents rebirth *(pratisandhāna)*. In this explanation he relies on a long-established Abhidharma tradition, for instance, in the *Abhidharmakośa*:[54]

> [Objection: If the cognition which serves as the support *(āśraya)* of another cognition is called *manas*] then the last cognition of the Arhat would not be a *manas*. For there is no [cognition] for which it is the immediately preceding [homogeneous] past [condition].
>
> [Reply:] No, because [the last cognition of the Arhat] too is established as being a *manas*. However, because other causes are missing a posterior cognition does not arise.

Furthermore, the Cārvāka should not use the last cognition of the Arhat merely on the basis of the Buddhist *siddhānta*, for if the example is established by a means of knowledge, it cannot be disputed. If it is not established, it is simply false and cannot be used to prove anything. To understand the argument, we have to keep in mind the difference between *prasaṅgasā-*

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[53] On Bhāviveka's date (c. 500-570?) cf. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School*, p. 61. Ruegg does not explain how he arrives at this date, but he probably relies on Kajiyama's dating in "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla."

[54] Cf. *AKBh* 12.1-3 on 1.17cd: *arhatas tarhi caramaṃ cittaṃ na mano bhaviṣyati. na hi tad asti yasya tat samanantarātītaṃ syād iti. na, tasyāpi manobhāvenāvasthitatvāt. anyakāraṇavaikalyāt tu nottaravijñānasambhūtiḥ.*

dhana, which is a legitimate procedure, and the use of an *anyatarāsiddhahetu,*which is not.[55] Kamalaśīla adds to the discussion by turning the cognition at death into the subject of a new inference which proves the opposite of the Cārvāka thesis:[56]

> A cognition which is accompanied by desire is capable of giving rise to another cognition which is based on it as its material cause, because it is accompanied by desire, just like a cognition in a previous state (i.e., any state between birth and death). And the cognition at death is accompanied by desire. Thus [the inference employs] a *svabhāvahetu.*

Yet Dharmakīrti suspects that the Cārvāka, inspired perhaps by such statements as Vasubandhu's (cf. above), could change his reason and reformulate the inference in the following manner: The cognition at death of a person with desires does not link to another cognition because of the incompleteness of the cause of linking. I am not sure what the Cārvāka would mean by "incompleteness of the cause." If we take the discussion in the subsequent verses into account, perhaps he means that the senses are no longer present at the moment of death.

If this line of argument is adopted by the Cārvāka, then he is obliged to admit that his original inference was wrongly formulated. If the incompleteness of causes is the reason, "why didn't [you] state exactly that in this [proof of yours] (v. 46d: *kiṃ tad evātra noditam)?"* In a tour de force of commentatorial wizardry, Prajñākaragupta suggests no less than three different interpretations for *kiṃ tad evātra noditam.* The first, which is also supported by Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, is the most probable one and is reflected in the translation above; according to the second interpretation, however, the sentence means the exact opposite: "Didn't [you] state exactly that in this [proof of yours]?" That is, nothing new is said here, this reason is as false *(hetvābhāsa)* as the previous one. The third interpretation proposes another analysis of *noditam:* instead of *na uditam* it can be read as *no ditam, no* being one of the four particles expressing negation *(amānonāḥ pratiṣedhavācakā iti).* In this case *dita* is a past passive participle

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[55] Cf. Iwata, *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgasādhana,* ch. I.

[56] Cf. *TSP* 652.20-21 on 1898: *yat sarāgaṃ cittaṃ tat svopādeyacittāntarodayasamarthaṃ, sarāgatvāt, pūrvāvasthācittavat. sarāgaṃ ca maraṇacittam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*

derived from $\sqrt{}$*DĀ*(3) meaning "cut off, cut into pieces" *(dita = khaṇḍita)*. According to this interpretation one would have to translate: "Isn't precisely that (i.e., your reason that the cause is incomplete) cut into pieces (i.e., disproved) in this [case/proof, since there is only one cause, namely, the cognition of the preceding moment, and it is complete]!"

Even though the second and third interpretations are philologically less likely (even Ravigupta, who accepts the first two, stops short of endorsing the third one[57]), they fit nicely with the line of argument adopted by Dharmakīrti. If the incompleteness of the cause is assumed as the reason in a modified inference, the inference is still false because in this case the Cārvāka uses an unproved reason *(asiddhahetu):* it is not established that the cause is incomplete. The Cārvāka claims that the body with (or even without?) the senses, etc., is the cause of cognition, but this is in no way established. Therefore, because that which is claimed to be a cause is not a cause in the first place, its absence cannot be adduced as reason. This is best illustrated with the mental cognition. The mental cognition does not arise from the body with the senses, because if this were the case it would be like a sense cognition (e.g., limited to certain kinds of objects). Nor does it arise from the body with all the senses taken together, because the senses do not cooperate. Nor does it arise from the body without the senses, because the body is devoid of consciousness (vv. 47-48a).

The Cārvāka may ask why, if the body is not the cause of the mental cognition, they always subsist together.[58] The answer is that they have the same cause, just as sight and hearing of the same person or color and flavour of the same object always subsist together without being each other's cause. Dharmakīrti leaves the cause unspecified, but all the commentaries identify it as *karman* (48b-c).

A further objection in the same vein is that it cannot be explained why the mental cognition is transformed by the body if the body is not its cause. For instance, the transformation of the body by poison, etc., causes a mental transformation in the form of pain. Dharmakīrti admits the transformation,

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[57] Cf. R 321b5 = 642.5.

[58] What does Dharmakīrti mean by "subsist together" *(sahasthiti)?* Does it follow from this statement that a mental cognition is assumed to be present throughout one's life, in conformity with the Yogācāra position and against the concept of a single-layered cognition advocated by the Sautrāntikas?

but denies that it is caused by the body as support. Rather, the transformation is caused by the apprehension of the body, i.e., by the body as object, not as support (v. 48d).[59]

Thus, the body may be said to be an assisting factor *(upakāraka)* in the production of the cognition, but not its cause. The cause (i.e., the "material" cause, *upādānakāraṇa,* here also the support, *āśraya)* is that whose existence always helps to bring about the result. In a rather abrupt manner Dharmakīrti adds that it was with this kind of cause[60] in mind that the Buddha used the locative and the ablative cases in the two formulations of *pratītyasamutpāda* (i.e., *asmin sati, idaṃ bhavati* and *asyotpādād idam utpadyate).*

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*[61] Vasubandhu gives no less than four reasons as to why it is necessary to formulate *pratītyasamutpāda* in these two ways, and then reports the opinions of other teachers, some of which he agrees with, some of which he does not. None of these reasons corresponds exactly to the one adduced by Dharmakīrti. The closest perhaps is Vasubandhu's first reason, namely, that the two are necessary for the sake of restriction *(avadhāraṇārtham):* if there were only one formula, one would understand that *saṃskāras* arise from *avidyā,* but one could think that they might also arise from something else. The two formulas together make clear that they arise only when *avidyā* is present, not when something else is present.[62]

The only opinion where the notion of support appears is introduced after the rejection of Vasuvarman's opinion:[63] "Then there are certain [non-Buddhist philosophers] who assume the existence of the *saṃskāras,* etc., when the *ātman* is present as support *(āśrayabhūta),* and their arising because of the arising of *avidyā,* etc. Therefore, in order to reject that assumption, [the Buddha] made the [following] determination: When A alone

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[59] For more details cf. the notes to the translation. Cf. also *TSP* 641.16f. on *TS* 1885.

[60] Although the word used is *hetu,* there is no doubt that it is an equivalent here to *upādāna-kāraṇa* or *āśraya;* cf. v. 49, n. 1.

[61] Cf. *AKBh* 138.28f. on 3.28 ab; dLVP, vol. 3, p. 81f.

[62] Cf. *AKBh* 139.1-3: *avadhāraṇārtham. yathānyatrāha "avidyāyāṃ satyāṃ saṃskārā bhavanti, nānyatrāvidyāyāḥ saṃskārā" iti.*

[63] Cf. *AKV* 457.25: *apara iti sthaviravasuvarmā.*

- due to the arising of which alone B arises - is present, B arises, not when something else [is present]."[64] Each of the formulas alone would, presumably, not be enough to eliminate the assumption of an *ātman* as support.

Dharmakīrti's statement in v. 48d that the cognition is transformed by the body only as object seems to suggest a Yogācāra point of view (cf. also v. 41c). If this is the case, v. 50 could be interpreted as an alternative from the Sautrāntika point of view. One may admit that the body is sometimes the assisting cause *(upakāraka)* of the series of cognition *(cittasantati),* but this does not mean that the series ceases to exist when the body ceases to exist, just as fire may change the color of a pot, etc., but the pot does not cease to exist when the fire stops.[65] If the body were the cause (i.e., the "material" cause, not just an *upakāraka)* of cognition, there would follow an inadmissible consequence: the cognition would last as long as the body, in which case a dead body too would have to have cognition. The Cārvāka objects that the cognition is absent in a dead body, because there is no breath in it. This objection is rejected, because the cognition is the cause of the breath and not vice versa.

Dharmakīrti gives several reasons as to why cognition is the cause of breath:
1) One observes that breath is controlled by cognition, but not the other way round.
2) Breath is impossible without consciousness, because the drawing in and pushing forth of wind cannot be effected without an effort, and effort implies consciousness.
3) If cognition were the result of exhalation and inhalation, it would increase and decrease according to the increase and decrease in breathing (vv. 51-52).[66]

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[64] Cf. *AKBh* 139.10-12: *santi tarhi kecid ya ātmani saty āśrayabhūte saṃskārādīnāṃ bhāvaṃ parikalpayanti, avidyādīnāṃ cotpādāt tadutpattim. atas tāṃ kalpanāṃ paryudāsayitum idaṃ nirdhārayāṃ babhūva. yasyaivotpādād yad utpadyate tasminn eva sati tad bhavati, nānyasmin.*

[65] It is not entirely clear whether in this case *upakāraka* is also to be understood as *āśraya;* cf. n. 1 on v. 50.

[66] The argument from increase and decrease is repeated in v. 73 below; cf. also *PV* II 169 (Vetter, *Der Buddha,* p. 71; for a different interpretation cf. Franco, "Was the Buddha a Buddha?" pp. 195-196), and in a different context *PV* I 220.

4) If breath were the cause of cognition, the same inadmissible consequence as the one pointed out in v. 51ab would apply to exhalation and inhalation: the cognition would be present as long as they are present, and they, being caused by the body, would be present as long as the body is present. Consequently there would be no dead body.

All this, however, is not the case if one assumes that cognition is the cause of cognition, because there is a further cause for the continuity of a series of cognition in a certain body. Unfortunately, Dharmakīrti does not state what cause he has in mind. I assume that "that which projects the continuity" *(sthityāvedhaka)* is probably equivalent to *āyus* (life force or life span, cf. v. 58) (v. 53).[67]

At this point, Dharmakīrti begins a long digression into different doctrines about the nature of the body. None of these doctrines, however, seems to be advocated by the Cārvāka, and therefore they will be treated separately in the next chapter. The discussion with the Cārvāka seems to be resumed only in v. 103 or 104.

We have seen that according to Kambalāśvatara[68] the body inhabited or governed by exhalation, inhalation, etc., *(prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhita)* produces the cognition. Dharmakīrti seems to interpret this function in the sense that the breaths are the restricting factors *(niyāmaka)* which prevent the arising of more than one cognition at a time per body.

Under the assumption that the body is composed of atoms,[69] or at least of many parts, one might posit that these could produce the cognition either collectively, as an aggregate, or individually, each by itself. If they were to

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[67] Cf. *AKBh* 74.4f. (on 2.45b, dLVP, vol. 2, p. 217): *traidhātukena karmaṇā nikāyasabhāgasya sthitikālāvedhaḥ.*

[68] Cf. *TS(P)* 1863 quoted above.

[69] Among Dharmakīrti's commentators, Devendrabuddhi, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin take the statement in v. 103 as referring to atoms; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 52a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 46a2-3: *rdul phra rab re re nus pa ñid yin pa* ($D_{(De)}$: *na),* R 342b4 = 684.4: *rdul phra rab rnams rgyu ñid yin,* and M 42.15: *samastānāṃ dehaparamāṇūnām.* Only Prajñākaragupta seems to interpret the "parts" as parts of the body like ear, nose, etc. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy,* vol. I, p. 242, points out that certain Cārvākas accepted the existence of atoms; however, so far I have not been able to locate the source of this interesting statement. A possible source could be *TRD* 218.1-2 on *ṢDS* 48-49: *aṇavo 'pi hy apratyakṣāḥ, kiṃtu ghaṭādikāryatayā pariṇatās te pratyakṣatvam upayānti.*

produce it collectively, like seed, water, earth, etc., produce a sprout together, then cognition would not arise when a single part of the body is missing. If, on the other hand, each part of the body would be capable of producing cognition by itself, there would be, all at the same time, as many cognitions as there are parts (or atoms) in the body.[70] If the Cārvāka should try to avoid the dilemma by claiming that the breaths are the main cause of cognition and that not every part of the body is capable of producing a cognition, this will not solve the problem, for there are several breaths, and therefore there would still be several cognitions at the same time (vv. 103-104).

Even if one assumes that there is only one breath, this could not account for the gradual arising of many cognitions during one's lifetime. Dharmakīrti uses here a variant of the "neither one nor many" argument. But unlike this argument in the Madhyamaka tradition, which has been studied by Tillemans,[71] Dharmakīrti uses the argument to deny a causal relationship, whereas the Mādhyamikas use it to deny existence. Further, the component of sequence and simultaneousness *(kramayaugapadya)* is not present in the Madhyamaka argument. Breath cannot be the restricting factor of cognition, because many cognitions can arise during one long breath. For instance, when someone takes a long breath and looks from one place to another at the same time, that person perceives many different objects, which implies different cognitions. It is interesting to note that the same argument is employed by Śāntarakṣita against the existence of the *ātman.*[72] Indeed, the argument could be applied to any lasting cause of cognition. From the Yogācāra point of view, however, this argument may be problematic.[73] Couldn't one assume that a cognition resembles a clear mirror *(svacchadarpaṇasaṃsthānīya)* and that many different objects are reflected in it *(arthapratibimba)* without a change in the cognition itself? Thus, the apprehension of many objects would not imply many cognitions. Yet although this could

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[70] For an earlier version of this argument cf. *NBh* 871.2f. on *NS* 3.2.37, *ŚV, Ātmavāda* 111-113, etc.

[71] Cf. Tillemans, "The 'neither one nor many' argument for *śūnyatā.*"

[72] Cf. *TS* 197-198, criticizing Uddyotakara.

[73] The following consideration is based on Prajñākaragupta's commentary, not on Dharmakīrti's verse itself.

be the case with external objects, if the cognition is completely passive *(udāsīna)* what would prevent it from apprehending all mental objects at the same time? One cannot say that it would apprehend only objects in proximity, because the distinction of far and near does not apply to mental objects at all. Even if the succession of objects in cognition would be accounted for by different grades of concentration or meditation *(bhāvanātāratamya),* this has nothing to do with breath. Therefore, breath cannot be the restricting factor (vv. 105-106).

The other alternative is to conceive of breath as momentary. One may assume that many momentary breaths are the cause of many momentary cognitions. But this only shifts the problem to the breaths. If many cognitions that arise gradually can arise only from many breaths that arise gradually, then these breaths too can only arise from gradual causes. But the body is not gradual and therefore cannot produce gradual breaths. Nor could the previous breath produce the subsequent one, because there is no previous breath for the first breath in this life, as the Cārvāka does not admit a previous life. Furthermore, one cannot assume that breath is one because it is connected with different places.[74] If one assumes that the breaths are many and that they produce cognition together, one is left to face the initial difficulty: even when one breath is missing, e.g., if one stops breathing for a moment, the cognition could not arise. Finally, one cannot say that in different situations different breaths produce cognition,[75] because cognition would vary according to whether it is produced by one breath or the other (vv. 107-111).

We finally arrive at Dharmakīrti's own doctrine. How does it avoid the inadmissible consequence that all cognitions would arise at the same time? His explanation is based on the concept of *samanantarapratyaya:* one cognition produces only one cognition, because its capacity is limited *(śakti-niyama).* He states that one can observe that this is the case, because as long as one keeps looking at one object, one cannot see another object. The fact that a cognition which could have arisen, at least in principle, does not arise,

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[74] It is not entirely clear what the different places are. I assume that Dharmakīrti refers to the doctrine of five breaths according to which they have different locations in the body, cf. Frauwallner, *GiPh,* vol. I, p. 60.

[75] It is not clear to me what exactly Dharmakīrti has in mind when he refers to the varying states or situations *(yathābhāvam).* According to Prajñākaragupta, whichever breath happens to be found in proximity (to what?) could produce cognition.

points at this restriction (v. 112).[76] The Cārvāka makes one final attempt to rescue his position by trying to accommodate the principle that one cognition produces only one cognition. Although the body is capable of producing many cognitions, the cognition that arises first from the body limits the capacity of the body to produce any further cognitions (v. 113). This position resembles what Frauwallner calls "jüngere Lehre, erste Entwicklungsstufe."[77] However, I would hesitate to identify the two. Within its context in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, the Cārvāka suggestion looks more like an inner objection made up by Dharmakīrti himself, not the position of a real opponent. It certainly looks very different from the doctrine of the *suśikṣitacārvākas* (assuming that Frauwallner had in mind *NM* II 348.2f.), or the doctrine of Udbhaṭa.[78] Whether Dharmottara's opponent in the *Paralokasiddhi*[79] is a real one or not is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand, the discussion seems too long in order to be just a theoretical deliberation. On the other hand, as already pointed out by Steinkellner, it seems to be based on *HB* 11.11-17.11; cf. also *HB* II 136ff. In any case, one important difference has to be noted between the two doctrines: Dharmakīrti's opponent assumes that the cognition impairs the capacity of the body to produce further cognitions. No such assumption appears in Dharmottara's much longer discussion.

The Cārvāka suggestion, says Prajñākaragupta, is completely unfounded. It would be like saying that the first moment of smoke arises from fire and then limits the capacity of fire to produce more smoke. Further, the causes of the first cognition do not have any intelligence by which they could deliberate: "Now cognition is produced by cognition; no need for us to produce further cognitions." The example of smoke and fire to illustrate this particular relationship between body and cognition may have been taken by Prajñākaragupta from Dharmottara.[80] But again one has to notice the

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[76] Cf. *PV* III 522 translated in ch. III above.

[77] Cf. Steinkellner, *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi,* p. 11.

[78] Cf. *NMGBh* 197. Solomon dates Udbhaṭa to c. 775-825 or perhaps slightly later; cf. "Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa," p. 992.

[79] Cf. p. 3.4ff., and the translation p. 42ff.

[80] Cf. Steinkellner, *op. cit.,* p. 3.4, translation p. 42.

difference: in Dharmottara's text, the example is raised by the opponent, in P by the proponent. In P this doctrine is also illustrated by the example of the *śālūka* lotus that arises first from cow dung and later from the lotus itself. In this case too, just as in Dharmottara's discussion, the limitation of capacity is not mentioned, i.e., the lotus is not said to obstruct the cow dung from producing further lotuses. However, if the Buddhist doctrine is accepted, it is found to carry with it difficulties which the Cārvāka doctrine did not. It can explain why only one cognition arises at the time, but it cannot explain why a cognition should be related to the body. If the body is not the support of cognition, cognition should be able to exist alone. Dharmakīrti accepts this consequence. And indeed the Buddhists from the earliest times onwards accepted the existence of a formless sphere *(ārūpya-dhātu)* where there is no matter and living beings exist with their mental components alone. Under certain other conditions, the cognition (or *kar-man?)* assists the material cause of the body, and then the two are found together. In this connection Dharmakīrti states that the cause of the body in the next life are the five bases (or that which has the five bases) *(pañcāyata-na)* of this life. It is not entirely clear to me what is meant by *āyatana.* Devendrabuddhi explains *pañcāyatana* as the body that has the nature of the five senses.[81] Prajñākaragupta does not say anything on the five bases except that they leave their traces in those who are born in the *ārūpyadhātu;* when they eventually disappear from the *ārūpyadhātu,* the bases by way of traces will be the cause of a new body.[82] The same is repeated by Ravigupta.[83] On the other hand, while commenting on v. 115a *(taddhetuvṛtti),* Prajñākara-gupta mentions *kalala,* etc., as the cause of the body;[84] thus it is not impossible that he understood the five bases as the five embryonic stages, namely, *kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana* and *praśākhā.*[85] Kamalaśīla (*TSP*

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[81] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 56b2 = $D_{(De)}$ 50a3: *tshe 'di ñid kyi skye mched lṅa | tshe 'di ñid kyi dbaṅ po lṅa'i ṅo bo can te lus kyi tha ma ni ...;* cf. also M 45.24: *pañcāyatanaṃ pañcendriyāṇi.*

[82] Cf. P 104.3-4.

[83] Cf. R 693.2-3 = 347a2-3. Like Devendrabuddhi, and unlike Manorathanandin, Ravigupta interprets *pañcāyatana* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying "body."

[84] Cf. P 103.33.

[85] Cf. *AKBh* on 3.19a-c, dLVP, vol. 3, p. 58 and n. 1.

656.19-20) seems to take *pañcāyatana* as referring to different states of the body like the state of a child or old man: *pañcāyatanalakṣaṇo dehasantānasyāvasthābheda ayam āmutriko deho, bālavṛddhāvasthābhedavat.* The latter are two of the five states of child, adolescent, young man, middle-aged and old person *(bālakumārayuvamadhyamavṛddhāvasthā).*[86] Yet another possibility, which, however, is not supported by any of the commentaries, is to interpret the five bases as the five *skandhas*. For the time being it seems that the interpretation of the five bases as the five senses is the safest and the most conservative one: it is directly supported by D and M, it is not directly contradicted by P and R, and the canonical expression for the six senses, of course, is *ṣaḍāyatana.*Further, this interpretation connects smoothly to the next verse (116). Why Dharmakīrti mentions only five rather than the usual six bases can be explained by the assumption that according to him only the material senses are considered as the cause of the body.

A further difficulty in the Buddhist position is that none of this is ever seen. One does not see the five bases, whatever they might be, producing a new body after death. The *ārūpyadhātu* is not even perceptible. The Cārvāka bases his negation of a causal nexus on mere non-observation. Dharmakīrti replies that the fact that something is not seen does not mean that it does not exist; mere non-observation does not lead to certainty. As a next step, the Cārvāka could try to construe a syllogism which goes beyond mere non-observation: The senses do not link to another life, because they are senses, just as the senses of Devadatta do not link to the senses of Yajñadatta. However, the reason in this inference, says Dharmakīrti, is not conclusive *(śeṣavat).*[87]

Prajñākaragupta introduces the Cārvāka against whom the next verse (117) is supposed to argue as claiming that the senses of the newborn are included in the sperm and blood of the parents *(śukraśoṇitāntarabhavendriya);* they do not come from a previous life. Although reflecting perhaps a genuine

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[86] On these five stages cf. *AKBh* on 4.53ab, dLVP, vol. 4, p. 119; further references in Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt,* p. 81.

[87] On this meaning of *śeṣavat* cf. Steinkellner, *PVin* II_2, nn. 433, 436; Iwata, "Pramāṇaviniścaya III 64-67," p. 170, n. 18. The term is explicitly connected to the Nyāya *śeṣavat* inference in *PV* I 331 and the *Vṛtti* thereon. The origin of this particular meaning seems to be due to Dignāga's criticism of the Nyāya *śeṣavat* inference as not conclusive; cf. *PVSVṬ* 609.7f.

Cārvāka doctrine, this position cannot be traced back to Dharmakīrti's verses, which state only that the capacity of the senses to produce the subsequent senses is observed, namely, in the intermediate state between birth and death. Thus, one can infer that the senses at the first moment in this life are also produced by previous senses. Dharmakīrti's opponent may try to undermine the example of this implied inference: if a sense is one and the same throughout one's life, then one cannot claim that the capacity of the senses in the intermediate state to produce subsequent senses is observed. But this argument does not seriously affect the Buddhist position, because one can change the subject of the proof from the senses themselves to certain modifications of the senses, like swiftness, alertness, etc. These qualities cannot be said to be one and the same throughout one's life (v. 117). If the opponent claims that the senses, at least in the first moment of life, arise from the body, the same questions and arguments as above can be repeated: Do they arise from each part of the body individually, or from all parts collectively? Further, they would last as long as the body lasts, etc. (v. 118ab).

At this point Dharmakīrti makes a somewhat strange proposition to the opponent. He states: If you admit that the senses arise from cognition, let them and the future body arise from cognition. This comes as a surprise, for what Cārvāka in his right mind would accept that the senses arise from cognition? Unfortunately the discussion does not continue any further, and Dharmakīrti concludes that it is not the case that all last cognitions do not connect to a new life because the causes are incomplete, and that the Cārvāka inference based on the last cognition of the Arhat is doubtful *(śeṣavat)* (vv. 118cd-119).

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So much for what Dharmakīrti has to say against the Cārvākas. However, his arguments are also interesting for what they omit. Roughly speaking, the European philosophical tradition uses three kinds of arguments for proving personal survival after death, or what is traditionally called immortality: the metaphysical,[88] the ethical,[89] and the empirical. The first two types have been

[88] Cf. for instance the following arguments of Descartes, not dissimilar to those raised by Dharmakīrti: "Our soul is in its nature entirely independent of the body, and in consequence it is not liable to die with it. And then, inasmuch as we observe no other causes capable of

completely discredited by professional philosophers. The ethical arguments have practically disappeared, and any attempt to use them sounds naive and out of place in a serious philosophical discourse.[90] The metaphysical arguments fare no better. Not only do they lack followers, they are usually not even considered worth refuting.[91]

For most of us, if I may so generalize, if the doctrine of rebirth is to be taken seriously, it will have to be based on empirical evidence, or on what we take to be empirical evidence. However, when we look at contemporary investigations relevant to the possibility of rebirth, we are confronted with two opposite trends which exist largely independent of each other. On the one hand, we find the materialists, typically and prominently represented by figures like Bennett and by books with ambitious, and obviously false, titles like *Consciousness Explained*. The empirical materialists draw on a number of prestigious and lucrative fields such as artificial intelligence, brain neurology, cognitive psychology and linguistics, and have made such a compelling case that almost the entire philosophical community, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, has been converted. A. Margalit, Israel's most famous philosopher, has recently proclaimed himself "the last dualist," a

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destroying it, we are naturally inclined to judge that it is immortal" *(Discourse on Method* V).

[89] For instance, the argument that if there were no life after death, the wicked would not be punished and the good not be rewarded.

[90] That is, in a philosophical as opposed to religious or theological discourse; in the latter such arguments are still very much alive.

[91] Cf. Perrett, *Death and Immortality,* p. 2: "Until quite recently many analytic philosophers too often regarded such concerns [about death and immortality] as falling outside the competence of philosophy." This is only symptomatic of a general disbelief in the powers of the mind to reach any philosophical (non-scientific?) truth; cf. *ibid.*, p. 171: "It is very rare in philosophy to be able to provide knock-down arguments, particularly in areas like metaphysics, ethics and philosophy of religion."

It may be mentioned in this connection that in chapter 8, p. 145ff., Perrett provides a clear and stimulating analysis of the notion of rebirth on the basis of the *Lokāyataparīkṣā* in *TS(P)*. However, his interpretation of the Buddhist position is different than mine (p. 153): "... there are some mental events which have no physical events in their causal ancestry (allowing here for the possibility of indirect causation)." Although this statement is certainly acceptable to a Buddhist philosopher, it represents only a preliminary position; the final Buddhist argument is rather that no mental event is entirely caused by a physical event. Or in other words, all mental events have mental events in their causal ancestry.

somewhat exaggerated appellation, no doubt, but symptomatic of the isolation one experiences in some North American universities when one fails to join the latest fashionable trend.

At the same time, and largely unnoticed by professional philosophers, Ian Stevenson, Carlson Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Virginia, has revolutionized the field of study of rebirth by adopting a rigorous scientific methodology.[92] The use of interview technique to check the reliability of the informants, the cross-referencing of various reports, checking of alternative hypotheses, the use of questionaires and statistics, and not least, the sheer quantity of reported cases and their factual, even prosaic character make of these sober publications a formidable case which cannot be dismissed offhand. Before Stevenson's systematic approach, detailed studies of rebirth claims always centered on a single individual. In contrast, Stevenson's student S. Pasricha from the Department of Clinical Psychology at the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences, Bangalore, has examined some 300 cases.[93] Reports on 76 cases were collected in less than three years.[94] A systematic survey with the standard sampling techniques was conducted in Fatehabad Tehsil, Agra District, U.P., and approximately one out of 450 persons claimed to remember a previous life (19 out of 8611).[95]

According to Pasricha, the subject usually starts talking about his or her previous life between the ages of two and four, and continues to do so up to the age of six; then the memory gradually fades. The previous personalities usually died young and by a violent death. The children display a behaviour unusual for their families, but concordant with the previous life: likes and dislikes for certain food, clothes, persons, or phobias of wells, weapons with blades, etc., when these were the cause of death. Certain external signs are said to be related to the previous death, such as birthmarks corresponding to previous wounds, etc.

My purpose here is not to argue in favour of one position or the other, but to point out the contrast between the modern approach and the one displayed

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[92] Cf. Stevenson, *Cases of Reincarnation Type.*

[93] Cf. Pasricha, *Claims of Reincarnation: An Empirical Study of Cases in India,* p. 245.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247. Contrast this with a classic like Ducasse's *A Critical Examination of the Belief in a Life after Death,* which relies only on a few spectacular cases.

by Dharmakīrti. Why doesn't Dharmakīrti use empirical or ethical arguments? Why does he rely exclusively on metaphysical arguments? Is this something peculiar to or characteristic of the Indian or Buddhist philosophical tradition? The first two questions cannot be answered with certainty, but the third can be clearly answered in the negative. Although our knowledge of the topic before Dharmakīrti's time is at best fragmentary, it is clear that Dharmakīrti's predecessors did not share his restrictions. With the possible exception of the *pūrvapakṣa* in the relevant passages of the **Śataśāstra*,[96] the earliest available source for philosophical proofs of rebirth is the *Carakasaṃhitā*.[97] The passage is well-known and was recently studied by Meindersma, Filliozat and Preisendanz.[98] There is no need, therefore, to elaborate on it in any length; it will suffice to observe that empirical arguments, next to semi-empirical arguments (which are classified as perception, but are in fact inferences based on perceived marks),[99] have a prominent role in it, e.g., that the newborn performs actions he could not have learnt in this life, recollection of past lives, etc. Similarly, ethical arguments such as the fact that certain people live happily, others unhappily *(sukhāsukham āyus)*, are also raised in support of the thesis of rebirth.

In the Buddhist tradition itself, we might contrast Dharmakīrti's hesitation to use empirical and ethical arguments with the approach in the *Jātakamālā*.[100] The passage in the *Jātakamālā* is of particular interest for two reasons. In a survey of the *paralokasiddhi*-tradition in Buddhist literature, Namai pointed out: "We can say that most of the traditional arguments on this subject can be traced back to Āryaśūra's description of the Bodhisattva sermon. Accordingly, his argumentations can be considered as the prototype

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[96] Cf. Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts*, p. 34. Note that the arguments here, just like the one in *NS* 3.1.17, are primarily concerned with the existence of an *ātman*, not of rebirth.

[97] Cf. *CS*, *Sū* 11.27-33.

[98] Cf. Meindersma, "*Paralokasiddhi* in *Carakasaṃhitā*"; Filliozat, "Caraka's Proof of Rebirth"; Preisendanz, *Studien*, pp. 307-309.

[99] Cf. *ĀVD* 157.25-26.

[100] Cf. *JMā* XXIX.7-12. On the date of *JMā* cf. Hahn, "Notes on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature," p. 36.

for the proof of the existence of other lives in the Buddhist tradition."[101] The second reason is that Dharmakīrti is supposed to have composed a commentary on the *Jātakamālā*, and thus also on these verses. Having read only a small portion of this commentary, I find it nevertheless hard to believe that it was composed by the author of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. The comments on *JMā* XXIX.7-12 are very rudimentary and add nothing to the text by way of argument. However, I must add that an authority such as Steinkellner seems to accept the traditional attribution of the commentary to Dharmakīrti.[102] Whatever the case may be, we can safely assume that the *Jātakamālā* was known to Dharmakīrti, or at least that the arguments propounded there were familiar to him from other sources.[103] Here too we find the recollection of previous lives and the behaviour of the newborn child as the prominent arguments for rebirth.

Thus, there can be no doubt that certain types of arguments were known to Dharmakīrti and that he consciously chose not to use them. Did he think that they were not valid, or that using them against the Cārvāka would involve the use of a reason not established for the opponent *(anyatarāsiddha)?*[104] Or did he think that his own arguments based on the nature of causality would turn out to be much more convincing?

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[101] Cf. Namai, "Two Aspects of *Paralokasādhana,*" p. 228.

[102] Cf. Steinkellner, "Anmerkungen zu einer buddhistischen Texttradition: Paralokasiddhi," p. 89 and n. 25.

[103] Note, for instance, the parallels to *MHK* III.203, 213f., *NS* 3.1.17-23 and *ŚV, Ātmavāda* 65-66, pointed out by Namai, *ibid.*, n. 4.

[104] On a Cārvāka argument against *jātismara* cf. the fragment quoted in *TSP* 665.19-20 on *TS* 1945: *tatra yad uktaṃ cārvākeṇa: jātismaraṇam asiddham ekagrāmāgatānāṃ sarveṣāṃ smaraṇāt* ... . "What has been said in this [connection] by the Cārvāka: Recollection of a [previous] life is not established, because all those who have come from the same village [would] remember [each other or the village], ..."

Dharmakīrti's silence on *jātismara* is even more remarkable when one considers that in Mahāyāna it can be obtained also through non-meditational acts like listening to a text being read, and undergoes what Schopen calls a process of "domestication" and "democratization"; cf. Schopen, "Some notes on *Jātismara,*" p. 133 and *passim.*

CHAPTER FIVE

The Establishment of the Other World and the Refutation of Permanent Entities[1]

In the last chapter we saw that in the discussion about the existence of the "other world" Dharmakīrti's main opponents were the Cārvākas, or more precisely, if my somewhat tentative arguments are accepted, Kambalāśvatara. Yet we saw at the same time a remarkable similarity between the Cārvāka arguments against rebirth and those used by Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. These Brahminical philosophers did not deny, of course, the doctrine of rebirth, but only claimed that if the Buddhist doctrine of *anātman* were to be admitted, rebirth would be impossible. Consequently, one could expect Dharmakīrti to address these Brahminical schools and their doctrines in their specificity, and I will try to show here that this is indeed the case. After arguing that neither the body nor the breaths nor the senses could be causally responsible for the plurality and diversity of cognitions (vv. 34ff.), Dharmakīrti examines further possible relationships between body and cognitions in which the body is considered 1) as determined by the three humours *(doṣa)* (vv. 54-59), 2) as material cause *(upādānakāraṇa)* of cognition (vv. 60-62),[2] 3) as support or sustainer *(āśraya, ādhāra)* of cognition (vv. 63-72) and 4) as a whole *(avayavin)* (vv. 84-103).[3] Should we assume

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[1] This chapter is based on my paper "Vaiśeṣika or Cārvāka? The mysterious opponent in *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.63-72."

[2] The structure of the text is not entirely clear, and it is quite possible that this section is logically subordinate to the previous one, since the body as material cause is transformed by the transformation of the humours.

[3] This discussion of the *avayavin* is not as extensive as it may seem from the number of verses, for it contains a long digression (vv. 92-102) on the meaning of words. Still, it is of special interest since these verses probably constitute the first occasion on which Dharmakīrti criticizes the concept of *avayavin*. In the *PVSV* no discussion of the *avayavin* can be found. I am indebted for this remark to my friend Dr. T. Funayama, Kyoto.

As for vv. 73-83, they may be considered as an exposé of Dharmakīrti's own doctrine. This distinction, however, is not clear-cut, and one may consider, for instance, vv. 73-74 as

that we are still dealing with Cārvāka opponents? In principle there is nothing objectionable to such an assumption; the trouble is that the fragmentary Cārvāka materials known to us do not support this assumption unequivocally.[4] Should we then assume that the opponents belong to a medical school and to the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, or perhaps even to the Sāṅkhya, where the doctrines of the three humours and of the whole are well-established? The trouble is that none of these schools considers the body to be the support or material cause of cognition.[5]

Before arguing any further, we need to take a closer look at the arguments themselves. The discussion of the three humours is very smoothly connected with the preceding verses in which Dharmakīrti confronts the Cārvāka with various arguments against the capacity of the body to produce cognitions. If the body were one lasting and changeless entity from birth to death, it could not produce cognitions gradually, and thus all the cognitions one has throughout one's life would be produced at once. If the body were the material cause of cognition, the cognition would last as long as the body, and thus there could be no dead body (v. 51). If the breaths are considered the cause of cognition, the same inadmissible consequence applies: Because the

a continuation of the criticism of *āśraya,* in which "support" is not considered as a cause of continuity (as in vv. 63-72), but as something whose increase and decrease cause increase and decrease in the supported. Although the broad outline of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is clear, its detailed structure on the level of individual verses and their interconnection is sometimes quite obscure.

[4] For instance, the doctrine of the humours is not mentioned in the collection of Cārvāka fragments in Namai, "A Survey of Bārhaspatya Philosophy"; cf. the discussion below.

[5] As is well-known, according to Nyāya–Vaiseṣika and Mīmāṃsā, the cognition is a quality of the soul and has the soul as its support, and even according to Sāṅkhya, which, as far as I can see, is not targeted here by Dharmakīrti, *manas* or *buddhi* or *ahaṅkāra* have evolutionary primacy over the body and cannot be said to have it as support or material cause. In the light of the evolutionary sequence, one could perhaps say that the cognition is the support or material cause of the body. The medical schools does not seem to have a unitary position on that matter, but they recognize the existence of a permanent soul and follow either Nyāya or Sāṅkhya.

It is worthwhile noting that early Yogācāra considered the body with the senses to be the support of cognition; cf. *ASBh* 52.16-17: *cittasya hi sendriyaḥ kāya āśrayaḥ prasiddhaḥ*. "The body with the senses is commonly known as the the support of cognition." Cf. also the discussion of this passage in von Rospatt, *Momentariness*, pp. 126-127. Contrast this statement with Dharmakīrti's statement in v. 47b: *manojñānaṃ na sendriyāt.*

body is the material cause of the breaths, the breaths would last as long as the body and the cognition as long as the breaths (v. 53). All these inadmissible consequences do not apply if one admits that cognition is the cause of cognition.

However, the Cārvāka can diversify his causes and claim that the body is not less diversified than the cognition, karma, *saṃskāras*, or whatever. The body is not exactly the same throughout one's life, and the changes in the body can account for its changing capacity to produce cognitions. Thus, the inadmissible consequences raised in v. 51 against the positions that the body, and in v. 53 that the breaths, are causes of cognition, do not apply. To account for this changing capacity of the body the Cārvāka can take recourse to the theory of the three humours *(doṣa)*,[6] namely, wind, phlegm and bile, well-known from medical texts. When the three humours are in equilibrium, the body is in good health; when the equlibrium is disturbed, various sicknesses arise; and when the disturbance is serious enough, one dies. Thus, the three humours and their fluctuating relationship can account for the phenomenon of death. Therefore, the inadmissible consequence that the cognition would last as long as the body is present and thus there would be no dead body does not apply to the Cārvāka position.

To illustrate his case, the putative Cārvāka uses the simile of a wick *(varti)*, which after a while can no longer produce a flame. Dharmakīrti, however, objects that the example is not appropriate, because the transformation of the humours in the body is reversible. For instance, a transformation that causes fever is reversed, and the fever recedes.[7] Consequently, when the humours of a dead body regain their equilibrium, which seems to be implied by the cessation of fever, life arises again.

The opponent tries to counter by giving another example. A dead body does not revive, just as charcoal is not transformed back into wood. But Dharmakīrti replies that this example too is not appropriate because medical treatment is on principle effective. When the equilibrium of the humours is

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[6] When the three humours *(dhātu)* are causes of disease, they are called "faults" *(doṣa)*; cf. Aruṇadatta's comment on *AH, Sūtrasthāna*, 1.6, quoted and translated by Das, *Vṛkṣāyurveda*, p. 276f.

[7] All the commentaries illustrate this point with the example of fever *(jvara)*. D, however, adds poison *(dug, *viṣa)*, which is perhaps a less obvious example, but acceptable as long as as the poison is not a deadly one, or as long as one assumes, as Dharmakīrti seems to do, that the humours regain their equilibrium after death.

disturbed, and the body suffers from fever *(jvara)*, etc., one applies some medical treatment and the fever disappears, which implies that the humours have regained their equilibrium. Therefore, unlike the transformation of wood into charcoal *(aṅgāra)*, the transformation of humours is reversible. For only when the transformation of the humours is reversible can medical treatment be applied successfully. In the next two verses (56-57) the opponent objects that a small transformation of the humours, like the one which causes fever, etc., is reversible, but a large transformation that causes death is irreversible. Thus some transformations of the humours are reversible, while others are not. Against this, Dharmakīrti argues that the distinction should not be made between smaller and larger transformations, but between reversible and irreversible ones. Even a small transformation, such as the black colour *(śyāmatā)* of a piece of wood that is only slightly scorched, may be irreversible. On the other hand, no matter how long and how intensively one heats a piece of gold to keep it liquid, as soon as the fire is removed the gold returns to its solid consistency.[8]

The opponent replies with a counter-example in verse 58. If the transformation of the humours is always reversible, there would be no incurability of disease. Dharmakīrti explains that what is called incurable disease is due to one of two factors: either the restoring or healing factor *(samādhātṛ)*, such as a medicine or a physician, is not available, or the life force, which all the commentators identify with karma, decays *(āyuḥkṣaya)*.[9] However, if the humours alone were the cause of disease, there would be no incurable disease. In other words, according to Dharmakīrti there are no incurable diseases in the proper sense of the word. All diseases are, at least in principle, curable. Vibhūticandra[10] makes a distinction between timely and untimely death. The latter *(akālamaraṇa)* occurs when a medicine, etc., are not available, the former *(kālamaraṇa)* when the life force decays. It is difficult to say whether he attributes both kinds of death to karma *(tattatkarmavaśāt)*. D, P, R and M seem to think that only timely death is caused by

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[8] For further use of this argument cf. *PV* II 150-151, 162; cf. also 61, 76, 117, 181.

[9] On *āyuḥkṣaya* cf. *AKBh* 74.12f. (on 2.45ab, dLVP, vol. 2, p. 217f; cf. also p. 218, n. 4): "Is death due only to the decay of the life force alone or does it arise otherwise as well?..."; cf. also *AD* 102.1f. and *BA* 2.55; cf. also v. 53 below.

[10] Cf. M(S) p. 32, nn. 5-6.

karma. The phenomenon of untimely death, however, may be problematic, for in this case one would have to admit that a quantitative change becomes qualitative, i.e., that beyond a certain point a reversible transformation becomes irreversible. Otherwise, if death is not due to the decay of the life force, a dead body could indeed be revived once a medicine or a physician have become available. Perhaps another way of interpreting this verse (58) is to take it as a direct reply to the distinction made by the opponent between large and small transformations. Even if one accepts the opponent's assumption that beyond a certain point the quantitative difference in a transformation becomes a qualitative one, and thus the transformation is no longer reversible, one could still argue that at its beginning such a transformation is still reversible. Thus no disease would be incurable. For in principle, if the proper treatment is given from the beginning, there is no reason why a disease should not be cured. Such a reading, however, is improbable, for in the next verse (59) Dharmakīrti argues that if the humours alone were the cause of death, the dead body would become alive again when someone dies of a snake-bite and the cause of death is removed by extracting the poison or cutting off the bitten spot.[11]

Having looked at these arguments in some detail, do we have any reason to assume that Dharmakīrti's opponent is not a Cārvāka? As mentioned above, we do not possess decisive evidence for the assumption that the doctrine of three humours was accepted by the Cārvākas. This doctrine does not appear in Namai's collection of Cārvāka fragments (the most extensive to date), nor in the doxographical literature, nor, to the best of my knowledge, in modern studies of Lokāyata. However, our knowledge of the Lokāyata is at best fragmentary, and there is prima facie strong evidence that the Cārvākas accepted the doctrine of the humours. For instance, Malayagiri says:[12]

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[11] On the treatment of snake-bites by incision, cauterisation and sucking of the poisoned blood cf. *Suś, Kalpasthāna,* ch. 5. However, Dharmakīrti may be referring to a popular belief according to which poison accumulates after death at the bitten spot. Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 124, seems to take this argument in a completely different manner, namely, that by cutting off the limb, life will *not* be restored; cf. below v. 59, n. 2.

[12] Cf. *NAṬ* 32b1-2. I am indebted for this reference to A. Pohlus, Berlin.

> *atrāhuḥ bārhaspatyāḥ - naite rāgādayo lobhādikarmavipākodayanibandhanāḥ, kintu kaphādiprakṛtihetukāḥ, tathā hi - kaphahetuko rāgaḥ pittahetuko dveṣo vātahetukaś ca mohaḥ.*
>
> On this the Bārhaspatyas say: These, desire, etc., are not conditioned by the arising of the fruition of karma of greed etc., but are caused by the basic elements, [namely] phlegm etc. To explain: desire is caused by phlegm, hatred is caused by bile, and delusion is caused by wind.

This would seem to be clear-cut evidence for the endorsement of the theory of humours by the Lokāyata, but when we take a closer look at Malayagiri's presentation, we can ascertain that it is not based on any Lokāyata source, but is entirely extrapolated from Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra.* Practically every sentence of the Lokāyata *pūrvapakṣa* in the *NAṬ* can be traced back to P. More specifically, the above statement seems to be based on P 120.22-23: *nābhyāsajā rāgādayaḥ, kintu vātādijāḥ. tathā hi - vātaprakṛter mohaḥ, pittaprakṛter dveṣaḥ, kaphaprakṛte rāga iti.* Now, does Prajñākaragupta know of a Lokāyata source that uses the doctrine of the humours in this manner, or does he borrow his information from some other secondary source? It seems that Prajñākaragupta, too, is not familiar with any Lokāyata source on the humours, but paraphrases what Kamalaśīla says in *TSP* 668.24-25: *kecid āhuḥ - śleṣmaṇaḥ sakāśād rāgaḥ, pittād dveṣo, vātān moha iti.* I have not been able to trace the source of this statement, and it is indeed a pity that Kamalaśīla does not identify it. Unfortunately, we do not have a clear criterion to distinguish between genuine fragments and paraphrases and bogus or phantom materials. The present case of the humours illustrates clearly how precarious our assumptions about the Lokāyata are. Usually I would not hesitate to accept the above statements as reflecting a genuine Lokāyata doctrine. The only thing which makes me feel uneasy about it is the fact that none of Dharmakīrti's direct comentators seems to know a Cārvāka who pronounced this doctrine. We can ascertain this not only by an argument *ex silentio*. For in order to illustrate the opponent's position, Prajñākaragupta quotes half a verse from the *Siddhasāra* of Ravigupta.[13] If Prajñākaragupta knew a suitable Cārvāka opponent, why would he quote from a Buddhist medical source?

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[13] Cf. P 74.10 = *SSāra* 1.10cd: *teṣāṃ* (scil. *doṣāṇāṃ) samatvam ārogyaṃ kṣayavṛddhī viparyayaḥ.* I would like to thank Professor R. Emmerick, Hamburg, for identifying this verse.

Although the details of the arguments, in which sickness occupies a prominent place, certainly point at a medical school, it does not automatically follow that Dharmakīrti is criticizing an opponent from a medical school. He could engage, for instance, in a purely philosophical exercise, checking whether a Cārvāka could eventually use the doctrine of the three humours to save his position from Dharmakīrti's own criticism. Such an assumption is certainly not impossible, but it seems less and less probable as we move along to the next groups of arguments where the body is taken as support *(āśraya)* of cognition. Here again prima facie there is no reason to assume that a Cārvāka is not the target of the arguments, for the Cārvākas indeed considered the body as the support of cognition, while the Naiyāyikas did not. Yet when we look at the details of the argument, such an assumption becomes rather unlikely.

Dharmakīrti claims that neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing has a support, for a non-existing thing cannot have one, while an existing thing does not need one. The opponent objects that an existing thing has a support which is the cause of its continuity *(sthitikāraṇa)*. Dharmakīrti replies that continuity is not something different from the agent of continuity *(sthātṛ)*, i.e., the continuing thing itself. Thus, the cause of continuity is nothing but the cause of the thing itself, i.e., the respective previous moments in the same series, and not its support. Even if it is admitted that a thing and its continuity are different, the cause of the thing is also the cause of its continuity. Therefore, nothing is accomplished by the assumption of a further support.

If one assumes that something continues to exist because of the cause of its continuity, then it will not be destroyed as long as that cause is present, e.g., the cognition would last as long as the body; however, one observes that the cognition arises and disappears while the body continues to exist. If one assumes that the destruction of a thing is due to a cause of destruction, the same inadmissible consequence applies here too, namely, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing. If a thing is destroyed because of a cause of destruction, it would continue to exist even without the cause of continuity until a cause of destruction operates on it. In other words, until a cause of destruction arrives the thing continues to exist by itself; thus, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing, i.e., is superfluous. And when a cause of destruction arrives on the scene, the thing is destroyed; thus, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing, i.e., is powerless.

The opponent may claim that the cause of continuity is responsible for the continuity only until a cause of destruction arrives. In this case, however, the destruction would be a property of that thing. For if a thing needs a cause for its continuity, this implies that the thing left to itself will perish by itself or spontaneously. Thus, the destruction is immanent to the own nature of the thing. Consequently, when the thing is present the destruction cannot be obstructed. For whatever obstructs the destruction will also obstruct that very thing. Therefore, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing (vv. 63-66ab).

The opponent may claim that the body is the sustainer *(ādhāra)*[14] of cognition just as the pot is the sustainer of water, but the same inadmissible consequence would apply here too, under the assumption that the pot is considered to be the cause of continuity for water. However, there is another meaning of "support" that is acceptable to Dharmakīrti. When things perish at every moment, something is called "support" not because it causes continuity, but because it causes the series *(santati)* to be located at the same place (i.e., on the support). In this sense, and in no other, the term "support" may be applied to one of the assisting causes of the series. If, on the other hand, one accepts the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika position that things are not momentary, and some notion of support is to be used in this context, then the sustainer of water, etc., would be something that prevents their movement. But in the case of qualities, universals and actions, things which lack movement, the assumption of support is superfluous (vv. 66cd-68). By the same argument the relation of inherence, the notion of the inhered or containing cause, and the residence of the universal in all its individuals are refuted because they do not need a support (v. 69).

Verses 70-72 summarize and conclude the discussion. If a thing has to be destroyed by something else, this implies that the thing, by its own nature, tends to continue to exist; thus, the cause of continuity is superfluous. If, on the other hand, a thing is unstable by its own nature and tends to be destroyed even without a cause of destruction, then the cause of continuity is powerless. According to the opponent, everything which has a support lasts, and everything that arises has a support. If this were the case, no thing would ever be destroyed. The argument in this form is highly elliptic. However, Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin explain that things whose support is eternal, e.g., the soul, would last as long as their support. But

[14] "Sustainer" *(ādhāra)* seems to be used here as a special case of "support" *(āśraya)*; cf. the discussion below.

even things that do not seem to have an eternal support, such as a pot, would last forever, because the pot is supported by its halves *(kapāla)*, which are supported by their parts, and so on up to the atoms, which are eternal. Thus, nothing will ever be destroyed. Therefore, if a thing has a perishable nature, nothing can make it continue; and if it does not have a perishable nature, nothing can make it continue either.

Even though the Cārvākas considered the body to be the support of cognition or consciousness, the main reason for not assuming a Cārvāka opponent is that Dharmakīrti uses typical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, referring in vv. 68-69 to the categories of quality *(guṇa)*, universal *(sāmānya)*, action *(karman)* and inherence *(samavāya)*. Of course, this argument in itself is not conclusive. Can we be sure that no Cārvāka has ever accepted the Vaiśeṣika categories, at least in a modified form? The Cārvākas were not creative metaphysicians. On the contrary, they seem to have adapted previously existing philosophies of nature to their ethical needs. For instance, certain *Bṛhaspatisūtras* evoke unmistakenly the philosophy of nature found in the *Mahābhārata* in a formulation which is also reflected in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.*[15] We know that certain Cārvākas were willing to accept atomism, even though atoms are not known by perception, the only means of knowledge traditionally accepted in the school.[16] Certain other Cārvākas, or perhaps the same ones, were willing to admit ether as a fifth element, next to the four accepted by Bṛhaspati.[17] And it is even possible that some Cārvākas accepted the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness in some form.[18] And it should not surprise us that a school that was fighting above all a

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[15] Cf. *BS* A3: *tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñā(ḥ)* with *PDhS* 81.2: *trividhaṃ cāsyāḥ kāryaṃ śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñakam,* and *PDhS* 94.2-3: *tāsāṃ tu kāryaṃ trividhaṃ śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñakam.* Cf. also *MBhā* 12.187.8-10ab and 12.239.9-11ab.

[16] Cf. n. 69 in chapter IV.

[17] Cf. *SKV* I 16b1-2: *keṣāñcil lokāyatikānām ākāśasyāpi bhūtatvenābhyupagamāt pañcakopanyāso na doṣāyeti.* Cf. also *TRD* 450.11-12: *caturbhūtātmakaṃ jagad ācakṣate. kecit tu cārvākaikadeśīyā ākāśaṃ pañcamaṃ bhūtam abhimanyamānāḥ pañcabhūtātmakaṃ jagad iti nigadanti.*

[18] Cf. *TSP* 639.25 on *TS* 1885: *athedaṃ mahābhūtacatuṣṭayaṃ paraiś cārvākaiḥ kṣaṇikam abhyupagamyate yathoktadoṣabhayāt.*

moral or political battle was quite open in other matters and quite willing to update or modernize its philosophy of nature, as long as this did not interfere with its ethics. Indeed, one has the feeling that the entire Cārvāka metaphysics and epistemology (with the notable exception of Jayarāśi's) were subservient to their moral teachings. Furthermore, we know of at least two philosophers, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, who wrote both Cārvāka and Nyāya works.[19] Whether they were Cārvākas who converted to Nyāya or Naiyāyikas who converted to the Lokāyata, is impossible to determine. But the possibility of their having introduced Vaiśeṣika categories into the Cārvāka school is certainly not unimaginable. And if this is the case, one can assume that the relationship between body and consciousness was redefined by using Vaiśeṣika concepts.

On the other hand, the alternative assumption that Dharmakīrti was criticizing a Vaiśeṣika opponent immediately raises two obvious problems. First, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas did not deny the doctrine of rebirth. This problem, however, is easily solved, because, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā arguments against rebirth should be taken as an *aniṣṭāpādana* based on the Buddhist presuppositions. Second, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas did not maintain that the body is the support of cognition. Thus, in this respect, Dharmakīrti's arguments would involve the fallacy of *siddhasādhyatā*.

In spite of that, the assumption of a Cārvāka opponent is problematic. The reason for this is the same as above: if a Cārvāka were Dharmakīrti's opponent, then the commentators, or at least the two early commentators Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, should have known about it. In fact, Devendrabuddhi, while commenting on v. 64c, but certainly referring already to v. 63, identifies the opponent as a Vaiśeṣika *(bye brag pa)*.[20] And Śākyabuddhi thereon reiterates the same identification.[21] Significantly enough, they do not even qualify their identification by *ekadeśin* or a similar

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[19] Cf. Steinkellner, "Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya," pp. 149-162; Potter, *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. II, pp. 281, 338-340. Cf. also *NMGBh* 197.4: *cirantanacārvākair hi bhāviviktaprabhṛtibhiḥ* ... .

[20] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 36b2 = $D_{(De)}$ 32a7: *bye brag pa'i bum pa la sogs pa'i rdzas kyi yaṅ gnas par byed pa yod pa'i phyir ro* ‖ "For according to the Vaiśeṣika, even for a substance like a pot, etc., there is [something] that causes continuity."

[21] Cf. *PVṬ* 125b2.

expression, that is, they understand the opinion criticized as orthodox or mainstream Vaiśeṣika, not as some individual deviation. Prajñākaragupta does not identify the opponent by name, but he uses typical Vaiśeṣika vocabulary in his comments.[22] Manorathanandin is the only one among the commentators who makes an effort to keep the Cārvāka in the discussion and to show that the arguments involving Vaiśeṣika terminology are relevant to the Cārvāka as well: "Just as the pot, etc., are the sustainer of something existing, such as water, etc., so is the body [the sustainer] of cognition."[23] "The universal 'cow' resides only in certain individuals (i.e., cows), and consciousness [resides] only in [those] certain [material elements] that have transformed into the form of a body."[24] This is a respectable, but somewhat awkward attempt to make the discussion coherent. Manorathanandin probably faced the same problem we do, and his solution was to construe analogies between certain relations in Vaiśeṣika and the mind-body relationship in Cārvāka thought. Significantly, the relations used for the analogies do not hold for the mind-body relationship in Vaiśeṣika itself. It seems quite certain, therefore, that none of the commentators knew of a Cārvāka source that may have been the target of Dharmakīrti's arguments.

Moreover, our suspicion that no real Cārvāka opponent hides behind Dharmakīrti's arguments increases when we examine parallel passages in Dharmakīrti's writings where the topic of support or sustainer *(āśraya, ādhāra)* is discussed. In his reduction of various relationships to causal relationship in *PVin* III,[25] Dharmakīrti interprets the relation of sustainer and sustained *(ādhāra, ādheya)* in terms of assisting cause and its effect *(upakāraka, upakārya)*. The example used to illustrate this relationship is that of water and ground. Without the ground, the special state of the water, e.g., being still, is impossible. The opponent objects that the water is calm not because the ground participates in its production, but because of a contact with the ground; cf. *PVin III* 312a2:

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[22] Cf. P 80.10f. Some of the terms used are: *samavāya, saṃyoga, yutāyutasiddhi, avayavasamavetatva,* etc.

[23] M 31.15: *yathā jalādeḥ sata evādhāro ghaṭādis, tathā cittasya deha iti cet.*

[24] Cf. M 32.8-9: *kāsucid eva vyaktiṣu gotvaṃ vartate keṣucid eva ca dehākārapariṇateṣu caitanyam iti ... .*

[25] Cf. *PVin* III 312a1f., translated by Iwata, "Pramāṇaviniścaya III 64-67," p. 178f.

gal te de las bdag ñid kyi khyad par skyes pa'i phyir chu de ltar gnas pa ni ma yin no || 'o na ci źe na | ldan pa las yin no źe na.

[Objection:] The water does not remain so (i.e., without change) because a specific character has arisen [for it] from that [sustainer/support], but because of conjunction.

Here too the opponent is not named, but the doctrine of support in terms of conjunction, which is itself connected to the supporting and supported entities by inherence,[26] is specific to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Cf. for instance, *VS* 5.1.7: *saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam.* And even the example of water as something supported seems to be taken directly from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sources, e.g., *NBh* 574.4-5: *vidhārake hi vāyvabhrasaṃyoge gurutvād apāṃ patanakarma na bhavati.* "For when there is a supporting conjunction between wind and cloud, the action of falling of water because of heaviness does not arise." The probability that this doctrine of support was borrowed by a Cārvāka is, I think, rather low. It would imply that some Cārvākas claimed that the body is the support of consciousness because it has a contact with consciousness. The assumption of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent, on the other hand, is further strengthened when one takes into consideration another parallel passage where the relationship of support and supported is illustrated by the example of berries on a plate. Dharmakīrti is again reducing various Vaiśeṣika relationships to causal ones, and the opponent asks how the plate could be the sustainer of the berries, since it does not produce the berries. Cf. *PVSV* 70.16-20:

prakṛtyaiva guruṇo dravyasyāsamānadeśakāryotpādana-dharmaṇaḥ samānadeśakāryotpādanabhāva ādhārakṛtaḥ. tasmāt tatpūrvakṣaṇasahakāri kuṇḍaṃ tatraiva badarakāryaṃ janayad ādhāra ity ucyate. anyatheha kuṇḍe badarāṇīty api na syāt. na vai tadupakārakṛto 'yaṃ vyapadeśaḥ, kiṃ tarhi, saṃyogakṛtaḥ.

The fact that a heavy substance, which by its own nature alone is destined to produce its effect in a dissimilar place, produces its effect in the same place is due to a sustainer. Therefore, inasmuch as a plate that is an assisting [cause] in

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[26] Cf. *PVin* III 312a2-7 and Iwata, *ibid.*, p. 189.

the previous moment of these [berries] produces its effect, [namely] the berries [of the next moment], precisely there (i.e., precisely where the previous berries were on the plate), it is called a sustainer. Otherwise, one would also not [have the cognition] "There are berries here on the plate."

[Objection:] This designation is not due to the assistence [of the berries] by the [plate], but is due to a conjunction.

Dharmakīrti replies to the objection by arguing that all connections between things are based on causal relationships. The opponent claims that such a reduction of the relationship between sustainer and sustained could not account for the relation between a universal and its support, since the universal is eternal. Cf. *PVSV* 71.11-14:

athāpi syāt sthāpaka āśrayaḥ sāmānyasya. tataḥ sthitihetutvād ādhāro na jananād iti. tad ayuktaṃ tasya tadabhāve 'pi sthānāt. patanadharmaṇāṃ hi bhāvānāṃ pātapratibandhād ajanako 'pi sthāpako bhavet.

[Objection:] The support of a universal is what causes the continuity [of the universal in a certain place]. Therefore [something is] a sustainer because [it] is a cause of continuity, not because [it] produces [the universal].

[Reply:] This is not correct because [the universal] continues [to exist] even when that [cause of continuity] is absent. Even though [something is] not a producer, [it] may cause continuity, because it prevents things that are destined to fall from falling.

The close parallel between this passage and ours is, I think, undeniable. And here too, everything points at a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Furthermore, unlike the commentators of *PV* II, Karṇakagomin identifies the opponent of this section twice as Uddyotakara.[27] In the first instance he quotes from *NV* 669.7-8 on *NS* 2.2.64, and in the second instance he closely paraphrases *NV* 481.9f. on *NS* 2.1.33. Under the assumption that *PVSV* and *PV* II refer to the same doctrine (and thus to the same opponent), Karṇakagomin's identification is corroborated by the few references I was able to trace to the latter in post-

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[27] Cf. *PVSVṬ* 277.6 and 281.15: *yad āhod<d>yotakaraḥ* ... .

Dharmakīrtian Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika literature. *PV* II 68 is quoted in *NBhū* 125.1-2, and there is no doubt that Bhāsarvajña understands Dharmakīrti's verse as aiming at the Nyāya–Vāiśeṣika doctrine of the whole *(avayavin)* and of residence *(vṛtti)*. In his reply he charges that Dharmakīrti's notion of sustainer is too narrow. Cf. *NBhū* 125.3-5:

> *na hi gurutvapratibandhaka evādhāro loke prasiddhaḥ kiṃ tv anyathāpi. yathā darpaṇe mukhaṃ, śarīre duḥkhādayaḥ, khadge dīptir iti.*
>
> For a sustainer is not well-known among people only as something which obstructs [the effect of] heaviness, but in other ways too, for instance, a face in the mirror, pleasure, etc., in the body, brightness on a sword.

Similarly, *NBhū* 506.8-508.20 contains a detailed discussion of verses 63-66 as well as of Prajñākaragupta's commentary thereon,[28] and it is clear that Bhāsarvajña defends the doctrine of sustainer as cause of continuity as a Nyāya doctrine. He concludes the discussion by saying *(NBhū* 508.20): *sthiti-hetur ādhāra ity etasminn api pakṣe na doṣaḥ kaścid iti.* "'The sustainer is the cause of continuity.' In this tenet too there is no fault whatsoever." Nowhere throughout this relatively long discussion is there even a hint that this position was advocated by Cārvākas.

NM II 306.6-7 is not a direct quotation of *PV* II 72 and as such could refer to other passages in Dharmakīrti's writings where the doctrine of momentariness is expounded, notably *PV* I 195, but the formulation has a striking similarity to *PV* II 72 and most probably alludes to it:

> *vinaśvarasvabhāve 'smin kṛtaṃ pralayahetubhiḥ* |
> *anaśvarasvabhāve hi kṛtaṃ pralayahetubhiḥ* ||

Just like Bhāsarvajña, Jayanta interprets this argument as criticizing the Nyāya, and no reference or connection to a Cārvāka can be detected in this context.

Similarly, from the Vaiśeṣika side, *PV* II 72 seems to be referred to in *NKan* 189.7f.: *api ca bhāvasyāvinaśvarasvabhāvatve vināśo 'śakyakaraṇo vahner iva śītimā, vinaśvarasvabhāvatve vā nārtho hetubhiḥ.* "Moreover, if a thing has an imperishable nature, [its] destruction cannot be effected, like

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[28] Cp. *NBhū* 506.9f. with P 79.29f., *NBhū* 507.1f. with P 81.32f., etc.

the coldness of fire. Or if [it] has a perishable nature, the causes [of destruction] are superfluous." Since this rendering is not a quotation, we cannot be sure whether Śrīdhara does not refer to some other passage where the same argument appears. The context in the *NKan* would fit better with a passage where the doctrine of momentariness is discussed without specific reference to the concept of support/sustainer, and earlier in the discussion Dharmottara's name is mentioned (*NKan* 184.10). In any case, here too there is no indication in the discussion that a Cārvāka is somehow connected to the topic.

Finally, the assumption that we are not dealing with a Cārvāka opponent is corroborated by the close parallel passages in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śānta-rakṣita. Unlike most of the arguments against the Cārvākas, the arguments presented here do not appear in the *Lokāyataparīkṣā,* but in the *Sthirabhāva-parīkṣā* and in the *Sāmānyaparīkṣā;* in both cases they occur in contexts which do not have anything to do with Cārvāka ideas, nor with the doctrine of rebirth, nor with the relationship between body and cognition, nor even with the relationship between soul and cognition.[29]

The parallel passage in the *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā* is a bit intriguing, because Śāntarakṣita's opponent, or one of his main opponents, is no other than Aviddhakarṇa.[30] However, a closer examination leaves no doubt that we are dealing here with Aviddhakarṇa the Naiyāyika. The whole context of the discussion points at the Nyāya school, and Aviddhakarṇa seems closely related to Uddyotakara, for their positions are presented next to each other and they are refuted together.[31] Rather than pointing at a Cārvāka, the evidence from the *TSP* strengthens Karṇakagomin's identification of the opponent as Uddyotakara.

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[29] Cf. *TS* 350-384. One verse is repeated almost verbatim in the *Sāmānyaparīkṣā;* compare also v. 68 below with *TS* 801:

syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhakaḥ |
agatīnāṃ kim ādhāraiḥ sāmānyānāṃ parikalpitaiḥ ||

Cf. also *HBṬĀ* 386.15-16.

[30] Cf. *TSP* 172.12f. on *TS* 367: *atrāviddhakarṇoktāni vināśasya hetumattvasādhane pramāṇā-ni* ... . Although the general doctrine of a cause of destruction was undoubtedly endorsed by Aviddhakarṇa, it is not clear to me whether his particular arguments, as reported in 367-369, are addressed by Dharmakīrti.

[31] Cf. *TSP* on *TS* 370. They are refuted together in *TS* 373ff.

To sum up, we have multiple evidence which points at a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent for the verses under discussion. First, parallel passages from Dharmakīrti's own writings (*PVSV* and *PVin* III). Second, identifications of the opponent by some of Dharmakīrti's commentators - as a Vaiśeṣika by Devendrabuddhi (and Śākyabuddhi), as Uddyotakara by Karṇakagomin.[32] Third, the reaction to Dharmakīrti's verses by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors like Jayanta, Bhāsarvajña and Śrīdhara. Fourth, the context of the same arguments in the *TS(P)*.

It has to be admitted, however, that all this is not enough to entirely exclude the possibility of a Cārvāka opponent, if we assume that certain Cārvākas accepted some revised version of the Vaiśeṣika ontology. In this case, the Cārvāka position would be in general similar to that of the Mīmāṃsā. For inasmuch as the Mīmāṃsakas accepted large portions of the Vaiśeṣika ontology and rejected momentariness, they could be equally the target of Dharmakīrti's arguments. And indeed Śālikanātha had every reason to feel that Prabhākara is also targeted by Dharmakīrti.[33]

Therefore, what can be concluded from the above is that Dharmakīrti criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and by the same token the Mīmāṃsā. The question whether the Cārvākas are *also* criticized must, for the time being, remain open, inasmuch as we cannot exclude the possibility that certain Cārvākas accepted the Vaiśeṣika ontology in some form. It goes without saying that even if this were to be the case, this would not mean that entities like an eternal soul would have been equally accepted by the Cārvākas, just as the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas accepted inherence, but denied that it is one or eternal. I have to emphasize, however, that this is a purely theoretical possibility and that we have no hard evidence to support it. I for one think that it is highly improbable.

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[32] Note, however, that Karṇakagomin's two references to Uddyotakara occur immediately before and after the passage that is relevant for the present discussion. It is, of course, theoretically possible that the opponent in the passage in between was not Uddyotakara.

[33] Cf. *PrP* 369.23f.: *kiṃ kṛtakā bhāvāḥ svahetubhyaḥ samupajāyamānā vinaśvarasvabhāvā eva jāyante, avinaśvarasvabhāvā vā? vinaśvarasvabhāvā udayānantaram eva līyanta iti kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ. avinaśvarasvabhāvās tu na kadācid vinaśyeyuḥ.*
"Do produced things that arise from their own causes arise having a perishable nature or an imperishable nature? Having a perishable nature, they pass away immediately after [they] arise; thus, [they] are momentary. On the other hand, having an imperishable nature, [they] would never perish."

This inevitably leads us to the following question: What is, in the final analysis, the subject matter of these verses? For the Cārvāka, the support of cognition is the body; for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā, it is the *ātman*. Unfortunately, vv. 63-72 mention neither the body nor the *ātman*. It should be noted, however, that immediately before (v. 62) and immediately afterwards (v. 73) the body is explicitly mentioned, and therefore the more natural reading would be to understand the body as the main subject of these verses, allowing for the *ātman* to be the subject of the refutation by implication in v. 69, that is, to be intended as the rejected *samavāyikāraṇa*, namely, of cognition.

Consulting the commentaries on this question does not lead to a clear-cut answer. Devendrabuddhi introduces v. 63 as a general rejection of the notion of support, under the assumption of its ontological difference from the supported. The rejection by implication applies to the cognition too, but in fact applies to any quality *(*guṇa)*, universal, etc.[34] This is also consistent with Devendrabuddhi's identification of the opponent as a Vaiśeṣika. On the whole, Devendrabuddhi must have considered vv. 63-72 as a digression into the topic of support in view of the Vaiśeṣika categories, a digression that is of no particular relevance to the topic of rebirth. Significantly, neither a word for body nor a word for *paraloka* appear in Devendrabuddhi's comments on these verses. On the other hand, the word **ātman* appears twice, in the commentary on v. 69 and, more significantly, on v. 71, where pleasure, etc., are said to be supported by the *ātman (bdag la brten pa'i bde la sogs pa)*. When we add to that the typical Vaiśeṣika vocabulary, we get a consistent presentation of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Yet the connection to the Cārvāka is not entirely severed, and it appears where one would expect it least, namely, in the commentary on v. 69c, where it is suggested as one out of three alternatives to interpret *-ādi* in the verse. Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 37b5 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a7f.: *'byuṅ ba rnams la brten nas sems ñid gnas pa'am* | "Or consciousness continues [to exist] inasmuch as [it] rests on the elements."

Reading through Prajñākaragupta's commentary, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. First, there is no mention of an opponent by name. Second, Prajñākaragupta introduces v. 63 as referring to the body and cognition (P 79.24: *kāyacetasoḥ)*. Third, the word *ātman* is never used.[35]

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[34] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 35b5 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b4: *'dis kyaṅ sems ñid daṅ yon tan daṅ spyi la sogs pa gźan gyi rten ñid yod pa ma yin te.*

Fourth, *paraloka* and equivalent expressions occur; cf. for instance P 82.2: *paralokasya pratiṣṭhitir it[ī]<y ani>ṣṭam āpatitam,* and P 82.10: *anādyanantaḥ saṃsāraḥ.* Yet throughout the discussion, typical Vaiśeṣika terminology is used. The general impression one gets from Prajñākaragupta's comments is that of a Cārvāka opponent who has incorporated the Vaiśeṣika ontology into a materialistic world view.

Ravigupta (R 329a4ff. = 657.4ff.) on the whole follows Prajñākaragupta, and perhaps his interpretation should not even count as an additional opinion. If there is a difference between the two commentaries, it is that Ravigupta's comments slightly strengthen the impression of a Cārvāka opponent. The body is introduced as the subject for practically every verse, and the Vaiśeṣika terminology, although present, is less prominent. The establishment of *paraloka* is maintained as the general topic of the discussion. Finally, we reach Manorathanandin, our last commentator, who knew the somewhat conflicting interpretations of Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta and had to decide between them or find some compromise. He introduces v. 63 (= 65 in M's enumeration) as referring to the body (M 30.10: *nanu dehaś cittasyāśritaḥ;* cf. also M 31.15 on v. 66cd (= 68cd): *tathā cittasya dehaḥ).* He seems to understand vv. 63-67 (= 65-69) as a general critique of the notion of support and supported, and v. 68 (= 70) as a specific critique, perhaps no longer referring to a Cārvāka; cf. M 31.21, introducing v. 68 (= 70): *evaṃ sāmānyenāśrayāśrayibhāvadūṣaṇam abhidhāya [dravyadūṣaṇādau]*[36] *viśeṣe dūṣaṇam āha - syād ādhāro jalādīnām ... .* In this analysis Manorathanandin differs from Prajñākaragupta who presents vv. 66cd-68 as a reply to the objection that the arguments of vv. 63f. are useless because the support of water is seen and no reasoning can sublate that perception. Verse 69ab (= 71ab) according to Manorathanandin is definitely not referring to a Cārvāka, but to a Naiyāyika etc.; cf. M 31.26f.: *samavayikāraṇaṃ ca samavetakāryajanakaṃ, yathā - ātmādi buddhyādīnām.* But the second half of the same verse (69cd = 71cd) brings the Cārvāka back into the discus-

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[35] On the contrary, in the introduction to the verse the opponent implies that the cognition, just like any quality, would be destroyed when its cause characterized by inherence is destroyed. Thus, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent seems to be ruled out, since this would imply that the *ātman* may be destroyed. Further, statements such as in P 82.13, where *caitanya* rather than *vijñāna* or a similar expression is used, also seem to evoke a Cārvāka rather than a Naiyāyika.

[36] *dravyadūṣaṇādau* is most probably a later interpolation.

sion; cf. M 32.9: *keṣucid eva ca dehākārapariṇateṣu caitanyam.* The same shift can be seen in connection with the summarizing verses 70-72 (= 72-74) where Manorathanandin reverts again to a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent and mentions the *ātman* as support of pleasure (M 32.16: *sukhādir ātmāśritaḥ).* On the whole, Manorathanandin's solution was to read certain verses as referring to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, others as referring to Cārvāka. Thus, this section of M can be read as a general critique of "support" that can sometimes be used against the Cārvāka, sometimes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In view of the above, it may be advisable to suggest yet another reading of "support" that has certain advantages in explanatory power, even though it has a disadvantage inasmuch as it is not endorsed by any of the commentaries, at least not explicitly. One of the problems in reading vv. 63-72 as referring to the Nyāya was the assumption that in that case the arguments should refer to the *ātman,* which is never mentioned in these verses, and furthermore, that immediately before and after this section (in vv. 62 and 73) the body is mentioned. Yet we could maintain the assumption of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent and still keep the body as subject of discussion, since in Nyāya the body is considered support *(āśraya)* for the experience of pleasure and pain *(sukhaduḥkhasaṃvedana).*[37] Assuming such an understanding of "support" would bring our verses somewhat closer to the example of the berries on the plate or the water on the ground, for the berries and the water do not rest on the plate or the ground in the same manner as a cognition is supported by the soul or a quality by its substance. Further, this reading of "support" will also provide a smoother reading of v. 69 as referring to something new - in the interpretation of "support" as *ātman, samavāyikāraṇa* and *āśraya* refer to the same entity. However, there remains the problem of the relevance to the topic of rebirth. My suggestion is that it is relevant because, just like the Cārvāka, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā[38] denied that the series of cognition can shift from one body to another as long as one does not assume the existence of an *ātman.* Therefore, unlike the assumption of the omnipresent soul as the support in which the cognition inheres, the assumption of the body as support of cognition (technically: as delimiting the possibility of the experience by the omnipresent soul to a

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[37] Cf. *NS* 3.1.6 and *NBh* 724.5f.: *kāryaṃ tu sukhaduḥkhasaṃvedanaṃ tasyāyatanam adhiṣṭhānam āśrayaḥ śarīram;* cf. also *NBhū* 125.4 quoted above.

[38] Cf. *ŚV, Ātmavāda* 59-62, quoted above; cf. also *NM* II 345.4f.

certain place) makes the discussion relevant to the doctrine of rebirth, even if we assume a Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika opponent.

Thus, is there any reason to assume a Cārvāka opponent at all for the verses under discussion? As we have seen, the assumption of a Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika opponent fulfills all three requirements for the discussion to be meaningful in its context. It accounts for the terminology and the specific doctrine of support as cause of continuity (not of a single cognition, of course, but of the series) and as sustainer, it allows the body to be the intended support, and it keeps the discussion relevant to the topic of rebirth. As pointed out above, this cannot absolutely exclude the possibility of a Cārvāka opponent as well, but in fact the only evidence for such an opponent is based on Prajñākaragupta's commentary. (Ravigupta and Manorathanandin probably rely in this point on Prajñākaragupta and cannot count as providing independent evidence.) Moreover, it should be noted that there is no absolute necessity to read the comments in P as referring to a Cārvāka, since the statements concerning the body and the "other world" can be read against a Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika–Mīmāṃsā background. Admittedly, however, such a reading is less natural.[39] But does this mean that Prajñākaragupta actually knew a Cārvāka text where such opinions were advocated? Couldn't he just assume that Dharmakīrti was criticizing a Cārvāka (an understandable assumption in this context) and construe his commentary accordingly? What was his source material for the presumed Cārvāka doctrine?

In the previous section (vv. 54-59), Dharmakīrti argued against the dependence of the cognition on the body characterized by the three humours, and basically the same dilemma had arisen. In this context I was able find some source material, even if not conclusive, for the assumption that some Cārvākas adapted the doctrine of the three humours to their needs. On the other hand, I could not find any independent sources that attribute to Cārvākas a doctrine concerning the causes of continuity and destruction that would resemble the one presupposed by Dharmakīrti's arguments.

Furthermore, in the introduction to v. 54 Prajñākaragupta explicitly identifies the opponent as a Cārvāka (cf. P 74.4: *cārvākasyāpi tarhi parihāro 'sty eva),* but in this case it seems quite certain that no such Cārvāka was known to him. For in order to illustrate the opponent's position, Prajñākara-

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[39] Cf. n. 35 above.

gupta quoted from the *Siddhasāra* of Ravigupta.[40] Similarly, the presentation of the opponent in v. 69 seems to refer to a Cārvāka, yet the source material seems to come from the Vaiśeṣika. Cf. for instance, P 82.29-30: *evam āśritatve 'pi caitanyaṃ śarīrābhāve 'pi śarīrāntarānugataṃ bhaviṣyatīti na paralokāsiddhiḥ.* "In the same manner, even if consciousness rests on [a body], when [one] (i.e., the present) body is absent, it will follow another body (i.e., be connected with a future body). Thus, the other world is not unproved." Such a statement certainly evokes a Cārvāka opponent, yet P 82.18-19 is almost a quotation of Praśastapāda: ... *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām ihabuddhinibandhanaḥ samavāya iti vacanāt,* to be compared with *PDhS* 773.3-4: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ.*

I would like to conclude, therefore, that the opponent in vv. 63-72 was a Naiyāyika (and, by the same token, a Vaiśeṣika and a Mīmāṃsaka).[41] If we can rely on post-Dharmakīrtian literature, everything seems to point in Uddyotakara's direction. However, unlike some of the arguments in the *TS(P)* that match unmistakenly the arguments found in the *Nyāyavārttika,*[42] Dharmakīrti's arguments are too general to allow a perfect matching. As they stand they are even applicable, at least to some extent, to the Sarvāstivāda and the Sammatīya.[43] But to the best of our knowledge, they are *not* applica-

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[40] Cf. n. 11.

[41] This identification has implications also for the identity of the opponent in the section on the *avayavin* (vv. 84-103), which is not discussed here. However, a closer examination is needed before we can determine whether Dharmakīrti addresses a specific opponent like Uddyotakara or whether he argues against the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika in general.

[42] Cp. *TSP* 172.23f. with *NV* 834.1-835.6 on *NS* 3.2.14.

[43] On the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of the Sarvāstivāda cf. *AK(Bh)* 2.45cd. However, Dharmakīrti's arguments operate with two elements (cause of continuity and cause of destruction) rather than four as in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. Further, there is no reference to the four *anulakṣaṇas* (cf. *AK(Bh)* 2.46ab), which are so typical of this doctrine.

Vasubandhu also refers to someone from a different school *(nikāyāntarīya)* who accepts a cause of destruction. Yaśomitra *(AKV* 266.15) identifies him as a Sammatīya: *yo 'py āha nikāyāntarīya iti. āryasammatīyaḥ. sa ghaṭāder mudgarādikṛta iti manyate. kālāntarāvasthāyi hi tasya rūpam.* This doctrine must refer only to material things since the Sammatīyas accept that the mental elements are momentary *(AKV* 266.15: *cittacaittānāṃ kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamāt* ...). Yaśomitra's statement seems to contradict Vinītadeva's, as reported by Bareau, *Les*

ble to the Lokāyata. Yet a note of caution has to be added. Not only is our knowledge of Lokāyata too fragmentary to allow any definitive conclusion, but also the direction of our investigation goes directly against the Tibetan tradition of Dharmakīrti scholarship. According to this tradition, as represented by Tsoṅ kha pa and his disciple rGyal tshab, the materialists are the sole opponents in the sections examined here. Even the criticism of the *avayavin* and the atoms (vv. 83ff.), rGyal tshab claims, is directed against the Cārvākas, and is analyzed by him as a second refutation of materialism, even though the terminology used by Dharmakīrti is typical of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. rGyal tshab certainly senses that there is a problem here and says: "Even though this whole is a fundamental doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika, the opponent of these statements is again[44] the Lokāyatika because [this whole] is part of the refutation by way of analysis of the nature of the body as [something] which functions as support when the Lokāyatika claims the body to be a special support of the mental cognition."[45] Of course, such comments should not be accepted blindly, and our knowledge today of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā texts is far superior to what rGyal tshab could have known from the texts at his disposition, but the comment as such is thought-provoking and points at a genuine problem in Dharmakīrti's text.

I think that it has become clear by now that in trying to establish the autonomy of the mind Dharmakīrti was not concerned solely with the Cārvāka, but was fighting on several fronts at the same time. I do not delude myself that this is the last word on the subject, but it is only appropriate to

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Sectes, p. 126, thesis 23) and n. 2, namely, that the *skandhas* last for more than a moment. Unfortunately we don't know enough about the Sammatīya doctrines to be able to judge whether Dharmakīrti's arguments could apply to their doctrine. However, to the best of my knowledge neither Dharmakīrti's commentators nor other Buddhist works like the *TS(P)* even hint at the possibility that Dharmakīrti criticizes the Sammatīyas in these verses. This agrees with von Rospatt's observation (*Momentariness*, p. 4) that in the later phase of the doctrine of momentariness the discussion is directed against the Brahminical schools. If there is a nuance of difference between my findings and those of von Rospatt's, it is that the discussion is directed above all against the Naiyāyikas rather than the Vaiśeṣikas.

[44] Literally: "... the re-opponent of these statement is the Lokāyatika ... ."

[45] Cf. *gSal byed* 272.8-11: *yan lag can 'di bye brag pa'i rtsa ba'i 'dod pa yin kyaṅ | rgyaṅ phan lus yid blo'i rten khyad par can du 'dod pa na | rten byed pa'i lus kyi ṅo bo la dpyad nas 'gog pa'i yan lag yin pas | gźuṅ 'di dag gi phyir rgol ni rgyaṅ phan yin no ||* The translation above differs considerably from Jackson's in *Is Enlightenment Possible?* p. 272.

conclude a study of Dharmakīrti with a note of vagueness and uncertainty that reflects the intriguing ambiguity of the original.

Annotated Translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* II 34-72

Together With Prajñākaragupta's Commentary

sādhanaṃ karuṇābhyāsāt sā buddher dehasaṃśrayāt |
asiddho 'bhyāsa[1] *iti cen nāśrayapratiṣedhataḥ* ||34||

[1] $PV_{M(S)}$: *asiddhā'bhyāsa*

"Compassion is the proof [of the Buddha being a means of knowledge]. That [compassion arises] from repeated practice.
[Objection:] Since the cognition rests on the body, the repeated practice [of compassion] is not established [for more than one life].
[Reply:] No, because [we] deny [that the cognition] rests [on the body]."

1) There are two ways to construe *karuṇā:* either as a first member of a compound or as a nominative. Thus, we can read either *sādhanaṃ karuṇā-bhyāsāt; sā buddher dehasaṃśrayāt,* or *sādhanaṃ karuṇā; abhyāsāt sā.* The Tibetan translation, *sgrub byed thugs rjes goms las de,* opts for the latter alternative: "The proof is due to compassion. ..." The Tibetan translators used the instrumental case-ending precisely in order to prevent that *thugs rje* would be misconstrued with *goms,* for the object of *goms* can be construed either with the particle *la* or directly; thus, if the instrumental had not been used, *sgrub byed thugs rje goms las* could have been misunderstood in the sense of the first alternative. Devendrabuddhi too opts for the latter alternative; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$18a1f. = $D_{(De)}$ 16b3f.: *sgrub byed thugs rje ... de* (i.e., *thugs rje) ni sgrub pas byed pa'o* | ... *goms las thugs rje źes bya ba de yin no* ||. Similarly M 20.10: *sādhanaṃ karuṇā,* and 20.12: *abhyāsāt sā.* R 316a4 (= 631.4) and 316b2 (= 632.2) also construes in this manner: *sgrub byed thug rje źes bya ba ... goms pa la (las?) źes bya ba ... de ñid goms pa las.* Only Prajñākaragupta gives both alternatives. The first alternative is explicated in P 53.8-9: *tasya prāmāṇyasya sādhanaṃ kuto bhavati? karuṇābhyāsāt. sā ca karuṇā buddher dehasaṃśrayāt.* The second alternative, which is clearly better, is introduced in P 53.13: *athavā sādhanaṃ karuṇā,* and continues in 53.15: **abhyāsāt sā;* cf. the translation below. Cf. also the translation by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 116: "That which establishes [the Buddha as a source of knowledge] is compassion that comes from repeated practice." Nagatomi, *"Mānasa-Pratyakṣa,"* p. 248, however, translates *abhyāsāt sā* by "and thus (is completely natural to him) from long-repeated exercise *(abhyāsa)."* Later on the same page he makes clear that "completely natural" is an equivalent to *svarasavāhin,* which does not appear in the

commentaries on this verse, but is understandable in view of the discussion in vv. 120-131ab.

2) P 53.6-54.19: "[One may object:] Whence is it proved [that the Buddha is] a means of knowledge endowed with both characteristics,[1] or [in other words] what is the reason *(hetu)?* Thus, [Dharmakīrti] says: ... (v. 34ab). Whence is *the proof* that he is a means of knowledge (or: a reliable person)? *By the repeated practice of compassion.* And *that,* [i.e.] compassion, *is due to resting on the body of cognition.*[2] Because it rests on that which is the body of cognition, this compassion, assisted by repeated practice, obtains the highest degree of excellence *(parām prakarṣagatim).*
[Objection:] Even if [we admit that the Buddha has] compassion, nevertheless, how is it possible [to affirm that his] being a means of knowledge/reliability [is proved] from that [compassion]?
[Reply:] It is possible, because

> 377. Compassion is the wish that someone else [would be] disconnected from the cause of suffering as well as from suffering [itself]. The mind of someone who has this [compassion] is, therefore, [set] on procuring the means for that [disconnection].

For, as we shall show later on, [a person] who has the wish to disconnect someone else from suffering necessarily seeks the means for that.

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[1] Cf. *PV* II 1 and 5c, discussed in ch. II above.

[2] Note that $P_{(Pe)}$ 54b4 reads *yul* instead of "body," which is probably due to a misreading of *deha* as *deśa;* the same misreading occurs also in the next sentence. $P_{(De)}$ 46a7, however, reads *lus.* As long as the Skt is correct and at least one Tib recension agrees with it, a deviation in the other recension is not mentioned in the notes hereafter.

The statement that compassion rests on "the body of cognition" is not entirely clear. Perhaps one has to connect this to the discussion of unlimited increase of compassion in vv. 120-131ab. "The body of cognition" could then be interpreted as the own nature of the cognition, i.e., compassion can increase to the highest degree, because it becomes the own nature of the Buddha's stream of consciousness. Cf. Apte, *s.v. tanu* (3): "Nature, the form or character of anything." Cf. also *PW, s.v. kāya* (7): "Natur," "Eigenthümlichkeit." A somewhat similar usage of words for "body" *(deha, tanu, kāya)* can be observed in the *TUS,* for instance, p. 6.20 = 88.7 *(tanu).* Although Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, if I understand it correctly, is not convincing, one cannot but admire its ingeniousness.

Or *compassion is the proof* [for the Buddha's being a means of knowledge]. For a compassionate [man] is not without helping others. Because he teaches for the sake of others for this [reason] (i.e., in order to help them), [the Buddha is] a means of knowledge [by way of his teaching]. [Alternatively, compassion is the proof, because] a compassionate [man] applies himself to the means [for ending suffering], and this means [as practiced by him] is the proof that he himself [and not only his teaching] is a means of knowledge (i.e., is reliable or is an authority). This compassion itself, characterized by the desire to protect everyone, from what does it arise? [Dharmakīrti] says: *That [compassion arises] from repeated practice.*[3] For compassion arises towards those who are one's own from the awakening of traces [left by past experience] through seeing [their] suffering.[4] By repeated practice [compassion] proceeds even towards someone about whom one does not care, or an enemy *(udāsīnaśatrupakṣa)*. Therefore, if one is not omniscient, protecting all [living beings] is impossible. Thus, the repeated practice of the means for that [protection of all living beings] is being accomplished [by the Buddha].

[Objection:] According to the learned people, the cognition rests on the body, and compassion is nothing but [a mode of] cognition. Thus, it (i.e., compassion) too indeed rests on the body. Therefore, because the body is [reduced] to ashes, etc., *the repeated practice is not established.* For if another life is possible, then by the accumulation of repeated practice during many lives, the [result] desired [by you, the Buddhists, could] be established. For:

> 378. The cognition has the nature of the body, is the effect of the body, or is a quality of the body; by relying on [no

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[3] Read *abhyāsāt sā* instead of *karuṇābhyāsāt;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 55a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 46b3: *goms las de.*

[4] The Skt has one or two lacunae here; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 55a1-2 = $P_{(De)}$ 46b3-4: *sñiṅ rje ni bdag gi pa rnams la sdug bsṅal mthoṅ bas bag chags sad pa las skye la | goms pa las ni tha mal pa daṅ dgra bo'i phyogs dag la 'jug pa yin no* ||. The Skt text could be reconstructed in two ways, either as *karuṇā hy* <*ātmīyeṣu*> *duḥkha* <*darśanena vāsanāprabodhād utpadyate.*> *abhyāsāt* ..., or *karuṇā hi duḥkha* <*darśanenātmīyeṣu vāsanāprabodhād utpadyate.*> *abhyāsāt* ... . The first alternative seems more probable, but has the disadvantage of involving two lacunae instead of one.

matter which of] the three doctrines here, [one must con clude that] repeated practice is impossible.[5]

[Reply:] In respect to that [Dharmakīrti] says: ... (34b-d).[6]
['Because (we) deny (that the cognition) rests (on the body)' means] because it is denied that the body alone, without the cognition which follows from the previous [life] *(pūrvānvayabuddhi),* is a support for the cognition.[7] Indeed, whether [the cognition] is an effect, a quality, or otherwise (i.e., has the nature of the body), the body alone is not [its] support.
[Objection:][8] The cognition which rests on the body is apprehended as effected by the body, because one observes that it rests on the body of the parents *(mātāpitṛdehāśrayaṇa).* To explain: The behaviour which has the nature of [cognition], the sharpness of the mind, etc., which follow (i.e., which are similar to) the parents, have as their support the great elements [destined for] the body to be produced. [It is] similar to [the case of] murals, etc., which follow the visual cognition, etc., of the painter [and] rest on the wall, [but] are the product of the painter.[9] Thus, a mural does not last

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[5] This verse is quoted with some variants by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 46.30-31. The first half of the verse reads exactly as in P, but it is preceded by *atha* which was mistakenly considered to be part of the verse (i.e., *atha dehātmikā* ...). To account for the two additional syllables the editor emended the second *pāda* to ... *dehakāryā dehaguṇa* ..., apparently against all manuscripts and the Benares edition of 1917 that is not available to me. The last *pāda* reads *na paralokasya sambhavaḥ* instead of *nāsty abhyāsasya sambhavaḥ.*

The entire refutation of the Cārvāka in *NAVV* 46.6-51.8 consists of summaries, paraphrases and quotations of P.

[6] *buddher dehasaṃśrayāt* should be read as a part of the *mūla* text.

[7] Read *buddher āśrayatvasya;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 55a6 = $P_{(De)}$: *blo'i rten yin pa.*

[8] The following objection is summarized by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 47.1-4.

[9] $P_{(Pe)}$ 55a8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 47a1-2, however, seems to be corrupt: ... *ri mo la sogs pa bźin no* | *ri mo byed pa'i gzugs śes pa la sogs pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can rtsig pa la brten pa daṅ ri mo ni ri mo byed pa'i 'bras bu'i ṅo bo ñid do.* Cf. also R 316b5 = 632.5.

The same Cārvāka argument appears in *NAṬ* 4b4-7 and in *ĀNṬ* 316a8-11, and it is used there to refute the existence of the *ātman.* It is probable, however, that Malayagiri simply adjusts and modifies the argument from P 53.27f., for the entire discussion against the Cārvākas in *NAṬ* 3a10-8a6, 32b1-34b7 and in *ĀNṬ* 315a6-319a13 (the two are practically identical) seems to be extracted from P. The quotations of verses from P in the *NAṬ* were

without a wall, nor step over to another wall, nor come from another wall. Or [it is] similar to [the case of] the colour which arises from the ripening of the mango fruit, etc., [which does not last without the fruit, does not go to another fruit, nor come from another fruit]. Or [it is similar to the case of] smoke, which is the product [of ignition or the igniter?], does not come from another fire, nor sets out to another fire. As for the power of intoxication *(madaśakti),* it rests on the intoxicating [substance], [and] it does not exist before liquids like *kaṣāya,* etc., are mixed[10] [with that substance], [but] is manifested [only afterwards]. When the [power of intoxication] is disappearing [in a certain intoxicating substance], it does not take another intoxicating [substance] as its support. In the same manner, senses, special features of consciousness [etc., rest on a body and when destroyed in that body, do not go to another body, etc.]. And thus, [a commentator on our *Bṛhaspatisūtra]* says: The principles *(tattva,* viz. the right or true predicates of things) are earth, water, fire, and wind. [To wit,] the principles are only earth, etc., [and] earth, etc., are the(?) only principles. (Or perhaps: earth, etc., are only principles, i.e., are not the actual earth, etc., which are only a manifestation or a transformation of the principles). Neither ether, etc., nor momentariness, etc., [are principles]. Thus, there is nothing but [these] principles. Neither is [everything] cognition only *(vijñānamātra),* nor is everything empty *(śūnya).* For there is no proof for any of these (or: no proof at all). The terms body, sense and object [apply] to their aggregate.[11] [To wit,] aggregate [means] a special transformation of the great elements which is immeasurable [inasmuch as its forms like bodies and objects are infinite]; [it is] the object of the designation as body, etc. From these, [i.e.] from body sense and object,[12] consciousness [arises], just as the power of intoxication [arises] from ferment, etc. Therefore, the cognition [is said to be] like the power of intoxication. [The cognition] is not linking [to another

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identified by Muni Jambuvijayaji in "Quotations in Malayagiri's Commentary on the Nandisūtra."

[10] The parallel passage in *NA VV* 47.3 reads *kaṣāyādeḥ saśarkarād apūrvā* instead of *kaṣāyāder asamparkād apūrvā,* but the reading in P seems preferable to me.

[11] Read *śarīrendriyaviṣayasañjñā.*

[12] Note that this is a somewhat unusual interpretation of the *sūtra;* usually *tebhyaḥ* is taken as referring to the principles earth, etc.

cognition in another body in another life] inasmuch as it comes from another world (i.e., from the previous life). And [saying that it is] like the power of intoxication implies [by analogy that it is] like a mural and like smoke. Indeed, these are not seen to pass (or: shift) [from one wall or one fire to another].
[Reply:] This is not true.

> 379. Over and above colour, etc., how can the elements be perceived? These are five. Thus, the determination of the number [as four] is not correct.

The [real] five great elements are [not earth, etc., but] colour, sound, smell, flavour and touch.[13] The terms earth, etc., [apply] to their aggregate, because earth, etc., are not apprehended otherwise (i.e., over and above colour, etc.).
[Objection:] Flavour can be touched. Therefore, there is a transformation of the four.[14]
[Reply:] Even so, it is not correct [to call the elements] 'earth,' etc., [rather, their] designation should be 'colour,' etc.[15] [Besides,] momentariness, etc., will be proved later on [and consequently there can be no transformed elements, as this implies continuity]. Therefore, it is not repudiated [here]. Furthermore, [your position is not correct,]

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[13] Transpose *rasa* and *śabda?* So in $P_{(Pe)}$ 56a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 47b1: *gzugs daṅ ro daṅ dri daṅ sgra daṅ reg pa ste.*

[14] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 3.
The argument is not entirely clear. Perhaps flavour can be touched because it comes in contact with the gustatory sense when being perceived. To say that this implies "a transformation of the four" seems to presuppose that the Cārvāka here did not adopt the accumulation theory, but considers that each element possesses a single elementary quality, e.g., water possesses only flavour and wind only touch. This, in turn, implies that the objects like water, etc., in everyday practice are not composed of "pure" elements like water, but composites of all four elements. From the Buddhist point of view, Prajñākaragupta's concession ("even so") might be understood in the light of the Abhidharma concept of "atoms" of matter (except those of sound and senses) as consisting of eight "substances" *(aṣṭadravyaka-paramāṇu):* the four *mahābhūtas* and *rūpa, gandha, rasa, spraṣṭavya;* cf. *AK* 2.22ab.

[15] Read *rūpādīnīty abhidheyaṃ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 56a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 47b2.

380. for inasmuch as all [elements] can be seen, all [elements] would be one. If, on the other hand, [they are distinguished by] different modes, there would be an infinite number [of elements].

381. Therefore, what can be apprehended as having five supports should be designated fivefold. As for its inner division, it does not obstruct the fact that [it] is five[fold].

382-383. As for what has been said, [namely,] 'If there is a means of knowledge for the emptiness of all [things] *(sarvaśūnyatva)*, there is no emptiness. If there is emptiness [of all things], there is no [means of] knowledge [for it]. Thus, these two contradict [each other],' it will be shown later on of what kind the emptiness of all [things] is, and of what kind the means of knowledge thereof. How would haste *(tvarā)* in this [matter] help?"

prāṇāpānendriyadhiyāṃ dehād eva na kevalāt ׀
svajāti[1]*nirapekṣāṇāṃ janma janmaparigrahe* ‖35‖
atiprasaṅgāt ($36a_1$)

[1] PV_M: *sajāti-*, PV_{Tib}: *raṅ gi rigs;* cf. also v.38 below

"It is not [the case that] exhaling, inhaling, senses and cognition arise only from the body alone, independent of [causes of] their own kind, when there is attainment of birth/life, because this is absurd."

1) 35ab is translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 117. Although the translation is basically the same as the one above, I am not quite sure why the verse is interpreted to mean or to imply that "Rather, he [Dharmakīrti] says, both mental events and physical events can be seen as effects of the *same* set of causal conditions" (my emphasis). Such an interpretation would be more appropriate for 48bc, but even there they are not said to arise from exactly the same set, for what is *upādānakāraṇa* for the one is *nimittakāraṇa* for the other.

35 a-c is translated by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 21. However, he interprets it as saying that breaths, senses and cognition can be understood (lassen sich begreifen) only (nur) from their similar previous capacities (Fähigkeiten). This seems to be a bit more than what Dharmakīrti is actually saying, for by saying that they are not independent of causes of their own kind, Dharmakīrti does not say that they arise *only* from such causes. In fact, this verse does not deny that they arise *also* from the body.

2) I follow PV_{Tib} and $D_{(Pe)}$ 20a1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 17b7 in construing *janmaparigrahe* with the preceding. P 55.1-2 (translated below) and M 21.26 construe it with *atiprasaṅgāt*. PV_R 317a2 (= 633.2) also separates *janmaparigrahe* and *atiprasaṅgāt,* but seems to have read *janma* as part of the compound, i.e., *janmajanmaparigrahe: skye źiṅ skye ba len pa na* ‖, which one may translate: "When there is attainment of every single life/birth..." This interpretation, however, would leave the verse without a subject in the original Skt. Further, it is clear from the commentary that Ravigupta himself did not interpret the verse in this manner.

3) The precise meaning of *parigraha* here is not easy to determine. The *PW* lists no less than 23 different meanings, and although many of them can be discarded easily in the present context, there is still much room for ambiguity. The Tibetan translation *yoṅs su len pa* (rather than the usual *yoṅs su 'dzin pa)* probably hints at the right solution: *len pa* is usually used for *upā√DĀ*. In this sense one can translate it somewhat vaguely as "appropriation," "obtainment"; cf. also P 55.1: *athābhyupagamyate janmaparigrahaḥ paralokanirapekṣa eva.* The word occurs twice more in this chapter in vv. 183 and 219 (and if Miyasaka's index is to be trusted, nowhere else in the *PV);* Vetter translates it as "Erreichen," and "Ergreifen" respectively.

4) P 54.21-56.2: "[Objection:] The senses, etc., which conform to the presence and absence of the body, etc.,[1] of the parents, rest indeed on the [elements which form one's own body], because they have the nature of the great elements [which constitute] the body.[2] [The senses, etc.,] are not perceived otherwise, as coming from the other world. Therefore, how could the doctrine of the existence of the other world *(paralokāstitvavāda)* be better [than ours]?
[Reply:] This is also not true, because ... (vv. 35-36a).
For exhaling, etc., cannot [exist] independently of [causes of] their own kind, because of [their] special nature which is caused by movement to and fro *(capalatā),* etc. And movement to and fro, etc., follow upon repeated practice by oneself, they do not follow upon repeated practice by the parents. Otherwise, it would not be [the case that oneself *(ātman)* (or: the complex of exhaling, etc.)] is not of the nature of (i.e., is different from) the parents[3] (or: of the nature of [exhaling, etc., of] the parents) because of contact with

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[1] $P_{(Pe)}$ 56a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 47b5, however, lacks an equivalent for *-ādy-*.

[2] The argument is not entirely clear. I assume that the Cārvāka position here is parallel to the one in P 53.27-28. The cognition is on the one hand an effect of the body of the parents and on the other hand rests on one's own body, i.e., the great elements which form the body of the new living being.

By saying that the senses have the nature of the great elements which constitute the body, and by implying that they are perceived to be so, the Cārvāka could refer to the fact that the senses correspond to the state of the body, e.g., they are healthy in a wholesome body, etc.

[3] Read *-amātā-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 56b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 48a1: *pha ma'i raṅ bźin med par mi 'gyur ro.*

unwholesome [objects], etc.[4] Therefore, [breaths, senses, etc.,] do not arise from the body of the parents alone, independent of [causes of] their own kind.[5]

[Objection:] But if desire, etc., existed previously in [a person] who has the nature of the parents, then the body of the parents, etc.,[6] too is the cause. [Reply:] This is not correct.[7] If the attainment of life *(janmaparigraha)* is admitted as entirely independent of the other world, then, when the attainment of life is being admitted [in such manner], there is an absurd consequence: All causal relations, without exception, would fall to pieces. And these [causal relations] are to be determined on the basis of the *Anumānapariccheda.*[8]

> 384. If all exhaling, inhaling, etc., are preceded (i.e., are caused) by repeated practice, and they lack their own repeated practice, how could they possibly be without support [by causes of their own kind]?

For it is a property of [every] effect that it does not arise without [its] cause (lit. having left the cause, it does not arise in any other way). Otherwise, it is not its effect. The relationship between cause and effect *(janyajanaka-*

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[4] If I understand correctly, Prajñākaragupta argues that if breaths, etc., which presuppose repeated practice, would conform to those of the parents, the breaths, etc., of a child would not be spoiled or improved by the practice of the child.

[5] Read *-nirapekṣāṇāṃ.*

[6] *ādi* is difficult to explain in its present position, and $P_{(Pe)}$ 56b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 48a1 seems to move it to a more appropriate position: *pha ma'i lus la sogs pa yaṅ.* Perhaps the best solution is to delete it altogether as in 54.21.

[7] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 7.

[8] That is, ch. I. $P_{(Pe)}$ 56b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 48a2, however, reads *tshad mas yoṅs su bcad pas.* This could be explained by the assumption that the translators did not understand *pariccheda* as referring to a chapter, but literally as "ascertainment." As causal relations are not only ascertained by means of inference, but also by perception, they may have changed *anumāna* to *pramāṇa.* Conversely one may assume that *pramāṇa* was the original reading, *pariccheda* was misunderstood as "chapter," and since there is no chapter entitled *pramāṇapariccheda,* the latter was amended to *anumāṇapariccheda.* Note, however, that the colophon in Gnoli's edition reads *prathamapariccheda.*

bhāva) [is determined] by positive and negative concomitance. Therefore, sight, etc., are preceded by sight, etc., which are of the same kind and have arisen from repeated practice.[9]
[Objection:][10]

> 385. Smoke which arises from smoke does not always arise from smoke alone. A lotus *(śālūka)* which arises from a lotus as well, how does it arise [according to you] from cow-dung *(gomaya)?*[11]

In the same manner:

> 386. A colourful design *(citra)* arises from a painter, [but] is this the case with regard to [the colourful designs on] birds as well? Similarly,[12] the special property which arises from repeated practice can arise otherwise as well.

[Reply:] This too is not true.

> 387. The kind of smoke [which arises] from smoke does not arise[13] from something else as well. As for the special

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[9] Read *-abhyāsasambhavi-*. Cf. the similar formulation in 56.1-2, which makes it probable that *samānajātīya* should be construed with *cakṣurādi-,* rather than with *abhyāsa.*

[10] P 55.8-14, i.e., vv. 385-387 with the short connecting phrases, is quoted by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 46.6-13.

[11] The Cārvāka claims that a certain effect can arise without a cause of the same kind, that is, by another cause. Smoke arises from the previous moment of smoke in the same series, but it can also arise from fire. The example of the lotus seems to indicate a belief that certain lotuses arise spontaneously from cow-dung without a previous lotus seed. Cf. also R 317b3 (= 634.3): *de bźin du 'bras sā lu ni sā lu ñid daṅ res 'ga' ba laṅ gi lci ba las 'byuṅ ba daṅ* |.

[12] Read *tathābhyāsād* and delete *(hi);* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 57a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 48a5: *de bźin goms las.* This conjecture is confirmed by *NAVV* 46.10.

[13] Read *jāyate;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 57a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 48b5: *skye ba.* This reading is confirmed by *NAVV* 46.12 that also reads *anyathāpi* instead of *anyato 'pi.* Cf. also R 317b4 (= 634.4): *me las 'byuṅ ba ni ma yin te.*

> property [which arises] from repeated practice, it stands so[14] [already] at the beginning of life.

The same special property which arises from repeated practice of something heard, etc., is observed to be so even without repeated practice in this life.[15] And the connection *(saṅgama)* of that [special property] with repeated practice is not sublated [by its non-perception], because in other cases as well past repeated practice cannot be perceived at that time (i.e., at the time when a special property is perceived), just like a practice which has come from (i.e., has previously taken place in) another village.[16] Precisely for this [reason], one [can]not establish also that [a special property] is not preceded by repeated practice which belongs to the other world,[17] because something which has an unseen cause too is its effect, for the effect is connected to the cause, just like the knowledge[18] which is preceded by repeated practice in another place. In this connection, the story of the (Vaidika?) fool[19] comes [to mind].

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[14] Read *tathāsthitiḥ* (to allow a *bahuvrīhi)* or *tathā sthitaḥ;* cf. *NAVV* 46.13: *tathā sthitaḥ.*

[15] Read *ihajanma-*.

[16] Cf. *NAVV* 46.14-15; however, the comparison to the repeated practice in another village is used there by the Cārvāka in order to deny that consciousness arises from repeated practice in previous lives: *grāmāntarābhyāsavaj janmāntarābhyāsānupalabdher na tatkāraṇatā caitanyasya, kiṃ tu tadaiva tasyopalabdheḥ.*

[17] Obviously a dittography has occurred here which can be explained in the following manner: ... *deśāntarābhyāsa[pūrvakatvam api .... deśāntarābhyasa]pūrvakaparijñānavat.*

[18] $P_{(Pe)}$ 57a5 = $P_{(De)}$ 48a7, however, reads *bśes gñen* which usually translates *mitra,* but does not make any sense here; read *śes ñen.*

[19] The word *tauta* does not appear in *MW;* in *PW* it appears only as a variant of *tottāyana,* the name of a certain *Atharvaveda* school. My understanding of the word follows $P_{(Pe)}$ 57a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 48b1: *glen pa.* Another *tautopākhyāna* is referred to in P 473.20-21. Śānti Sūri quotes vv. 388-389 in *NAVV* 46.16-20, but he introduces them as *bhautākhyāna. bhauta* is attested in *PW* in the meaning of "von bösen Geistern besessen, verrückt, blödsinnig." Cf. also *MW, s.v.:* "idiot." It is probable therefore, that *tauta* is only a corruption of *bhauta.*

388. A certain fool[20] was reportedly asked by another: Tell [me], how is it possible[21] that a bull with long horns stays [in the belly] of [its] mother?[22]

389. He said: Those buffalos do not come from the belly of [their] mother. They come from the market and are only purchasable for a price.[23]

This Lokāyata doctrine is just so.

Or *'because this is absurd'* [implies the following:] If the effect, [i.e.] consciousness, arises from these alone, [i.e.] from the great elements, without coming from another life, why doesn't everything arise having the form of a living being?[24] If [the Cārvāka says that this is so because life is not] due [to the elements as such, but] to the occurrence of a special transformation [of the elements], the same question [arises]: Why does the special transformation not [arise everywhere]?[25]

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[20] Here too *NAVV* 46.16 reads *bhautaḥ* instead of *tautaḥ;* cf. the previous note.

[21] *NAVV* 46.16 reads *sambhavaḥ* instead of *sambhavam.* Both readings are possible: either *sambhava* is a direct object of *kathaya,* or it starts a new sentence. If *sambhavaḥ* is preferred, one has to emend *sthitiḥ* to *sthiteḥ,* as in *NAVV. NAVV* also reads *mahiṣasya* instead of *vṛṣabhasya,* but some of the manuscripts as well as the 1917 Benares edition read *vṛṣabhasya.*

[22] I follow $P_{(Pe)}$ 57a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 48b1: *ma lto na | gnas pa ci ltar.*

[23] *NAVV* 46.19 reads *evaiṣāṃ* instead of *eṣāṃ tu;* the Benares edition, as reported in n. 6, reads: *evaiṣāṃ śūnyena krayavikrayamātrakam.*

[24] The following passage is summarized in *NAVV* 47.5-7.

[25] The Skt text in round brackets is probably reconstructed by Sāṅkṛityāyana on the basis of $P_{(Pe)}$ 57a8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 48b3: *mtha' dag srog chags kyi raṅ bźin du ci ste mi 'gyur | yoṅs su 'gyur ba'i rnam pa'i bye brag srid pa'i phyir ro źe na |.* I would read *sakalaṃ* instead of *sakala-.* Cf. also the paraphrase in R 317b6-7 (= 634.6-7): *de lta bas na sa'i steṅ thams cad srog chags kyi raṅ bźin du thal bar 'gyur ro ‖ 'on te 'byuṅ ba yoṅs su gyur ba'i khyad par ñid ...* and M 21.7: *sarvaṃ prāṇimayaṃ jagat syāt.* Under the present alternative, P practically repeats $D_{(Pe)}$ 20a3-4 = $D_{(De)}$ 18a1: *thal 'gyur phyir | rdo daṅ chu la sogs pa dag la yaṅ thal ba'i 'gyur ba'i phyir ro ‖.* "'Because it is absurd,' [i.e.] because [breaths, senses and cognition] would [arise] also in stones, water, etc."

[Objection:] There is a certain beginningless transformation, or a special line of succession *(paramparāviśeṣa)*, which cannot be perceived.[26] Because of that [transformation or special line of succession] certain [parts of the world consist in] living beings, others [in which that transformation did not take place] do not.
[Reply:] This is also not correct.

> 390. If [you claim that] this special transformation is not seen, what [kind of] an assumption is that? Something which is capable of being seen *(darśanayogya)* [and yet] cannot be seen is not treated as a real object.[27]

If this special transformation existed, it would be perceived. If it is assumed only because one observes [its] effect, then in this case a repeated practice which is indeed observed should be assumed, because the assumption of an unseen entity is more cumbersome *(adṛṣṭakalpanāgaurava)*. Therefore, it has been well said: Exhaling, etc., are preceded by entities which are of the same kind.[28]"

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[26] $P_{(Pe)}$ 57b2 lacks the negation, as noted in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 2, but $P_{(De)}$ 48b4 has it. Both lack an equivalent for *vā*.

[27] On the expression *sadvyavahāra-viṣaya* cf. Steinkellner, *HB* II, p. 156, n. 3; cf. also Schmithausen, *Vibhramaviveka*, p. 268, n. 215.

[28] $P_{(Pe)}$ 57b5 does not have an equivalent for *-bhāva-*, whereas $P_{(De)}$ 48b6 may have read *-ābhyāsa-* instead: *rigs mtshuṅs pa* ($P_{(De)}$ adds: *goms pa) sṅon du 'gro ba can*. I prefer to follow the Skt, or maybe even the Tib as in $P_{(Pe)}$; cf. the close parallel in P 55.5-6. It seems that according to Prajñākaragupta things are preceded by causes of the same kind, whereas special properties like *capalatā* or capacities such as *parijñāna* are preceded by repeated practice.

yad dṛṣṭaṃ pratisandhānaśaktimat[1] |
kim āsīt tasya yan nāsti paścād yena na sandhimat ||36||

[1] PV_M: *śaktamit*, $PV_{M(S)}$: *śaktimat*

"That which was seen to have the capacity of linking, what did it have [before] that it does not have later on, by virtue of which it no [longer] has the [capacity of] linking?"

1) The subject of the verse is not entirely clear. One possibility would be to understand it as the body, in which case Dharmakīrti would argue from the Cārvāka presuppositions. Linking would not imply rebirth, but linking within the same life, postponing death indefinitely. Another alternative would be to take the breaths, etc., as the subject, each being a cause for an effect of its own kind (cf. the previous verse). This is probably Devendrabuddhi's interpretation ($D_{(Pe)}$ 20a5 = $D_{(De)}$ 18a3): *dbaṅ po la sogs pa raṅ gi rigs la bltos pa daṅ bcas pa*, "the senses, etc., which depend on [causes of] their own kind." Prajñākaragupta (P 56.21-23) does not specify the subject, but says only that if the causal complex is complete the effect must be produced; cf. also M 21.12-13 (echoing at the same time $D_{(Pe)}$ 20a6-7 = $D_{(De)}$ 18a4): *samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇatvāt pratisandhānaṃ prāptam.* R 318a3-4 (= 635.3-4) seems to take *srog chags (*prāṇin)* as the subject, but *prāṇin* is usually a masculine. M 21.10 follows D: *prāṇāpānādi.* This verse is translated by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 22, but he also leaves the subject unspecified.

2) P 56.3-57.14: "[Objection:] Let causes which have arisen in a previous life be established from [their] effect [in the present life], but how does one infer [the cognition, etc.,] which belong to a future life?[1]
[Reply: Dharmakīrti] explains that [in the following words:] ... (v. 36b-d). For linking of the respectively previous [cognition, etc.,] is ascertained by inference, the inferred object, the resulting inferential cognition, etc.[2]

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[1] $P_{(Pe)}$ 57b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 48b6 translates this sentence as a verse.

[2] Read *anumānānumitā-;* the role of the differentiation is not clear to me.

[Objection:] Movement to and fro *(cāpala)*, etc., arise from something which lacks such movement, characterized [for instance] by lack of pulsation, slowness *(aspandamandatā)*, etc., by repeated practice directed toward it.[3] But that[4] is due to the great elements alone. Therefore, from that, too, the previous life is not proved.[5] Therefore, a beginningless succession of lives is not proved. For when there is no beginninglessness, [for instance] also when smoke arises from other smoke, the succession does not [last] forever. Therefore, there is also interruption [of the series of cognitions], just like in the case of smoke.[6] Therefore, the faults that living beings are also endless *(anantatā)* and that living beings become manifest as something unprecedented *(apūrvasattvaprādurbhāva)*, do not [apply to our position].[7]
[Reply:] This is also not [the case].

> 391. Also the slowness of living beings is due to repeated practice of slow activity. Therefore, that slowness too is

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[3] Read *acāpalāt* instead of *acāpalatvāt?* Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 57b7-8 = $P_{(De)}$ 49a1. The syntax is a bit awkward, and the Tib rearranges the word order, but does not point at a different Skt text. Cf. R 318a5 (= 635.5): *gyo ba la sogs pas (pa?) ni mi gyo ba goms pa las 'byuṅ ste.*

[4] I see no feminine word of reference for *sā* except *aspanda(tā)* or *mandatā.* The latter seems to be intended, because in v. 391 and in the following discussion *mandatā* is mentioned as the opposite of *cāpala.*

[5] There is a lacuna after *tatas tato,* cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana's retranslation in n. 2, in which, however, *iva* should probably be deleted, and *pratibandha* should be replaced by *prabandha* or *anubandha.* In the text, read *dhūmād* instead of *dhūmamad.*

[6] Cf. R 318a6 (= 635.6).

[7] Insert *iti* before *doṣāḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 58a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 49a2: *skye ba'i phyir,* $P_{(De)}$: *skye ba źes bya ba.* The first fault should be clear. The second fault, which by implication applies to the Buddhist position, is avoided by the Cārvāka inasmuch as the living beings are preceded by the material elements. This has been shown in the present context by the fact that living beings possess movement which is preceded by lack of movement and which can be found in the material elements alone. This seems to imply that something can arise only from something dissimilar, e.g., living beings from something not alive, movement from something which lack movement, etc. Such reasoning reminds of the Sāṅkhya arguments for the existence of primordial matter.

preceded by [slowness]. Therefore, the wheel of life *(bhava-cakraka)* is beginningless.[8]

Indeed, the modes (i.e., natural dispositions) of living beings, such as slowness, etc., are not due to their own nature alone, but [also] to repeated practice of something of the same kind. Just as movement to and fro is due to practicing that [kind of movement], similarly slowness, etc., too are due to repeated practice of sloth *(kausīdya)*. Therefore, it is established that *saṃsāra* is beginningless. For the dullness *(mantharatā)* of sight, etc., are due to the repeated practice of sleep/sloth *(svāpa)*. Therefore, the swift *(capala)* sight, etc., of[9] someone who has just awakened from sleep *(suptaprabuddha)* are mutually connected to swift sight, etc. [before sleep]. Thus, in the beginning of life too, exactly like at the awakening after sleep, there is connection with [previous] sight, etc., for [the living being] for whom the awakening of traces [of past experience] has arrived.

How could sight which is found in one body be linked to another body? How could a capacity *(śakti)* which is found in one substance shift to another?

> 392. Because of the capacity of *mantras* and *tantras* the capacities of poison [can be found] in a lump of sugar *(guḍa)*, etc. Exactly so, because of the capacity of karma the capacities of the senses [can be found] in another body.[10]
>
> 393. Just as the body in the end of dream *(svapnāntika)* [is conducive] to a transformation of the awaking body by [its] trembling *(trāsa)*, jumping *(laṅghana)* and running *(dhāva-*

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[8] Read *sāpīty* and take *anādi* as a nominal predicate, not as a part of the following compound.

[9] Read *suptaprabuddhasya* instead of *suptaprabuddhaś;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 58a5 = $P_{(De)}$ 49a4-5.

[10] Cf. R 318b2-3 (= 636.2-3): *'di ltar dug gi nus pa sṅags kyi stobs kyis kha ra la sogs pa la 'pho ba de bźin du las kyi mthus lus la gnas pa'i mig la sogs pa lus gźan la 'phen par byed pas ... .*

na) [performed in the end of dream],[11] so it is with regard to other lives as well.

394. If [you object that] this [body] lacks reality *(satya-tāhīna)*, even better! Where even an unreal [body is conducive] to a transformation [in another body], what's the controversy about a real one?

395. Moreover, [what is called] 'reality' and 'unreality' belongs only to everyday practice *(vyavahāramātraka)*. In respect to the immediate experience of the own nature of things *(svarūpasākṣātkaraṇa)*, it is hardly possible [to determine] 'reality,' etc.

Therefore, *that* which was observed in the respectively previous [moments] *to have the capacity of linking, what did it have [before]* in addition *that it does not have later on,* due to the absence of which[12] *it does not have [the capacity of] linking* later on? For the effect does not arise when the cause is incomplete. But when the cause is complete, [i.e.] possessing all its parts *(kalāvat*[13]*)*, it is contradictory [to say] that the effect does not arise.
[Objection:] What is the contradiction here [in this case]?
[Reply:] Surely, precisely this is the contradiction, namely, the absence of relationship between cause and effect.[14]

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[11] The "body in the end of dream" is the body with which one experiences the last phase of a dream. It seems that for Prajñākaragupta this body is as real, or as unreal, as the body in a waking state. Activities like trembling, etc., performed by this body cause changes in the awaking body. The case of the transfer of trembling seems appropriate, but I am not sure whether Prajñākaragupta means that if one dreams intensely of jumping and runnning at the end of a dream, the awaking body jumps and starts running.

[12] Read *yadabhāvāt,* against $P_{(Pe)}$ 58b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 49b1 as well: *de med pas.*

[13] $P_{(Pe)}$ 58b3 has no equivalent to *kalāvati,* which may have been interpolated as a gloss for *sakale.* $P_{(De)}$ 49b2 reads *nus pa daṅ ldan pa* which might reflect an interpretation of *kalā* in the sense of skill.

[14] Read *ayam eva vyāghāto?* Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 58b4 =$P_{(De)}$ 49b2: *'di ñid 'gal ba ma yin nam.* The negation only translates *nanu,* unlike in Sāṅkṛityāyana's retranslation in n. 6.

396. If the effect does not arise, even though the cause is the same [as before] in all its aspects *(sarvāvasthāsamāna)*, [then] in this manner the effect would be independent [of the cause]. In this case it would not be an effect.

For the effect depends on the cause. A cause which is capable of that [effect] produces it necessarily *(haṭhāt)*. If [the effect] is absent even so (i.e., even when the capable cause is present), it would not be an effect.
[Objection:] Effect [is defined as that which] does not arise when the [cause] is absent, [not as that which arises when the cause is present.]
[Reply:] How [is it known that the effect] does not arise when the [cause] is absent?
[Objection:] How [is it known that the effect] arises necessarily when the [cause] is present?
[Reply:] Because it is ascertained to be so *(tattvena)*. That [the effect] does not arise when the [cause] is absent is also being ascertained. [As for the question] how [one knows that it is] always [so], this is the same [difficulty] in both [our and your position]. Therefore, [things] are to be accepted the way they are observed. And both [relations, positive and negative concomitance,] are observed: When the [cause] is present the [effect] arises necessarily, and when the [cause] is not complete the [effect] does not arise. Thus, both these [aspects of the causal relationship] should be adopted.
[Objection:] There is no relation of cause and effect, [since] it is not observed in this way.[15]

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[15] Delete *iti cet?* V. 397 only explicates the preceding statement, and the *pūrvapakṣa* would thus not be concluded by *iti cet.* The Tibetan translation reads *źe na* only after v. 397. But a corresponding emendation would be difficult to justify in terms of scribal errors. Finally, one might consider that the end of the *pūrvapakṣa* is marked by *evaṃ tarhi* in l. 4, but in this case the *pūrvapakṣa* would be summarized, explicated in the verse, and summarized again by the opponent himself. The translation reflects the Tib by ascribing the second summary to the *siddhāntin* without, however, arguing for any textual changes. Perhaps the odd position of *iti cet* could be explained by reluctance to place it immediately after a verse. Note also that v. 397 and the following prose sentence up to *-siddhiḥ* appear twice in $P_{(Pe)}$ 59a1-3. In the first occurrence an equivalent for *-siddhi* is lacking and the sentence concludes with *yin no,* in the second occurrence, however, it concludes with *'grub na.* $P_{(De)}$ 49b6-7, however, lacks the repetition.

397. There is no observation of positive and negative concomitance as pervasive; how could one see[16] the causal relationship?

[Reply:] If there is no observation [of the two relations] as pervasive, [and] therefore the relationship of cause and effect is not proved, then in this case nothing but non-duality[17] is observed. This has been said by [Dharmakīrti in v. 4]: 'The [cognition's] own form is apprehended by [the cognition] itself.' [Therefore,] 'there is no other world, there is no world here, there is no proof[18] of the other world, there is no doubt [about it], there is no transformation of the great elements, etc.' [all this] is cognition only *(vijñaptimātraka)*.
[Objection:] This (i.e., all the above) is based on everyday practice *(vyavahāra)*.
[Reply:] So is also the other world!

398. If [you are] satisfied with non-duality *(advaita)*, you are already liberated *(mukta evāsi)* in every respect. If everyday practice holds good, the other world as well should be thought upon.

If [everything] is annihilated[19] (i.e., if everything is an illusion, and nothing really exists), annihilation is indeed[20] better [for the purpose of salvation], because it is favorable to tranquillity [of mind] *(praśama)* and [to attainment of] heaven, etc.[21] For the annihilation of desire, etc., brings about the abandoning of things desired by everyone, such as being a good person,

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[16] Read *niścayaḥ* instead of *darśana?* $P_{(Pe)}$ 59a1 and 2 (cf. previous note) = $P_{(De)}$ 49b6 read *ṅes.*

[17] Read *advayavyatiriktasya* instead of *anvaya-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 59a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 49b7: *gñis su med pa la* ($P_{(De)}$: *las) ma gtogs pa.*

[18] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 3.

[19] Throughout this passage, read *upaplava* for *upalpava.*

[20] Read *eva* instead of *evam;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 59a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 50a2: *ñid.*

[21] Read *praśamasvargādi* instead of *praśamasya svargādi-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 59a6 $P_{(De)}$ 50a2: *rab tu źi ba daṅ mtho ris la sogs pa.*

etc.[22] To explain: All the different [senses] such as sight, etc., and [the mental factors] such as desire, etc., inasmuch as they rest on the force of beginningless traces *(anādivāsanābalāvalambin),* do not differ from mere cognition *(vijñaptimātra).* Therefore, even someone whose sight, etc., are impaired/lacking [may] have complete sight, etc., again in another life. Therefore, this is the way [it happens] in uninterrupted series of lives, and *saṃsāra*[23] has no beginning. And as long as there is no tranquillity through annihilation, it has no end either. Even if sight, etc., are real, or [even] if there is an external object, this own nature is beginningless.[24] Therefore, *saṃsāra* has neither beginning nor end."

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[22] The translation is only tentative; $P_{(Pe)}$ 59a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 50a2-3 deviates partially as noted in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 4.

[23] $P_{(Pe)}$ 59b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 50a4 has no equivalent to *saṃsāra,* but if it is omitted, *tasya* in the next sentence will have no explicit referent.

[24] Read *bāhyārthatve vānādir.*

na sa kaścit pṛthivyāder aṃśo yatra na jantavaḥ |
saṃsvedajādyā jāyante sarvaṃ bījātmakaṃ[1] *tataḥ* ||37||

[1] PV$_P$: *sarvabījātmakaṃ*

"There is no part of the earth, etc., where living creatures, such as those born from moisture, etc., are not born. Therefore, everything has the nature of a seed [of life]."

1) This verse is quoted by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 47.8-9. The variant *sarvabījātmakaṃ* is attested also by some of the manuscripts of the *NAVV*.

2) This verse is translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 119 (read "cannot be born" instead of "can be born"?), and with some omissions by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 21.

3) P 57.16-31: "[Objection: We can defend our position in 34 that the cognition depends on the body and reply to the argument in 35-36a by explaining the diversity of life as due to the diversity of the properties of the elements.] Special properties[1] of the great elements, like hardness *(kaṭhinatva)*, etc., are indeed perceived. Thus, because of the difference among these [special properties of the elements] there is no absurdity [in our position] (cf. v. 36a), even though [we maintain that consciousness/life] arises from the great elements. Thus, a special property like hardness, etc., alone has the nature of a seed [of life]. Living beings arise from this (i.e., these special properties) alone, [not from the elements as such]. Concerning this [objection] it has already been said[2] that there would be no relation between cause and effect. Furthermore, ... (v. 37).
Indeed, the distribution *(vibhāga)* of living beings does not come about according to the distribution of properties like hardness, etc., because one perceives living beings [of all kinds] everywhere. For although living beings arise from moisture, etc., (i.e., are diverse) they are not seen [to arise]

[1] Read: *-viśeṣāḥ.*

[2] Cf. P 56.24 on 36b-d translated above.

according to the distribution[3] [of special properties like hardness]. Thus, the distribution is not effected by hardness, etc. It is only karma characterized as volitional consciousness *(cetanā)* which remains alone[4] [to account for the diversity of life]. If one would say that the birth/species *(jāti)* of living beings is observed to follow hardness,[5] etc., then everything of the same birth/species (i.e., everything which has arisen from earth, etc., which has the property of hardness, etc.) would have the nature of a living being which has that form (i.e., hardness, etc.). All that which is water arranged/fixed [in certain configurations] inasmuch as it is caused to flow [in a certain direction(?)]/filtered(?)[6] would have the nature of a living being which has that form (i.e., being arranged/fixed). [Further] how could there be diversity in colour and structure *(varṇasaṃsthānavailakṣaṇa)* among the living beings?[7]

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[3] Read *avibhāgena*, $P_{(Pe)}$ 59b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 50b1: *rnam par dbye pa med par ma mthoṅ ba ma yin no.* I translated the triple negation as a single one; lit.: "For, although they are born from moisture, etc., it is not [true that] living beings are not seen without distribution [corresponding to the special properties of the elements]." The word *vibhāga* seems to be used for distribution involving three variables, namely, of special properties of the elements, of living beings, and of types of birth. According to the Cārvāka, special properties of the elements are found in certain parts of the elements and account for the fact that life arises only in certain places (i.e., in bodies). Against this, a two-tiered argument is raised. First, there is no part of the earth, etc., where life does not arise; second, in one and the same part different kinds of life are observed to arise, although there can be no difference in special properties in that very place. If the Cārvāka would claim that from one and the same property different forms of life arise, then the principle of causality would be abandoned, for the same cause would give rise to different effects.

[4] Read *yat param* instead of *yadi param;* $P_{(Pe)}$ 59b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 50b1: *sems pa'i mtshan ñid kyi las tsam 'ba' źig lus pa yin no.* For *param* in the meaning of "alone" cf. *PW, s.v. param* 5.

[5] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 6.

[6] Read *parisrāvya vyavasthāpitam* instead of *parimnā vyavasthāpitām?* $P_{(Pe)}$ 59b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 50b2: *btsags* (not *bcags* as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 7) *nas bźag pa'i chu.* The parallel passage in *NAVV* 47.11 reads *pariśrāvya;* the Benares edition, as reported in n. 8, reads *paritāpya.*

[7] This sentence (without *prāṇināṃ)* as well as the next two verses are quoted in *NAVV* 47.12-16. The text in *NAVV* differs only in one insignificant variant for 399b: *-kāyādayo 'pare.*

399. To explain: [Some] living beings, aquatic, etc., are seen to have red heads *(raktaśiras),* others to have yellow bodies *(pītakāya),* etc. From what does that form arise?[8]

400. Is the difference [of form] among lotuses, etc., admitted to be seen[9] as determined at any time by a seed which has that form[10]?[11] There is no difference [of form] among living beings which is determined by the seed (i.e., the form of their seminal material cause); the acts *(karman)* are the determining factors in all cases[12]."[13]

4) M 21.14-16, 19-20: "[Objection:] The senses, etc., do not arise from previous causes of the same kind, but rather from the body alone. And there is no absurdity (cf. v. 36a), because only certain transformations *(pariṇāma)* of the elements, [namely those] which have the nature of a body, are the cause of the [senses, etc.] and because other [transformations], whose nature is contrary to the [nature of a body], are not the cause [of senses, etc.]; just as [a certain] stone is a seed for gold and [a certain other stone] is not a seed [for gold].[14]

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[8] This verse is paraphrased in *NAṬ* 4b1-2 and in *ĀNṬ* 316a5-7.

[9] Read *dṛṣṭa iṣṭo;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 60a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 50b3: *mthoṅ 'dod.* I also suggest to delete the *avagraha.* The first conjecture is confirmed by *NAVV* 47.15, but not the second.

[10] Read *-rūpabījāt.*

[11] That is, the difference among lotuses, etc., could be due to a corresponding difference in their seeds, but such a difference is never observed.

[12] Read *sarvatra* instead of *santy atra;* $P_{(Pe)}$ 60a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 50b4: *kun tu.* Note, however, that the Tibetan translation construes it with what precedes, i.e., the first statement in this half verse. Following the Skt one may translate: "There are acts which are the determining factors here." The conjecture is confirmed by *NAVV* 47.16, but it is interesting that *NAVV* p. 47 n. 12 records the variant *santvatra.*

[13] Note the unusual meter of this verse *(indravajrā).*

[14] Cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 21a3-4 = $D_{(De)}$ 18b6-7: *de ltar na* ($D_{(De)}$: *ni) 'gyur na ji ltar sa'i khams khyed par can ma yin pa bźus pa las| cuṅ zad gser du 'gyur źiṅ| cuṅ zad dri mar 'gyur ba de bźin du sa la sogs pa khyed par can ma yin pa las | cuṅ zad srog chags daṅ | gźan ni 'byuṅ ba*

[Reply:] ... (v. 37).
As for the stones, etc., being a seed for gold and not [a seed for] gold is due to the existence and non-existence [respectively] of atoms of gold [in those stones]. Thus, the example is not similar [to the examplified]."

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yan gar ba ñid du 'gyur ro źe na |.

tat svajāty[1]*anapekṣāṇām akṣādīnāṃ samudbhave* |
pariṇāmo yathaikasya syāt sarvasyāviśeṣataḥ ||38||

[1] PV_M: *sajāty-*, PV_P, $PV_{M(S)}$, Mi: *svajāty-*, PV_{Tib}: *raṅ rigs*. PV_M was probably changed by Shastri to conform with M 22.11, cf. also v. 35 above.

"Therefore, if the senses, etc., (i.e., exhaling, inhaling and cognition) were produced independently of [causes of] their own kind, [then] just as there is a transformation of one [thing], there would be [a transformation] of everything, because there is no difference [in the cause of transformation]."

1) This verse is translated by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 22, and by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 119. The above translation differs from Hayes's mainly on two points: *svajāti* is translated there as "non-material causes," and *aviśeṣataḥ* is not taken in a causal sense, but adverbially: "without any distinction in cause."

2) According to $D_{(Pe)}$ 22a5-6 = $D_{(De)}$ 19b6-7 this verse refutes the interpretation of being support *(āśraya)* as possessing a capacity *(śakti)*; according to M 22.14 it also refutes the notion of being support in the sense of quality *(guṇa)*; cf. also their comments on v. 35. It seems to me, however, that the verse was rather meant as a conclusion to the discussion of 34-37. The Tib. version of P takes it as a *saṅgraha(śloka) (bsdu ba'o)*, which, although probably a later interpolation, seems to capture Dharmakīrti's intention better.

3) P quotes this verse, but does not comment on on it. $D_{(Pe)}$ 22a3 = $D_{(De)}$ 19b5 gives two reasons why there is no difference, namely, all parts of earth, etc., are the same in possessing (the same) material cause and (the same) cause of transformation (namely, the elements): *ñe bar len pa'i rgyu can ñid du mtshuṅs pa'i phyir daṅ* | *gyur ba'i rgyu can ñid du mtshuṅs pa'i phyir ro źes bya ba'i don to* ||.

4) M 21.21-22.10: "[Objection:] Although there is no difference [between bodies of living beings and other material things] inasmuch as they are caused by the elements alone, there can be [a difference of transformation] due to [their] being the cause of exhaling, etc., and the other (i.e., not being

such a cause),[1] just as there is a difference of transformation [among stones] due to the containment of atoms of gold and the other (i.e., non-containment of atoms of gold).
[Reply:] On this [objection] it has already been said that since living creatures are seen everywhere,[2] everything has the nature of a seed of [life]. Thus, there is no specific transformation which does not have the nature of a seed [of life]. Or the same inadmissible consequence applies here [in respect to the transformation] too: If this transformation into a seed is caused by the elements alone, every [transformation] would be so (i.e., into a seed) for it is impossible that the effect is different when the cause is not different.
[Objection:] The elements too, inasmuch as they possess many subdistinctions of various kinds, produce the various transformations, [not the elements as such]. Thus, the inadmissible consequence of [all transformations] being equally [a seed of life] does not [apply].
[Reply:] First of all, this distinction[3] is not due to the elements as such, because it would be [present] everywhere. Nor is it due to anything else, because there is nothing else [according to you]. According to us, however, karma too is accepted as coproducer; because of its diversity the diverse multitude of effects is acceptable."

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[1] Read *-hetutvetarābhyām* instead of *-hetutvābhyām.*

[2] Read *dṛṣṭeḥ.*

[3] Read *sa viśeṣo.*

pratyekam upaghāte[1] *'pi nendriyānāṃ manomateḥ*[2] ।
upaghāto 'sti bhaṅge 'syāś[3] *teṣāṃ bhaṅgaś ca dṛśyate* ॥39॥

[1] Mi: *upadhāte*
[2] PV_P, Mi: *mano mateḥ*
[3] PV_P, PV_M: *bhaṅgesyās/ḥ*

"[Nor are the senses, or the body together with the senses, the cause of cognition, for] even when every single one of the senses is damaged, the mental cognition is not damaged. But when the [mental cognition] is destroyed, their (i.e., the senses') destruction is observed."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 22, and translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 120. The translation above is basically the same, except that Hayes seems to take *manomati* as a *saptamī-tatpuruṣa*, rendering it by "the thoughts within consciousness." I take it as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*. From the point of view of Buddhist scholastics one may take *manovijñāna* as a *saptamītatpuruṣa*, since the senses are said to be the *āśraya* of the cognition (cf. *AK(Bh)* I.45ab), in which case, however, one should understand 'cognition based on the mind' (rather than "within" the mind). On the other hand, *āyatana* is explained as 'the door through which *citta* and *caittas* arrive' *(AKBh* 13.18 on I.20ab: *cittacait-tāyadvārārtha āyatanārthaḥ;* cf. also *PSP* §34 and n. 319), in which case one can interpret compounds such as *manomati, manovijñāna* and so forth as ablative or instrumental *tatpuruṣas*.

2) On the ambiguous ontological presuppositions of this verse cf. ch. III above, cf. also v. 126.

3) According to M 22.15-16 in the previous section (vv. 34-38) the body without the senses was considered to be the support of cognition, whereas in this section the body with the senses is taken as the support: *tasmād āśraya-tvam api nāsty, anindriyasya kāyasya kāraṇatvaśaktimattvaguṇavattvānām ayogataḥ* ॥40॥ *sendriyo 'pi kāyo buddher āśrayo na yukta(ḥ).*

Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 22b6f. = $D_{(De)}$ 20a6f.: *don gźan gyi phyogs* ($D_{(De)}$ adds: *kyi) yon tan la sogs pa'i ṅo bo yin na* । *blo'i ci lus rten du 'gyur na* । *dbaṅ po daṅ bcas par 'gyur ba'am* । *skra daṅ sen mo la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid can dbaṅ*

po med pa can du 'gyur grañ na | re źig dbañ po med pa can ni 'dod pa ma yin te | śi ba'i lus kyi skra dañ sen mo la sogs pa dag la yañ sems ñid yod par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || de'i phyir dbañ po dañ bcas pa can kho na yin no || da ni mig la sogs pa'i dbañ po'i bdag ñid can ñid kyis la ($D_{(De)}$: *lña) yin te | mig la sogs pa'i dbañ po dañ* ($D_{(De)}$: *lña) lus kyi miñ can de dag ni yid kyi blo'i rten ma yin no|| ci'i phyir źe na |* ... (v. 39).

"As regards the position that [cognition] is something different [from the body], (i.e.) that it has the nature of a quality [or result], etc., [of the body], which body would be a support of the cognition? Would it be [a body] with the senses, or [a body] without the senses, characterized by hair, nails, etc.? First of all, [a body] without the senses is not acceptable, because there would be cognition/consciousness even in the hair, nails, etc., of a dead body. Therefore, it must be [a body] with the senses. Now, [the body] is [in fact] five through having the nature of the senses such as sight, etc. These, the five senses, such as sight, etc., technically called the body, are not the support of the mental cognition. Why? (v. 39)"

4) P 58.3-59.8: "Moreover, the senses produce their effects (i.e., the sense cognitions) inasmuch as they are supported by the mental cognition, but the mental cognition itself is not supported by the [senses]. Therefore, the senses arise from the mental cognition, not from earth, water, etc. [Dharmakīrti] shows this [by saying] *'every single one,'* etc.

Or [what he shows is that] first of all the mental cognition does not arise from the body which has the nature of an aggregate of the [material elements].[1] As for exhaling, inhaling, etc., they have indeed the nature of a transformation of the great elements, because they have the parents as their only seed *(mātāpitṛbījamātraka).* And the mental cognition transmigrates *(saṃsārin),* not the senses, etc. For it has been said:

> 401. Disconnection and linking, passionlessness and abandonment, death and birth are accepted in respect to the mental cognition alone;[2] death and birth [are accepted] in equanimity(?).

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[1] Delete one negation as in $P_{(Pe)}$ 60a5-6 = $P_{(De)}$ 60b6.

[2] Read *eveṣṭā.*

Thus, the mind transmigrates, [and] it is not supported by the elements. For ... (v. 39).
For one observes that *when the* mental cognition *is destroyed* ('broken,' i.e., transformed) by fear, sorrow, happiness, anger, etc., sight, etc., are transformed; therefore [one concludes that] sight, etc., rest on the mental cognition.[3] Therefore, at the beginning of life too they indeed rest on it. Therefore, another existence (i.e., previous life) is well-established. But the mental cognition does not rest on the body in such a manner [as it supports the senses], because it rests on the effects of the multitude of the five senses (i.e., the sense cognitions) which can be transformed by the mental cognition *(manovijñānavikāryapañcendriyasamudāyakāryāśritatva).*
[Objection:][4] Even if we admit that sight, etc., are transformable by the mental cognition, why [do you claim that the senses] arise from the [mental cognition] alone? For it is not [the case that] a thing like a pot, etc., which undergoes a transformation because of fire, arises from fire alone.
[Reply:] On this, it is said:[5]

> 402. The pot, etc., are seen [to arise] otherwise. Therefore, it is not [the case that] they arise from this [fire] alone. On the other hand, the senses are not seen [to arise] otherwise, because of their [constant] transformation by the [mental cognition].

For all the senses are apprehended as distinguished by characteristic marks [caused by the mental cognition] like transparency *(prasāda*[6]*;* i.e., receptivity), but not all *(eva)* pots, etc., have a transformation caused by fire. Therefore, the pot, etc., are not [appropriate] examples *(dṛṣṭānta).*

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[3] Cf. D(Pe) 23b1-2 = D(De) 21a1-2: *'dod pa daṅ mya ṅan daṅ 'jigs pa la sogs pas yid la gnod pa na mig la sogs pa la gnod pa mthoṅ ba daṅ | dga' ba la sogs pas yid bde ba can gyi sems daṅ ldan pa can gyi yoṅs su rgyus pa mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro.* Cf. also the paraphrase in *NAVV* 48.27-28.

[4] Cf. *NAVV* 48.30-31.

[5] This verse is quoted in *NAVV* 48.32-33.

[6] Read *prasāda* instead of *prāsāda;* cf. P(Pe) 60b5-6 = P(De) 51a4: *gsal ba).*

[Objection:] Even if we admit that the mental cognition is observed to be a support [for the senses] now (i.e., in this life), why is it [claimed] that this is exactly so at another time also (i.e., in a previous life)?
[Reply:] This is not true.

> 403. Even if smoke is seen [to arise] from fire, no one here [in this world] has perception *(adhyakṣa)* as a means of knowledge *(pramāṇa)* [for the fact] that at another time as well it [arises] only from that [fire].

Therefore,

> 404. Just as the cognition that smoke is preceded by fire is due to recognition *(pratyabhijñā),* in the same manner the cognition that [the senses are] transformable by the mind which arises in respect to the beginning of life [is due to recognition].

The apprehension that at the beginning of life sight, etc., are being recognized as being transformable in conformity with the mind which is associated with movement to and fro (i.e., unsteadiness), etc. *(cāpalādiyogimanonurūpavikāryatā),* [in the form] 'These [senses also] are just so,' is correct, just as the apprehension that [smoke] which as a product of fire has been seen once in a certain place as preceded by fire, is being recognized as being preceded by that [fire] in another place, [in the form] '[Smoke] does not [arise] otherwise.'[7] Therefore,[8]

> 405 (= 406). A sense [arises] from a mental cognition, and a mental cognition [arises] from it. And in the case of that

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[7] The Skt contains a lacuna here, which is noted in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 4; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 61a2-3 = $P_{(De)}$ 51b1: *gźan du ma yin no źes rtogs pa bźin no.* Sāṅkṛityāyana translates back into Skt: *nānyatrāstīty avagamavat, tasmāt.* However, my understanding of this sentence is different than Sāṅkṛityāyana's. I fail to understand the additional comparison implied by *avagamavat;* I therefore take *dper na... bźin* as a translation only of *yathā* (from the previous line) and as indicating the beginning and the end of a single comparison. I also take *gźan du* as *anyathā* rather than *anyatra. 'sti* in *pratyabhijñāyamānosti* could be indicative of an aberratio oculi which could account at the same time for the present lacuna and the displacement of the next two verses.

[8] The next two verses seem to be misplaced in the Skt version and appear in Sāṅkṛityāyana's edition as vv. 406-407, p. 59.4-7.

> [mental cognition] too, [yet another sense] would [arise] from it. Therefore, it is established that life has neither beginning nor end.

[Objection: Since] the mental cognition, in its turn, is transformable by the transformation of the senses, [then] in this manner [the following problem arises]:

> 406 (= 407). One observes in many cases that the mind becomes depressed, etc.,[9] when sight, etc., are destroyed. Therefore, how [can it be said that the senses] rest on the [mind]? Here [in our position, however] nothing disagreeable is conceived.

[Reply:] This is not correct,[10]

> 407 (= 405). There is a mental transformation [for the father] even when the senses of the child, etc., are defective. [According to your doctrine, the father's] mind would rest on these [defective senses of the child]. There is no restrictive determination between the two (i.e., the transformation of the senses of the child does not necessitate a transformation of the mind of the father).[11]

If [the mind of the father] is not transformed in all cases by[12] a transformation of sight, etc., of the child, etc., then *(iti)* because there is no determination, the senses of the child, etc.,[13] are not the support [of his mind]. This very absence of restrictive determination is seen between the two. Even when there is a transformation of one's own [senses] such as sight, etc., there is no transformation of certain mental moments. Thus, they too (i.e., one's own

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[9] Read *manodainyādi.*

[10] Due to the disorder of the Skt text *naitad asti* does not appear here; it appears only in the Tib.

[11] Cf. *NAVV* 48.29-30.

[12] Read *-vikāreṇa,* $P_{(Pe)}$ 61a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 51b3: *'gyur bas.*

[13] Delete *iti,* which has no equivalent in the Tib.

senses) are not the support.[14] Therefore, the senses [in general] are not the support [of the mind].
[Objection:] If so, then the mental cognition is the support of the senses, but the senses are not [the support] of the mind. Consequently the mind would not rest [on anything]. [However] all six [types of] cognition, the visual, etc., [up to the mental] must have some support.
[Reply:] This is not the case. There is no fixed rule that everything must have some support."

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[14] Delete *na;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 61a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 51b4.

tasmāt sthityāśrayo[1] *buddher*[2] *buddhim eva samāśritaḥ* |
kaścin nimittam akṣāṇāṃ tasmād akṣāṇi buddhitaḥ ||40||

[1] M 22.23 *sthirāśrayaḥ* is not a variant reading, but is due only to a missing syllable: *sthi-*<*te*>*r āśrayaḥ*, cf. M(S) 24.11.
[2] $PV_{M(S)}$: *buddhe*

"Therefore, the support of the continuity of cognition is a certain [thing] which rests [in its turn] on the cognition alone; it is the efficient cause of the senses. Therefore, the senses [arise] from the cognition [and not vice versa]."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 22. The translation above differs inasmuch as Vetter takes *akṣāṇām* to mean "sense cognitions" (Sinneserkenntnisse).

2) The masculines *samāśritaḥ* and *kaścit* do not seem to refer to any implicit masculine noun in particular; they seem rather to be due to an attraction by *āśrayaḥ*. Although D, P, R and M basically agree in their interpretations of "support," they stress different aspects. For D and M it is something of the same kind *(samānajātīya)* as the cognition (cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 23b6 = $D_{(De)}$ 21a5): *de'i phyir blo gnas pa'i rten 'ga' źig rigs mthun pa'o*; cf. also M 22.23), by which they mean the previous cognition of the same series; cf. Vibhūticandra's note in M(S) p. 24 n. 4: *pūrvakṣaṇo buddheḥ*. P 59.12, on the other hand, interprets "support" as the efficient cause of the senses technically called karma characterized as volitional consciousness *(cetanālakṣaṇakarma-saṃjñita)*. Further, P 59.8 states that not all things need a support; I assume that he has in mind the mental cognition. R 319b1 (= 638.1) takes "support" as referring to *karma* which propels/projects *(*ākṣepika-karma)*, but in anticipation of 40c or because of a textual corruption this is specified as the support of continuity of the senses, not of the cognition: *dbaṅ po gnas pa'i rten 'phen par byed pa'i las yin te* |. However, in the explanation following this sentence he explains that this karma which is the efficient cause of the senses is the support of the continuity of cognition. Just like the others, he too identifies this karma with the previous mental cognition: *las kyaṅ yid kyi blo sṅa ma ñid yin no.*

3) D, P and M differ in their analysis of the syntax of the verse. According to P *kaścit* starts a new sentence and one should translate accordingly: "A certain [variety of this support] is the efficient cause of the senses." I prefer, however, to follow $D_{(Pe)}$ 23b6 = $D_{(De)}$ 21a5 and M 22.23 which read more smoothly and are also corroborated by PV_{Tib}: *blo ñid la ni brten pa 'ga'*. PV_R (in R 319b1 = 638.1), however, reads: *blo ñid 'ga' źig la brten te* ‖. This could be translated as "... rests on a certain cognition only," but I fail to see how such a reading could correspond to the Skt original unless the translator read *kāñcin* instead of *kaścin.*

4) P 59.9-19: " If [you still] insist *(nirbandha, mṅon par źen)* [that the mental cognition must have some support], the [following] is also stated: ... (v. 40).
Therefore, the support of the continuity of cognition is *the efficient cause of the senses* technically called karma characterized as volitional consciousness *(cetanālakṣaṇakarmasañjñita).*
[Objection:] Then this [support called karma] rests on the senses like sight, etc.
[Reply:] Regarding this [objection Dharmakīrti] says: And this [support] *rests on the cognition alone,* not on the senses. For the senses are not its support. And it has been said [that there are two kinds of karma]: karma which is volitional consciousness and karma after this volition.[1] And volitional consciousness has the nature [of a mental act which takes the form]: '[I want] this and that.' And this [volitional consciousness] arises inasmuch as it rests on the previous cognition alone which has the nature of linking.[2] It is not supported by the body. And only a certain [variety of volitional consciousness] is the support of the senses,[3] not all, because in the formless sphere

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[1] The translation is uncertain; I suggest to read *ca* or *vā* instead of *vāk.* $P_{(Pe)}$ 61b3-4 = $P_{(De)}$ 52a1: *sems pa'i las dan bsam pa'i las.* Prajñākaragupta probably refers to *AKBh* 193.9 (on 4.1) which quotes an unidentified sūtra: *sūtra uktaṃ dve karmaṇī cetanā karma cetayitvā ceti.* De La Vallée Poussin mentions numerous parallel passages, notably *AN* III.415: *cetanāhaṃ bhikkave kammaṃ vadāmi, cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā.* Cf. also *AD* 118.8 and Jaini's notes thereon.

[2] Read *-rūpāṃ buddhim* or *-rūpabuddhim;* cf $P_{(Pe)}$ 61b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 52a1: *de la* ($P_{(De)}$ om. *la) yaṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i raṅ bźin* (|) *blo sṅa ma ñid la brten nas*| *'byuṅ ba yin gyi* |.

[3] Read as in Sāṅkṛtyāyana's n. 2.

(ārūpyadhātu) there are no senses. For the production of senses[4] is due to karma accompanied by thirst for a body *(śarīrasatṛṣṇa-karman)*, because the connection with pleasure *(abhirati)* [occurs] there [in the body endowed with senses]. For when an object of thirst[5] is obtained, pleasure arises. *'Therefore, the senses [arise] from the cognition,* but not the cognition from the senses,' is the conclusion [of the discussion] *(upasaṃhāra)*.[6] Therefore, the mind alone is the cause. Thus, the casting of the respectively previous lives *(pūrvapūrvajanmākṣepa)* [is done] by the mind."

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[4] Delete *śarīra* in *śarīrendriyāṇām;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 61b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 52a2.

[5] Read *tṛṣṇā.*

[6] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 23b7 = $D_{(De)}$ 21a6: *źes bya ba ni mjug bsdu pa'o.*

yādṛśy ākṣepikā[1] *sāsīt paścād apy astu tādṛśī* I
tajjñānair upakāryatvād uktaṃ kāyāśritaṃ manaḥ II41II

[1] Mi: *yādṛśyâkṣepikā (= yādṛśyā ākṣepikā?)*

"Of whichever kind the projecting/propelling [cognition] was [before], let it be of that kind later on as well.
The mind is said to rest on the body, because it is assisted (or: co-produced) by the cognitions of the [body]."

1) P 59.20-60.4: "[Objection:] If in that case the present life [arises] from a mental cognition which has the nature of conceptual construction of a Self [in the form] 'I' *(aham ity evamātmakalpanārūpa),* then what is the cause for the belief in another (i.e., next) life? How is the mind possibly[1] said to rest on the body? Thus, he says ... (v. 41).
Of whichever kind this mental cognition, possessed by the grasping of a Self[2] [and] *projecting* a beginningless succession of lives for the transmigrating [living beings], *was* [before], *let it be*[3] *of that kind later on as well,* [namely] projecting. It (i.e., the cognition) cannot be otherwise. Therefore, that attainment of birth *(janmaparigraha, skye ba daṅ 'bral ba)* [will occur] later on as well. For A whose nature is not different from the nature of [something] which produces B[4] necessarily *(eva)* produces B. For instance, [even] an inferior fire which has come in contact with wet fuel, [but] whose nature to produce smoke is not different [necessarily produces smoke]. Otherwise,

[1] The particle *vā* does not seem to be used here as a disjunction, and $P_{(Pe)}$ 61a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 52a4 translates it with *kyaṅ*. I interpret it to express "some interest taken in the question by the speaker"; cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax,* p. 321, § 409.3.

[2] The Skt seems corrupt, perhaps one has to read *ātmagrahagrastā sā manobuddhir;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 62a1 = 52a5: *yid kyi blo de bdag tu 'dzin pas zin pa.*

[3] Perhaps one should read *astu* instead of *bhavatu;* $P_{(Pe)}$ 62a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 52a5 has the same translation as for *astu* in the verse.

[4] According to $P_{(Pe)}$ 62a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 54a6 one has to translate: A whose nature is to produce B, and whose nature has not changed ... .

there is no relationship of cause and effect [and] no everyday practice. Thus, people *(jagat)* would cease to act.
[Objection:] The Buddha has taught that the mind too rests on the body by saying: 'The body and the mind conform to (or: follow upon) each other.'[5]
[Reply: Dharmakīrti] rejects this [objection]: *The mind is said* by the Buddha *to rest on the body* [only] because [the mind] is being assisted by the cognitions of the body. However, the body is not directly the support of the [mind], in the same manner as sight, etc., [are not directly the support] of the visual cognitions, etc.[6] Therefore, the mind characterized as 'ego-maker' *(ahaṅkāralakṣaṇaṃ manas)* does not rest on the senses such as sight, etc.; nor does it rest on the body. It can only rest on a mind of the same kind, because the [mind] is present in the formless sphere *(ārūpyadhātu)* as well [where body and senses are absent], and because [the Buddha] has taught the existence of the *[ārūpyadhātu].*"

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[5] Read *iti* instead of *api;* cf. M 23.14.

[6] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 24b5-6 = $D_{(De)}$ 22a3: *de ltar na yul gyi sgo nas kyaṅ dbaṅ po'i śes pa 'gyur ba na | yid rnam par 'gyur mod kyi de yaṅ de rten ma yin no ‖ gaṅ yaṅ de la rten* ($D_{(De)}$: *brten) nas 'jug pa de ni de la phan 'dogs pa daṅ | gnos* ($D_{(De)}$: *gnod) pa dṅos su rjes su byed do ‖ dper na dbaṅ po'i śes pa bźin no ‖.*

yady apy akṣair vinā buddhir na tāny api tayā vinā |
tathāpy anyonyahetutvaṃ tato 'py anyonyahetuke ||42||

"Even if there is no cognition without senses, they too [are not] without it. Even so there is mutual causality. For this [reason] also these two have each other as causes."

1) I follow all the commentaries as well as Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 22, in taking 42ab as a complete sentence. However, one could also construe *yady api* with *tathāpi:* "Even if there is no cognition without senses [and] they too [are not] without it, nevertheless there is mutual causality." *tathāpi* can be explained in both cases as stressing the difference to a situation in which two things are always found together, like the two horns of a cow, and are not causes of each other. Alternatively, *tathāpi* could be understood that even if the Cārvāka position that there are no cognitions without senses is accepted, nevertheless senses and cognition must be causes of each other, because it is equally true that there are no senses without cognition.

2) P 60.8 is perhaps quoting a Cārvāka fragment from an unidentified source: *śarīram antareṇa na buddhir indriyātmakaṃ tathādarśanād iti.*

3) All the commentaries accept sense and cognition as the logical subject of *anyonyahetutvam,* but disagree about the implied subject of the predicate *anyonyahetuke.* I tend to follow D who takes it also as the senses and the cognition (cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 25a2 = $D_{(De)}$ 22a6: ... *dbaṅ po rnam par śes pa phan tshun rgyu can du 'gyur ro).* According to P 60.12, followed by R 320a6 (= 639.6) and M 23.20, one should understand body and mind *(kāyamanasī).* Thus, according to P, R and M there is a change of subject from 42c to 42d.

4) I also followed D in interpreting *tataḥ* "because of that" and as referring back to 42c ($D_{(Pe)}$ 25a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 22a6: ... *de phyir | phan tshun rgyu ñid yin pa'i gtan tshigs kyi phyir |);* P 60.11 glosses it perhaps with *sāmagrītaḥ;* R and M leave it uncommented upon.

5) The second half of the verse seems to contain a redundancy. I tend to think that the *tatpuruṣa*-compound *anyonyahetutvam* points at the future and

the *bahuvrīhi anyonyahetuke* points at the past; however, none of the commentators interpret the verse in this manner. According to $D_{(Pe)}$ 24b8f. = $D_{(De)}$ 22a5f., v. 42c points at the past: *de ltar na yaṅ phan tshun rgyu ñid yin par sṅar skye ba yoṅs su len pa na (*pūrvajanmaparigrahe) grub pa yin no* ‖ "Even so, [senses and cognition] are proved as causes for each other with regard to the attainment of a previous birth." 42d, on the other hand, points at the future ($D_{(Pe)}$ 25a1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 22a6): ... *ji ltar sṅar phan tshun rgyu ñid yin pa ... de bźin du phyis kyaṅ śi ba'i 'og tu dbaṅ po rnam par śes pa phan tshun rgyu can du 'gyur ro* ‖ "Just as [the two were] causes of each other before ... in the same manner later on as well, [i.e.] after death, the senses and cognition will have each other as causes." According to P 60.11-12, on the other hand, 42c points at the present, whereas 42d points at the past and the future (i.e., up to and beyond birth and death): *tato 'pi sāmagrītaḥ pūrvake pare ca kāyamanasī anyonyahetuke madhyāvasthāvad iti jñātavyam.* Cf. also R 320a6 (= 639.6): *dus da ltar bźin du skye ba daṅ 'chi ba'i tshe lus daṅ yid phan tshun rgyu 'gyur bas 'jig rten pha rol med pa ni ma yin no.* According to M 23.20, 43d points only at the past: *anyonyahetuke kāyamanasī madhyāvasthāvad anādidṛkpravāhavatīti siddhaḥ paralokaḥ.* Vetter, *loc. cit.*, renders *anyonyahetutvam* and *anyonyahetuke* by "gegenseitiges Ursacheverhältnis" and "sich gegenseitig bedingen," but I am not sure what, if any, difference is implied.

6) P 60.5-12: "Or let it be accepted that there is no cognition without the senses; even so the other world is not inexistent, because [the cognition and the senses] are the support of each other. Thus, he says ... (v. 42).
For just as you accept that there is no cognition without a body which has the nature of senses, because it is observed to be so, in the same manner it should be accepted that the senses too are not without the mental cognition. For the observation [of something to be] so, on which the [above] acceptance depends, is common to both [cases]. Thus being the case, [the senses, or the body which has the nature of senses, and the cognition] would be mutual causes,[1] for the series[2] of these two assist (or: co-produce) each other. And

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[1] Delete *-ka-?* Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 62b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 52b5.

[2] $P_{(Pe)}$ 62b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 52b5 *rgyu mtshan* would correspond to *nimitta* instead of *santāna,* but makes no sense in the present context; it is perhaps a corruption from *rgyun to rgyu* to which *mtshan* was added.

the causal complex of these two which have each other as causes arises from another causal complex. [Thus] it should be known that just as in the middle state [between birth and death], the previous and the posterior body and mind have each other as causes 'because of that too' [i.e.] because of the [present] causal complex.[3]"

[3] I follow $P_{(Pe)}$ 62b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 52b5-6 in construing *sāmagrītaḥ* with *tato 'pi.* It is possible, however, to construe *sāmagrītaḥ* with *pūrvake pare ca* "(body and mind) previous and posterior to the [present] causal complex."

nākramāt kramiṇo bhāvo nāpy[1] apekṣāviśeṣiṇaḥ |
kramād bhavantī dhīḥ kāyāt kramaṃ tasyāpi śaṃsati ||43||

[1] P seems to have read *nāsty*, cf. 61.26, 62.9; PV_{Tib}: *ltos pa'aṅ med*

"A [thing] which is characterized by gradation does not arise from [a cause] which lacks gradation. Nor does [something] which is not characterized by an [additional] special property depend [on assisting causes].
The cognition which arises from the body gradually announces (i.e., makes known) that it (i.e., the body) too has gradation."

1) This verse is quoted in *TBV* p. 336.21-22. The first half of the verse is quoted in *PKM* p. 325.16 and *TBV* p. 184.20.

2) This is an interesting, and as far as I know not very common, variant of the *kramayaugapadya* argument, which is usually employed to deny the existence of eternal or lasting entities, and not the causal relationship or the relation between support and supported; cf. also *PV* II 9. At first sight it may seem that Dharmakīrti assumes that cognition is lasting and changes gradually (as P 60.18f. seems to claim), however, in my opinion "cognition" in the singular number should be taken here in a collective sense, amounting to the argument that if the body alone would be the cause of cognition, then all the cognitions one has throughout one's lifetime should arise at once. This argument is only valid if the Cārvāka opponent assumes that the body retains its identity, or is substantially the same, from birth to death. Whether this is an accurate reflection of the Cārvāka position I do not know. If the above is denied by the Cārvākas, then the next verse (44) should apply.

3) P 60.13-62.13: "And if the body alone is the support of the mental cognition[1] [and] the [mental cognition] is not [the support] of the body, then the cognition, arising from the body, would arise either from a [body] possessing gradation or from a [body] which lacks gradation, for there is no other way [for the body to be]. In respect to these [alternatives], [it] does not arise from a [body] which lacks gradation, because ... (v. 43).

[1] Read as in Sāṅkṛtyāyana's n. 2.

For this mental cognition possesses gradation. Otherwise, when it apprehends its own form [in the awareness having the form] 'I,' it [would] apprehend all its natures *(svasvabhāva)*, [i.e.] past, present and future. Thus, [it] would apprehend all [its] lives [even those past and future]. If [the cognition] does not apprehend [all three] states *(avasthā)* (i.e., past, present and future), there is no cognition of [its] pervasion (i.e., extension in time to) the previous and the posterior *(pūrvāparavyāptipratīti)*.

> 408. If [the cognition] does not apprehend [its three] states, how could there be a cognition [of it] as the subject of [these] states *(avasthātṛ)*? For if there is no cognition of something (e.g., a state) to be pervaded *(vyāpya)*, there is no cognition that something else (e.g., the cognition) pervades [it].[2]

For if the state characterized by pervasion *(vyāpinī)* is not cognized [because it is past or future[3]], [then] since that which has to be pervaded is not cognized, how could the pervader be cognized as such (i.e., as pervading)? For it [can]not [be claimed that something] is so even though it is not cognized with that form. For the cognition alone settles whether [something] is so or different. [And] if it is not cognized that it pervades [past and future states], then it is necessarily cognized with a form different from that. Therefore, it does not exist at another time. Thus, existence at another time belongs to another cognition.[4] Thus, the cognition possesses gradation. Therefore, *a [thing] which is characterized by gradation does not arise from [a cause] which lacks gradation.*

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[2] $P_{(Pe)}$ 62b8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 53a2, however, construes *anyasya* with *vyāpya-: khyab bya gźan bzuṅ med par ni* **I** *khyab byed rtogs pa med phyir ro* **I**.

[3] Cf. Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 4.

[4] Delete *(na)*; $P_{(Pe)}$ 63a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 53a4, however, which is not entirely clear to me, seems to have read a negation whether in the form of an additional *na*, as assumed by Sāṅkṛityāyana, or by reading *kālāntaratāpratītyantarasya: dus gźan daṅ ldan par skye ba rtogs pa gźan med pa yin no* **I** The use of "state" *(avasthā)* to designate the three times reminds of Vasumitra's terminology; cf. *AKBh* on 5.26ab, p. 296.20f.

[Objection:] Even if we admit that the cause (i.e., the body) lacks gradation, why should the effect (i.e., the cognition) too be precisely so[5]? For the effect is not always *(eva)* the same as the cause, for one observes also [an effect] which has different characteristics [than the cause].
[Reply:] On the above it is said:

> 409. If the effect would [arise] from a [cause] which lacks gradation, all [of it] would arise only then (i.e., at once). At another time, however, this [cause][6] is completely absent, because at that time [the effect] is [already] completed.

To explain: A [cause would] produce an effect, if it would be apprehended at the time of the effect.[7] For what is not being cognized then (i.e., at the time of the production of an effect), is not the cause of that [effect]. If [you say that the cause] is cognized, then [it can be] cognized [only] till the time of [its] destruction, because [it] is one [qualitatively and quantitatively]. Therefore (i.e., because it is without gradation), [it] would be destroyed already then (i.e., when its effect is completed). For such is its lack of gradation. Therefore, an effect posterior to the destroyed [cause] would not arise. Or if it would [arise], [it would] not be its effect.[8] If [you say that the cause] is being cognized gradually, [it] is a cause which possesses gradation.[9] Thus being [the case], [the cause] is not lacking gradation. For what is being cognized as blue is not non-blue.
Or [we can adopt another line of reasoning].

> 410. [We] do not say that the effect arises from a cause, inasmuch as it has the form (i.e., nature) of that [cause], but

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[5] Read *tathābhūtena.*

[6] *sa* does not seem to have an explicit referent; perhaps one has to supply *hetu* or *kāya.* The use of *sa* instead of *tan* is obviously due to metrical reasons.

[7] $P_{(Pe)}$ 63a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 53a6, however: *gal te 'bras bu'i dus su bzuṅ na | de lta na 'bras bu med par 'gyur ro.* As an equivalent to *tat* is lacking and *kāryakāri* is not translated literally, one could assume that the original used by Tibetan translators was illegible at this point and the part *tatkārya...* was misread as *na kārya...* .

[8] I prefer to read *tatkāryam.*

[9] Read *kramavat kāraṇam;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 63a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 53a7: *rgyu rim pa can.*

that the relationship of cause and effect [is determined] by positive and negative concomitance.

An effect is still *(eva)* an effect, even [if it may be] different from the cause, because the relationship of cause and effect[10] is characterized by conformity in positive and negative concomitance. On the other hand, where there is no positive and negative concomitance, that is neither effect nor cause.[11] And what does not arise when the cause remains the same does not conform to that cause.
[Objection:] Effect is only that which does not arise when something [else] (i.e., the cause) is absent. But what is the use of [defining it as] that which arises necessarily when something [else] is present?[12]

411. [Reply:] If [something] is not present even when something [else] is present, how [do you know that] it is absent when [the other thing] is absent? How [do you know] that this absence of this [thing] is conditioned *(prayukta)* by the absence of the [other thing]?

If [something] does not arise even when there is a capable cause,[13] that [thing] would not be its cause. How [could] it possibly be known that the absence of the one is conditioned by the absence of the other? Just as when the cause remains in the same state *(tadavastha),* [the effect] does not arise all by itself, in the same manner, also when the [cause] is absent, [the effect] will not arise all by itself, [i.e.] independently. When it (i.e., the effect) depends on[14] [a cause], when the cause is capable, [it] would arise necessarily.

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[10] Delete *-lakṣaṇa* which lacks an equivalent in $P_{(Pe)}$ 63b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 53b1.

[11] The Tibetan translation has a second negation before *kāraṇaṃ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 63b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 53b2: *rgyu ma yin źiṅ 'bras bu ma yin na.* This could well be a clarification and does not necessarily point at a different reading.

[12] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 5, but delete the second *na;* the corresponding negation in $P_{(Pe)}$ 63b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 53b2, together with *gal te,* seems only to translate *nanu.*

[13] Read *samarthe.*

[14] Read *tasya paratantratve.*

> 412. For even if the absence/inexistence of things *(padārtha)* may arise all by itself, [their] existence, on the other hand, [is not so]; since [it] depends on something else, how could it not arise from a cause?

For it is correct that absence/inexistence *(abhāva)* arises all by itself, because [it] has no causes *(nirhetuka)*. On the other hand it is incorrect that existence, since [it] depends on causes, does not arise when the cause is capable.[15]
[Objection:] It is indeed correct that the effect does not arise even when the cause is present, because it (i.e., the absence) is independent.[16]
[Reply:] If so, [when you say] 'When this is absent, [that] is absent,' the absence [of the latter, i.e., the effect] is not conditioned by the absence of the cause. Consequently, how would it (i.e., the absence of the effect) be its effect (i.e., of the absence of the cause)? Therefore, [the effect] would not arise all by itself (i.e., the absence of the effect would be independent). And what is not hindered by a [certain thing], is not determined by that [thing].[17] Therefore, just as [the effect] does not arise all by itself, in the same manner it would also arise [all by itself]. Therefore [it would] not be an effect [which arises from that cause]. But when it would arise only when the cause is present, then, even if its nature is suppressed *(svarasanirodha)* because it arises [anew] in each subsequent moment,[18] as soon as the [cause] is absent, the series is cut off *(santānoccheda)*; such is the dependence on the cause. Therefore, *a thing which is characterized by gradation does not arise from [a cause] which lacks gradation.*
[Objection:] An effect possessing gradation [can arise] also from [a cause] which lacks gradation, inasmuch as [the cause] depends on [another] assisting [cause] characterized by gradation.
[Reply:] This is also not [the case]. *Something which is not characterized by an [additional] special property does not depend,* [i.e.] something onto which a special property is not added does not depend on anything in order to

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[15] Read *samarthe.*

[16] Delete *ca (?na).*

[17] Read **yaś ca yena na (ni)vāryate* (or similar); $P_{(Pe)}$ 64a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 53b7: *gaṅ źig gaṅ gi* ($P_{(De)}$: *gis) bzlog par bya ba* ($P_{(De)}$: *byed pa) ma yin pa.*

[18] Read *-kṣaṇotpattitas.*

acquire [that] special property. [However] the [body] does not have [such] a special property. Or if [it has such] a special property, [this means change in the body, and thus the body] is not permanent [from birth to death].[19] And if a special property different [from the body] is admitted, [then] the effect which depends on this special property would arise from it alone, not from the permanent [body].
[Objection:] The [body] owns this special property (i.e., the property which is different from it and on which the effect depends).
[Reply:] No; '[having] a special property' [means] either producing a special property *(viśeṣakaratva)* or producing the cognition of a special property *(viśeṣapratyayakaratva)*. It (i.e., the body or any cause which lacks gradation) does not produce a special property, because it has no special property [which arises additionally in it at the time of this production, precisely because it lacks gradation]. If [you say] that the special property arises from a special property [in the body or any cause], then [the body or any cause] is impermanent. [Or] if [the special property responsible for the production of the special property] is different [from the body or any cause], the previous inadmissible consequence [applies].[20]
[Objection:] It is a cause for the cognition of a special property.
[Reply:] This is also not correct.

> 413. When a special property does not exist, the cognition of a special property does not arise. If it is so (i.e., if it does arise), this is an erroneous cognition *(bhrānti)*. Thus, [your] exertion [about a special property] is useless.
>
> 414. For when [something] is cognized [as] having no special property, it is understood to be permanent. If there is a special property and [its cognition] is not erroneous, how [could one have] a valid cognition that [it] is permanent?
>
> 415. If [it] is cognized [to be] without a special property, how could it be dependent[21] [on assisting causes]? Since [it]

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[19] Read *anityatā* |.

[20] Cf. P 61.27-28: The special property would arise from the special property, not from the body which is proclaimed to be its cause.

[21] Read *apekṣyatvam*. Although the grammatically correct form would be *apekṣitvam* (abstract

is indifferent *(audāsīnya)* [to assisting causes], it does not have a special property either.

416. If a special property arises [for it], then it is correct to say that with regard to this it depends [on assisting causes]. In this sense there is an everyday practice *(laukika-vyavahāra)* [of saying] that '[something] depends on [another thing].'

Therefore, it is correct [when Dharmakīrti says] that *'something which is not characterized by an [additional] special property does not depend [on assisting causes].'*

417. The cognition which arises gradually from the body would make known the gradation of the body. That by which its (i.e., the cognition's) gradation is caused otherwise (i.e., not by the body which according to you lacks gradation) is evident as the cause [of cognition].

418. The mental cognition *(manodhī)* comes forth from the respectively previous experience. And that [previous experience] too is due to a previous [experience]. Consequently, the latter [experience] too [is due to a previous experience].[22] Therefore, there is no starting point *(anavasthiti)* to this."

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of *apekṣin,* "depending on"), not *apekṣyatvam* (abstract of *apekṣya,* "to be depended on") I refrain from emending the text, because in P 65.16 similar usages of *-apekṣya* can be observed, i.e., *anyānapekṣyam* instead of *anyānapekṣam* and *parasparāpekṣyam* instead of *parasparāpekṣam.*

[22] $P_{(Pe)}$ 64b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 54a7, however: *de las gźan las de yaṅ źes* |.

pratikṣaṇam apūrvasya pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ kṣaṇo bhavet |
tasya hetur ato hetur dṛṣṭa evāstu sarvadā ||44||

"At every moment, the respectively previous moment has to be the cause of the new [moment]. Therefore, let only the observed cause always be [considered as cause]."

1) This verse is translated by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 22.

2) P 62.14-24: "[Objection:] The body produces the cognition gradually in dependence on the respectively previous cognition.
[Reply:] In this case, the body [at the time of producing a cognition] should have a special [additional] property. Thus, it follows that the cause of the body accompanied by the cognition is the respectively previous body of exactly the same kind (i.e., accompanied by a cognition). When this is the case ... (v. 44).
It is established that precisely the respectively previous body which is helped by the cognition [and] observed as the cause of the [respectively] posterior [body with cognition] is always the cause [of a body with cognition, i.e.] at birth and death as well, just as [it is] in the state in between. Otherwise, because a concomitance is not cognized, nothing would be cause of anything, for there is no other means [to determine something as cause except by observing that it invariably precedes the effect].

> 419. Therefore, what has been observed once *(sakṛt)* [to arise] from something, [arises] exactly from that [thing] at another time as well. The relationship be tween cause and effect is well-known in exactly this manner.

And it is not [the case that] people engaged in everyday practice *(vyavahārin)* do not admit the relationship between cause and effect. This has been shown above. Therefore, [we] stop [the discussion here]."

cittāntarasya sandhāne ko virodho 'ntyacetasaḥ I
tad yad[1] *apy arhataś*[2] *cittam asandhānaṃ kuto matam* II45II

[1] Mi, PV_P and PV_M: *tadvad;* PV_{Tib}: *gaṅ yin de yaṅ*
[2] Mi: *arthataś*

"What is the contradiction concerning the last cognition's linking to another cognition?
On account of what do [you] maintain that the cognition of the Arhat also does not link?"

1) Although all editions of the Skt text read *tadvad api,* I decided to follow the Tib reading which is also confirmed by PV_D, PV_P and PV_R; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 26a4 = $D_{(De)}$ 23a7: ... *gaṅ yin de yaṅ* ($D_{(De)}$: *la)* II and R 321a5 (= 641.5): ... *gaṅ de yaṅ ni* II. It should also be noted that none of the commentaries seems to have read *tadvat;* at least none of them comment on any comparison in the immediate context.

If one would try to follow the Skt text, one could perhaps understand the second half of the verse as an unmarked *pūrvapakṣa:* "Even so (i.e., even if we would admit that there is no contradiction when the last cognition in life links to another cognition), on what basis do you maintain that this is not the case for the last cognition of the Arhat?" A related interpretation and translation, also under the presumption that 45cd presents a *pūrvapakṣa,* would be: "On account of what do [you] maintain that the [last] cognition of the Arhat does not link, although it is like that [last cognition in general]?" The advantage of these interpretations would be that they account satisfactorily for the difficult *tadvad api,* in the first interpretation taken as equivalent to *tathāpi.* However, I do not see how the question in v. 46ab could be construed to relate to 45cd in these interpretations. At most the speaker of the rhetorical question in 45cd could utilize the implied fact that the last cognition of the Arhat should also link to another cognition, as a means of knowledge to establish absence of liberation. 46cd, however, cannot be understood to continue this line of discussion; it clearly addresses the question why according to the opponent there is no further production of cognition after death, i.e., why rebirth cannot be established.

With difficulty one may also understand 45cd as a statement of the *siddhāntin,* by separating the connection between *tadvat* and *api:* "On account of what do [you] maintain that the cognition of the Arhat also does not link, just as that [last cognition in general which according to you does not link]?" In this case one would have to assume an implicit *pūrvapakṣa* between 45ab and 45cd, as explicated by the commentaries as preceding 45 (cf. below). The discussion would run on smoothly in v. 46. However, it seems highly unnatural to construe *api* with *cittam* and not, as usual, with what precedes, i.e., *tadvat.*

Thus it is preferable to read *tad yat* and follow D, P, R and M which explain the verse as presenting a *siddhānta* that responds to the Cārvāka who uses the last cognition of the Buddhist saint as an example in an inference to prove that all cognitions at death, those of ordinary people as well, do not produce further cognitions. Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 26a1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 23a4-5: *lam po che'i skyes bu la sogs pa'i sems ni 'chi ba'i sems ñid yin pa'i phyir sems gźan daṅ mtshams sbyor ba ma yin te | skyes bu dgra bcom par 'dod pa'i 'chi ba'i sems bźin no* ||; cf. also P 63.18-20 translated below, R 321a5 (= 641.5) and M 24.13. According to this interpretation the *siddhāntin* in 45 replies to an objection which, however, is not formulated in the text.

2) P 63.11-12 (followed by M 24.15-17) differentiates between two kinds of contradiction or opposition; the one characterized by incompatibility *(sahānavasthāna),* the other by subsistence by mutual exclusion *(parasparaparihāra<sthiti>).* These two kinds of contradiction are mentioned by Dharmakīrti in *NB* 3.72-75, where the sensations of heat and cold illustrate the first, existence and inexistence the second kind which is more precisely determined as the fact that the characteristics of two things subsist by mutual exclusion. It has to be noted that Dharmakīrti does not use the term *sahānavasthāna;* however, it appears in *NBṬ* 199.7 and 207.4-7. The opponent (P 63.17-18) argues for a contradiction of the second type only. $D_{(Pe)}$ 26a3 = $D_{(De)}$ 23a6 mentions two kinds of contradiction without specifying them; R does not refer to them at all.

3) P 62.25-63.25: "[Objection:] In the state in between [birth and death] the body is observed to be preceded by a body with cognition; therefore, the previous [body] as well, [i.e.] the body at the beginning of a [new] life, is preceded by a body accompanied by cognition. Therefore, the cognition in this life [arises] only from a cognition in another (i.e., previous) life, [and]

from the cognition in this life also a cognition in a future life [arises].[1] Thus, the other world is well-established [in the future as well]. In this manner, also the opposite [to your position follows] from another reason. Thus, the position of the opponent is well-established. To explain:

> 420. The cognition at [the time of] death [of all people] is not followed by another birth, because it is this cognition [at death], just like the cognition at death [of the Arhat] who is free from defilements *(vītadoṣa)*.

The cognition at death does not link to another cognition, just like the cognition at death of [the Arhat] who is free from passions *(vītarāga)*. And the cognition of ordinary people which is accepted [by you] as effecting linking to another birth is [also] a cognition at death. Therefore, there is no linking [to another birth; thus, there is no future life and everyone would be liberated]. If [you object that] this (i.e., 'because it is a cognition at death') is not a [valid] reason [for absence of linking in general], because it is obstructed by the opposite [of the probandum] (i.e., the presence of linking in the case of cognition at death of ordinary people), then the opposite (i.e., the presence of linking in the case of cognition at death of ordinary people) too is not a [valid] reason [for presence of linking in general], because it is obstructed by that [absence of linking in the case of cognition at death of the Arhat]. Therefore, there is a common [difficulty for both reasons].
[Reply:] It is not common, because if A is contradictory to B, [the presence of] A would prove the absence of B [and] if A is connected to B, [the presence of] A [would prove] the presence of B. But there is no contradiction between cognition at death and linking, because ... (v. 45).
For what is the contradiction concerning the last cognition's linking to another cognition which [for you] is to be proved as inexistent, be it [a contradiction] with it (i.e., the last cognition itself) or with its object? What is the contradiction by which its absence would be proved?[2] None! Neither [a contradiction] characterized by incompatibility, nor [a contradiction]

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[1] Read *vijñānam aihikam | aihikavijñānād api;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 65a2-3: *skye ba can* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *gźan) gyis* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *gyi) rnam par śes pa ñid las 'di yi* ($P_{(De)}$: *'i) rnam par śes pa yin la | 'di'i rnam par śes pa las kyaṅ 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ba'i skye bo'i* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *ba'i) rnam par śes pa yin pa'i phyir* ... .

[2] In the syntactical division of the last two sentences I follow $P_{(Pe)}$ 65b1-2 = $P_{(De)}$ 55a3.

characterized by subsistence by mutual exclusion.[3] For when the state of being a cognition at death arrives, one does not observe the opposite (or: contradictory) of linking. Precisely for this [reason], one does not observe the [cognition at death] taking its place by excluding the [linking], because linking to another birth is not visible. Therefore, being a cognition at death is not contradictory to linking, because contradiction in either of the two forms is not observed. Therefore, [the cognition at death in general] does not prove the absence of linking. But [the first cognition's] being an effect is contradictory to the absence of linking.[4] Therefore, it is capable to prove the absence of the [absence of linking]. Thus, linking is proved by the opposite [to your probandum] (i.e., the absence of the absence of linking). And it will be shown that two [reasons] whose purposes are mutually contradictory, [but nevertheless] do not deviate [with regard to this purpose], do not exist in one[5] [subject].[6]

[Objection:] There is indeed a contradiction here, characterized by subsistence by mutual exclusion. How [can you say that] there is no contradiction? For

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[3] Read *-parihārasthiti-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 65b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 55a3-4: *phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa.* Cf. also P 63.17.

[4] Cf $P_{(Pe)}$ 65b5-6 = $P_{(De)}$ 55a5: *'bras bu ñid ni mtshams sbyor ba med pa [bsgrub pa ma yin no ǁ 'bras bu med pa daṅ] 'gal ba yin te* |. Words in square brackets are omitted by $P_{(De)}$.

[5] Read *ekatra* instead of *aikatra.*

[6] The subject intended must be the cognition at death, and the two purposes the absence and presence of its linking to another cognition. The two reasons would be "being a cognition at death" for the Cārvāka, and "being a cognition" (in general) for the Buddhist. On the *viruddhāvyabhicārihetu* cf. Preisendanz, *Studien,* pp. 357-363.

$P_{(Pe)}$ 65b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 55a6 (... *don la* ...) presents a different interpretation of the compound *parasparaviruddhārthāvyabhicārin* which corresponds to the first interpretation (preceding the more common one adopted by me) of the compound *viruddhāvyabhicārin* found in the *NBṬ* (224.9-11 on 3.110), i.e.: "do not deviate with regard to purposes which are mutually contradictory." It may be reminded that the *NBṬ* also was translated by Blo ldan Śes rab.

421. the cognition at death of the Arhat does not link[7] [to another cognition]. His cognition ceases *(vimokṣa)* just as a lamp becomes extinguished *(pradīpasyeva nirvāṇam).*

For the cognition at death of a man assumed [by you to be] an Arhat becomes extinguished like a lamp. Because one therefore cognizes that cognition at death [in general] is established by exclusion of the [linking to another cognition], the contradiction is well-established. Consequently the absence of contradiction is not well-established.
[Reply:] This is also not coherent. *On account of what* means of knowledge *do* you *maintain* that *also this* [last] *cognition of the Arhat does not link* [to another cognition]? You do not have a means of knowledge for this, because you strive only in order to sublate that [cognition of Arhat].[8] If [on the other hand] the Arhat is admitted,[9] then [you also have to admit that] for him non-linking is effected by disconnection from the defilements *(kleśavisaṃyoga),* not otherwise. And this disconnection from defilements does not exist for ordinary people. Thus, even though [the last cognitions of ordinary people] are cognitions at death, how [would they] not link? For being a cognition at death does not contradict linking [to another cognition], because [only] a contradiction of the disconnection from defilements with linking is accepted.[10] But this [contradiction] is not admitted by you."

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[7] Read *pratisandhir.*

[8] Inasmuch as the Cārvāka negates the other world he also negates the existence of the Arhat (and *eo ipso* the cognition of the Arhat): if there were no future lives, there would be no difference between ordinary people and enlightened beings inasmuch as no one would be reborn.

[9] Read *arhann abhyupagamyate;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66a2-3 = $P_{(De)}$ 55b2: *gal te dgra bcom pa khas len na ni.* The particle *ni* could perhaps stand for *hi,* in which case one should read *yadi hy arhann.*

[10] $P_{(Pe)}$ 66a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 55b3, however, seems to have read *-abhāva* instead of *virodha-.*

asiddhārthaḥ pramāṇena kiṃ siddhānto 'nugamyate |
hetor vaikalyatas tac cet kiṃ tad evātra noditam ||46||

"Do [you] follow a tenet whose content is not established by a means of knowledge?
If [you say that] this [absence of linking] is due to the incompleteness of the cause, why didn't [you] state exactly that in this [proof of yours]?"

1) I follow the PV_{Tib} in taking *asiddhārthaḥ* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound: *tshad mas ma grub don can gyi* ||. The Cārvāka tries to establish the example of his inference by having recourse to a Buddhist tenet, i.e., that the last cognition of the Arhat does not link to another cognition (cf. v. 45). Thus he tries to contradict the Buddhist thesis of rebirth by utilizing an example accepted by the Buddhist but not by himself. Dharmakīrti objects in principle to the use of tenets in such a manner. Either the tenet is established by a means of knowledge and then it has to be admitted by the opponent as well; or it is not established, and then it is null and void and cannot be used to establish anything. In other words, the opponent is not allowed to use an example in which he himself does not believe. That much can be read directly from the verse. All the commentators, however, give it an additional twist, which I cannot see there: If the *siddhānta* is accepted, the other world is accepted as well. To explain: The Cārvāka is accused of misrepresenting the Buddhist position, because the absence of *pratisandhāna* is maintained only for the cognition at death of the Arhat, not of everyone. Further, there is no real opposition between the last cognition of an Arhat and rebirth, but only between the absence of defilements, peculiar to the Arhat, and rebirth. Thus, accepting the Buddhist position regarding the last cognition of the Arhat as it really is would entail recognition of rebirth in general, not its negation. Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 26a8 = $D_{(De)}$ 23b3, P 64.7, R 321b1-3 (= 642.1-3), M 24.20 and 25.7.

If, on the other hand, the Cārvāka tries to present his independent proof for the absence of linking, he is guilty of not having stated his reason. Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 26a8-26b2 = $D_{(De)}$ 23b3-4: *gal te de rgyu bral yin na* | *de ltar ni 'gyur na* | *skyes bu dgra bcom par 'dod pa'i 'chi ba'i sems daṅ* | *gźan gyi rgyur grub* (read with $D_{(De)}$: *gyur) pa dbugs 'byuṅ ba daṅ rṅub pa dag 'chi ba'i dus na med ciṅ rten du gyur* ($D_{(De)}$: *'gyur) ba'i dbaṅ po rnams kyaṅ* (add

with $D_{(De)}$: *ldog pa) de ltar na | de rgyu daṅ bral ba'i phyir ñid mtshams sbyor bar mi 'dod do źe'o ||. "If [you say that] this is due to the incompleteness of the cause.* To explain: Exhaling and inhaling, which constitute the cause of the cognition at death of the person accepted [by you, the Buddhists] as Arhat and of other [cognitions at death], are absent at the time of death, and the senses which constitute the support [for cognitions] are equally missing. Thus, only due to the incompleteness of the cause *this* linking [to another life] is not admitted." In other words, the reason and the example are no longer based on a Buddhist tenet, but on the Cārvāka doctrine according to which the breaths, the senses, etc., are the cause and support of cognition; due to their absence there is no rebirth.

2) P suggests no less than three different interpretations for *kiṃ tad evātra noditam;* cf. the translation below and the exposition in chapter IV above.

3) 63.26-64.15: "[Objection:] The contradiction [characterized by subsistence by mutual exclusion] (cf. the previous verse) is apprehended from nothing but [your] tenet *(siddhānta).*
[Reply:] No! Because the tenet [that the cognition at death of the Arhat does not link to another cognition] serves to convey a contradiction [between a last cognition and linking to another cognition] only in respect to the cognition at death of the Arhat.

> 422. For the tenet does not establish a contradiction of every [cognition at death with linking to another cognition]. The [tenet] establishes that cognition at death links in certain [cases].[1]
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> 423. [Objection:] There is no proof of linking by a means of knowledge. Thus, since there is no means of knowledge for it, the contradiction certainly arises.

[Reply:] This is also not true. If the tenet is sublated by a means of knowledge, then it is certainly not a means of knowledge. How is what [you]

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[1] Read *kvacit tena;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 55b5: *la lar des ni ston pa yin* |.

aspire to proved by that [which is not a means of knowledge]? [Dharmakīrti] says [exactly] this [with the following verse]:[2] ... (v. 46).
If the tenet is certainly not a means of knowledge, then the contradiction of the cognition at death with linking is not proved by it. *Do [you] follow,* or [more precisely] assent to, this [tenet]? Indeed, [something] which is not a means of knowledge does not become a means of knowledge, even if it is being assented to. If [it] is a means of knowledge, it is a means of knowledge in all [respects]. Thus, the opposite [of your probandum, i.e., the absence of the absence of linking] is proved.[3]
[Objection:] In certain [respects] it is a means of knowledge; in certain [respects] it is not a means of knowledge.
[Reply:] No, because [mere] wishing is common to both proponent and opponent *(vādiprativādin).*
[Objection: When we say] 'due to the incompleteness of the cause,'[4] a reason proves the contradiction, not a tenet.
[Reply:] If *this* non-linking *is due to the incompleteness of the cause* [comprising breaths, senses, etc.], for what reason *didn't [you] state exactly that* incompleteness, [i.e.] pronounce [it] as a reason [in your inference]? Has an inconclusive reason been brought forth[5] [when you said] 'because [it] is a cognition at death'?[6]

Or [we may suggest another interpretation:] If *[you say that] this [absence of linking] is due to the incompleteness of the cause,* [i.e.] if the incompleteness of the cause, characterized as the body, etc., in the state of dying is the reason [for the absence of linking],[7] [then] *what* is said in addition *here [in*

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[2] $P_{(Pe)}$ 66a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 55b6 adds *de bśad pa ni* | *(tad āha).*

[3] Read *viparyayasiddhiḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 55b7.

[4] Read *atha hetuvaikalyād* or *hetor vaikalyād;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 56a1: *'on te* ($P_{(De)}$: *gal te) rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *bral ba'i) phyir ro* ‖. Note, however, that the Skt also makes sense, and could be translated as follows: "[Objection: The cognition at death] is not a cause [for another cognition], because [the other causes] are incomplete."

[5] Read *upanyastaḥ.*

[6] Read *-cittatvād ity;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 56a2: ... *sems yin pa'i phyir źes.*

[7] The Skt seems corrupt; the translation follows the Tibetan. Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66b5-6 = $P_{(De)}$ 56a3:

your proof]? [Nothing!] This [reason] too is nothing but a pseudoreason *(hetvābhāsa)*. The previous [reason] (i.e., 'because it is a cognition at death') was not conclusive *(anaikāntika)*, whereas this one is not established *(asiddha)* because this incompleteness of the cause is not found here [in the state of dying].[8]

Or [in the statement:] *kiṃ tad evātra noditam, 'no'* [is used] in [the meaning of] negation.[9] [For it is said:] *'a, mā, no* and *na* express negation.' [Thus,] 'Is it *noditam?'* [has to be understood as] '[Is it] not *ditam?', ditam* [means] 'cut into pieces' *(khaṇḍita)*,[10] [and thus] the [complete] meaning is 'It is cut into pieces indeed!', [i.e.] the incompleteness itself is not established, because the previous cognition *(manas)* which is complete is the cause [of linking]. And why this is [the case] was explained [above in v. 36f.]."

... *bral ba gtan tshigs yin pa* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *yin na) 'dir lhag pa ci źig brjod de* |. It is conceivable that already in the basis of Tib **hetutvenoktam* (or with a similar predicate) was corrupt or partly illegible, and the translators did their best to provide a meaningful conclusion to the clause.

[8] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 26b6-7 = $D_{(De)}$ 23b7f.: *gal te thams cad la khyad par med pa sgrub par byed pa yin par 'gyur źe na | de ltar na yaṅ gtan tshigs 'di ni ma grub pa ñid yin te | 'di ltar dbugs 'byuṅ ba daṅ rṅub pa dag las yid kyi blo ma yin źes 'gog par 'gyur ba ñid kyi phyir ro* ||. M 25.9-10 explicates that cognition at death, i.e., the reason in the first inference, lacks an example *(dṛṣṭāntavikala)*, whereas the fact that inhaling, etc., are causes for the cognition will be refuted (in the following verse). The lack of an example results from the fact that the Cārvāka cannot base it on a Buddhist tenet.

[9] Read *pratiṣedhe* (or *pratiṣedhaḥ?)* instead of *pratibodhe;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 66b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 56a4: ... *no źes bya ba ni dgag pa yin no* ||. Note, however, that the Skt could be rendered meaningfully as well: "... [the unusual negation] *no* [is used] to alert [the reader]."

[10] It is interesting to note that a commentary on the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* also glosses *dita* with *khaṇḍita;* cf. *pw*, p. 79, col. 3.

taddhīvad grahaṇaprāpter[1] *manojñānaṃ na sendriyāt* ǀ
jñānotpādanasāmarthyabhedān na sakalād api ǁ47ǁ
acetanatvān nānyasmād dhetvabhedāt sahasthitiḥ ǀ
akṣavad rūparasavad arthadvāreṇa vikriyā ǁ48ǁ

[1] PV$_P$: *-prāpte,* PV$_{Tib}$: *'gyur phyir*

"[A mental cognition could arise either from the body with the senses, or from the body without the senses.] The mental cognition does not [arise] from [the body] endowed with the senses, because [the mental cognition] would [be] an apprehension like a cognition by the [senses].
Nor [does it arise] from the complete [body endowed with all the senses taken together], because of the difference as to the capacity for producing a cognition.
Nor [does the mental cognition arise] from the other (i.e., from the body without the senses), because [it] is not conscious.
[Objection: If the body is not the support of cognition, why do they subsist together?]
[Reply:] They subsist together because there is no difference as to [their] cause, just as the [different] senses [of the same person subsist together without being support of each other, or] just as colour-and-shape and flavour [of the same object subsist together].
[Objection: Whatever is transformed by the transformation of something else is supported by that thing, and the transformation of the body by poison, etc., causes a transformation in the mental cognition.]
[Reply:] The transformation [of the mental cognition by the body is caused] by [the body as] object [but not by the body as support]."

1) These two verses are rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, pp. 22-23. His interpretation differs from the translation above in several points, notably, in the interpretation of *sakalāt* as referring to the body as a whole, if I understand correctly: in the sense of an *avayavin* ("aus dem Körper als 'Ganzem'"); consequently he interprets *jñānotpādanasāmarthyabhedāt* as "weil sich sonst die Fähigkeit Erkenntnis hervorzubringen ändern müsste, sobald z.B. ein Glied verloren geht." Furthermore, *vikriyā* is understood as "Beeinflussung," and the last *pāda* is interpretated in a general manner, i.e.,

that influence on the cognition can only be effected by an object ("Eine Beeinflussung des Denkens ist aber nur durch etwas, das für es Objekt ist, denkbar.").

2) The translation of 47 follows D and M against P and R. The reason for Prajñākaragupta's unlikely interpretation of the verse (R repeats P practically verbatim) is probably the fact that 47a *(taddhīvad grahaṇaprāpteḥ)* can provide a reason for the rejection of both alternatives, namely, that the mental cognition arises from the body endowed with any sense *(sendriyāt)* or the complete body endowed with all the senses taken together *(sakalāt),* which Prajñākaragupta simplifies to refer to the assemblage of all senses because in this alternative other parts of the body are not relevant to the production of cognition (cf. P 65.13-14: *samudāyād api notpadyata ity ayam eva parihāraḥ).* Consequently, *jñānotpādanasāmarthyabhedāt* is only an additional argument for the second alternative (cf. P 65.15: *parihārāntaram āha).* Thus, he construes *api* with *jñānotpādanasāmarthyabhedāt,* rather than with *sakalāt* (cf. P 65.18: *apiśabdena pūrvako hetuḥ samuccitaḥ).* According to this interpretation one would have to translate as follows: "The mental cognition does not [arise] from [the body] endowed with [any of] the senses or from all [the senses taken together], because the [mental cognition] would be an apprehension like a cognition by the [senses]; [the latter alternative is rejected] also because of the difference (i.e., independence) of the capacity [of the non-collaborative senses] for producing a cognition."

3) Several interpretations are possible to explain the intended similarity between the mental cognition and the cognition by the senses. $D_{(Pe)}$ 27a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 24a3 suggests that if the mental cognition were the result of the senses, it would have the vivid image/appearance of the visible, etc. *(*rūpādispaṣṭābha): gzugs la sogs pa la gsal por snaṅ pa can yin pa dẹ ltar na yid kyi śes pa yaṅ de'i 'bras bu yin na 'gyur te* |.

P provides two interpretations. 1) The mental cognition would be restricted to a certain kind of object, just as the visual cognition apprehends only colours and shapes, etc. (cf. P 64.28: *prativiṣayaṃ grahaṇaprāpteḥ).* 2) The mental cognition would follow the activity of the senses, just as the sense cognition does; but the mental cognition arises even when the eyes are closed, and it is not transformed when the senses are transformed (cf. 65.10-12).

R 322a4-5 (= 643.4-5) reiterates D: *ji ltar mig gi stobs kyis skyes par gyur ba gsal bar snaṅ ba de bźin du | mig las skyes pa'i yid gyi rnam par śes pa gsal bar snaṅ 'gyur ro źes bya ba'i tha tshig go.* "Just as [the cognition] produced by the power of the senses has a vivid appearance, similarly the mental cognition which is produced by the senses would have a vivid appearance. This is the meaning [of the comparison]." Cf. also M 25.13: If the mental cognition would arise from the senses, the apprehension of conceptualized sensory objects would be more vivid *(vikalpyamāneṣu rūpādiṣu spaṣṭatarasya grahaṇasya prāpteḥ).* This interpretation is based on Dharmakīrti's theory that all vivid cognitions are free from conceptual construction and all conceptual constructions are not vivid; cf. *PV* III 283ab: *na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphuṭārthāvabhāsitā* (on Dharmakīrti's deviation from Dignāga in this point cf. Franco, "Once again").

If one has to opt for one of these interpretations, perhaps Prajñākaragupta's first interpretation is the one to be preferred, for it connects nicely with the second alternative in 47d. The opponent would continue to argue that the mental cognition is not restricted to a certain kind of object, because unlike the individual sense cognition it is produced by all the senses taken together.

4) At least two interpretations are possible for what Dharmakīrti means by the "difference as to the capacity." P 65.15-16, repeated by R 322b3-4 = 644.3-4, understands this as referring to capacities independent of each other; D and M interpret the expression as intending the difference between the capacity of the senses which are restricted to their own specific objects and the capacity of the mental cognition to apprehend all kinds of objects. Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 27a4-5 = $D_{(De)}$ 24a5-7: ... *de ni don thams cad 'dzin pa de ltar na | rten dbaṅ po gcig gis bskyed pas yul thams cad kyi tha sñad yoṅs su rdzogs pa'i phyir | dbaṅ po gźan rnams don med par 'gyur ro || de dag kyaṅ don thams cad 'dzin pa can gyi śes pa gcig skyed par byed pa* ($D_{(De)}$ only: *skyed pa) ma yin pa de ltar na|* ($D_{(De)}$ om. *|) dbaṅ po du ma yin te* ($D_{(De)}$: *|) dbaṅ po de dag gi raṅ gi yul la śes pa skyed par byed pa'i nus pa tha dad pa yaṅ mthoṅ ṅo źes bstan par 'gyur ro ||*. Cf. also M 25.16: *na sakalād apīndriyakalāpāt pratiniyataviṣayāgrāhiṇo manovijñānasya sambhavaḥ.*

5) Concerning the lack of difference as to the cause, all four commentators identify the common cause as karma (cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 27b6 = $D_{(De)}$, P 65.27, R 323a3 = 645.3, M 25.25); cf. also Vetter, *ibid.* Dharmakīrti, however, leaves the cause unspecified just as above in vv. 40-41. Verse 48cd is

translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 118: "The coincidence [of the body and consciousness] is due to their having the same cause, like the physical senses and like colour and flavour." He does not seem to allow the possibility of karma being the intended cause here. On p. 122, on the other hand, and without referring to this verse, he states: "Therefore, concludes Dharmakīrti, mental events are not caused by physical events of any kind; rather, mental events and physical events simply occur together at the same place and the same time, each being the result of separate chains of antecedent conditions."

6) As for the transformation by the body as an object, M rightly refers the reader to v. 41 *(tajjñānair upakāryatvāt);* cf. also v. 77 below.

7) P 64.16-66.6: "[Objection:] This [reason] is not a non-established reason *(asiddha-hetu),* [namely, the reason] characterized as incompleteness of the cause[1] (cf. v. 46). To explain: The support of the mental cognition is either the body endowed with the senses or [the body] without the senses, characterized by the tips[2] of the hair, nails, etc. To explain: [The mental cognition] arises from the body alone, [either from the body] characterized by the heart *(hṛdaya)* [as the seat of thoughts and feelings] or from the other (i.e., from the body without the senses).
[Reply:] This is not correct. The way [to understand] the body is twofold: [It may be understood as] endowed with the senses or without the senses; [further, under the former alternative] any one [of the senses may be] the cause [of the mental cognition] or [they may be the cause] otherwise (i.e., all of them taken together). To begin with, the [body] endowed with the senses is not [the cause] ... (vv. 47-48).
First, the body endowed with any one of the senses is not the support (Tib: the cause) [of the mental cognition]. [The body] endowed with the senses

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[1] Read *hetuvaikalya-*.

[2] Prajñākaragupta emphasizes the tips of the hair, nails, etc., rather than adducing simply the hair, nails, etc., probably because he intended to enumerate those bodily parts which are most remote from sensation, or perhaps because someone could claim that the roots of the hair, etc., do produce sensations. In a parallel passage, Malayagiri mentions only hair, nails, etc. (cf. *NAṬ* 5a13, 5b13, 6a2 and *ĀNṬ* 317a2-3, 318b1-2), never their 'tips,' and it is not entirely impossible that the text is slightly corrupt; however, the Tibetan translation *rtse mo* supports the Skt as it is transmitted. Cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 27a8 = $D_{(De)}$ 24b2 quoted below in n. 16.

[means that] it subsists/acts with the capacities of the senses *(indriyaśakti)*, [i.e.] it has the nature of the senses because there is no difference between a capacity and that which has a capacity *(śaktimat)*. And thus, the position is that the mental cognition arises simply from any one of the senses. Thus, [Dharmakīrti] says: *'The mental cognition does not [arise] from [the body] endowed with the senses,'* [i.e., it] does not arise from any one of the senses, *because [the mental cognition] would [be] an apprehension* of the respective [sense] object, *like a cognition by these,* [i.e.] like a cognition by the senses.[3] If [the mental cognition] follows (i.e., conforms to) to the sense of sight, then [it] necessarily has [also] the nature of a cognition *(manas)* which follows [any of] the other senses.[4] Otherwise, if [something] caused by something else[5] does not have the own nature of that [cause], to what is this own nature due? (or: how does it arise?) Thus, [the own nature] would be without a cause.
[Objection:] A cause, although it is one, is observed to have the nature to produce effects with different *(tadatat-)* natures, just as fire has the nature to produce smoke and ashes.[6] However, [in our case] there is a difference in the causal complex *(sāmagrībheda)*. When the causal complex for something visible is brought together, sight produces a visual cognition;[7] when the

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[3] Cf. *NAVV* 49.1-2.

[4] Read *anusāriṇi sati* instead of *anusāri hi mano;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 67a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 56b3: *mig la sogs pa dbaṅ po'i rjes su 'braṅ ba yod na* |. In the continuation of the sentence (67a8) *apara* seems to be construed with *manaḥsvabhāvam* or *svabhāvam:* ... *ṅes par dbaṅ po'i rjes su 'braṅ ba'i phyir ro* ‖ *yid gźan gyi raṅ bźin du 'gyur ba yin te* |. "..., [then] it necessarily follows a (i.e., any?) sense. Therefore, [it] would have the nature of another cognition/the cognition would have the nature of something else [every time that it follows another sense]." The different construction and therefore slightly different interpretation also make another deviation of the Tib, in the conditional clause, meaningful, namely, **cakṣurādīndriyānusāriṇi.*

[5] I interpret *taddhetoḥ* as a *bahuvrīhi*-compound (genitive singular); however, this goes against $P_{(Pe)}$ 67a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 56b3 which translates *de'i rgyu las.*

[6] Read *vahnir dhūmabhasmajanana-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 67b1-2 = 56b4: *du ba daṅ thal ba skyed pa.* Cf. also R 322a5 (= 643.5): *dper na me ni du ba daṅ thal ba skyed pa byed pa na* ... .

[7] Delete *ca.*

visible is absent [the eye produces] a mental cognition. In the same manner one should explain in the case of hearing, etc.[8]
[Reply:] This is not true.

> 424. Inasmuch as [something] arises resting on the activity of a sense, it is accepted as born from a sense. [But] activity of a [sense][9] is not [observed] there (i.e., in the case of arising of a mental cognition); thus, how would it arise from a sense?

'Because [the mental cognition] would [be] an apprehension like a cognition by the [senses].' This [statement] has the [following] meaning: For the sense cognition which follows the activity of a [sense] apprehends the object. That is why *(iti)* it is designated so (i.e., as born from a sense). If the mental cognition too [would] be so (i.e., follow the activity of a sense), it too, just like the [sense] cognition, would apprehend by following the activity of the [sense]. Otherwise, how [could] it be designated thus (i.e., as born from a sense)? It is contradictory that [on the one hand] following the activity of a [sense] is not apprehended [in the case of the mental cognition], and [on the other hand the mental cognition] is understood to be born from a sense. From a sense, however, [there arises a cognition] that has the form of a determination of the object as standing before [one's eyes] *(purovyavasthitārthanirūpaṇākāra),*[10] even when the object is not in proximity, just like [the cognition] that has the form of an immediate apprehension of hairs by [a person whose senses are] impaired by the timira[-ailment] *(timiropahatakeśakalāpālocanākāra).* The mental cognition, however, arises even for [a person] whose eyes are closed *(nimīlitalocana);* how does the sense operate in this [case]? And how is something born from a sense [when the sense] is not transformed when it[self] is transformed? In respect to this [it is said] *'because [the mental cognition] would [be] an apprehension like a cognition by the [senses],'* i.e., because [the mental cognition] would [be] a cognition

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[8] Cf. R 322a6 = 643.6.

[9] Read *tadvyāpāro;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 67b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 56b5: *bya de.* Cf. also the quotation of this verse in *NAṬ* 5b8-9 (Jambuvijaya, "Quotations," p. 391) and *ĀNṬ* 317a10-11.

[10] Read *-nirūpaṇākāraṃ* and delete *cakṣurvijñānavijñānaṃ* which has no equivalent in $P_{(Pe)}$ 67b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 56b7f.

that is characterized by the transformation of a [sense]. Apprehension *(grahaṇa)* [means] nothing but cognition *(vijñāna).* If [it] is not transformed by the transformation of a [sense], then [it] is not born from a [sense].

Nor does [the mental cognition] arise from the assemblage [of all the senses] *(samudāya).* Precisely this [same] refutation [applies here too].

[Dharmakīrti] states another refutation: *because of the difference as to the capacity for producing a cognition.* It is observed that in respect to the production of cognition the capacity is different, [i.e.] distinct, completely independent from [anything] else, not mutually dependent[11] (i.e., the senses are not observed to depend on each other for producing a cognition). Otherwise, because the assemblage is absent when even one[12] [of its members] is absent, [the mental cognition] would not [arise], just like the sprout *(aṅkura)* [does not arise] when [the assemblage of] earth, etc., is not complete.[13] But the mental cognition arises even for [persons who] lack sight, etc.[14] Therefore, the [mental] cognition *(manas)* is not bound to/dependent on the assemblage [of all the senses]. By the word *api* ('also') the previous reason is added [to the present one].[15]

[Commentary on 48:] *Nor* does [the mental cognition] arise[16] *from the other,* [i.e.] from [the body] without the senses, *because [it] is not conscious.* [Objection:] What is the meaning [of the reason] 'because [it] is not conscious'? If [it means] 'because [it] is without a sense cognition,' [we] certainly accept that, [but] how is this a reason [for not producing a mental

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[11] On *-apekṣya* instead of *-apekṣa* cf. n. 21 on v. 43.

[12] Read *-syaikā-*.

[13] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 27a3 = $D_{(De)}$ 24a4-5: ... *lhan cig byed pa gcig med na myu gu la sogs pa mi 'byuṅ ba yin* (read with $D_{(De)}$: *bźin) no* ||. Cf. also R 323a4 = 645.4.

[14] Cf. *NAVV* 49.2-4.

[15] Cf. R 322b5 (= 644.5): *kyaṅ gi sgras ni gtan tshigs sṅa ma gzuṅ ṅo.* But $D_{(Pe)}$ 27a2-3 = $D_{(De)}$ 24a4: *kyaṅ gi sgras ni dbaṅ po gcig med na yaṅ 'di med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir te .* "The word *api* [conveys the further reason, namely] because even when a single sense is absent, the [mental cognition] would be absent."

[16] $P_{(Pe)}$ 68a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 57a5, however: *mthoṅ ba.*

cognition]? [To explain:] Let it be admitted that a sense cognition does not arise from the [body without senses]; however, how [does this reason imply that] a mental cognition does not arise [from it]? If [on the other hand, the body is said] to be not conscious because [it] lacks mental cognition, [then] exactly this is what is being examined. Thus, the reason ['because it is not conscious'] is part of the content of the thesis *(pratijñārthaikadeśa-hetu)*.[17] [Reply:] On the above it is said:

> 425. When hair, nails, etc., are not observed to cause sensation *(cetayant, tshor byed)*, how [can it be your] stand that the mental cognition arises from them?[18]

For unlike touch, etc., which are perceived as causing sensation[19] by their [own] cognitions,[20] hair, nails, etc., are not [apprehended] by the mental cognition in this way. [Otherwise,] when [it] is bound to/depends on[21] them (i.e., hair, nails, etc.), when they are absent the mental cognition [too] would be[22] absent, and when they are destroyed, [it too] would be destroyed.[23]

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[17] P 65.19-22 is quoted or closely paraphrased by Malayagiri; cf. *NAṬ* 5b9-11 and *ĀNṬ* 317a10-12.

[18] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 27a8f. = $D_{(De)}$ 24b2-3: *sems ñid med phyir* <|> *skra daṅ sen mo'i rtse mo la sogs pa ni sems med pa yin na | gaṅ gis na de dag la blor 'gyur | de rgyu ñid yin na yaṅ lus las 'phos pa rnams kyaṅ blo'i rgyu ñid du* (add with $D_{(De)}$: *'gyur ba daṅ) 'chi ba'i lus kyaṅ ṅo* ‖. Cf. also R 322b7 = 644.7.

V. 425 is quoted with some changes by Malayagiri (Jambūvijaya, "Quotations," p. 391); cf. *NAṬ* 6a1-2 = *ĀNṬ* 317b1-2:

cetayanto na dṛśyante keśaśmaśrunakhādayaḥ |
tatas tebhyo manojñānaṃ bhavatīty atisāhasam ‖

[19] Read *cetayantaḥ*.

[20] $P_{(Pe)}$ 68a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 57a7 (... *ci'i rnam par śes pa'i sgo nas ...)* is not clear to me. Malayagiri *(NAṬ* 5b12-13 and *ĀNṬ* 317a13) explicates with *sva-svanimittavijñānaiḥ*.

[21] Read *pratibaddhatve;* cf. also *NAṬ* 6a2 and *ĀNṬ* 317b2.

[22] Read *syāt;* cf. also *NAṬ* 6a3 and *ĀNṬ* 317b3.

[23] P 65.25-26 is paraphrased and slightly expanded in *NAṬ* 5b12-6a3 and *ĀNṬ* 317a13-b3.

[Objection:] If the body is not the support [of the mental cognition], then why do [they] subsist together?
[Reply:] On this [Dharmakīrti] says: *Because there is no difference as to [their] cause,* technically called karma, which causes the restrictive determination of subsisting together, [i.e.] because [its] capacity is fixed in such manner, *just as the [different] senses [of the same person, or] just as colour-and-shape and flavour [of the same object subsist together],* [i.e.] just as the senses[24] or colour-and-shape and flavour, even though [they] do not rest on each other, are restrictively determined to subsist together for a certain time; for in the case of subsistence together [its] cause is not only the relationship of support and that which rests on it.
[Objection:] Sight, etc., are the support of visual cognition, etc., because when the [senses] are transformed, [the cognitions] are characterized by transformation.[25] Similarly, due to the transformation of the body by poison, phlegm, etc., the [mental] cognition *(manas)* undergoes a transformation characterized by motionlessness, etc.[26] Thus, there is a relationship of support and that which rests on it [between the body and the mental cognition].
[Reply:] This is also not true. *The transformation [of the mental cognition by the body is caused] by [the body as] object,* [i.e., as something] to be apprehended *(grāhya).* [The mental cognition] of [a person] who does not [actually] suffer pain (or: who cannot endure pain) is transformed by meditating on that [pain], [i.e.] by concentrating on it. For striking with cutting weapons, etc., inflict pain on the [mental] cognition *(manas)* inasmuch as they are being made objects[27] by the [mental] cognition, not inasmuch as they are [its] support. And an object [can] cause a transformation [of the mental cognition] even if it is external, but it is not the support

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[24] Read *yathākṣāṇāṃ.*

[25] This is a quotation of *AK* 1.45ab.

[26] Read *viṣaśleṣmādinā manasas timita-,* or better: *manasaḥ stimita-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 68b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 57b3-4: *bad kan daṅ dug la sogs pas lus 'gyur na yid bloṅ ba la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid du 'gyur ba'i phyir ... .* Cf. also R 323a4 = 645.4.

[27] Read *ālambyamānā.*

of the [mental cognition], because even when the [object] is absent, pain [can] arise by mere superimposition *(āropamātra).*

> 426. Therefore, [an object], internal or external, exists[28] [only] as something whose form is superimposed [on a mental cognition] by the [mental] cognition *(manas).* The transformation of the mental [cognition] is due to the transformation of that [form].

However, support and object are not one [and the same thing]. Therefore, the body is not the support of the [mental cognition]. Thus, the defiled mental cognition *(kliṣṭa-manas)* is not supported by the body. And what is its support [namely, the *ālayavijñāna]* will be made known later on. The object is nothing but a superimposition of something previous on something posterior (i.e., a posterior mental cognition depends on a previous mental cognition for its object). However, [an object] different from the [mental] cognition *(manas)*[29] does not exist. Thus, [the mental cognition has] neither [an external] object nor an [external] support *(nirālambanāśraya)."*

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[28] Read *vidyate;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 68b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 57b6: *yod.*

[29] $P_{(Pe)}$ 69a1 = $P_{(De)}$57b7 has no equivalent for *manaso* here, but contains an equivalent to *manas* in the next sentence: *yid ni dmigs pa med pa ciṅ rten med pa yin no.*

sattopakāriṇī yasya nityaṃ tadanubandhataḥ |
sa hetuḥ saptamī tasmād utpādād iti cocyate ||49||

"[But to be an object is not enough in order to be a support.] The cause (i.e., the support) is that whose [mere] existence always assists [in bringing about the effect] due to the [effect's constant] attachment [to it].
For this [reason the Buddha uses] the locative [case ending in the formula *tasmin satīdaṃ bhavati* 'When this is present that arises'] and [for exactly the same reason he uses the ablative case ending when] it is said 'because of the arising' [in the formula *asyotpādād idam utpadyate* 'This arises because of the arising of that']."

1) It is quite clear that the above does not provide a definition of cause in general, but only of the so-called "material" cause *(upādānakāraṇa)* or support; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 28b8 = $D_{(De)}$ 25b5: *de* ($D_{(De)}$: *des) ni ñe bar len pa'i rgyur gyur ba'i khyad par bstan to* ||; cf. also the conclusion of the parallel passage in *TSP* 643.1: ... *sa eva kāraṇaviśeṣa upādānatvena prasiddhaḥ.*

2) I construe the adverb *nityam* with *upakāriṇī* rather than with *tadanubandhataḥ,* although one could also consider the latter alternative. PV_{Tib} places *pāda* b before a and thus does not decide clearly for either alternative. The commentaries are ambiguous in this point; however, one can observe that they contrast assistance at all times and assistance only at some times. Besides, it seems more important to stress that the mere existence of a cause always assists in bringing about an effect than to amplify that the effect is always attached to it. The term *anubandha,* just like *anuvartana, anvaya, anuyāyitva,* etc., already implies the constancy of attachment to or following upon something. It is also possible that Dharmakīrti intended *nityam* to be understood by *kākākṣigolakanyāya.*

3) I follow P 67.15-16 in construing *tasmāt* with both *saptamī* and *utpādād iti cocyate: tasmāt evāsmabhir uktāt sadopakāritvena saptamī, tasmād eva pañcamy utpādād iti cocyate.* "Exactly *because of that,* [i.e.] because of what we said [in 49ab], *the locative* [case ending is used] inasmuch as [something] is always assisting [in bringing about the result]; *and* precisely *because of that* the ablative [case ending is used in this sense when] *it is said*

'because of the arising.'" This interpretation is also corroborated by PV_{Tib}: *... de phyir bdun pa dan* ‖ *skyes phyir źes ni bśad pa yin* ‖. $D_{(Pe)}$ 29a2-3 = $D_{(De)}$ 25b6-7 also construes *tasmāt* with *saptamī* and *utpādāt;* however, he draws *tasmād utpādāt* together and understands both to be part of the clause concluded by *iti* (i.e., "because of the arising from that"). Further, D, like M, construes *saptamī* also as the subject of *ucyate: ... bdun pa brjod pa yin te* | *... de las skyes pas źes bya ba ...* . Ravigupta's comments do not allow a definitive understanding of his interpretation of the verse.

According to M 26.17-18 *tasmād* is part of the clause concluded by *iti,* but unlike D and P, M reads three formulae, characterized by the locative case ending, by 'from that' and by 'because of the arising,' into the verse. Cf. M 26.14-18: "However, that which assists [in bringing about the effect only] sometimes is a cause only of an [additional] special property, not of the property-possessor *(dharmin),* because the [property-possessor] arises even when it is absent. And a cognition is [invariably] bound to a cognition alone. An [additional] special property of the [cognition], however, is caused by the body, etc. Therefore, the [body] is not the cause [of cognition]. Nor does the cognition cease because the [body] ceases. And having in mind that [something] is a cause inasmuch as [it] is characterized by [the effect's] constant attachment [to it], *the locative [case ending] is pronounced* [by the Buddha in the formula] 'When this is present that arises,' and the ablative [case ending in the formula containing] *'from that';* and having in mind that to be an effect is [to be] attached to that cause, *'because of the arising' is also pronounced [by him]."*
It seems to me that M's reading of three different formulae into the verse may be based on a misunderstanding of P 67.15-16.

4) P 66.7-17: "Moreover,

> 427. [Something] is not the cause that brings about the [effect] by merely [being] an assistant. Only a qualified (or: special) being-a-cause *(viśiṣṭa-hetutva)* brings about the effect.[1]

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[1] Read *nirvartakaḥ* and *vinirvartakam* in l. 8 and *nirvartakatvam* in l. 9, also against $P_{(Pe)}$ 69a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 57b7: *zlog byed, zlog par byed pa,* and *zlog par byed pa ñid.* Note, however, that the same corruption occurs also in R. Although it is conceivable that this quite common corruption in manuscripts occurred independently at this place, maybe under the influence of the

What is this qualified cause *(viśiṣṭa-hetu)* which has the property of bringing about[2] [the effect]? He says this [with the following verse]: ... (v. 49). For that *whose [mere] existence assists [in bringing about the effect] is the cause* which brings about[3] by bringing about the result to be brought about. How does it assist? *Always, due to the [effect's] attachment [to it]* (or: *due to the [effect's] attachment [to it] at all times),* [i.e.] because of the [effect's] attachment [to it]. Attachment *(anubandha)* [means] following upon *(anuvartana).* [Thus, the intended cause here is the one] *whose [mere] existence assists [in bringing about the effect]* always, due to [the effect's] following upon [it] (or: due to [the effect's] following upon [it] at all times). However, even when something that has the capacity to assist [only] sometimes is absent, assistance arises sometimes from something else as well, characterized as an [additional] special property [of that other thing]; this [assistance]

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subsequent frequent occurrence of *nivṛtti* and other derivations of *ni√VṚT,* it cannot be ruled out that there is some interdependence between the two Tibetan translations at this point. This could be supported by the need of an additional similar conjecture; cf. also note 3 below. It should be added that it is not impossible to follow the argument even without the above conjectures: *nivartaka-hetu* can be understood as that cause which causes the absence of the effect by its own absence; only such a cause is the support. However, in the context of this verse that defines the cause in terms of the function of its existence *(sattā),* i.e., the assistance rendered by it, such a line of thought would be surprising. Cf. also M 26.12: *na copakāraka ity evāśrayaḥ, kintu nirvartakaḥ.*

One possible reason for a conscious change of the text could be the close parallel in P on the next verse; cf. 69.31: *nopakāraka ity eva nivartako bhavaty upakāryasya,* with a similar conclusion to the discussion in 70.1-2: *na tannivṛttau nivṛttiḥ.* Similarly, one could speculate that also Ravigupta noted this parallel and composed his own commentary accordingly, assuming that in P on 49 one should read *nivartaka,* etc.

[2] Cf. the previous note.

[3] The Skt contains two lacunae here: *sa hi hetur *nirvartanena nirvartyasya phalasya* nirvartako ... upakāriṇī.*katham upakāriṇī?;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 69a3-4 = $P_{(De)}$ 58a2: *gaṅ źig yod pas phan 'dogs par byed pa'o ‖ rgyu de* ($P_{(De)}$: *'di) ni {log pas zlog par byed pa'i* (read *bya ba'i?) 'bras bu} zlog par byed pa yin no ‖ {ji ltar phan 'dogs par byed pa źig ce na |} rtag tu de'i rjes su 'jug pas te | de'i rjes su* (add with $P_{(De)}$: *'jug) pa'i sgo nas so ‖.* The portion in {} has no equivalent in the Skt. Cf. also R 323b1-2 (= 646.1-2): *gal te rgyu ldog par byed pa po gaṅ źig yod pa ñid phan 'dogs par byed pa'i* (read *bya ba'i?) bras bu de ldog pa'i rgyu yin no ‖ ji ltar yod pa ñid phan 'dogs pa yin źe na rtag tu de'i rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir te 'bras bu'i rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir ro ‖.*

does not always cause [the effect] to follow [upon itself]. Thus it is correct[4] [that] the [effect] does not cease even when that [accidental cause] ceases.[5] And the existence of the body does not always assist [in bringing about the mental cognition], because one observes that sometimes [the cognition] is transformed even when there is a transformation only[6] of a previous cognition [and not of the body]. Therefore, it is possible that even when the body is absent, sometimes the series of cognitions continues to exist[7] indeed, because it is supported by a [previous cognition] because [its] transformation is accomplished by a transformation of the [previous] cognition *(cittavikāra-vihitavikāratva).* And it is well established that the body is not the cause [of cognition] by always assisting [in its production]."

The rest of Prajñākaragupta's commentary contains an interesting discussion on the usage of the ablative and locative case endings as expressing a causal, not temporal relationship; on the basis of this interpretation he proceeds to prove future rebirth by a *kāryahetu.* His lengthy exposition, however, deserves a special study which I hope to undertake on a different occasion.

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[4] $P_{(Pe)}$ 69a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 58a4 adds: *źes rigs so.* However, I prefer to construe **yuktam* with the following sentence, although it is not concluded by *iti.*

[5] Read perhaps *tannivṛttāv api* instead of *tannivṛttyāpi;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 69a6 =$P_{(De)}$ 58a4: *de ni ldog kyaṅ de ldog pa ma yin no* ‖.

[6] $P_{(Pe)}$ 69a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 58a5, however, lacks correspondence to *-mātra-*. Cf. R 323b4 (= 646.4): *sṅar gyi sems tsam 'gyur ba las* |.

[7] Read *āstaiva.*

astūpakārako vāpi kadācic cittasantateḥ |
vahnyādivad ghaṭādīnāṃ vinivṛttir na tāvatā ||50||

"Or [the body] may sometimes assist [in bringing about] the series of cognitions, [but] this does not imply *(na tāvatā)* that [the series of cognitions] ceases [when the body ceases], just as fire, etc., [may assist in the production] of a pot, etc., [but the pot does not cease when the fire ceases]."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 23.

2) Does the above verse mean that when the body is an assistant in the production of cognition it is also a support for the series of cognitions? $D_{(Pe)}$ 30a1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 26b4 distinguishes between support *(āśraya)* and the so-called "material" cause *(upādānakāraṇa),* and claims that the series of cognitions may sometimes be supported by the body, but in this case the body is not the material cause: *lus la brten pa'i sgo nas* | *'ga' źig tshe na sems rgyun gyi* | *lus phan 'dogs* ($D_{(De)}$ adds: *par) byed pa'aṅ yin bla ste* | *de ltar na yaṅ de'i ñe bar len pa'i rgyu ñid du ma grub pa'i lus* ... . A similar distinction is made in *TSP* 644.24f.; however, Kamalaśīla does not use the term *āśraya,* but rather the expression *sākṣād upakārin* ("direct/immediate assistant"): *bhavatu vā sākṣād upakārī deho manomateḥ svopādānapravṛttāyāḥ kadācit, tathāpi na dehanivṛttāv api tasyā nivṛttiḥ sidhyati, yathā vahninivṛttāv api na ghaṭādivinivṛttiḥ, svopādānapravṛttatvād iti nāniṣṭāpattiḥ.* P 69.30 as well admits the body to be sometimes an assistant inasmuch as it is a support *(kadācid āśrayatvenopakārakatve 'pi dehasya* ...), yet he does not contrast "support" with "material cause." In any case, the issue is not problematic for Prajñākaragupta, because for him the verse is stated only for the sake of argument (P 69.26: *abhyupagamyedānīm ucyate),* that is, he understands *astu* in a different manner than D. For D *astu* means "let it be admitted/it can be accepted"; for P it means "let it be admitted only for the sake of argument." R and M, on the other hand, do not seem to accept that the body can be a support; at least there is no mention of "support" in their commentaries on this verse. I tend to follow R and M against D and P (as well as against *TSP)* in not understanding the body to be a support of cognition, but only to be an assistant in its production, for the example of the pot and fire does not fit with the relationship of support and what rests on it: The pot which is baked

by fire changes its colour, but its support is the pot of the previous moment. The difference according to Dharmakīrti consists in the fact that the fire/body participates only sometimes in the production of a special feature of the pot/cognition, whereas the real cause or support is always a part of the causal complex. The verses are certainly too laconic to allow a definite interpretation; my impression, however, is that 48d is formulated from a Yogācāra point of view, whereas 50 represents the Sautrāntika alternative. On *upādāna* cf. also vv. 60-61 and 68 below.

3) P 69.26-70.4: "First, it has [already] been said that *the transformation [of the mental cognition]* by the body *[is caused] by [the body as] object* (cf. v. 48d), [but] not due to the fact that [the body] is [its] support, as [is the case for] sight, etc. [which cause a transformation of the visual cognition, etc., by being their support]. Now, [the following] is stated inasmuch as one admits [only for the sake of argument that the body may be a support]: ... (v. 50).
Even if the body sometimes assists [in bringing about a cognition] by being a support, *this does not imply that the series of cognitions ceases* when the body ceases. [Something] does not cause the cessation of [an effect] which has to be assisted by merely [being] an assistant. A pot, etc., which have attained useful(?) [additional] special properties due to fire, etc., do not necessarily cease when the fire, etc., cease. Or, even when [additional] special properties characterized as fluidity, etc.,[1] are attained [by gold, etc.] because of fire, the gold, etc., does not cease when the [fire] ceases. Let it be admitted that this very [additional] special property characterized as fluidity, etc., ceases; the gold, however, remains exactly the same *(tadavastha)* (i.e., inasmuch as its own nature of gold is concerned).[2] For whom the cognition *(citta)* is the cause of cognition *(cetas),* for that [person][3] there is cessation [of the cognition] because of the incompleteness of the [cause],

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[1] Read *dravatādilakṣaṇa-*.

[2] For P 69.30-70.2 cf. *NAṬ* 6a11-12 and *ĀNṬ* 317b9-11.

[3] $P_{(Pe)}$ 73a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 61a7 indicates a reading corresponding to **yac cittaṃ ... tathā dehasya ...: gaṅ źig sems sems* ($P_{(De)}$ om. one *sems) kyi rgyu yin pa de'i ltar na lus ...* . It also construes this sentence as the subject of the predicate *uktam* in the following sentence, i.e., "The cessation ... has been stated as a sublating factor ... ."

even when the body remains exactly the same (e.g., in a swoon or in deep sleep)."

anivṛttiprasaṅgaś ca dehe tiṣṭhati cetasaḥ |
tadbhāvabhāvād vaśyatvāt prāṇāpānau tato na tat ||51||

"And an inadmissible consequence [would follow, namely, that] the cognition would not cease (i.e., one would not die) as long as the body lasts.
[Objection: No such consequence follows, because breathing, etc., are also causes of the cognition. Thus, when they are absent the cognition ceases although the body remains.]
[Reply:] Because [they] are present when the [cognition] is present [and] because [they are] controlled [by the cognition], exhaling and inhaling [arise] from the [cognition], not the [cognition from them]."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 23. The second half of the verse is translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 122. The above translation follows Vetter's rendering in interpreting *vaśyatvāt* as a second reason; Hayes translates it by "powers" and understands the ablative as expressing a cause: "... therefore, breathing arises from the powers of the mind rather than vice versa."

2) I follow $D_{(De)}$ 27a5 *(sems ñid yod na dbugs 'byuṅ rṅub dag yod pa'i phyir;* $D_{(Pe)}$ 30b4 contains a lacuna at this point), P 70.12 *(citte sati tayor bhāva iti),* R 324b1 = 648.1 *(sems yod na 'byuṅ ba daṅ rṅub pa yod pa)* and M 26.26 *(tasya cittasya bhāve bhāvāt)* in interpreting *tad-* as referring to the cognition. Theoretically it is also possible to interpret *tad-* as referring to the body; Buddhist scholastics would allow both interpretations. Cf. *AKBh* p. 243.19 (on 4.73ab, dLVP vol. 4, p. 154): *prāṇo nāma vāyuḥ kāyacittasaṃniśrito vartate.* "The wind called breath rests on body and cognition"; cf. also *AKV ad loc.* I am also tempted to construe *tato* by *kākākṣigolakanyāya* both with *prāṇāpanau* and *na tat.* However, I am not sure whether this is allowed, because *tato* would then have two different referents, namely, the cognition when construed with exhaling and inhaling and the breaths when construed with *tat.*

3) P 70.5-21: "[In v. 50] a sublating factor [against the position] that [the cognition] has the body as its only cause was stated. Another [sublating factor] is also stated: ... (v. 51).

Let there be cessation [of cognition] when the body is absent, [as] in the state of ashes, etc.,[1] because the cause (i.e., the body) is absent. However, when the body remains exactly the same[2] cessation [of cognition would] not be possible,[3] and also [when the body remains] differently (i.e., when it changes) [cessation of cognition would not be possible], because [the cognition] follows all the [different] states [which the body may attain].
[Objection:] The [cognition] is also the effect of exhaling and inhaling. Thus, [it can] cease because they are lacking.
[Reply:] This is also not correct. Exhaling and inhaling arise precisely from the cognition, *not* the cognition *from them*. Therefore, [this is] not a rejection [of our argument that the cognition would last as long as the body does].
[Objection:] How is that?
[Reply:] *Because [they] are present when the [cognition] is present.*[4] When the cognition is present, these two (i.e., exhaling and inhaling) are present, not the other way round.[5] And [also] *because [they] are controlled [by the cognition], the [cognition] does not [arise]* from exhaling and inhaling. If exhaling and inhaling[6] [were] the cause of cognition, then [they] would not be under its control.[7] But it is perceived that the two are controlled by the cognition. And if [exhaling and inhaling] had arisen[8] from something other [than the cognition], then they [would] arise from it alone; the cognition would not affect [them] at all. Indeed, something which depends on one thing

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[1] Read *bhasmādyavasthāyāṃ?* $P_{(Pe)}$ 73a8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 61b1 seems to correspond to **bhasmībhūtādidehābhāvāvasthāyām: thal bar gyur pa* ($P_{(De)}$: *'gyur ba) la sogs pa lus med pa'i gnas skabs su ni ... ;* cf. however *NAṬ* 6b1 and *ĀNṬ* 317b13: *bhasmāvasthāyām.*

[2] Read: *dehe tu tathābhūta.*

[3] P 70.8-9 are paraphrased in *NAṬ* 6a13-b2 and *ĀNṬ* 317b12-318a1.

[4] $P_{(Pe)}$ 73b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 61b3 has no equivalent for *atra* which should probably be deleted.

[5] Cf the paraphrase in *NAVV* 49.5-6.

[6] Read *prāṇāpānau.*

[7] The following passage is summarized in *NAVV* 49.7-8.

[8] Read *utpannau.*

cannot be controlled by another. [In that case] the cognition would only determine *(paricchedaka)* these two as dependent on their own causes [which are different from the cognition; but it could not control them, e.g., one could not consciously decide to take a long breath, stop breathing for a while, etc.].[9]

[Objection:] The cause of these two may produce them inasmuch as it has the cognition as an assisting [cause].

[Reply:] Then the cognition too is the cause of these two. Thus, it does not arise from them.

[Objection:] Although[10] exhaling and inhaling have arisen from another cause *(mūla),* they are governed by the cognition, just as the servant *(bhṛtya)* [is governed] by the master *(svāmin).*[11]

[Reply:] This is not true.

> 444. The servant is observed to arise from something else,
> but not these two. These two do not arise without the cogni-
> tion, from something else.[12]

For exhaling and inhaling are never seen without the cognition, as [is the case with] the servant [who is sometimes seen without the master]. Therefore, they[13] do not [arise] from another cause. Therefore, only the cognition is [their] cause. Therefore, *the [cognition] does not [arise]* from these two."

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[9] *NAṬ* 6b4-5 and *ĀNṬ* 318a2-5 present Malayagiri's own thoughts on the dependence of exhaling and inhaling on the cognition.

[10] Although *api* follows *anyataḥ* and a literal translation should have been "from another cause also," this does not provide the required meaning. I therefore understand *api* as governing the entire clause up to *utpannau* inclusively, i.e., as an enclitic conjunction; cf. also $P_{(Pe)}$ 73b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 61b6: ... *rtsa ba gźan las skyes kyaṅ* ... .

[11] Cf. R 324b4 (= 648.4): *dper na jo bos khol po bźin du źe na.*

[12] This verse is quoted in *NAVV* 49.9-10.

[13] Read *atas tau;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 74a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 61b7: *des na de dag* ... .

preraṇākarṣaṇe vāyoḥ prayatnena vinā kutaḥ |
nirhrāsātiśayāpattir nirhrāsātiśayāt tayoḥ ||52||

"[Objection: In the state of sleep, etc., exhaling and inhaling are present, but the cognition is absent. Therefore, the cognition is not their cause.] [Reply:] How [could] the pushing forth and drawing in of wind [be possible] without a [conscious] effort? [Moreover, the cognition] would decrease and increase, because these two decrease and increase."

1) This verse is translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 122. The translation above is basically the same; I doubt, however, that Dharmakīrti did not take the argument seriously, and that it is only an example of "philosophical playfulness." The same argument is repeated too often to be a joke, and it is, in fact, one of the cornerstones in Dharmakīrti's doctrine of determination of a causal relationship. The second half of the verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 23.

2) P 70.22-71.2: "[Objection:] Since exhaling and inhaling are present in the state of sleep, [fainting] etc.,[1] these two do not have the cognition as their cause. For A which has B as a cause does not arise when B is absent.[2]

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[1] Read *svāpādyava-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 74a1-2 = $P_{(De)}$ 62a1: ... *gñid log pa la sogs pa'i gnas skabs su* ... .

[2] P's introduction to this verse contains a lacuna that occurs after this slightly corrupt sentence which is translated according to the Tibetan; compare P 70.23 with the Tibetan translation: *na hi tatra tathābhāva eva hi (*na hi tatkāraṇaṃ tadabhāve bhavati?). ananyahetutām eva darśayati.* $P_{(Pe)}$ 74a2-5 = $P_{(De)}$ 62a1: *de'i rgyu can ni de med par 'byuṅ ba ma yin no ẑe na* | *de yaṅ ma yin te*| *lus kyi spyod pa ci* ($P_{(De)}$: *spyod la ji) sñed pa* || *de kun sems kyi 'dus byas yin* || *gñid log dbugs 'byuṅ riṅ thuṅ sogs* || *de ni sṅar gyi sems las yin* || *dbugs riṅ du 'byuṅ ba la sogs pa'i rnam par 'gyur ba mtha' dag ni sṅon gyi sems kyi 'du byed pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can yin no* || *'di ltar dbugs 'byuṅ dal goms pas* || *rmi lam du yaṅ dal ba ñid* || *dbugs 'dren [g]ẑan du 'gyur ba las* || *[g]ẑan ñid du ni 'gyur ba yin* || *rgyu gẑan ma yin pa ñid ston par byed pa ni* |.

The first verse is preserved in the paraphrase of this passage in *NAVV* 49.13-14:

śarīraceṣṭā yāvatyas tāḥ sarvāś cittasaṃskṛtāḥ |
suptasya dīrghahrasvādiniḥśvasāḥ pūrvacittataḥ ||

Cf. also R 324b5-6 (= 648.5-6): *gñid log pa'i tshe yaṅ 'byuṅ ba daṅ* | *'jug pa yod na de*

[Reply:] This is not [correct].

444a. As many activities *(ceṣṭā)* of the body as there may be, they all are conditioned *(saṃskṛta)* by [previous] cognitions. Long or short breaths, etc., of a sleeping [person] are due to a previous cognition.

All transformations, such as long breathing, etc., conform to the traces of previous cognitions.

444b. Thus, due to the practice of short breathing [in the waking state], in sleep, too, breathing is short. [Breathing] becomes feeble [in sleep] due to the feebleness of drawing breath [in the waking state].

[Dharmakīrti] shows that [exhaling and inhaling] do not have another cause [except the cognition]: ... (v. 52).
If consciousness [were] the effect of exhaling and inhaling, then the pushing forth and drawing in of wind would be [possible] without a [conscious] effort. But this is not so, because these two have the nature of pushing forth and drawing in (i.e., they do not happen from the nature of the wind itself, but are due to a special effort).
[Objection:] Only the pushing forth and drawing in of these two depend on the cognition, not [their] own nature [as wind]. [For] the own nature [arises] from another cause.[3] Thus, the cognition [arises] from [wind, and] the pushing forth and drawing in [of that wind results] from the [cognition].[4]
[Reply:] This is also not true.

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la sems med pa'i phyir de dag ji ltar sems daṅ 'brel bar 'gyur sñam du sems na | de ni de ltar ma yin te | sṅur ba drag po (strong snoring) *la sogs pa'i 'gyur ba thams cad sṅon gyi rnam par śes pa'i bag chags kyi khyad par gyi rjes su 'gro ba ste | 'di ltar dbugs [g]źan pa la goms pas rmi lam du [g]źan par [rgyu] <'gyur> źiṅ | śin tu riṅ ba la goms pas dbugs riṅ par 'gyur ro ||.*

Cf. also *NAṬ* 6b3-5 = *ĀNṬ* 318a1-3: *tathā hi yadi mandau prāṇāpānau niḥsrasṭum iṣyete tato mandau bhavato dīrghau cet tarhi dīrghāv iti. yadi punar dehamātranimittau prāṇāpānau prāṇāpānanimittaṃ ca vijñānaṃ tarhi nettham icchāvaśāt prāṇāpānapravartanaṃ bhavet.*

[3] Delete *na* as in $P_{(Pe)}$ 74a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 62a5. The Tibetan reading is confirmed by R 325a1 (= 649.1): ... *ṅo bo ñid ma yin te| de rgyu gźan las 'byuṅ ba'i phyir ro.*

[4] Cf. *NAVV* 49.15-16.

445. If a dead person as well has this wind, why does [his] cognition *(cetanā)* stop? If this [wind] is not the cause of [cognition], the body would become the cause [and this alternative was refuted in v. 51].

If it is not a lasting wind which is the cause of cognition, cognition would cease [even while one is alive, because the wind may be absent].[5] If, on the other hand, [a lasting wind] is the cause [of cognition], then for a dead person as well there is permanence of [this] wind. And exhaling and inhaling have the form of an effect [of this lasting wind]. Thus, it is not the case that because they are absent cognition ceases. Consequently, it would not cease (cf. v. 51). And [moreover] by decrease and increase of exhaling and inhaling, the cognition would decrease and increase, because it is [supposedly] their effect. When the cause decreases or increases,[6] the effect decreases or increases necessarily.[7] Otherwise, one would not [say] 'This is [its] cause.'"

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[5] Read *nivṛttir;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 74b1 $=P_{(De)}$ 62a6: ... *ldog pa ñid du 'gyur ro* ǁ.

[6] Read *'bhivardhamāne;* cf. also *NAṬ* 6b6-7 and *ĀNṬ* 318a5.

[7] P 70.33-71.2 is paraphrased and expanded in *NAṬ* 6b5-9 and *ĀNṬ* 318a4-8, and summarized in *NAVV* 49.19-21.

tulyaḥ prasaṅgo 'pi tayor na tulyaṃ cittakāraṇe |
sthityāvedhakam anyac ca yataḥ kāraṇam iṣyate ||53||

"The same inadmissible consequence [applies] in the case of these two as well, [but it is] not the same in the case of [cognition] whose cause is a cognition, because that which projects [and actually effects] the continuity and something else are accepted as cause [of the cognition]."

1) Instead of the impersonal construction with the neuter adjective *tulyam* in 53b one could expect *tulyaḥ,* since the adjective could also be related to *prasaṅga.* M 27.18 uses the neuter noun *prasañjana* to account for the neuter form.

2) D, P, R and M differ slightly in their interpretation of the consequence. According to P 71.5 it consists in the fact that consciousness would not cease as long as the body lasts *(tathāpi dehe tiṣṭhati cetaso 'nivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ),* whereas according to $D_{(Pe)}$ 31b5 = $D_{(De)}$ 28a4 (... *de ltar dbugs 'byuṅ rṅub dag kyaṅ ci'i phyir ldog par 'gyur),* R 325a5 = 649.5 *(de dag 'byuṅ ba daṅ 'jug pa dag dgag pa med par thal bar mtshuṅs pa yin no)* and M 27.14 *(tayor api prāṇāpānayor dehe tiṣṭhaty anivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ)* it consists in the fact that exhaling and inhaling would not cease as long as the body lasts. However, in the final analysis the two interpretations amount to the same, since exhaling and inhaling are assumed to be the cause of cognition. Breathing lasts as long as the body lasts (= D, R and M); this implies that the cognition lasts as long as the body lasts (= P), because it lasts as long as its cause, namely, breathing lasts. P's interpretation has the advantage of allowing an exact repetition of the consequence stated in 51ab, not only its application to exhaling and inhaling.

3) I followed M *(id.)* in construing *api* with *tayoḥ* and not with *prasaṅgaḥ;* cf. also PV_{Tib}: *de dag la yaṅ thal bar mtshuṅs* ||. However, PV_{D} and PV_{R} in $D_{(Pe)}$ 31b4 = $D_{(De)}$ 28a3-4 and in R 325a5 (= 649.5) read *de dag thal bar mtshuṅs na yaṅ. tayor api* in P 71.6 *(tayor api prāṇāpānayor anivṛttiḥ)* cannot be considered as a *pratīka* because the genitive would relate to a reason which is not indicated in the verse but only in P. The same applies to *tayor api* in the next sentence *(tayor api dehakāryatvād anivṛttir eva);* the

non-cessation of cognition was already stated as the inadmissible consequence meant in 53b, and the non-cessation of exhaling and inhaling appears only as a reason for this consequence.

4) "That which projects [and actually effects] the continuity" *(sthityāvedhaka)* is in my opinion an equivalent of *āyus* (life force or life span); cf. 58c below. Cf. also *AKBh* 40.15 and 21 on 2.5 and 6. Note, however, that this identification of *sthityāvedhaka* as *āyus* is not supported by any of the commentaries. P uses three different (and equivalent?) expressions in the commentary to this verse: *taddehasatṛṣṇakarman* (71.11), *saṃskārabījasañjñitam avidyādirūpam* (71.12) and *sthityāvedhakaṃ vāsanālakṣaṇam* (74.2). $D_{(Pe)}$ 31b7 = $D_{(De)}$ 28a6 and M 27.19 mention simply *karman*. R 325b3 = 650.3 understands it as part of the traces that are left by karma: *de bźin du śes pa ni sems kyis bskyed pa yin yaṅ | las kyi bag chags kyi cha yis byas pas srog chags rnams 'tsho ba'i dus su tha dad pa yin no.* "In the same manner, although the cognition is produced by a cognition, the creatures are different in respect to lifetime because [the cognition] is produced by a part of the traces of karma." Alternatively, Ravigupta calls it **avidyā* (325b1 = 650.1), which could explain why he understands it as only a part of the traces of karma.

The reason why none of the commentators specifies more than one cause lies in their interpretation of the second half-verse which is different than the one suggested in the translation. P, R and M seem to have construed *sthityāvedhaka* as qualifying *anyat* and understood *ca* in the sense of *api*. According to this interpretation one may translate "because [not only the cognition, but] something else as well, [namely, karma] which projects the continuity, is accepted as cause [of the cognition]." I preferred to follow the PV_{Tib}: *gnas pa'i 'phen byed gźan dag kyaṅ ‖ gaṅ phyir rgyu ni yin par 'dod ‖*. PV_R (in R 325a7 = 649.7), however, supports the other interpretation: *gnas pa 'phen par byed pa yi ‖ rgyu gźan yin par 'dod pa'i phyir ‖*. The translation in PV_D seems corrupt; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 31b7-8 = $D_{(De)}$ 28a6: *gźan nas 'phen par byed pa ni ‖ gaṅ phyir rgyu ni yin par 'dod ‖*. Perhaps *anyac ca* was understood in the sense of *kiṃ ca,* therefore placed at the beginning of the half-verse, and later on mechanically corrupted.

If we are right in assuming that for Dharmakīrti *sthityāvedhaka* represents *āyus* and that *āyus* for him, as for the Sautrāntikas, is only a capacity of karma, then, if *sthityāvedhaka* and *anyat* refer to two different causes, we are short of a cause. In this case one may suggest that Dharmakīrti has the

traditional theory in mind according to which cognition, life force and (bodily) heat *(uṣman)* are dependent on each other; cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna,* p. 6, with n. 58, and n. 502, with reference to *AKBh* 73.21ff. *AK* 2.45a$_2$b is quoted in P 46.19. The "other" cause would then be bodily heat.

5) P 71.5-74.3: "Or let exhaling and inhaling be the cause of cognition; even so, there [would follow] the inadmissible consequence that the cognition would not cease as long as the body lasts, because these two as well, [i.e.] exhaling and inhaling, [would] not cease [as long as the body lasts]. These two as well [would] certainly not cease because [they] are an effect of the body. Because they [would] not cease, the cognition too [would] not cease. [Objection:] Exactly the same inadmissible consequence [applies] also in the case of cognition whose cause is a cognition.[1]

> 446. Also the inadmissible consequence [would follow that] the cognition does not cease as long as the [cause-]cognition lasts (i.e., as long as there is a cause-cognition, there must be an effect-cognition, and this should also hold true for the cognition at the time of death). And if [you say that according to your doctrine the cause-cognition does not last at all, but] is accepted as previous to the [cognition which it produces], the cognition that is previous [to the cognition to be produced by it] does not become inactive (i.e., the cognition at the time of death should also be active and produce a further cognition).

[Reply:] On this it is said: *[But it is not] the same in the case of cognition whose cause is a cognition, because something else as well which projects the continuity is accepted as cause [of the cognition]. Something else* also, technically called karma accompanied by thirst for this body, *is accepted as cause.* For the cognition does not arise from the mere existence of the

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[1] Read *cetaḥkāraṇe;* I understand the compound as a *bahuvrīhi,* since it is the cognition, resulting from the body or the cognition, that is the subject of non-cessation in v. 51ab and 53b. However, $P_{(Pe)}$ 74b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 62b3 (... *sems sems kyi rgyu yin pa la* ...) and R 325a6 = 649.6 (... *sems kyi rgyu sems yin nam* |) seem to interpret it as a *tatpuruṣa*-compound. This conflicts with the paraphrase of v. 53b in R 325a7f. = 649.7f. *(sems ni sems kyi rgyu can yin yaṅ ṅo* ||*).*

previous cognition,[2] because also something different from that [cognition], technically called the seed of (i.e., deposited by) karmic forces *(saṃskāra-bījasañjñita),*[3] that has the form of ignorance *(avidyā),* etc., is a cause [of cognition]. When this [cause] is awakened in (or: by) a previous cognition, the [next] cognition arises there or elsewhere (i.e., in the same body or in the next body), because the different traces *(vāsanā)* [left by previous experience] and the factors that awaken [them] are manifold. For instance, one does not see dreams of various forms just by mere connection with sleep.[4] For although the connection with sleep[5] is common [to all dreams], one sees a certain dream only at a certain time, because the traces and the conditions for their awakening[6] are manifold. Because the awakening of traces[7] is manifold, the cessation[8] [of the cognition is also possible]. However, this is not the case (i.e., the cessation of the cognition would not be possible) also if [the cognition] has the body alone as its cause, because it is observed to be exactly so.[9]
[Objection:] How is that?

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[2] Read perhaps *pūrvacittasantānasattāmātrakād;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 74b8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 62b4: *sṅa ma'i sems kyi rgyun yod pa tsam las* ... .

[3] $P_{(Pe)}$ 75a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 62b4-5: *'du byed kyi bag chags kyi miṅ can* would correspond to *saṃskāravāsanāsañjñita.*

[4] Read *middha* instead of *siddha-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 62b5: ... *gñid daṅ 'brel ba tsam gyis* ... . Cf. also R 325b1f. = 650.1f.

[5] Read *middha-*.

[6] Read perhaps *-prabodhapratyayacitratvāt;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 62b6: *bag chags sad pa'i rkyen sna tshogs pa'i phyir ro* ||.

[7] Read *vāsanā-*.

[8] *(d)hi* does not seem to make sense here, and has no equivalent in the Tibetan; perhaps one should read *-tvād vinivṛttir.*

[9] *evam eva* can be construed with what precedes *(na tu ... evam eva)* or with what follows *(evam eva dṛṣṭatvāt);* the translation follows $P_{(Pe)}$ 75a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 62b6-7: ... *de lta bu ñid du mthoṅ ba'i phyir ni* ... .

447. [Reply:] Because this would not be possible otherwise,[10] every [cognition] has the awakening of traces as its cause because one observes the traces of cognition, just like a cognition in a dream.

If the mere body and sleep[11] alone were the cause [of cognitions in dreams], everyone would see the same dream *(svapnadarśana)* all the time. However, a certain [person] perceives [only] a certain [dream]. Therefore, it is correct [to maintain that] the [cognition in a dream] is produced indeed by the connection with traces, because the traces in respect to this[12] (i.e., in respect to the production of cognition) have various forms. Therefore, each and every cognition in this body or[13] elsewhere is connected with something that is determined by the awakening of traces; otherwise this is not intelligible.
[Objection:] Inasmuch as [the cognition] arises from the power of traces *(vāsanābala)* [and does not have a real object], it is completely untrue, just like a dream.
[Reply:] That too is untrue.

448. Even though [they] arise from the power of traces, the diverse phenomena *(prapañca)*, such as sexual intercourse *(surata)*, etc., are not unreal, because their own purpose is brought about; a real efficient action *(satyārthakriyā)* is effected [by them].[14]

For how [can it be that] everyday activities, such as sexual intercourse, etc., *(suratādivyavahāra)* that depend upon the power of traces [and] whose

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[10] Read *anyathānupapattitaḥ;* cf. $P_{(De)}$ 62b7: *de lta min na mi 'thad phyir* ‖ ($P_{(Pe)}$ 75a4: *de lta yin na mi 'thad phyir* ‖).

[11] Read *middha-*.

[12] Read *tatra;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 63a1: *de la* ... .

[13] Read *vā* instead of *ca?* Cf. also P 71.13: *tatra* ... *anyatra vā.*

[14] Read *-bala-, prapañcaḥ* and *-kriyā kṛtā.* Note, however, that $P_{(Pe)}$ 75b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 63a3 seems to correspond to *-kriyākṛtaḥ: yod ñid don byed pas byas yin* ‖. Prajñākaragupta's arguments in this passage seem to be inspired by *Viṃś* 4a: *svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā* (scil. *yuktā).*

procedures have the power[15] to accomplish actions in view of aspired goals *(samīhitārthakriyākaraṇaprabalapravartana)*, have a nature which is vitiated by the calamity of being unreal *(asatyatāvyatikaravyastātman)?* If [you claim that] even though they conform to traces *(vāsanānvayin)*, everyday activities like sexual intercourse, etc., are not unreal because they are connected with a real woman, etc., *(satyastryādisamanvayin)*, [then] everyday activities such as birth, etc., *(janmādivyavahāra)* are also so. Thus, it is the same [for both positions]. For they too (i.e., the activities of birth, etc., just like the activities of sexual intercourse, etc.,) consist in the abandonment [of one body] and appropriation of another real body[16] there (i.e., at the place of birth). Therefore, [they] are not unreal. To explain: After [the cognition] has appropriated (or: on the basis of) another body which was produced by sperm and blood *(śukraśoṇita)*, life proceeds, even though [it] arises from the power of traces.[17]

[Objection:] How is it [known that there is] a transition [of the cognition from one body] to another body *(śarīrāntarasañcaraṇa)* without [this] being perceptible?[18]

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[15] Read *-prabala* instead of *-pravaṇa;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75b1-2 = $P_{(De)}$ 63a4: ... *don bya ba byed pa nus pa 'jug pa de* ($P_{(De)}$ om. *de) dag* ... .

[16] Read *utsarga* instead of *utsaṅga.* The meaning of the compound *satyaśarīrāntarotsargopādānatā* is clear, although a precise analysis poses problems inasmuch as *satyaśarīrāntara* has to be construed only with *-upādāna-*. The Tibetan translation avoids the problem by rearranging the two members of the *dvandva -utsargopādāna-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 63a5: ... *bden pa'i lus gźan len pa daṅ | 'dor ba'i phyir* ... .

[17] Note that $P_{(Pe)}$ 75b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 63a5 construes *vāsanābalabhāve 'pi* with the next sentence.

[18] P 71.29-72.4 is summarized in *NAVV* 51.1-3. Śānti Sūri then expands the discussion in P and claims that a transition of the mind *(manaḥsaṅkrānti)* to another body is possible only by the fact that somehow one becomes the apprehender *(grāhaka)* of another body; this transition is observed even with regard to the body of animals *(paśu)*, etc. Thus, how can one say that the transition to another body is not observed? An opponent objects that if transition consisted in the mere fact of another body being apprehended, then just as in the case of injury to another body, one would not be agitated *(vyākula)* even by injury to one's own body; Śānti Sūri replies that this is not true: some people become agitated even when seeing the blood of another living being *(pararaktadarśana)*, whereas other people are indifferent even to injury to their own body *(ātmaśarīrakṣati)*.

[Reply:] This is just like the [invisible] transition to the state of the body of an old man, etc. *(vṛddhādiśarīrāvasthāsañcaraṇavat).*[19]
[Objection: We deny different bodies during a single lifetime:]

> 449. Because the [body from birth to death] is established to be one inasmuch as [it] arises from a single material cause, the transition to another body is certainly not so (i.e., is not like the transition from the state of a child's body to the state of an adult's body, etc.).

What has a single [pair of] sperm and blood as its material cause, that is one (i.e., the same) body.[20] Therefore, [the transition of the cognition from the body in the state of a child to the body in the state of an old man] is not a transition to another body. But the body of an animal *(paśu),* etc., [to which the cognition supposedly transmigrates] is another body, inasmuch as it has arisen from another [pair of] sperm and blood. And a transition to such [a body] is not observed; therefore, how is it assumed to be possible?

> 450. [Reply:] Even so, [your argument] does not negate the fact that [the so-called different stages of one body] are [in fact] different bodies. Having different characteristics *(vilakṣaṇatva)* is accepted[21] as the factor that brings to an end *(nivartaka)* being that (i.e., being the same entity).

Indeed, because it has different characteristics[22] than [the body of] a child, the body of a young man, etc., cannot be said to be the same [body as the former]. There (i.e., in the case of the different bodies that one has throughout one's lifetime) transition is observed: Transition in this case is the arising [of cognition] inasmuch as it is accompanied by the [respective body]. And its arising in this way is due to the power of traces. Therefore, there is no contradiction [in our position].

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[19] On the different stages of the body cf. *AKBh* on 4.53ab, dLVP vol. 4, p. 119.

[20] Read *ekam eva śarīraṃ tad* or similar; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 63a7: ... *de ni lus gcig ñid yin pa'i phyir* ... .

[21] Read *iṣyate.*

[22] Read *bālādivilakṣaṇabhāvena;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 75b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 63b1: ... *byis pa la sogs pa daṅ mtshan ñid mi mthun pa yin pas* ... .

[Objection:] A transition [of cognition] to another body that has different characteristics is not observed.
[Reply:] That [argument] too is not conclusive *(anaikāntika),* because one observes the transition from the body in the end of dream *(svapnāntikaśarīra-sañcāra)* [which has different characteristics than the body in the waking state].
[Objection:] Because that [body in the end of dream and for that matter throughout a dream] is unreal *(alīka),* this is no transition at all.
[Reply:] No, because what is being observed cannot be unreal.
[Objection:] Just as[23] that [body] is unreal, so also is the transition[24] in that case.
[Reply:] What will it [mean] to be unreal *(asatyatva)*? If [you claim that] it is the fact of being sublated by a waking cognition *(jāgratpratyaya),* [then we answer that] when the cognition [in a dream takes place], at that time it is not being sublated. That [it] is being sublated at another time, however, is not correct.
[Objection: The object of a dream] is not perceived at that very time by a waking [cognition].[25]
[Reply: The object] perceived by a waking cognition is not perceived by the [cognition in a dream] either. Thus, being sublating factor and what is to be sublated *(bādhyabādhakabhāva)* [applies] equal[ly to both cognitions].
[Objection: The sublated object] is not apprehended in waking.
[Reply:] How [could one] distinguish between waking and non-waking *(pra-bodhāprabodha)*?
[Objection:] Because a cognition arises [in the form] 'I am awake. '
[Reply:] The cognition 'I am awake' arises in a dream too. Therefore, how [can one] distinguish [between waking and non-waking] on the basis of that? Therefore, when the perception is the same [in both states], neither being inexistent nor being untrue is appropriate.
[Objection:] Being untrue is the fact that [a cognition] does not last long because the traces are weak *(vāsanādaurbalya),* [and it is also] an apprehen-

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[23] *hi* does not seem to be used in a causal sense here, but only as an emphatic.

[24] Read perhaps *asatyaḥ* after *sañcāro 'pi;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76a3 = 63b3: ... *'pho ba yaṅ mi bden pa yin no* ... .

[25] Read *jāgratā nopalabhyata.*

sion which is specific [to only one perceiver and] is characterized by weakness.
[Reply:] Then where traces are firm *(vāsanādārḍhya)* and in the case of a common perception,[26] the opposite [applies] (i.e., being true). Therefore (i.e., because in the case of the perception of the body in a dream we observe that there is firmness of traces and that perception is common to many perceivers, this perception is true and consequently the body in a dream real) the transition is real.

> 451. To explain: Being true[27] does not occur in any other [way] than due to the firmness of traces. The truth of the cognitions of a waking [person] is due only to the firmness of traces.

Where the traces are firm this is a waking cognition, a true one as well as a common perception. But it (i.e., the firmness of traces) exists indeed by its own form (i.e., independently from a waking cognition) [and thus at the end of a dream also].[28] Therefore, the transition is established. However,

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[26] The word order in Skt seems odd; I add the phrase *sādhāraṇopalambhe ca* to the relative clause. Thus, although the weakness of traces has just been named as the cause of being untrue (72.11) and firmness of traces will be given as the cause for a true and common perception in 72.14, a common perception could be adduced at this stage of the discussion as a further case where the contrary, i.e., truth, is assumed (cf. also 72.15-16). Perhaps because of the resulting confusion as to what the condition for truth actually is (i.e., firmness of traces alone or also commonness of a perception), the Tibetan translation seems to explicate *tatra* with *sādhāraṇopalambhe;* consequently it does not have an equivalent to *ca.* Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 63b6: ... *gaṅ la bag chags brtan par yod pa thun moṅ du dmigs pa der bzlog pa ...* ("Where traces are firm, there [i.e.] in the case of a common perception, ..."). Perhaps *sādhāraṇopalambhe ca* was at some stage added in the margin of a manuscript to fill the lacuna in the relative clause and misplaced in a subsequent copy. With or without *ca,* it was interpreted by the translators as the specification of *tatra.* Finally, because of the slight confusion as outlined above, it is also possible that *sādhāraṇopalambhe ca* is simply an interpolation, to be related to the relative clause in the sense as understood by me.

[27] One probably has to read *na paraḥ satyatodayaḥ,* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 63b7: *bden pa'i skye ba gźan yod min* **|**.

[28] The additions in the translation of this highly elliptic sentence are tentative and motivated by the aim to provide a meaningful transition to the conclusion *(tataḥ siddhaḥ sañcāraḥ).* For minimal unambiguity one would except at least *tatrāpi* (i.e., at the end of a dream also) or something similar. The Tibetan translation contains the particle *kyaṅ,* though in a strange

because the traces are [sometimes] not firm, [a certain cognition] is destroyed at once *(jhaṭiti)*. And how [would a cognition] be untrue in a case where a command of a deity *(devatādeśa)*[29] appears to two dreamers *(svapnadarśin)*? [Objection:] At that time (i.e., the time of a dream) [the cognition] is indeed true.
[Reply:] If so, [then] it is not the case that all objects of a dream are unreal. In this case,

> 452. because the transition is well-established, it is clear that, because an [additional] special property is assumed, this (i.e., what you have objected to our inference) is an answer which is a false objection *(jātyuttara)* corresponding [to our own inference] on the [basis of] a variation *(vikalpasama)*.[30]

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position after *ñid* (corresponding to *eva);* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 63b7f.: *de ni raṅ gi ṅo bor yod pa ñid kyaṅ yin te* |. It may be a remnant of missing words or an illegible passage already in the manuscript at the disposal of the translators.

[29] The phenomenon of the "dream command" *(svapnādeśa)*, i.e., instructions given by a god to his devotee in a dream, is still alive in modern Indian religiosity; cf. Korom, "Language, Belief, and Experience in Bengali Folk Religion." $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 64a1 *(gaṅ du lhas bstan pas rmi lam mthoṅ ba gñig la snaṅ ba* ...) either presupposes a slightly different text *(devatādeśato?)* or represents a different interpretation.

[30] Cf. *NS* 5.1.4, *Vādavidhi* frg. 14a, pp. 122 and 139, and *Nyāyamukha,* p. 56. P 45.2 quotes Dignāga's definition in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* VI, p. 542, v. 12 (quoted by Tucci, *Nyāyamukha,* p. 56): *sādharmye 'pi viśeṣoktir vikalpasamam.* In the translation of *vikalpasama* I follow partly Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's,* p. 131, and partly Frauwallner, *Nachgelassene Werke* I, p. 83-84. If I understand correctly, the Buddhist makes the following inference: The transition of cognition from one body to another after death is real, because this is observed, just like the transition from the body of a child to the body of an adult. The opponent replies that there is a variation regarding the properties of the example and the subject: in the case of the example, the transition is between similar bodies, in the case of the subject between dissimilar bodies. Accordingly there is a corresponding variation also regarding the property to be proved: the transition from the body of a child to the body of an adult is real, the transition from one body to another after death is not real. Thus, the opponent assumes an additional special property of the example (i.e., relating to similar bodies) which is absent in the Buddhist subject of inference; by analogy to this variation also the property to be proved (i.e., being real) should be absent in the subject. Prajñākaragupta exposes the faultiness of this objection: transition between dissimilar bodies is observed when the cognition passes from the body in a dream to the body in the waking state (cf. 72.3-4: *svapnāntikaśarīrasañcāradarśanād anaikāntikam).* By asserting the reality of the body in a dream against the opponent's

Or [we claim that] it is understood that there is transition immediately[31] after death, because one perceives [already] at the beginning of life the sharpness [of the senses] *(pāṭava)*, which is a result of traces of [previous] cognitions *(cittasaṃskāraphala)*.[32]

> 453. When it is observed that at the beginning of life a cognition which has the nature of clinging to the body *(śarīrāgraharūpa)* arises for all bodily beings *(dehin)*, why not [assume that it] comes from another body?[33]

This nature of cognition, to begin with, that has[34] the form of clinging to the body, etc., at the beginning of life or at another time, which is characterized by connection with gradation *(tāratamyayogin*, i.e., is present in various degrees) [and] is perceived for all living beings as the result of various degrees of previous repeated practice *(pūrvābhyāsatāratamyaphalatā)*, does not arise without a cognition that has been conditioned by previous repeated practice of clinging to a body.[35] Therefore, merely[36] on the basis of the

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objections, he proves the reality of this transition between dissimilar bodies. Thus, the specific qualification on whose variation the opponent bases his objection is irrelevant to the issue under discussion.

31 Read *maraṇānantaraṃ* (cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 64a2-3: *śi ma thag pa)* and *pratītam.*

32 This argument stands in contradiction to the assumption that the senses of newborn living beings are not yet capable to grasp objects; cf. Preisendanz, *Studien,* pp. 315 and 336-337

33 This verse is quoted in *NAṬ* 4b13-5a1 = *ĀNṬ* 316b3-4, with *janmāntarāgatiḥ* instead of *dehāntarāgatiḥ;* cf. also Jambuvijaya, "Quotations," p. 391. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 64a3 seems to reflect an understanding of *āgati* not in the sense of "coming," but of "understanding"!

34 Read *-rūpaś* to allow a *bahuvrīhi*-compound; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 64a4: ... *raṅ bźin can ...* .

35 The translation follows the Skt; for *-saṃskṛtacitta* compare P 72.19 *(cittasaṃskāraphala).* However, the reading is not certain. The Tibetan translation does not have an equivalent to *-citta* and presupposes a derivation of *abhi-saṃs-√KṚ (abhisaṃskṛta; abhisaṃskāra?);* the placement of a *śad* before the equivalent to *antareṇa* seems odd and may point at some problem in the manuscript available to the translators. Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 64a4: ... *goms pa sṅa ma'i mṅon par 'dus byas pa | med na ...* . Malayagiri paraphrases in *NAṬ* 4b12-13 = *ĀNṬ* 316b2-3: ... *janmādau śarīrāgrahaḥ śarīrapariśīlanābhyāsajanitasaṃskāranibandhaḥ.*

capacity of this [argument] it should be understood that there is a transition *(sañcaraṇa)* from another body to the body here.[37] The inference[38] does not function otherwise.

[Objection:] There is no perception *(pratyakṣa)* concerning the transition [of cognition from one body to another]; therefore, how can it be apprehended by inference[39]?

[Reply:] This is also no a fault [in our position], because:

> 454. What is wrong (lit.: what is the faultiness) here [when] there is no perception concerning an object to be inferred *(anumeya)?* For the object (or: realm/field of operation) of perception is not the object of inference.[40]

For the operations *(pravartana)* of perception and inference are indeed accepted as excluding each other's realms (i.e., perception apprehends only particulars, inference only universals). How could precisely that be a fault?[41]

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[36] Note that *eva* has no equivalent in $P_{(Pe)}$ 76b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 64a4-5 which reads *de* ($P_{(De)}$: *de'i) śugs kyi* (read with $P_{(De)}$ *kyis)* … .

[37] Read *ihaśarire.*

[38] Read *anumāna-* instead of *anumā-*. The inference referred to could be extracted in various formulations from P 72.21-23. Malayagiri presents a simplified version in his paraphrase *NAṬ* 4b9-13 = *ĀNṬ* 316a13-b3: *tathā hi kṛmer api jantos tatkālotpannasyāpy asti nijaśarīraviṣayaḥ pratibandhaḥ, upaghātakam upalabhya palāyanadarśanāt, yaś ca yadviṣayaḥ pratibandhaḥ sa tadviṣayapariśīlanābhyāsapūrvakaḥ, tathādarśanāt. na khalv atyantāparijñātaguṇadoṣa-vastuviṣaye kasyāpy āgraha upajāyate. tato janmādau śarīrāgrahaḥ pariśīlanābhyāsajanita-saṃskāranibandhana iti siddham ātmano janmāntarād āgamanam.*

[39] Read *anumānāt.*

[40] This verse is quoted in *NAṬ* 5a3-4 (cf. also Jambuvijaya, "Quotations," p. 391) and *ĀNṬ* 316b6-7, together with a close paraphrase of the introduction 72.24 (*NAṬ* 5a1-2, *ĀNṬ* 316b4-6).

[41] Cf. the close paraphrase in *NAṬ* 5a2-3 and *ĀNṬ* 316a5-6.

[Objection:] How is inference [possible] without the operation of perception in respect to an [object] of the same kind as the [object of inference] *(taj-jātīya)?*[42]
[Reply:] This is also not a fault.

> 455. First, the clinging to a body or something else is perceived by perception to have occurred because of repeated practice. Isn't the inferential cognition due to that [previous perception]?[43]

The [following] is stated [by the opponent]: Since inference is preceded by perception,[44] how is inference [possible] without perception concerning an [object] of the same kind as the [inferred object]? The rejection regarding that [objection] is this: Let it be admitted that the transition is not seen by perception, but the result which conforms to the transition *(sañcārānurūpa)* is perceived indeed, just like [in the case of] a transition from another village.[45] For instance, someone who has come from another village, or another country, is perceived to delight in food,[46] etc., of the same kind as an object of previous[ly experienced] pleasure. It may be that he was not perceived by others (i.e., by his fellow villagers, etc.) to be coming from such a country[47] (i.e., where food of that kind is common); nevertheless his coming from such a country is very well apprehended by inference. In this way, coming from the world of the gods, etc., too should be inferred from

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[42] Cf. *NAṬ* 5a4-5 and *ĀNṬ* 316a7-8.

[43] Cf. the adaption in *NAṬ* 5a7 = *ĀNṬ* 316b10: *anyatrādhyakṣataḥ sākṣāt tato dehe 'numā na kim* ‖ (cf. also Jambuvijaya, "Quotations," p. 391).

[44] Cf. *NS* 1.1.5.

[45] Read *grāmāntara-*.

[46] $P_{(Pe)}$ 77a5 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b2 *ñe bar spyod pa* indicates an understanding of *upakaraṇa* in its specific Buddhist sense of "food"; cf. Edgerton, *BHSD, s.v. upakaraṇa,* p. 133b: *upakaraṇa = bhoga,* food.

[47] Read *aparais tathābhūtadeśād āgacchan;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77a5-6 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b2-3: *gal te gźan dag gis de lta bur 'gyur ba'i yul na<s> 'oṅs pa ... .*

the joy about a special food, etc.,[48] because the inference [in this case] operates only because perception operates [previously] in respect to the coming from another village.[49] For perception does not operate [previously] in respect to a fire that is connected to a special property, which is [presently] being inferred from smoke.
[Objection: It] operates on fire as such (i.e., the previous perception of fire, on which the inference is based, apprehended fire as such, and thus the object of inference was perceived before by perception).
[Reply:] Here [in our case] too, [it] operates in respect to the transition from a country, etc. [in general]. Therefore, [the situation] is the same [for both cases].
[Objection:] Just as[50] the transition to another country, etc., is observed [to be effected] by/with the very same body, [i.e.] without [the person] abandoning [his] body, and just as the transition to the body in a dream *(svapnaśarīrasañcāra)* is unreal, in the same manner here too, at the beginning of a [new] life, there would be no abandonment of the [previous] body and no reality [of the body and hence of the transition]. Therefore, [your position is] not correct *(asamañjasa)*. To explain:

> 456. If in the case of transition to another body there would be non-abandonment [of the previous one] and coming together [of the cognition] with a real [body],[51] then the

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[48] Read *-ābhiramād devādilokād;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77a6-7 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b3: ... *mṅon par dga' bas lha la sogs pa'i 'jig rten nas 'oṅs nas* (om. *nas* as in $P_{(De)}$) *kyaṅ ṅes par bya ste* |.

[49] Malayagiri also adduces the example of a person coming from a different village, but does not elaborate on it; cf. *NAṬ* 5a9-10 and *ĀNṬ* 316b12-14.

[50] Insert *yathā* before *deśa-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77a8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 64b5: *dper na* ... .

[51] Read *-sañcāre 'tyāgasatyasamāgamau.* This tentative reconstruction of the Skt is based partly on the context and partly on Tib; cf. the introductory remarks in 73.5 (... *janmādau śarīrāparityāgāsatyate syātām* ...) and the explanation in 73.10-11 with the essential emendations *śarīra<tyāga>m antareṇa and <'>satya śarīrānvayī.* $P_{(Pe)}$ 77b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b6 ... *gal te lus gźan 'pho ba ni* | *dor daṅ bden pa daṅ 'brel na* ‖ obviously did not read the *dvandva*-compound *śarīrāntarasañcāratyāgau,* but understood *śarīrāntarasañcāra* as the topic of the sentence. If this corresponded to a locative *śarīrāntarasañcāre,* the missing negation in Tibetan could be easily explained as being due to an unwritten *avagraha* (i.e., *tyāga-* instead of *'tyāga-)* in the manuscript available to the translators. It is also clear that Tibetan presupposes

proof of the other world *(paralokaprasādhana)* [would be] true.

457. And if the [situation] before [and] after death is exactly like the absolute interruption [of the series of cognition] in sleep without a dream, what is accomplished [by adducing the example of transition between sleep and waking]?[52]

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a compound *(')tyāgasatyasamāgamau.* It remains to be explained how *-tyāgau* found its way into the manuscript. The change of *-sañcāre to -sañcāra* is less problematic.

[52] Read *'svapnopalambhane* ($P_{(Pe)}$ 77b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b6: *rmi lam dmigs med par), tad* instead of *tu* (Tib: *der)* and *kiṃ kṛtam.* The argument is not entirely clear. If I understand correctly, the Cārvāka uses the Buddhist analogy of the transition of cognition between the bodies in sleep and waking against the Buddhist himself. If one understands that the transition between sleep and waking should illustrate the transition between the previous life and the present one, it would follow that the state before death in the previous life would be without cognition, just like in the state of dreamless sleep. If one understands that the transition between waking and sleep should illustrate the transition between the present life and the next one, it would follow that the state after death in the present life would be without cognition, just like in the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, if the states in the previous and the next lives would be without cognition, the Buddhist example of transition between sleep and waking would merely affirm the materialist position that there is no life before and after the present one.

The disturbing *tu* in 457d does not have any equivalent in Tib, where *der* has to be accounted for. It could correspond to *tad* which would loosely refer to the states before death in the previous life and after death in the present one. In the explanation of the verse in 73.14 these two states are referred to collectively as *paraloka.*

It may seem odd that the word *maraṇa* should refer to two different deaths as is necessarily the case in the above interpretation. One could also interpret the argument in such a manner that "death" would refer only to death in the present life: If one understands that the transition between (dreamless) sleep and waking should illustrate the transition between the present life and the next one, it would follow that the state before death in the present life would be without cognition, which is absurd. If one understands that the transition between waking and (dreamless) sleep should illustrate the transition between the present life and the next one, it would follow that the state after death in the present life would be without cognition, which would merely affirm the materialist position that there is no life after the present one. The disadvantage of this interpretation is that the first consequence and the resulting absurdity would not be clearly expressed in the verse, nor even mentioned in the explanation in 73.14. Further, 457cd would be split in such a manner that it would not be possible to understand everything preceding *kiṃ kṛtam* as one conditional clause; after a comparison concluded by *maraṇāt pūrvam* a brief conditional clause would follow without an explicit predicate or another word (e.g., *tathā)* linking it to the comparison. Cf., however, the syntactical structure of the explanation in 74.13-14: *kiñca yathā ... tathā yadi ... kiṃ kṛtam ...* .

Indeed, if the transition to another life too, just as the transition to another country, would be [effected] without abandoning[53] the body, a proof of the opposite [of your position] *(viparītasādhana)* is attained. In the same manner, the transition to a dream is observed to go together with an unreal[54] body. Therefore, the transition to the other world too would be so [and the other world would be unreal]. [Thus, by adducing the example of transition to a dream you prove the opposite of your position; but] the materialists *(nāstika)* accept indeed that the posterior and previous worlds (i.e., lives) are unreal.

Moreover, if the other world too is exactly like the interruption of cognition for a person who does not see a dream *(asvapnadarśin)* in the state of sleep *(svāpa)*, or [if one maintains that cognition continues to exist in dreamless sleep, is exactly like his] having cognition that is not manifested *(avyaktavijñānatā)*, what [results] from such [a reasoning]? [By adducing the example of transition between sleep and waking you affirm that there is no cognition before and after this life, i.e.] the point of view *(dṛṣṭi)* of the materialists is not destroyed. [Thus] what would be accomplished for[55] those who profess the other world *(paralokavādin)?* [Nothing!]
[Reply:] On the [above, the following] is stated:

> 458. The transition with the very same body is sublated by perception. Seeing another [body means] the abandonment of a previous body.
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> 459. All cognitions in a dream are evolved from[56] true cognitions. And what is contradictory (lit.: the contradictoriness) [when we maintain] that a true cognition arises from a dream?

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[53] Read *śarīra(pari?)tyāgam antareṇa;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b7: ... *lus ma btaṅ bar* ... .

[54] Read *asatya-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 64b7: ... *mi bden pa'i lus* ... .

[55] Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 65a2: *'jig rten pha rol smra bas kyaṅ.* This may correspond to *paralokavādinā (api),* in which case one would have to translate: "What would be accomplished by him who ... ."

[56] *-janmanaḥ* is obviously corrupt. $P_{(Pe)}$ 77b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 65a3 reads *bden pa'i rnam śes rnam 'grel* ($P_{(De)}$, however: *'brel) yin* | could correspond to *-vīvṛtam.* This would fit with the brief explanation in 73.29 *(svapnāsatyatā hi satyatānvayinī),* but does not explain the corruption in the Skt from the graphical point of view.

460. All interruption [of cognition] is perceived as connected to awakening. The interruption after death as well is connected to an awakening to reality *(satyatābodha).*

This (i.e., the following) has [already] been said [above]: Inasmuch as the cognition is being perceived in this body as the result of repeated practice of cognition which is connected to a previous body *(pūrvaśarīrasaṅgatavijñānābhyāsaphalatva),* it necessarily does not arise without abandoning the [previous] body. Therefore, how [could it be possible that the cognition] does not[57] abandon the body? [Furthermore] the abandonment of a previous body is indeed observed:[58] The perception of the abandonment of the previous body is nothing but the perception of this [present] body.[59]
[Objection:] When the previous body is not established, how [could] the abandonment of the previous body be established?

461. [Reply: This is] not [correct]. When delight *(abhirati),* etc., in respect to the body is established to be preceded by delight in respect to the body, then the previous body is certainly established for us.

The previous body is established only by the proof of a special previous delight. However, precisely that [previous] body is not perceived at present. But [when] a past [object] is not perceived [at present], [this] does not [mean that] it did not exist at that time either. Therefore, [to say] that a previous body is not abandoned is sublated by perception.

And concerning what has also been said: Just as one comes here from a dream that is unreal, so [one] also [comes] from the other world that is

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[57] Read *śarīrāparityāgaḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 65a3: ... *lus yoṅs su ma btaṅ* |.

[58] $P_{(Pe)}$ 78a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 65a5, however, has an additional negation *(*adṛṣṭa)* and lacks an equivalent for *pūrva (lus ma mthoṅ ba ñid 'dor ba yin te* |*).* This may reflect a different interpretation of the argumentation intended in verse 458. The Buddhist would admit that the abandonment of the previous body is the abandonment of an invisible body. However, the perception of this present body means the perception of the abandonment of the previous body (cf. the next note).

[59] *-parityāga* has no equivalent in the Tibetan; it was probably dropped in the transmission of the Tibetan text (cf. the previous note) and its absence necessitated the additional negation in $P_{(De)}$; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 65a5: ... *sṅon gyi lus* ($P_{(De)}$ adds *ma) dmigs pa* ... .

completely unreal; and just as[60] one goes from here to the unreal body of dream, so [one] also [goes] to the other world. Therefore, the other world is not real – that is also not true. For the unreality of a dream follows upon reality. And [it] is a condition *(nimitta)* of a true cognition. Thus, as we shall explain [later on], the intermediary state of existence *(antarābhava)* is [also] so.[61] Or:

> 462. We shall explain later on that[62] every cognition is established as not different[63] from a dream, because this [later context] alone is the appropriate occasion *(prastāva)* for it.[64]

It will be explained that there is no difference whatsoever between a cognition in a dream and another [cognition]. Therefore, it is established that the transition to the body in the other world is just like [the transition to] the body in a dream. Therefore, even if we admitted that there is a difference of [a body] that has come from another [country from a body in a dream] only[65] [in the sense that the one] possesses resistance *(sapratighatva)* [and the other] does not, etc., because there is a difference in the power of traces, nevertheless the cessation of cognition is not at all observed. Therefore, living beings have an uninterrupted series [of cognitions] *(anuparatasantāna)*. Therefore, the other world is established. Dying, etc., however, [occur] because that which projects the continuity, which is characterized by traces, is diverse *(citratva)*; there is no inadmissible consequence that [the series of] cognition would not cease as long as the cognition lasts,[66] because [when continuity is

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[60] Read *yathā;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 65b1: *ji ltar* … .

[61] Cf. the commentary on v. 83, which, however, is not translated here.

[62] Read *iti* instead of *yadi;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 65b2: … *gnas so źes* | *de ltar* … .

[63] Read *svapnād aviśeṣatayā;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 65b2: *bye brag med par* … .

[64] Cf. the commentary on v. 83.

[65] Read perhaps *-ādimātraviśeṣaḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78b2-3 = $P_{(De)}$ 65b4: … *la sogs* (add with $P_{(De)}$: *pa) tsam źig khyad par* … .

[66] Cf. above, v. 446.

no longer projected] there is no such cognition [which causes a cognition to arise]."

na doṣair viguṇo deho hetur vartyādivad yadi |
mṛte samīkṛte[1] *doṣe punarujjīvanaṃ bhavet* ||54||

[1] PV$_{M}$, Mi: *śamīkṛte*, PV$_{Tib}$: *ñams gyur* (also in PV$_{D}$ and PV$_{R}$) is probably a corruption of *mñam gyur*, as in PV$_{P(Tib)}$; cf. also R 325b5 = 650.5: *skyon mñam pas*. It is improbable that *ñams gyur* reflects a translation of *śamīkṛte* in which *śamī* was understood as a derivation of √*ŚAM* in the wider sense of "killing, destroying."

"If the body is not (i.e., ceases to be) the cause [of cognition] inasmuch as it [has become] defective because of [a disorder of] the humours, just as the wick, etc., [when it has becomes defective or spoiled by water, etc., ceases to be the cause of the flame], [then] when in a dead [body] the [disturbed] humour is made equal [again to the other humours], [the body] would be reanimated."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 23, and translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 123. The translation above differs considerably from Hayes's, for he translates *doṣaiḥ* as "by diseases" and *doṣe* as "corruption." This interpretation is contradicted by all commentaries, and seems to be incompatible also with v. 58 below. Hayes also prefers the variant *śamīkṛte* and coordinates *mṛte* and *śamīkṛte doṣe* with a conjunction: "... when [the body is] dead and its corruption is neutralized."

2) P 74.4-22: "In that case (cf. 74.3) for the Cārvāka too there is indeed a [way of] avoiding [the inadmissible consequence mentioned in verses 51 and 53], because such a body [which causes the cognition to arise] is absent. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti] says: ... (v. 54).
[Objection: We can also account for the diversity by diversifying the cause.][1] For *a body which [has become] defective because of [a disorder of] the humours*, [namely] wind, phlegm, etc., *is not*[2] at all such [a body] from which the cognition arises. Thus, because such a body [which causes the

[1] The following objection and the reply thereon are summarized in *NAVV* 47.25-29.

[2] Read *na* instead of *ta;* cf. P$_{(Pe)}$ 78b6 = P$_{(De)}$ 65b6 and R 325b3-4 = 650.34.

cognition to arise] is absent, the inadmissible consequence that [the cognition] would not cease does not [apply to us].[3]
[Reply:] This is not [the case]: If it were so, [then] because the humours become equal (i.e., regain their equilibrium) when the body is dead [and] consequently one [re]gains health *(ārogya),* the body *would be re-animated.* For it has been said: 'Health [consists in] their being in equilibrium; the opposite [consists in] decrease or increase [of one of them].'[4]
[Objection:][5] How is it known that the humours are made equal [after death]? [Reply:] Because one does not[6] observe transformations [of the body] such as fever *(jvara),* etc. [after death]. For the humours, inasmuch as they do not cause a transformation [of the body at that time] do not cause [its] death, for there would be death all the time. Otherwise (i.e., if there would be no transformation of the body, but nevertheless death would occur) the body would not be the cause [of cognition], because the cognition [would] not follow the presence and absence of its (i.e., the body's) transformation. For the fact that [the cognition] has the body as its cause [would] be known [only] thus, [namely] if [the body] would be re-animated.

> 463. For if [the cognition] has cognition as its cause, the cognition does not cease. For if the cognition is not defective,[7] one observes that it comes (i.e., arises) again.[8]

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[3] Add a negation; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78b6-7 = $P_{(De)}$ 65b7: *ldog pa med par thal ba ma yin no.* Cf. also R 325b4 = 650.4. The *pūrvapakṣa* is paraphrased in *NAṬ* 6b9-11 = *ĀNṬ* 318a8-9.

[4] This is a quotation of *SSāra* 1.10. It is also quoted by Malayagiri in his paraphrase of this and the following paragraph in *NAṬ* 6b11-7a1 = *ĀNṬ* 318a9-13, and by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 47.27.

[5] The following two sentences are quoted in *NAVV* 47.29.

[6] Read *-vikārādarśanāt;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78b8f. = $P_{(De)}$ 66a1: ... *rnam par 'gyur ba ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro* **I** Cf. also *NAṬ* 6b12 = *ĀNṬ* 318a10 and *NAVV* 47.29: ... *jvarādivikārādarśanāt.*

[7] Read *'viguṇatve;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 66a3: ... *mi mthun pa med pa na* ($P_{(De)}$: *ni)* **I**.

[8] *gṛhe 'py apunar* is obviously corrupt; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 66a3: *phyir yaṅ 'oṅ bar mthoṅ ba yin* **I**.

> 464. But if [the cognition] has the body as its cause, how [could] the body that is exactly such [as before] when the defectiveness ceases, not be the cause of cognition [again]?[9]

For if the body is the cause [of cognition], it is not correct [to assume] that exactly such a body becomes a cause [at one time, and] not [a cause] at another time.[10] When exactly the same kind of defectiveness [occurs], a certain [person] dies, [but] a certain other [person] does not. How is this difference [possible]?[11] On the other hand, if [the cognition] has cognition as its cause, the defectiveness and non-defectiveness of cognition are the cause of death and of the opposite[12] [respectively]. Thus, the difference is not impossible.

> 465. Even when a [disturbed] humour is appeased, death occurs for a certain [person], but for a certain [other person][13] life [goes on] even though [the body] is defective because of the humours. This could not be established [according to your theory].[14]

Indeed, the effect is not [something] whose occurrence is improper (i.e., irregular) *(asamañjasavṛtti)*. Therefore, the cognition is not the effect of the body, because if [it] were the effect of the body, [the dead body] would be re-animated."

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[9] Read *vaiguṇyavinivartane;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 66a3: *mi mthun ldog par 'gyur ba na* ‖.

[10] $P_{(Pe)}$ 79a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 66a3-4, however, interprets this sentence differently: *lus rgyu yin na ni* | *de lta bur 'gyur ba'i lus ñid gźan gyi tshe rgyu ma yin no źes mi 'thad do* ‖ "If the body is the cause [of cognition], it is not correct [to assume] that exactly such a body is not the cause [of cognition] at another time."

[11] Cf. *NAṬ* 7b7-8 = *ĀNṬ* 319a2-3.

[12] Delete *-tva-?*

[13] I construe *kasyacit* with both *maraṇam* and *jīvanam.*

[14] This verse is quoted in *NAṬ* 7b8-9 = *ĀNṬ* 319a3-4, with *bhavanmate* instead of *vyavasthitam;* cf. also Jambūvijaya, "Quotations," p. 392.

nivṛtte 'py anale kāṣṭhavikārāvinivṛttivat |
tasyānivṛttir iti cen na cikitsāprayogataḥ ||55||

"[Objection: Re-animation does not occur even if the humours regain their balance, for] the [defectiveness of the body] does not cease [with the cessation of its cause], just as the transformation of wood [into charcoal] does not cease, even when the fire ceases.
[Reply:] No, because one applies medical treatment."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme,* p. 23. The translation above differs slightly in the interpretation of the reply. Vetter understands it as expressing explicitly a *prasaṅga:* "denn es müsste sich ärztliche Behandlung anwenden lassen." In my understanding, the application of medical treatment refers to medical treatment of diseases caused by the imbalance of humours while one is still alive; the mere fact that one attempts it, and its success at least in some cases, indicate that the transformation caused by the humours, unlike the transformation of wood by fire, has a reversible nature. Consequently (here my interpretation converges with Vetter's), death should also be treatable according to the opponent.

2) P 74.23-29: "[Objection:][1] Even when the cause of the defectiveness ceases, the defectiveness caused by it does not necessarily cease. Indeed, even when the fire ceases, the transformation caused by fire on a [piece of] wood is in no [case] seen to have ceased. Therefore ... (v. 55).
Just as the transformation of wood does not cease even when the fire ceases, similarly the transformation [of the body characterized as] death which is caused by the humours will not cease [with the cessation of their imbalance]. Thus, the inadmissible consequence that [the body] would be re-animated (cf. v. 54) does not [apply].[2] For this [reason Dharmakīrti] says: No,[3] because one employs medical treatment. If the transformation by the humours were

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[1] This objection is closely paraphrased in *NAVV* 47.29-48.1.

[2] Cf. the paraphrase of the *pūrvapakṣa* in *NAṬ* 7a2-3 = *ĀNṬ* 318a13-14.

[3] Read *na cikitsā-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 66b1: *ma yin te gso ba 'jug pa'i phyir ro* |

not reversible, one would not apply [medication, etc.] for the purpose of medical treatment (?).[4] For [only] when the transformation by the humours is reversible can medical treatment in order to revert it be successful.[5]"

[4] The Skt contains a short lacuna here; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79b2-3 = $P_{(De)}$ 66b1: *gal te ñes pa'i 'gyur ba bzlog tu med pa yin na gso ba'i phyir sbyor bar mi 'gyur ro* ‖ *ñes pa'i 'gyur ba bzlog tu yod pa yin na* | ... .

[5] Cf. *NAṬ* 7a6-7 = *ĀNṬ* 318b3-4 and *NAVV* 48.2-3.

apunarbhāvataḥ kiñcid vikārajananaṃ kvacit |
kiñcid viparyayād agnir yathā kāṣṭhasuvarṇayoḥ ||56||
ādyasyālpo[1] *'py asaṃhāryaḥ pratyāneyas tu yatkṛtaḥ*[2] |
vikāraḥ syāt punarbhāvas tasya hemni kharatvavat ||57||

[1] PV_P, Mi: *ādyasyānyo*, PV_{Tib}: *chuṅ*
[2] Mi: *pratyāney astn yat kṛtaḥ*

"Some [things] produce in certain [other things] a transformation in such a way that [the previous state] does not arise again (i.e., irreversibly); other [things produce a transformation] in the opposite way, just like fire in wood and gold.
[The transformation] of the first [type of object of transformation, e.g., of wood] even if it is small, is irremovable, but that on which a repairable transformation has been caused would arise again, just like solidity in gold."

1) These verses are translated by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 23. The translation above differs only in minor points.

2) P 74.30-76.21: "[Objection:] Before the transformation [characterized as] death *(maraṇavikāra)*, the transformation caused by the humours [in the case of fever, etc.], [being] small,[1] is indeed made to cease (i.e., reversed), but the transformation [characterized as] death will not cease. Thus, the humours have transformations [caused by them that are of two kinds:] reversible and irreversible.[2] Therefore, this (i.e., the fact that medical treatment is applied in the case of fever and not in the case of death) is no fault [in our position]. [Reply:] This is not an answer [to our objection in v. 55], because ... (vv. 56-57).
The [following] is the meaning of this [couple of verses]: *Some [things]* bring about *in certain [other] things* a transformation without [the previous state's]

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[1] I have left *api* untranslated, as I do not understand its function here; the Tibetan translation has no equivalent for it either. Perhaps is has been attracted from *alpo 'pi* in v. 57a.

[2] Read *doṣā ni-*. For the alternative cf. also R 326a3 = 651.3 and *NAṬ* 7a7-8 = *ĀNṬ* 318b4-5.

arising again,[3] for instance fire in wood. *Other [things produce a transformation] in* exactly *the opposite way,* for instance that very same [fire] in gold.[4] But one and the same [thing] does not cause in one and the same [thing] a transformation which is so and not so (i.e., which is reversible and not reversible).[5] Here the transformation *of the first* [kind of] cause of transformation or object of transformation, *even if it is small, is irremovable.*[6] Even mere blackness *(śyāmatāmātra)* caused by fire on wood is irremovable.[7] However, even extreme liquidity[8] in gold changes [into solidity] again when the fire ceases. Thus, since a small transformation caused by the humours is reversible, a major [transformation] too, characterized as death, would cease (i.e., be reversed). Therefore, the inadmissable consequence that [the dead body] would be re-animated (cf. v. 54d) [would certainly apply to your theory]. To explain: Even a transformation caused by sleep *(nidrā),* which is characterized as cessation of consciousness *(cetanāvirati)* (i.e., the state of dreamless sleep), ceases when sleep is absent. If, however, it is said that

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[3] Read perhaps *apunarbhāvi-;* cf. also P 76.17-18.

[4] Read *suvarṇe;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 66b4: *gser la.* Cf. also the paraphrase in *NAṬ* 7a3-6 = *ĀNṬ* 318a14-318b3 and *NAVV* 48.1-2.

[5] The Skt has a lacuna here; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 66b4-5: *gcig ñid gcig ñid la ni | de lta bu daṅ de lta bu ma yin pa'i rnam par 'gyur ba byed pa ma yin no ||.* Probably one has to read ... *tathābhūtātathābhūtavikārakāri.* Cf. also *NAṬ* 7a8-9 = *ĀNṬ* 318b5-6.

[6] Read *ādyasya* instead of *anyasya, vā yo* instead of *vāyor* and *'lpo* instead of *'nyo;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79b7-8 = $P_{(De)}$ 66b5: *de la rnam par 'gyur ba byed pa'am | rnam par 'gyur ba bya ba daṅ po rnam par 'gyur gaṅ yin pa de ni chuṅ yaṅ zlog* ($P_{(De)}$: *ldog) pa ma yin te.* Cf. R 326a6 = 651.6.

Although the mention of the transformation of the cause seems a bit odd or unnecessary in the case of fire, Prajñākaragupta perhaps introduces it because he keeps in mind that the removability of transformation concerns also the humours as cause of transformations of the body. Alternatively, one may interpret *vikārakāriṇaḥ* as a subjective genitive, in which case "transformation" has to be understood in the sense of "transforming," and thus "transformation of the cause of transformation" as "transformation by the cause of transformation."

[7] Cf. *NAṬ* 7a4 = *ĀNṬ* 318b1.

[8] Read *atidravatāpi;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 79b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 66b6: ... *śin tu źu yaṅ* ... .

there is not at all cessation in this [case, because even in the state of dreamless sleep consciousness does not cease], then [we] counter:

> 466. [This is not correct,] because something which does not have the form of awareness *(saṃvedana)* is not accepted as awareness. If in spite of that (i.e., although a state is without the form of awareness) its presence [were accepted] (i.e., that there is awareness in dreamless sleep), the dead too should have awarenesss.

> 467. For in respect to lack of awareness, there is no difference between [dreamlessly] sleeping and dead [persons]. How all [other factors] such as inhaling, etc., [are present in deep sleep alone, but still cannot account for the difference between sleep and death] that too is considered [below].

In respect to lack of awareness alone, there is no further difference between [dreamlessly] sleeping and dead [persons]. Thus, just as the [dreamlessly] sleeping [person] awakes, the dead too would be re-animated by blows, application of medicine, etc.
[Objection:] The [dreamlessly] sleeping [person] does not completely lack awareness, but the dead does; therefore there is a difference.
[Reply:] No, because the lack of awareness is the same in both [cases]. If it is said that even if [the dreamlessly sleeping person] lacks awareness, it continues in the form of a potency (i.e., latently) *(śaktirūpa),* [we demand that] it should be pointed out what this potency is. If the potency is nothing but awareness, then[9] there is indeed awareness [in dreamless sleep]; [thus] how could [this state] lack awareness? [Furthermore, your statement is] contradictory [for you say that] one and the same thing [namely, awareness] is both present and absent [in dreamless sleep]. If [you say that] the potency is different from awareness, then it is nothing but the body. Thus, as long as the body that produces consciousness *(caitanyajanaka)* lasts, the [awareness would] certainly not cease, because the potency [would] be present.
[Objection:] The body which produces [consciousness] is destroyed, and another [body] which does not produce [consciousness] arises; thus, there is no consciousness [in a dead body].

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[9] Read *tadā;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 80a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 67a3: ... *de'i tshe rig pa ñid yod pas* ... . Cf. also R 326b3 = 652.3.

[Reply:] What [does it mean] that [this body] does not produce consciousness? If [you say that it means] that [it] lacks[10] awareness, the [dreamlessly] sleeping [person] too has this [lack]. Thus, the [dreamlessly] sleeping [person] too[11] would have no awareness [even afterwards] in the state of waking.
[Objection:] In the [dreamlessly sleeping body] inhaling, etc., are present. Therefore (i.e., because of this essential difference from a dead body), it is not the case that the body does not produce [consciousness afterwards, in the state of waking].
[Reply:] Then [consciousness would] arise exactly at that time, [i.e.] in the state of [dreamless] sleep. Thus, [the dreamlessly sleeping person] would not have fallen into [a dreamless] sleep at all.
[Objection:] Consciousness arises [after dreamless sleep] from inhaling, etc., accompanied by the transformation of [dreamless] sleep *(nidrāpariṇati).*
[Reply:] What is this [thing] called [dreamless] sleep? If it is the lack of awareness, the dead [person] too has it. Thus, awareness would arise again when a transformation of that[12] [lack of awareness called "dreamless sleep" takes place]. If, however, one would say that [consciousness] does not arise [at some time after death] from the body alone, because the assisting [causes] are not complete due to the absence of inhaling, [etc., we reply that] also in a transformation [characterized as] fainting *(mūrcchā),* etc., inhaling, etc., are lacking; thus, awareness would not arise [again after recovery]. Therefore, inhaling, etc., are not the cause of awareness. And that [inhaling, etc.] are not the cause of inhaling, etc., has already been made known above (cf. the commentary on v. 51). Furthermore,

> 468. When [dreamless] sleep disappears, corresponding[13] cognitions arise from the traces of previous cognitions. Therefore, the body is not the cause [of cognition].

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[10] Read *-rahitatvam.*

[11] Read perhaps *suptād api?* Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 80b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 67a5: ... *gñid log pa las kyaṅ* ... . In this case one could translate: "After [dreamless] sleep also there would not be awareness ... .

[12] $P_{(Pe)}$ 80b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 67a7, however, has no equivalent for *tat-*.

[13] Read *tathāvidhāḥ.*

Although the [alleged] arising from the body[14] is the same, the cognitions[15] are observed to conform *(anurūpa)* only to the previous traces. Therefore, the body is not the cause [of cognition], nor are inhaling, etc.

If, however, it is said that [the cognition] arises [after dreamless sleep] from the body accompanied by the traces, [we reply that] this is not true.

> 469. It is hardly possible that a trace which does not exist at the time [of waking up] would be a co-producer [of cognition].[16]

For [a trace] which does not exist is not an assisting [cause] of something which exists. And in the state of awakening, unlike the body, the previous cognition (i.e., the last one before falling asleep) [which contains the trace] does not exist [any longer], because cognition does not exist [during dreamless sleep].[17] And a non-existing [trace] is not a an assisting [cause], because it [can] not produce what is to be produced together.[18] For the existing and the non-existing do not subsist together *(sahabhāva)* [and therefore do not produce together]. Therefore (i.e., because the body cannot be accompanied by traces to produce a cognition at the time of awakening, but also cannot produce a cognition alone), the previous cognition alone is the cause in this [case] (i.e., in the case of awakening),[19] not the body.

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[14] Read *'pi* instead of *hi;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 80b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 67b2: *lus* ($P_{(De)}$: *lud) mtshuṅs par yod pa yin yaṅ* ... . Cf. also R 326b7f. = 652.7f.: ... *lus las skye bar mtshuṅs kyaṅ.* I also follow R in the interpretation of the compound *śarīrasambhave.*

[15] $P_{(Pe)}$ 80b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 67b2, however, reads: ... *blo la sogs pa* ... .

[16] This is only half a verse, and it cannot be excluded that an original second half had been lost already before the Tibetan translation was undertaken.

[17] The Skt has a short lacuna here; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 80b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 67b3: *sems med pa las* | ... .

[18] Read perhaps *sahakāryakaraṇābhāvāt;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 67b4: *lhan cig tu bya ba byed pa med pa'i phyir ro* ‖.

[19] The argument is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps it is based on the different presuppositions of the protagonists: For both the Cārvāka and the Buddhist there is no awareness during dreamless sleep. For the Cārvāka, however, this means that there is no cognition at all, and thus no substrate for a trace that supports the body in the production of a cognition when waking up. As the body alone cannot produce the cognition at that time for the reasons

[Objection:] Then how do blows, etc., awaken [the sleeping person, and not the previous cognition]?
[Reply:] This is not a reply [to our argument].[20]

> 470. Awakening (lit. the state of being one for whom a cognition has arisen) does not necessarily arise from a blow, etc., alone. For awakening is apprehended even without a blow.

For awaking does not [arise] from a blow, etc., alone, since one awakes by oneself as well.
[Objection:] A conceptual construction *(vikalpa)* arises immediately after awakening due to a connection with a perceived object. Thus,[21] how [could] the perception [after dreamless sleep] and a previous cognition [before that sleep] cooperate [to produce a conceptual construction]?
[Reply:] This is also not good. [The cognition previous to dreamless sleep can certainly be causally active immediately after awakening] because

> 471. here too a restriction is not observed in respect to awakening [only] when there is proximity [of an object],[22]

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already given, the previous cognition alone remains as the cause. However, for the Cārvāka there is no connection between this cognition and the cognition directly after waking up. For the Buddhist, on the other hand, the *ālayavijñāna* continues to exist even during dreamless sleep, and thus guarantees that a cognition before this sleep can be causally active immediately after sleep by way of a trace deposited in the *ālayavijñāna*.

Note that in the parallel passage in R 327a1 (= 653.1) *saṃskāra* is replaced by **abhyāsa (goms pa)*. Thus, Ravigupta's understanding of the argument may have been different than the one suggested here. However, the expression *abhyāsa* may be used here simply in the sense of "habit," i.e., the particularly strong trace effected by repeated practice.

[20] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a2 reads *len;* $P_{(De)}$ 67b5 is corrupted to *lam* as noted in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1.

[21] Perception alone cannot produce a conceptual construction that is also due to a previous mental cognition, for instance, a conceptual construction that the object is called by a certain name, or that it is pleasant or unpleasant. However, no further cognition has taken place after the dreamless sleep. Therefore, the conceptual construction must be produced also by a cognition before the dreamless sleep.

[22] If I understand correctly, to awake when there is proximity *(pratyāsattiprabodhana)*, i.e., towards something in proximity, means to have an object that is in physical proximity as the object of the first cognition after sleep.

> because one awakes [also] towards that which the [person] who fell into [a dreamless] sleep projected intentionally.

The awakening of the traces of the [dreamlessly sleeping person] occurs towards something which conforms exactly to that which the [person] who fell into [a deep] sleep had projected intentionally. But it is not observed that awakening[23] [occurs] only towards that which is in proximity due to a connection with an [object] which is apprehended when one awakes. And [when a person] is accustomed [to an object] of a certain kind, he awakes towards [an object] of precisely that kind, not towards anything else.[24] And awakening has the nature of a cognition that is an inner experience *(āntara-sparśa)*, etc.[25] And the awareness that is an experience of the body[26] [at the moment of awakening] indeed conforms to that which was repeatedly practiced and to the manner [in which it was practiced]. To explain:

> 472. Running away, taking up arms, etc., which have the form of awakening, arise for the living beings as sensations of pleasure, [etc.] from traces of fear, courage, etc. [respectively].[27]

For those who enter the abode of the meditation on fear *(bhayabhāvanābha-vananiveśin)*, awakening has indeed the form of sensation[28] of pleasure, etc.,

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[23] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a1 changes here the translation of *prabodha* from *sad pa* to *rtogs pa,* perhaps in anticipation of the definition of *prabodha* in l. 9.

[24] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a6-7 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a1 has no equivalent for *nānyatra;* it also construes *dṛśyate* of the previous sentence with the present sentence.

[25] Read perhaps *-sparśādijñānarūpam;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a1: *sad pa ni naṅ gi reg pa la sogs pa'i śes pa'i* ($P_{(De)}$ om. *śes pa'i) raṅ bźin ñid de* |.

[26] The translation follows $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a1-2: ... *lus kyi reg bya rig pa yin no* ‖ *(*kāyasparśasaṃvedanam).*

[27] Read *-saṃskārād* in *pāda* a; cf $P_{(Pe)}$ 81a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a2: ... *du byed las* ‖. The Tibetan translators may have had a somewhat different text in *pādas* cd: *bde sogs rtogs pa'i raṅ bźin ni* ‖ *srog chags rnams la skye bar 'gyur* ‖.

[28] The Tibetan translation construes *-rūpa* differently; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a2-3: ... *bros pa bde ba la sogs pa'i raṅ bźin du rig pa ñid* ... .

that [consists in] fleeing *(palāyana),* but otherwise [awakening that is an awareness of fleeing] is a painful condition *(duḥkhāsikā).* However, for those who have a cruel nature *(raudrātman),* who delight in assaulting others *(paropadravābhirati),* [awakening] has the form of sensation of pleasure, etc.,[29] that consists in taking up arms which cause harm to others,[30] etc.

Therefore,[31] neither the body nor inhaling, etc., are the cause of cognition [after dreamless sleep]. Only the cognition previous [to dreamless sleep] is the cause. And if that [previous cognition] has arisen from the body, then the inadmissible consequence would follow that [the cognition] would not cease [as long as the body lasts]. Thus,[32] exactly the same fault [remains for you]. Similarly, [the cognition] would not follow the previous cognition[33] [and this is against observation in everyday practice?].

[Objection: After death the body] is not (i.e., stops being) the cause because of the defectiveness [caused] by the humours.

[Reply:] When there is no defectiveness (i.e., when the balance of the humours is restored) [the body] would become a cause [of cognition] again. If [the humours would] bring about[34] a transformation characterized by the fact that [the previous state] does not arise again, [then] the transformation caused by them, even if small, would be irreversible, such as weakness *(daurbalya),*etc., and [the transformation] characterized as slow mental activity *(mandavijñānapravartana)*[35] or characterized as interruption [of

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[29] Read *sukhādi-.*

[30] Read *-kāriśastrādi-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a3: ... *gźan la gnod pa byed pa'i rgyu mtshon la sogs pa ... .*

[31] Read as in Skt and $P_{(De)}$ 68a4 omitting *des na ... yin no* ‖ in $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b2.

[32] Read *prasaṅga iti sa;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b3-4 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a4: ... *thal lo źe bya ba'i skyon de ñid yin no* ‖.

[33] Read perhaps *api* instead of *eva;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a5: ... *rjes su 'gro ba can du yaṅ ma* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *mi) 'gyur ro* ‖.

[34] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a5: ... *chos(?) rtsom par byed pa ñid ... .*

[35] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a6 correctly reads *źan;* Sāṅkṛityāyana seems to have read *gźan* as indicated by the suggestion *anyavijñāna-* in n. 4.

cognition] as in fainting *(mūrcchā)*,etc. [The transformation] of (i.e., effected by) what brings about a transformation characterized by the fact that [the previous state] does not arise again, is irreversible, ***but that on which a repairable transformation has been caused would***[36] ***arise again, just like solidity in gold.*** For even though the solidity of gold is gone [while the gold is heated], when the cause of the transformation disappears, it comes back again. Similarly the transformation [which consists in] the interruption of cognition that is characterized as death,[37] even though it is a major [transformation], [would] be made to cease (i.e., be reversed). Thus, [the dead person] would live again."

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[36] Read *kṛtaḥ* instead of *kṛteḥ* and *syāt* instead of *sa*.

[37] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 68a7, however, corresponds to *-vicchedalakṣaṇavikāraḥ* and has no equivalent for *maraṇalakṣaṇo*.

durlabhatvāt samādhātur asādhyaṃ kiñcid īritam |
āyuḥkṣayād[1] *vā doṣe tu kevale nāsty asādhyatā* ||58||

[1] Mi: *āyuḥ kṣayād*

"Because an agent which restores the harmony (i.e., a physician or a medicine) is not available, a certain [disease] is proclaimed [to be] incurable, or because of the exhaustion of the life force. However, if a [disturbed] humour alone [were the cause of disease, there would] be no incurability [of diseases]."

1) This verse is quoted by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 48.7-8; it is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 23.

2) Both P and M supply *vyādhi* (disease) ($D_{(Pe)}$ 33a4 = $D_{(De)}$ 29b1 and R 327b1 = 654.1: *nad*) as the subject of the verse, but *vyādhi* is a masculine noun; probably for this reason M 28.21 supplies *vyādhijātam*, where *-jāta* signifies that the whole class is meant (cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, § 229.4).

3) The use of the past participle *īritam* "proclaimed with a raised voice" seems to indicate that Dharmakīrti places himself at a certain distance from the unavailability of medical treatment as a cause for incurability of diseases. The real cause of incurability, as argued below by Prajñākaragupta, is the exhaustion of the life force.

4) Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 124, argues that "The position taken by Dharmakīrti himself on the question whether death requires a special cause follows the line of reasoning set out by Vasubandhu at *Abhidharmakośa* 4.2-3; the position taken here is that the cause of the cessation of a complex thing is the thing' s very existence as a complex (*saṃskṛta*) thing." I fail to see which verse(s) of Dharmakīrti Hayes could possibly have in mind as the basis for this affirmation. In any case, the statement seems to contradict the role of *āyus* (or of karma) as referred to in verse 58.

5) P 76.22-77.3: "[Objection:] Because medical treatment is [sometimes] applied [successfully, transformations caused by an imbalance of the

humours] are [sometimes] repairable,[1] and because there are incurable diseases, [the humours sometimes] have (i.e., cause) irrepairable transformations. Thus, because there are [transformations] in both ways, there is no fault [in our position].[2]
[Reply: Dharmakīrti] states the rejection [of this position]: ... (v. 58).
For incurability [of diseases results] from the absence of a medicine and physician capable to reverse the transformation caused by the humours, [i.e.] *because [they] are not available*[3] *a certain [disease]* is declared *[to be] incurable*, but according to the doctrine of the person who maintains that consciousness arises from the great elements *(mahābhūtodbhavacaitanyavādimata)* [an incurable disease] does not exist.

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[1] $P_{(Pe)}$ 81b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b1 has no equivalent for *vikāra;* perhaps one has to read *pratyāneyatvam.* Alternatively one could emend to *pratyāneyavikāratvam* (cf. *apratyāneyavikāratvam* in the same line).

[2] Cf. the paraphrase of the *pūrvapakṣa* in *NAṬ* 7a9-12, *ĀNṬ* 318b6-9 and *NAVV* 48.4-6.

[3] The translation basically follows Tibetan rendering, which presupposes *asādhyatā* instead of *susādhyatā.* It also presupposes *-nivartanasamartha-* (cf. also R 327b2-3 = 654.2-3: ... *rluṅ la sogs pa'i ñes pas byas pa'i 'gyur ba ldog par nus pa'i sman nam 'tsho bar byed pa'i sman pa* ...). However, it seems to have read *durlabh*<*atv*>*āt* instead of *abhāvāt* which is indicated also by the paraphrase in *NAṬ* and *ĀNṬ*. Further, the next sentence is interpreted as one phrase, although *na tu* would normally start a new adversative phrase. Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82a2-3 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b2-3: *bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa ñid ni ñes pas byas pa'i rnam par 'gyur ba sel nus pa daṅ(?) sman daṅ sman pa rñed par dka' ba las* ($P_{(De)}$ adds: *'thad pa las) yin la* | *sems 'byuṅ ba chen po las 'gyur ba smra ba'i gźuṅ las bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa 'ga' yaṅ med pa'i phyir ro* ‖. I therefore assume that the text originally read ... *abhāvāt. durlabhatvād* ... or ... *durlabhatvāt. abhāvād* ... (which could account better for an aberratio oculi in the manuscript available to the translators). Thus, *durlabhatvād* (or *abhāvād*) *asādhyaṃ kathitaṃ kiñcit* can be viewed as a complete sentence, recapitulating the previous statement by using almost all of the words of 58ab or close equivalents. *na tu* can in this case introduce the next phrase, as would normally be expected. Cf. also the paraphrase of P 76.26-27 in *NAṬ* 7b2-4 and *ĀNṬ* 318b11-13: *etac ca dvividham apy asādhyatvaṃ vyādheḥ (ĀNṬ: vyādher asādhyatvam) parameśvarapravacanavedināṃ (ĀNṬ: arhatāṃ) eva mate saṅgacchate, na bhavato bhūtamātratattvavādinaḥ. kvacit punar asādhyo vyādhir doṣakṛtavikāranivartanasamarthasyauṣadhasyābhāvād vaidyasya vā. vaidyauṣadhasamparkābhāve hi vyādhiḥ sarpan sakalam apy āyur upakramate.*

[Objection:[4] The body] is not re-animated precisely because the agent which restores the harmony is not available.[5]
[Reply:] This is not [true], because[6]

> 473. When a transformation [such as fever] is not reversed, [one can conclude that] an agent which restores the harmony is not available. [However, an agent which restores the harmony] is not [ever] a cause for re-animation; moreover, [it] is useless in respect to the cessation [of a transformation such as fever, etc., after death].[7]

Therefore,[8] when the transformation [such as fever, etc.] ceases [after death], the inadmissible consequence of re-animation would certainly arise [again].[9]
[Objection:] But for the opponent (viz. the Buddhist) too there is indeed incurability [of diseases. Thus, by criticizing our explanation of incurability, his own position that there is incurability is rendered incorrect].

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[4] Read perhaps *atha* or similar after *iti;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82a3-4 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b3: *'o na ... źe na* |. Cf. also *NAṬ* 7b4 and *ĀNṬ* 318b13 quoted in the next note.

[5] Cf. *NAṬ* 7b4-5 = *ĀNṬ* 318b13-14: *nanu vaidyauṣadhasamparkābhāvād evāsmākam api punarujjīvanaṃ na bhaviṣyati. na hi tad asti kiñcid auṣadhaṃ vaidyo vā yat punar ujjīvayati.*

[6] This sentence is missing in the Skt; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b3: *de ni med de gaṅ gi phyir* ‖. Cf. also *NAṬ* 7b5 = *ĀNṬ* 318b14: *tad apy ayuktam.*

[7] Cf. *NAṬ* 7b5-7 = *ĀNṬ* 318b14-319a2: *vaidyauṣadhe hi doṣakṛta*(*ĀNṬ* om. *-kṛta-*)*vikāra-nivartanārtham iṣyete, na punar atyantāsataś caitanyasyotpādanārthaṃ tathānabhyupagamāt. doṣakṛtāś ca vikārā mṛtāvasthāyāṃ svayam eva nivṛttā jvarāder adarśanāt. tataḥ kiṃ vaidyau-ṣadhānveṣaṇeneti.*

[8] "Therefore" refers here to the two reasons mentioned in the second half of the verse. On the one hand, since medical treatment is not considered to be a cause for revival, its unavailability is irrelevant for revival or non-revival. Moreover, medical treatment is used to eliminate a transformation such as fever, but after death fever disappears by itself, and therefore it is useless, i.e., superfluous. This implies that the only reason for death (i.e., that the body stops producing cognitions) is the imbalance of the humours. Since the balance is restored after death, as is evident from the cessation of fever, the body should start to produce cognitions again.

[9] Cf. *NAṬ* 7b7 = *ĀNṬ* 319a2: *tadavastha eva punarujjīvanaprasaṅgaḥ.*

[Reply:] The answer to that [is that only according to you incurability of diseases is incoherent,] but according to us incurability[10] is coherent. [Dharmakīrti] says that [with the following words]: *Because of the exhaustion of the life force,*[11] a disease *(vyādhi)* is incurable. To explain: It is observed that because of one and the same disease a certain [person] dies[12] [and] another does not.[13] Life force implies something else *(upalakṣaṇa)* [namely, karma].[14] [Thus, one should understand] 'or[15] because of the exhaustion of karma.'[16] For a disease, such as white leprosy *(śvitra)*, etc., which arises from karma, is incurable, because there is this kind of karma.[17] Therefore, nothing but the domination of karma *(karmādhipatya)* is the reason of [Dharmakīrti's] rejection [of the charge that there would be no

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10 Read *asādhyatvaṃ* instead of *asādhyaṃ*; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82a5-6 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b5: ... *bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa de* (del. *de* as in $P_{(De)}$) *ñid* ... .

11 Read *āyuḥ-*.

12 $P_{(Pe)}$ 82a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b5: *'tsho ba* ("lives").

13 Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 33b2-3 = $D_{(De)}$ 29b5: *ñes pa mtshuṅs pa gñen po brten* (read with $D_{(De)}$: *bsten*) *pa can dag las | gcig ni yun riṅ po gźan* ($D_{(De)}$ adds *du*) *yun mi riṅ ba gnas* ($D_{(De)}$: *nas*) *nad med pa thob par 'gyur ba de ltar na | de lta bu la sogs pas ni khyad par du mi 'gyur ro* |. Cf. also *NAṬ* 7a13f. = *ĀNṬ* 318b9-10: *tathā hi - asādhyatā vyādheḥ kvacid āyuḥkṣayād yatas (ĀNṬ: tathā hi) tasminn eva vyādhau samānauṣadhavaidyasamparke 'pi kaścin mriyate kaścin na* ... . Cf. also *NAVV* 48.9-10.

14 Cf. similarly R 327b3 = 654.3: *tshe źes bya ba ni las kyi yod pa'i mtshan ñid de* |.

15 It seems significant that the disjunction *(vā)* appears only here and not together with the *pratīka āyuḥkṣayāt*. Perhaps Prajñākaragupta wants to interpret the disjunction in the *kārikā* as hinting at the fact that *āyuḥkṣayāt* is an *upalakṣaṇa*. In this case one could translate *pāda* c_1 as follows: "Because of the exhaustion of the life force or [because of the exhaustion of karma a disease is incurable]."

16 Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 33a6 = $D_{(De)}$ 29b2: *tshe zad phyir te | sṅon byas pa'i* ($D_{(De)}$: *bya ba'i*) *las kyi nus pa yoṅs su zad pa'i mtshan ñid can yin pa'i phyir gso bar bya ba ma yin par brjod do* |.

17 Cf. *NAṬ* 7b1-2 = *ĀNṬ* 318b10-11: ... *kvacit punaḥ pratikūlakarmodayāt. pratikūlakarmodayajanito hi śvitrādivyādhir auṣadhasahasrair api kaścid (kaiścid?) asādhyo bhavati.* Cf. also 7b9-10 = 319a4-5: *asmākaṃ tu matena yāvad āyuḥkarma vijṛmbhate tāvad doṣair atipīḍito 'pi jīvati, āyuḥkarmakṣaye ca doṣāṇām avikṛtāv (ĀNṬ: adhaḥkṛtāv) api mriyate.*

incurable diseases also for the Buddhist]. Thus, [Dharmakīrti] says: *However, if a [disturbed] humour*[18] *alone* [were] the cause of transformation *[there would] be no incurability* of disease. Therefore, ... (v. 59)."

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[18] Read *doṣe*.

mṛte viṣādisaṃhārāt taddaṃśacchedato[1] *'pi vā* |
vikārahetor vigame sa nocchvasiti[2] *kiṃ punaḥ* ||59||

[1] Mi: *tad daṃśac chedato*
[2] Mi: *nocchvas iti*

"When for [a person] dead [because of snakebite, etc.] the cause of the transformation goes away (i.e., disappears) because one retrieves (i.e., extracts) the poison, etc., or even because one cuts off his bitten spot, why does he not breathe again?"

1) This verse is quoted by Śānti Sūri in *NAVV* 48.11-12.

2) The past participle *mṛta* seems to be used primarily for the dead person rather than the dead body. Yet it is clear that in this verse the actions such as extracting poison, etc., take place on the body as their object. For this reason the locative *mṛte* becomes somewhat problematic, especially if it is construed with the two ablatives rather than with the whole phrase up to *vigame*. I basically follow P, R and PV_{Tib} in interpreting the locative in the function of a genitive of remote object (cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, § 145). Only $D_{(Pe)}$ 33b5 = $D_{(De)}$ 29b7: *śi ba'i lus la yaṅ*) retains a locative of place, but specifies it either as "in a dead body" or as "in the body of a dead [person]." M 29.10 (*mṛte prāṇini sati*) solves the problem by assuming that *mṛte* is an incomplete locative absolute. Cf. also Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 23: "Wenn beim Toten die Ursache der Veränderung dadurch beseitigt wird, ..."

3) Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 124, seems to say in respect to this verse (or at any rate in respect to one of the verses among 57-61): "While it is true, says Dharmakīrti, that if a body is ripped to shreds by the sharp teeth of some animal, then it could not possibly return to life, ..." I cannot understand on what this statement is based, unless it is remotely inspired by *taddaṃśocchedataḥ*.

4) P 77.6-7: "For when one retrieves (i.e., extracts) poison, etc., for a dead [person] by *mantras*, etc., or [the poison] is gone *because one cuts off his*

bitten spot, [i.e.] because one cuts off his limb as [the poison] has been collected by itself[1] in the place of the bitten spot,[2] and when [thus] the cause of the transformation, such as fever, etc., goes away, then there would be the inadmissible consequence of re-animation [of the dead] – this is established."

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[1] D and R explain that while one is still alive the poison spreads throughout the body, but when one dies, it assembles itself in the bitten spot. Cf. the paraphrase of 59b in $D_{(Pe)}$ 33b6 = $D_{(De)}$ 30a1: *lus la khyab pa'i* ($D_{(De)}$: *khyab par byed pa'i*) *dug skyes bu śi ba'i* ($D_{(De)}$: *śi ba na*) *sos zin pa'i gnas gaṅ yin par yaṅ 'dus par 'gyur ba de bcad pa na* ... Cf. also R 327b7f. = 654.7f. (on 59a): *srog chags kyi ro'i dug la sogs pa sos bzuṅ ba'i gnas su 'dus te | 'di ltar ji srid gson pa de srid du | lus thams cad khyab par dug 'jug la | srog btaṅ nas so rjes su 'oṅ bar 'gyur ro ||*.

[2] Both Skt and Tib seem to be corrupt, and the translation above is a concoction of both versions. Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82b1-2 = $P_{(De)}$ 68b7f.: *śi ba la gaṅ tshe sṅags la sogs pas | dug la sogs pa ldog par 'gyur ba'am | de 'i sos zin pa bcad pa las te | sos zin pa raṅ ñid 'dus pa bcad pas log pa daṅ | 'gyur ba'i rgyu rims la sogs pa daṅ | bral par gaṅ gi tshe 'gyur ba* ... . On the basis of that I suggest to insert the *pratīka taddaṃśacchedato vā* after *mantrādinā*, del. *ca*, and read perhaps *daṃśadeśa upasaṃhārāt*. *tadaṅga-* has no equivalent in Tib, which, however, supplies a further nominative with *log pa* (parallel to the nominative *viṣādisaṃhāraḥ*). *-deśa* in *daṃśadeśa* is lacking in Tib, but is corroborated by M 29.10: *daṃśasthāne* and R 327b7 = 654.7: *sos bzuṅ ba'i gnas su*. Cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 33b6 = $D_{(De)}$ 30a1: *sos zin pa'i gnas*.

upādānāvikāreṇa nopādeyasya vikriyā |
kartuṃ[1] *śakyāvikāreṇa mṛdaḥ kuṇḍādino yathā* ||60||

[1] Mi: *karttuṃ*

"A transformation of the materialized cannot be effected without a transformation of the material, just as [a transformation] of the bowl, etc., [cannot be effected] without a transformation of the clay."

1) This verse is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 24.

2) P 77.8-23: "Furthermore, [the materialized] does not cease when something which is not [its] material cause ceases.[1] And the body is not the material cause [of cognition]. And if it were [the material cause, the cognition] would not be transformed without the [body] being transformed, because ... (v. 60).
For *a transformation of the materialized*, [i. e.] of the cognition, would *not be possible without a transformation of the material*, [i.e.] of the body. A transformation of the bowl, etc., is not perceived without a transformation of the clay.[2] Precisely this is the property of the material, [namely] that only by its transformation [the effect which has been materialized from it] is transformed.[3] Among the causes, although they are many, only a certain [cause] is the material [cause] of a certain [effect], not any cause (*kāraṇamātraka*). And even if the body is a cause, [the cognition] is not transformed by its transformation alone, because even when the [body] is not transformed, [the cognition] is transformed by the mere transformation[4] of the previous cognition due to fear (*bhaya*), sorrow (*śoka*), etc., and because

[1] $P_{(Pe)}$ 82b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 69a1-2, however, has no equivalent for *nivṛttiḥ*: *gźan yaṅ ñe bar len pa'i rgyu ma yin pa ldog pa'i phyir ma yin no.*

[2] Cf. *NAVV* 48.13-15.

[3] Cf. R 328a5 = 655.5. Cf. also the introduction to this verse in $D_{(Pe)}$ 34b1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 30b3.

[4] I follow $P_{(Pe)}$ 82b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 69a5 (*rnam par 'gyur ba'i phyir*) in reading *vikārāt* instead of *vikāras*; note, however, that Tibetan has no equivalent for *vikāramātreṇa*.

when the [body] is transformed [the cognition] is not necessarily transformed.[5]
[Objection:] The sprout (*aṅkura*) is transformed also when the water is transformed, and the [water] is not the material [cause] of the [sprout].[6]
[Reply:] No, [the sprout is not transformed by water] because the cause of the series (*santānakāraṇa*) is the material cause. And the seed (*bīja*) is the cause of the series, not the water, for the water is [only] the cause for a special state [of the series] (*avasthāviśeṣakāraṇatva*). The series does not arise from the water, because water [unlike the seed] is common to barley (*yava*), etc. Nor does the series of rice (*śāli*) cease when the water ceases, for even when the water is absent the series of rice is not absent. However, the special state[7] [such as having green colour, lushness, etc.] of the sprout, etc., of that [series arises] from water, and it[8] ceases when the [water] ceases. Therefore, the water is not[9] the material cause of that[10] [series], and the transformation of the successive [stages, namely] the sprout, etc., because of water, etc., is [effected] only through the transformation of the seed of rice. Therefore, because the cognition is being transformed even

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[5] Read *ca nāvaśyaṃ- (?)*; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 69a5: ... *daṅ* | *de 'gyur na yaṅ gdon mi za bar mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro*.

[6] Read *tat tadupādānam;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 82b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 69a5: *de de'i ñe bar len pa ni ...* . Cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 34b7f. = $D_{(De)}$ 30b7f.

[7] Read *avasthāviśeṣas*; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 69a7: *gnas skabs kyi khyad par*. Cf. also R 328a7 = 655.7.

[8] One may consider to read *tasya* instead of *tasyāś* and assume that the change in gender occurred once *-viśeṣa* was lacking in the text. However, *tasyāḥ* could also refer to *avasthā* in the original compound *-avasthāviśeṣa*, especially because *-avasthāviśeṣa* can be understood as equivalent to *-viśiṣṭāvasthā* or a similar expression.

[9] A negation has to be supplied with $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a2: *des na chu ni ñe bar len pa'i rgyu ñid ma yin no*. Note that $P_{(De)}$ 69a7 also lacks the negation: *des na chu de ni (de'i?) ñe bar len pa'i rgyu ñid do*. However, although it is not an exact paraphrase, R 328a7 = 655.7 confirms the negation preserved in $P_{(Pe)}$: *nus pa la sogs pa ni thun moṅ gi rgyu yin pas rgyun gyi rgyu ni ma yin no*.

[10] Read *asya?* Cf. note 7 above. $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 69a7 lacks an equivalent for *asya* or *asyāḥ*; cf. the previous note.

when the body[11] is not transformed, the body is not the material cause of the [cognition]. [Dharmakīrti] says precisely that [in v. 61]."

[11] $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a3-4 = $P_{(De)}$ 69b1, however, has no equivalent for *deha-*.

avikṛtya hi yad vastu yaḥ padārtho vikāryate |
upādānaṃ na tat tasya yuktaṃ gogavayādivat ||61||

"For [when] one thing is made to transform while [another] thing does not transform (i.e., does not change), that [other thing] cannot be the material cause of that [thing], just like a cow and a gayal, etc."

1) This verse is quoted by Malayagiri in *NAṬ* 8a1-2 (cf. also Jambuvijaya, "Quotations," p. 392 and *ĀNṬ* 319a9-10.

2) There are two ways to interpret the beginning of the verse. Either *avikṛtya* is the negated gerund of *vi-√KṚ* in its transitive meaning ("to transform something") in which case *yad* and *vastu* are to be interpreted as accusative forms, or *yad* and *vastu* are nominatives and *avikṛtya* is derived from *vi-√KṚ* as an intransitive-reflexive verb ("to undergo a change, to transform oneself"). In both cases we cannot assume a common grammatical subject for *avikṛtya* and *vikāryate*, because this will imply that the effect transforms the material cause: *tat* must refer to *vastu*, and *tasya* to *padārtha*. One may assume that *tat* is merely due to attraction by *upādānam*, but I am reluctant to do so. In the case of the first alternative one may also assume an unnamed common logical subject, in which case one may translate: "For [when] one thing is made to transform while [the transforming agent] does not transform [another] thing, ..." P 77.26 seems to favour the first alternative, changing the passive causative of the intransitive simplex to the passive of the transitive simplex: *avikṛtya ca dehaṃ vikriyate jñānam iti*. Of course *deha* could be used as a neuter noun here, but this seems highly unlikely as in the very same line it appears clearly as a masculine noun (*na deha upādānam asya*). This is the solution probably adopted also by Kamalaśīla; cf. *TSP* p. 643.14-16: *yat punar vastv a[dhi]<vi>kṛtyaiva yad vikāryate na tat tadupādānam, yathā gavayam a[dhi]<vi>kṛtya gaur vikāryamānaḥ. avikṛtya ca śarīraṃ manomater aniṣṭācaraṇādinā durmanaskṛtādilakṣaṇasya vikārasy[o]<ā>pādānaṃ kriyata iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ.* The emendations of *adhikṛtya* to *avikṛtya* go against *TSP*$_{\text{Tib}}$ 131b4 which consistently translates **adhikṛtya (dbaṅ du byas nas)*, but are confirmed by *TSP*$_{\text{ms}}$ 199a1, which also reads *vikārasyāpādānaṃ;* cf. also *TSP*$_{\text{Tib}}$: ... *grub par byed pa.*

Ravigupta most probably followed P, but this is not clearly reflected in R 328b2 = 656.2, since *'gyur ba*, unlike *vi-√KṚ*, must be intransitive in Tibetan. Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 24, seems to shift the negation: "Welches Ding sich nicht verändert, wenn es ein zweites verändert ... ." However, this should probably be understood as an interpretation following the second alternative above: *vastu* is understood as the grammatical and logical subject of *avikṛtya* (derived from the intransitive-reflexive verb) in the nominative case and also serves as the logical subject of *vikāryate*; the passive (causative) phrase is then turned into an active one. Thus, according to this interpretation also a common logical subject is obtained for the entire relative clause, absolute and main clause; contrary to the previous interpretation this subject is named explicitly. The disadvantage of this interpretation is that it does not fit with the example of the cow and the gayal. *PV*$_{\text{Tib}}$ also corresponds to the second alternative on account of the fact that *'gyur ba* is intransitive; it renders also *vikāryate* as a simple intransitive form (not as the passive causative of an intransitive simplex). This means two different subjects for the absolute and main relative clause: *dṅos gaṅ 'gyur ba med par ni* ‖ *dṅos po gaṅ źig rnam 'gyur ba* ‖. D and M are not conclusive. The above translation follows P in essence but not in grammar: I take *yad* and *vastu* as nominatives and assume different subjects for the entire relative construction.

3) This verse is introduced as providing the reason for what is said in v. 60 (cf. also M 29.17: *hi yasmāt*), but its content is also implied by v. 60 by modus tollens; cf. also Devendrabuddhi's introduction to v. 61 D$_{\text{(Pe)}}$ 35a1 = D$_{\text{(De)}}$ 31a2: *des bas na.*

4) P 77.26-28: "And the cognition is transformed while [the transforming agent] does not transform the body. Therefore, the body is not the material [cause] of the [cognition]. Therefore, the [cognition] does not cease when the body ceases, because, just like [in the case of] the cow and the gayal, etc., [the cognition] is not transformed by the transformation of the [body].[1] The gayal may somehow be the cause of a special state (*avasthāviśeṣa*) of the

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[1] Read *avikārāt;* cf. P$_{\text{(Pe)}}$ 83a5 = P$_{\text{(De)}}$ 69b2: *de 'gyur bas 'gyur ba ma yin pa'i phyir ...* . Less probable is an emendation to *tadavikāreṇa vikārāt;* cf. M 29.19: *ekasyāvikāreṇāparasya vikārāt.*

cow, and when the [gayal] ceases [to exist], only this special state should not be (i.e., admittedly ceases), but the series [of the cow would] not[2] cease."

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[2] Read *na punaḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a6 = $P_{(De)}$ 69b3: ... *mod* ❙ *rgyun ldog pa ni ma yin no* ❙.

cetaḥśarīrayor[1] *evaṃ taddhetoḥ*[2] *kāryajanmanaḥ* |
sahakārāt sahasthānam agnitāmradravatvavat ||62||

[1] PV_P, Mi: *cetaś śarīrayoḥ*
[2] perhaps: *taddhetvoḥ*?

"In [the case of] the cognition and the body it is so (i.e., as in the case of the cow and the gayal; the one is made to transform while the other does not transform).
[Objection: If the body is not the material cause of the cognition, why do they always and necessarily subsist together (or: are present together)?]
[Reply: Something] subsists together [with another effect] because its [material] cause is assisted in (or: towards) the arising of [its] effect [by the material cause of the other effect], just like fire and the fluidity of copper."

1) 62a is rendered by Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 24.

2) The compound *kāryajanmanaḥ* is problematic. I interpret it as a *tatpuruṣa* compound in the objective genitive indicating the remote object; cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, §115: "The **objective genitive** is occasionally interchangeable with a locative or with prepp as *prati, upari*, etc."

According to P *kāryajanmanaḥ* is also a genitive, but most probably of a *bahuvrīhi* compound; cf. P 78.14-15: ... *dehasahakāritvena sahasthānaṃ kāryajanmanaḥ kāyacetolakṣaṇasya vahnitāmradravatvavat*. I interpret the compound as a *bahuvrīhi* (cf. the translation below), because I expect the effect to be characterized as body and cognition, not the production of the effect. Similarly, I expect the effect to subsist together with another effect, not its production with another production. The Tibetan translators of P seem to render the compound as 'the arising effect,' but I do not know how they analysed it; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 84a1-2 = $P_{(De)}$ 70a4-5: ... *'bras bu skye ba lhan cig gnas pa yin te*. Cf. also P 78.12: *tataḥ sahasthānaṃ kāryajanmanaḥ*. The Tibetan translators of the *kārikā* too seem to understand *kāryajanmanaḥ* as a genitive, and also construe it with *sahasthānam;* cf. PV_{Tib}: *de rgyu lhan cig byed pa las* || *skye ba'i 'bras bu lhan cig gnas* ||. This may be translated as "... because of the assistance of its cause, the effect which arises subsists together [with another effect]." It is not clear to me on what grammatical

analysis of *kāryajanmanaḥ* this interpretation is based. Perhaps because an interpretation of the compound such as suggested above for P amounts to an unusual mode of expression, M 29.25f. interprets *-janmanaḥ* as the ablative of a *tatpuruṣa* compound: *tasya cetasaḥ śarīrasya ca hetoḥ (hetvoḥ?) pūrva-cittakṣaṇasya kalalādeś ca sahakārāt sahakāraṇāt kāryayoś cittadehayor janmana utpādāt tayoḥ sahasthānaṃ bhavati.* One may thus translate: "[The cognition and the body] subsist together because the arising of the effects (i.e., of cognition and body) is due to the assistance of their [respective] cause[s]." If this interpretation is accepted, one has perhaps to emend *taddhetoḥ* to *taddhetvoḥ,* although none of the commentaries clearly indicates this reading; on the contrary, the translation of the *kārikā* in D and R speaks clearly against it. The interpretation in R is not quite clear to me, but Ravigupta too seems to have taken *kāryajanmanaḥ* as an ablative (328b5 = 656.5): *lus daṅ śes pa ñid 'bras bu bskyed pas ...*; cf. also R 328b6-7 = 656.6-7: *... lus daṅ sems skyed pa'i phyir ... . PV_D* and its interpretation by Devendrabuddhi, at least according to the Tibetan translators, points at *kāryajanmanaḥ* as a genitive. However, it differs from P and PV_{Tib} in rendering *taddhetoḥ* as a *bahuvrīhi;* cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 35b1-2 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b1: *de rgyu can 'bras skyed pa ni | lus ci* (read with $D_{(De)}$: *kyi) rgyu can nur nur po la sogs pa'i miṅ can phyi ma phyi ma'i lus kyi gnas skabs kyi mtshan ñid can gyi 'bras bu skyed pa'i yid kyi rnam par śes pa lhan cig byed pa yin no ||.* This *bahuvrīhi* appears also in PV_R (cf. R 328b4 = 656.4) (not, however, in Ravigupta's commentary, cf. above): *de rgyu can 'bras bskyed pa ni.* It is quite possible that at both places the *bahuvrīhi* only reflects the interpretation of the Tibetan translators; at least in the case of the above quoted sentence in D a tentative reconstruction, together with a comparison with similar statements in P, excludes such a grammatical analysis.

3) P 77.28-79.3: "[Objection:] Let it be [admitted that] because there is a relationship of [two things] which are not material cause and effect between the cow and the gayal, [they] are not what is made to cease and what causes to cease *(anivartyanivartakatva)* (i.e., the one does not cease when the other ceases), [but] how does [this] affect [the relationship between] the body and the cognition? For if [the body] were not the material cause [of cognition], the good and bad qualities[1] of the one [would] not [be effected] by the good

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[1] $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 69b4, however, has no equivalent for *guṇa*. The presence of *guṇa*, however, is corroborated by R 328b4 = 656.4: *gźan la skyon <daṅ yon tan?> yod pas gźan*

and bad qualities[1] of the other. And [further, the two] would not necessarily subsist together, just like the series[2] of rice, etc., and water *(śālyādisantānodakavat)* [may subsist together occasionally, but not necessarily].
[Reply:] On this it is stated ... (v. 62).
For it is not established otherwise here [in the case of the body and cognition][3] (i.e., it is not established as different from the case of water and rice, or fire and the liquidity of copper), because *in [the case of] the cognition and the body it is so,* [i.e.] there is a relationship of [two things] which are not material cause and effect *(anupādānop[4]ādeyabhāva);* just as [in the case] of the cow and the gayal, [the body and cognition] are only helping [each other] in some way: The cognition is not necessarily transformed by the transformation of the body alone. Therefore, because the body[5] is not the material cause, the cognition does not cease even when the [body] ceases.[6]

> 474. A thing which is the cause for a [special] state is not[7] the material cause. For when the cause of the [special] state *(avasthākṛt)* ceases, only this [special] state should cease.

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skyon daṅ yon tan can du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir. The disappearance of the word *guṇa* may be due to the fact that *guṇadoṣaḥ* is a non-standard *dvandva* compound: it is neither a plural *dvandva* nor a singular *dvandva* with neuter inflection, but a singular *dvandva* that follows the inflection of the last member; cf. Edgerton, *BHSG,* §23.3, with reference to Wackernagel II.1 §70. This non-standard grammatical form may also account for the interpretation of **anyaguṇadoṣa* in R as a *bahuvrīhi* compound.

Note also that Tib has no equivalent for the instrumental *(-doṣeṇa)* which is also corroborated by R above.

[2] $P_{(Pe)}$ 83a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 69b4, however, reads *rgyu* instead of *rgyun.*

[3] Read *anyathātra prasiddham;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 83b1 = $P_{(De)}$: *'dir gźan du ni grub pa ma yin te.*

[4] Read *-upādeya-.*

[5] Read *kāyasya,* as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1, and probably *tannivṛttāv;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 83b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 69b6-7: ... *de ldog kyaṅ* ... .

[6] Verses 474-477 are quoted in *NAVV* 48.18-24 with the following variants: 475c: *bhavet tasya* instead of *bhaved asya;* 477c: *akāryaṃ* instead of *na kāryaṃ;* 477d: *bhinnaṃ* instead of *cittaṃ,* yet *cittaṃ* is attested in n. 14 thereon.

[7] $P_{(Pe)}$ 83b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 69b7, however, lacks a negation.

475. The cause of the series *(santānakāraṇa),* however, is the material cause. When this [cause] ceases, the series would cease.

476. When the fire ceases, only the fluidity of copper ceases. The cognition subsists for a certain time together with the body,

477. because their two causes assist each other, just like fire and the fluidity of copper. However, the cognition does not subsist [with the body] as [its] effect, just like gold [subsists with fire, but not as its effect].[8]

Just as copper[9] that is assisted by fire is the material cause of fluidity,[10] [and] therefore fire and the fluidity[11] of copper subsist together, similarly also the cognition that is determined by (i.e., resides in) a body arises from a cognition that is assisted by the body [and] the body, in its turn, arises from the cause of the body, [namely, the embryonic stages of] *kalala,* etc., that are assisted by the cognition; *thus, what arises as effect subsists together [with another effect].* [This] means the following:

478. When [two things] occur together in one and the same causal complex because they assist each other, the subsistence together also of their two effects is not incorrect.

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[8] The Tib seems to suggest a different interpretation of the verse, which, however, is not clear to me; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 83b5-6 = $P_{(De)}$ 70a1-2: *rgyu de min na gñis 'bras ni | sems ñid gser bźin gnas pa yin |*. One could expect perhaps a new sentence to start with *kāryaṃ tu* (and not with *na kāryaṃ tu).* According to this interpretation one could translate *kāryaṃ tu cittaṃ tiṣṭhati hemavat* as "The effect [namely] the cognition subsists [even without the body] just like gold [subsists even without fire]." However, in this case one is left with an extremely elliptic statement *tayor hetvor na,* which could not be construed with the previous *pāda.* The word order *na kāryaṃ tu* instead of **na tu kāryaṃ* is probably due to metrical reasons.

[9] Read *tāmrasya* as in Sāṅkṛtyāyana's n. 2.

[10] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 35b3-4 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b3: *dper na zaṅs ma źu ba ñid kyi zaṅs ma ñid ñe bar len pa yin pa de lta na yaṅ źu ba'i* (add with $D_{(De)}$: *gnas) skabs na me lhan cig byed pa ñid yin pas na ma ṅes pa yin no.*

[11] Read *-dravatvayoḥ.*

Because the cause of the body, technically called *kalala,* etc., is assisted by the cognition,[12] [and] because the cognition as well is assisted by the body,[13] *that which arises as effect,* characterized as cognition and body, *subsists together, just like fire and the fluidity of copper.* But when the body ceases, the cognition is qualified (or: distinguished) by another body, or it is without a body [as in the *ārūpyadhātu*]. Thus, it does not cease, just as the series of gold [does not cease when the fire ceases].
[Objection:] Just as there is a special property of the series of rice because of water, etc., and it (i.e., the property) ceases[14] when the water ceases, [and just as] the material cause that is harmed because of fire, etc., [that is, in the final analysis] the series [of rice] itself, ceases, similarly a cognition, [i.e.] the material cause, that is harmed by something is not the cause of the series [any longer]. Thus, the series would stop.[15] [Consequently, there would be no afterlife.] And just as a lotus *(śālūka)* arises from something of a different kind, [i.e.] from cow-dung, similarly [the cognition] arises first from the body alone [and only in subsequent moments from the cognition]. [Consequently, there would be no previous life].
[Reply:] On the above, it is said:

> 479. The material cause of rice, etc., is harmed because of fire, etc., but the material cause [which consists in] cognition is not harmed by anything.
>
> 480. It is not observed that the cognition arises first from the body, nor that [it] ceases without [its] material cause (i.e., the previous cognition) being harmed.

The material cause of cognition is not harmed like the material cause of the series of rice because of fire, etc. The cognition itself is the material cause of cognition, and for it burning, etc., are impossible.

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[12] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 35a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b1 quoted in n. 1) above.

[13] $P_{(Pe)}$ 84a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 70a4 *yul* presupposes *deśa-* instead of *deha-*.

[14] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 4.

[15] Delete the negation which has no equivalent in $P_{(Pe)}$ 84a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 70a6 which interprets the sentence as a question: ... *rgyun log par 'gyur ram* |. One could accomodate the negation if one interprets this sentence as a rhetorical question.

[Objection:] It is harmed by [dreamless] sleep *(middha)*, etc.
[Reply:] No, first of all, because sleep, etc., are [only] cause for temporary harm *(kālikopaghāta)*. [And further:]

481. The cognition [after awakening] that depends on a previous trace *(saṃskāra)* arises from a cognition although it is separated [in time] *(vyavahita)*.[16] And this [past cognition] is not cut off by [the subsequent] sleep.

Indeed sleep is not capable of harming the material cause of cognition:

482. Since one observes the production [of a new cognition] even from a cognition that has been cut off,[17] no difference with regard to cutting off (i.e., interruption of a series of cognition) is determined between death and sleep.

[Objection:] Sometimes there may be only interruption [without production of a new cognition].
[Reply:] This is not true.

483. The interruption is not perceived. How [could it be perceived] without an awareness either by the [cognition] itself or by another [cognition]?[18] [This being the case] how is such an assumption of an [interruption justified]?

First of all, the interruption of [the series of] cognition is not perceived by [the cognition] itself.[19] For the interruption of something else is perceived by cognition. But the interruption of [the series of] cognition is not [perceived] by anything.
[Objection: It is apprehended] by the absence of cognition.

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[16] Cf. P's commentary on *kārikā* 57 especially v. 468a-c.

[17] Cf. P 75.33f. on *kārikā* 57.

[18] $P_{(Pe)}$ 84b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 70b4, however, has no equivalent for the first *kutaḥ*, and construes one sentence up to *pareṇa: sad pa med pa'i rnam 'chad ni* ǀ *raṅ ṅam yaṅ na gźan gyis kyaṅ* ǀ *dmigs pa yod pa ma yin na* ǀ.

[19] Read *jnānasya* ǀ *anyasya* ...; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 84b2-3 = $P_{(De)}$ 70b5: ... *rnam par śes pa rnam par chad pa* ... ǀ *gźan rnam par chad pa ni* ... .

[Reply:] How could the absence of cognition,[20] inasmuch as it is not proved, prove [its own] absence? If [you say that it is] proved, [then] precisely this proof[21] is a cognition. Thus, how [can] the [series of] cognition be cut off?

484. [Objection: This is not correct] for inasmuch as the interruption [of the series of cognition after death] is never being apprehended [by the cognition itself], it would always be.[22] This precisely is the absence of the other world *(para-loka)*. Thus, there is an insuperable [difficulty in your position].

[Reply:] This is also not true.

485. Because the awareness/awakening is perceived as dependent on a previous trace, the[23] interruption as such of [the series of] cognition is not perceived.

At the beginning of life and when awakening [after dreamless sleep], the cognition is perceived precisely as following (i.e., conforming to) a previous trace *(pūrvasaṃskārānugata)*. Thus, there is no perception [by the cognition itself] of the interruption at the previous or posterior limits *(koṭi)* (i.e., after the series of cognition is cut off and when it arises again).

On the other hand, the interruption of [a series of] cognition of one [person] is not at all perceived by another (i.e., the cognition of another person), because the conditions of perception are absent *(upalabdhilakṣaṇa-*

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[20] Read *jñānā-*.

[21] Tib 84b4, however, has no equivalent for *siddhiḥ*.

[22] $P_{(Pe)}$ 84b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 70b6, however, corresponds to *jñāyamānaḥ;* note also that Tib construes differently: *kun tshe rnam par chad pa ni* ‖ *kun tshe śes pa ñid gyur ba* ‖. If I understand correctly, the Cārvāka agrees that the cognition itself does not perceive the interruption of its own series. However, this does not mean that the series is not interrupted. If the cognition itself does not ever perceive the interruption of its series after death, this means that the cognition does not ever arise again. Thus, the interruption remains for all time, and this is precisely what the Cārvāka means by the absence of the other world.

[23] Read *sa vijñānasya.* $P_{(Pe)}$ 84b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 70b7, however: *rnam śes de ni rnam 'chad* (read with $P_{(De)}$: *chad) pas* ‖. Perhaps one has to read *tadvijñānasya*.

prāptyabhāva) (i.e., the cognition of one person is not perceptible to another; therefore, its absence is also not perceptible).

Nor is there interruption [of cognition] when laxity *(śaithilya)* arises due to [a person's] being dispassionate *(vītarāgatā)*.[24]

> 486. Let it be agreed that the dispassionate [person] lacks desire[25] towards his own purpose *(svārtha)*. However, it is not appropriate [that] the [person] who lacks desire towards someone else's purpose *(parārthaniḥspṛha)* is also a [person] who is free from faults *(nirdoṣa)*.[26]

Indeed, being free from faults is not obtained through lacking[27] desire towards someone else's purpose. For precisely this is the fault of this [person], namely, that [he] is without compassion *(akṛpatva)*. Or the interruption [of the series of cognition] is indeed accepted by certain [Buddhists] because[28] one is dispassionate.[29] Thus, there is no fault [in our position]. Therefore, the cognition does not cease by harm to [its] material

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[24] This connection between *śaithilya* and *vītarāgatā* is unusual, since the latter has positive and the former negative connotations. I am also not aware of any other source which relates the two in such manner.

[25] Read *niḥspṛhatā.*

[26] $P_{(Pe)}$ 84b8 = $P_{(De)}$ 71a2: *ñes med ces pa 'brel ma yin* | would correspond to *nirdoṣa iti,* which is metrically deficient. Perhaps one should read *saṅgatam* (as below in P 79.31) instead of *saṅgataḥ*, and interpret the second half of the verse as formed by analogy with the first, i.e., as containing an implicit *iti.* If the masculine *saṅgataḥ* is retained, one may translate "... [the person] is not appropriate (i.e., is not fit) also as free from faults." In this case, however, *asti* becomes problematic, inasmuch as it cannot be understood as an emphatic copula linking *nirdoṣaḥ* with the subject, but has to be construed with *saṅgataḥ.*

[27] Read *-niḥspṛhatayā.*

[28] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1.

[29] I do not know which Buddhists are referred to here. Prajñākaragupta probably has in mind Hīnayāna Buddhists in general.

cause,[30] because the body is not [its] material cause [and] because the cognition cannot be harmed.
[Objection:][31] Let it be admitted that the cognition does not cease through the cessation of [its] material cause *(upādāna),* but [its] cessation through the cessation of [its] support *(āśraya)* has not been prevented [by you]. And it is apprehended that the body is the support [of cognition]. Thus, the cognition ceases [when the body ceases,] just as a mural, etc.,[32] [cease] when the wall, etc., cease *(kuḍyādinivṛtti).*[33] Thus, there is no proof of the other world *(paralokasiddhi).*

> 487. [Reply:] That is also not true. The transition *(sañcāra)* of the mural, etc., [from one wall to another] is not perceived. Therefore, things like murals, etc., would be destroyed when [their] sustainer *(ādhāra)* is destroyed.

For paintings, etc., on cloths/pots,[34] etc., are not apprehended as coming from another sustainer. But the cognition at the beginning of life and in the state of awakening [after sleep is apprehended] as following (i.e., conforming to) traces that go together with a body in another life *(janmāntaraśarīrasahacārisaṃskārānugata),* and as following traces of the body in the end of

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[30] Read *nopādāno-;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 85a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 71a3: ... *ñe bar len pa ñams pa ñid kyis* ... .

[31] From here on the discussion can already be considered as the introduction to the next verse.

[32] $P_{(Pe)}$ 85a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 71a5 (... *ri mo la sogs pa ldog pa bźin pas* ...) must have read *citrādeḥ,* but has no equivalent for *cittasya.* Perhaps one has to read *citrādeś cittasya.*

[33] Cf. R 328b7f. = 656.7f: *de ltar na 'gyur mod kyi gal te lus sems kyi ñe bar len pa ma yin yaṅ rten du ni 'gyur te | des na lus źig na śes pa ldog par 'gyur źiṅ | lus gźan la 'pho ba med de | dper na rtsig pa la brten pa'i ri mo rtsig pa źig pa na 'jig ciṅ | rtsig pa gźan la 'go ba med pa bźin no źe na.* "[Objection:] Let it be admitted to be so; nevertheless, even if the body is not the material cause *(upādānakāraṇa)* of cognition, it is its support *(āśraya).* Therefore, when the body is destroyed, the cognition would cease and does not go over to another body, just as a mural that rests on a wall is destroyed when the wall is destroyed and does not go over to another wall."

[34] The Skt reads *paṭādiṣu,* but $P_{(Pe)}$ 85a5 = $P_{(De)}$ 71a6 *(bum pa la sogs pa)* presupposes *ghaṭādiṣu.*

dream *(svapnāntikaśarīrasaṃskārānugata)*[35] [respectively]. Thus, unlike the mural/painting, [the cognition] does not have a restricted sustainer *(pratiniyatādhāra)* (i.e., is not confined to a single sustainer). For [only] when something has a restricted sustainer, is [it] destroyed when this (or: its) sustainer is destroyed. Moreover, neither the body nor anything else is support for anything.[36] Thus, how [would the cognition] be destroyed when the [body or anything else] is destroyed? As for murals, etc., they are not at all different from the wall, etc. Thus, they are destroyed only through their own destruction, not because the sustainer is destroyed."

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[35] Read as in Sāṅkṛtyāyana's n. 3. Cf. also R 329a1-2 = 657.1-2.

[36] This argument anticipates the discussion in vv. 63ff.

anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam |
sataś ced āśrayo nāsyāḥ sthātur avyatirekataḥ ||63||
vyatireke 'pi taddhetus tena bhāvasya kiṃ kṛtam |(64ab)

"[The body is] not the support, because both existing and non-existing [things] do not rest on [anything as their support].
[Objection:] The cause of continuity of an existing [thing] is [its] support.
[Reply:] No, because the [continuity] is not different from the agent of continuity (i.e., the continuing thing itself).
[Or] even if [the continuity] were different, the cause of that [existing and continuing thing would be the support]. [Thus,] what is accomplished by that [alleged support] for an [existing] thing? [Nothing!]"

1) One would expect "because both existing and non-existing [things] lack a support" as the reason. However, in this case an expression such as *anāśrayatvāt* instead of *anāśrayāt* is required. Dharmakīrti may have chosen *anāśrayāt* for metrical reasons. This does not mean, however, that this is merely an elliptical form of *anāśrayatvāt*, because *āśraya* can also be understood as an action noun, in the sense of "resting upon [something]"; cf. *pw*, *s.v.* Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 125, translates the beginning of the verse as follows: "Neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing has any support, because there is no such thing as support." Perhaps he construes *sadasatoḥ* with *nāśrayaḥ* rather than with *anāśrayāt*. Cf. also the next two notes.

2) I follow P 79.31, R 329a5-6 = 657.5-6 (but not PV_R) and M 30.13 in assuming that the objection starts with *sthitikāraṇam*. According to PV_D (cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 36a2 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b7f.), however, it starts with *na: gal te ma yin rten yod pa* || *gnas pa'i rgyu ni yin źe na* || "[Objection:] It is not [true that a support does not accomplish anything];[1] the support is the cause of continuity of an existing [thing]." PV_{Tib} seems to imply that the objection starts from *āśrayaḥ: yod med dag la rten med phyir* || *ma yin, yod pa'i gnas rgyu ni* || *rten yin źes na 'di rten med* || *gnas pa po las gźan min phyir* ||. Thus, one

[1] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 36a2 = $D_{(De)}$ 32a1: *rten du mṅon 'dod pa cuṅ zad mi byed pa ni ma yin te* |.

may translate "[The body] is not [the support of cognition], because both existing and non-inexisting [things] lack a support. [Objection:] The cause of continuity of an existing [thing] is the support [of that thing]. [Reply:] It[2] does not have a support, because [the continuity] is not different from the agent of continuity." The advantage of both interpretations is that the objection would stop with *cet;* their disadvantage, however, is that the first leaves open what is to be proved by *anāśrayāt sadasatoḥ*, whereas the second leaves open what is to be negated by it. PV_R presents yet another interpretation; cf. R 329a4 = 657.4: *yod med dag la rten med phyir* ‖ *rten ni gnas pa'i rgyu ma yin* ‖ *yod pa yin na 'di rten med* ‖ *gnas pa po las gźan min phyir* ‖. This version concludes the first sentence with *sthitikāraṇam* and construes the following sentence as corresponding to *sataś ced āśrayo nāsya;* however, *ced* does not indicate that the sentence constitutes an objection, but introduces a brief conditional clause *sataś ced*. This interpretation gives the argumentation a different direction and emphasis. Also, similar to PV_{Tib} it presupposes a reading *asya*. Such a reading implies that the genitive cannot be construed meaningfully with *avyatirekataḥ* any longer, but has to be related to the preceding noun *āśrayaḥ*. This further implies that one has to construe a sentence *āśrayo nāsya*, and that the sentence previous to this requires the inclusion of *āśrayaḥ* in *pāda* b as its predicate. Thus, we are left without explicit mention of what is negated in *pāda* a. I therefore consider *asya* to be a less probable variant. Hayes's interpretation, *ibid.*, p. 125, is not clear to me, for he leaves *āśrayaḥ* in *pāda* c untranslated.

The various syntactical interpretations of v. 63 can be presented as follows:

P, R and M:	*anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ; sthitikāraṇam* + *sataś ced āśrayo; na, asyāḥ sthātur avyatirekataḥ* ‖
D, PV_D:	*anāśrayāt sadasator; na, āśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam* + *sataś ced; āśrayo na, asyāḥ sthātur avyatirekataḥ* ‖
PV_{Tib}:	*anāśrayāt sadasator na; āśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam* + *sataś ced; āśrayo nāsya, sthātur avyatirekataḥ* ‖
PV_R:	*anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam;* | *sataś ced, āśrayo nāsya, sthātur avyatirekataḥ* ‖

[2] Note that PV_{Tib} may have read *asya* instead of *asyāḥ*.

3) Vibhūticandra's interpretation (cf. M(S) p. 34, n. 3) of *tad* in *taddhetuḥ* as referring to *sthiti* does not seem convincing to me (possibly an interpretation of P 80.5); I think it has to refer to *sthātṛ*. Hayes, *ibid.*, p. 126, translates *taddhetuḥ* as "continuity would have a cause."

4) P 79.24-80.21: "[Objection:] Let it be admitted that if[3] [two things like a wall and a mural] are not different, there is no relationship of support and and what rests on it [between them] *(āśrayāśrayibhāva)*, [but] if the body and the cognition are different, there should be [such a relationship between them].
[Reply:] This is not [the case]: ... (vv. 63-64ab).[4]
A non-existing [thing], to begin with, does not have a support.[5] For the horn of the donkey *(kharaviṣāṇa)*[6] has no support whatsoever. [Something that is] non-existing merely longs for arising from a cause.[7] Therefore, for a non-existing [thing] only a cause is possible, not a support. An existing [thing] too does not have a support, because an existing [thing] does not wish to attain anything *(sarvanirāśaṃsatva)* (i.e., exists independently of everything). Nor is it appropriate [to assume that] even an existing [thing] has a support because [it has] a cause for [its] continuity, because the continuity *is not different from the agent of continuity (i.e., the continuing thing itself)*. [Consequently,] if continuity is effected, [this would mean only that] the [thing] itself would be effected. But an existing thing is not produced,[8] because what has [already] arisen cannot arise again.

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[3] $P_{(Pe)}$ 85a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 71b1, however, may have read *avyatirekāt: tha dad pa med pa'i phyir*

[4] $P_{(Pe)}$ 85b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 71b2 inserts between 63d and 64a: *'di ni rten yod ma yin mod* ‖ "This may not be the support."(?)

[5] P 79.29-80.4 is paraphrased in *NAVV* 49.22-31.

[6] $P_{(Pe)}$ 85b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 71b3 *(ri boṅ gi rva)* may have read *śaśaviṣāṇasya*; cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 36a1 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b7. R 329a5 = 657.5 uses *nam mkha'i me rtog (*khapuṣpa/ākāśakusuma)* as example.

[7] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 35b8 = $D_{(De)}$ 31b6-7: *med pa'i yaṅ rten ma yin (!) te de yaṅ raṅ gi rgyu las skye ba yin gyi gźan źig rten du 'gyur ba ni ma yin no* ‖.

[8] $P_{(Pe)}$ 85b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 71b4, however, may have read *tasya* instead of *sata*: *de ni skyed pa ma yin*.

[Objection:] For [a thing] that has [already] arisen as well there is something (i.e., some property of it) that has not [yet] arisen. [Thus,] because that [property] is effected [in addition], there is a support. [Something] is called a cause *(kāraṇa)* when [the thing] arises with its entire nature *(sarvātmanā)*, [and is called] a sustainer *(ādhāra)*, etc., when a certain property arises. And it is not[9] [true that] the continuity is not different from the own nature [of the thing], because even for [something] that is falling *(patat)* when there is no continuity [at the same place], there remains [its] own nature.[10] If, on the other hand, the continuity were not different [from the thing itself], the [thing itself] would not be different from the continuity [and consequently] there would always be continuity [for that thing, and thus the thing would be eternal]. Because properties that cease [and] that are in contradiction [with each other] (e.g., continuity and discontinuity) are placed upon [the thing] *(nivartamānaviruddhadharmādhyāsa)* while its own nature remains, it is correct that [the continuity] has to be different [from the thing itself].
[Reply:] This is not true. *If [the continuity] were different*[11] [from the continuing thing itself], [then] the [cause of continuity] is nothing but *the cause of that [existing and continuing thing],* [i.e.] the [cause of that thing] is the cause of continuity, not a sustainer.[12]

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[9] $P_{(Pe)}$ 85b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 71b5, however, has no equivalent for *na ca*.

[10] The word *sthiti* could be rendered here more appropriately with "stability," rather than "continuity." However, if the translation is to be kept uniform throughout, "continuity" is a better solution on the whole, as it conveys better the basic idea that something continues to exist for some time. I considered using "stability" in the meaning of "resistance to change or disintegration," but this particular meaning seems to be restricted to chemistry. Another possibility would be to use "abidance" as an English equivalent, which can cover the two relevant aspects, namely, that of continuing to be something and that of staying or remaining at the same place.

[11] Prajñākaragupta omits the concessive particle *api*, probably because, as he argues below, he is not willing to concede this possibility. Cf. also the half-verse 488 below.

[12] The syntax is ambiguous; theoretically one could also translate: "..., this is nothing but the cause of that, [i.e.] this is nothing but the cause of continuity." However, I am reluctant to accept that *tad* in *taddhetuḥ* refers to "continuity," because I can make no sense of it, and I am equally reluctant to attribute such an interpretation of the *kārikā* to Prajñākaragupta. Besides, it would be unclear to what *asau* refers in this case. In my interpretation, the masculine form *asau* can be explained as being due to attraction by *-hetu*. In the translation

[Objection:] An [existing] thing has a sustainer [which is different from its cause].
[Reply:] No, because [it] does not accomplish anything for the [existing] thing.
[Objection: Something is] a sustainer, because [it] effects the continuity [at the same place] for the [existing] thing. [Thus, it does accomplish something.][13]
[Reply:] Inasmuch as this continuity has arisen, does it belong to something [yet] to be established (i.e., to be produced) or [is it] otherwise? [It does] not [belong to something yet to be established] before the arising [of that thing], precisely because the thing does not [yet] exist. [On the other hand,] how [could the continuity] that has arisen after that (i.e., after the arising of the thing) [and is thus] different from the other (i.e., the thing) [belong] to that thing?[14] For there is neither a relation of identity of nature nor of causality *(tādātmyatadutpattisambandhābhāva).*[15]
[Objection: The continuity] arises as inhering *(samaveta)* in that [thing].
[Reply:] What is the meaning of 'inhering in that'? [If it is] the continuity[16] in that [thing], the continuity too [would] have another continuity,[17] and thus an infinite regress *(anavasthā)* [would result]. [And] inasmuch as it is different, why is [it] not apprehended as different *(vyatiriktatvena)?*
[Objection:] Because of the relation of inherence *(samavāya).*

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above I rely partly on $P_{(Pe)}$ 85b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 71b7: *gźan yin na ni 'di de'i rgyu ñid de | 'di gnas pa'i rgyu ñid yin gyi rten ni ma yin no źe na |.*

[13] P 80.6-9 is summarized in *NAVV* 50.1-5.

[14] $P_{(Pe)}$ 86a1 = $P_{(De)}$ 72a1 has no equivalent for *tataḥ: tha dad pa gźan las skyes pa ji ltar dṅos po'i yin te |.* Accordingly one may translate: "How could a different [continuity] that has arisen from the other ... ."

[15] The lack of identity is obvious; the continuity cannot be produced by the thing itself because it is supposedly produced by the sustainer.

[16] Read *sthitir*; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 86a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 72a1: *der gnas pa'o źe na |.*

[17] Read *aparā sthitir.*

[Reply:] Let inherence be [assumed for the sake of argument]; even so, whatever form a [thing] has, with that form alone it should be apprehended.[18] Why is [it] apprehended otherwise?
[Objection:] Because of the blend *(saṃsarga)* [between the continuity and the thing].
[Reply:] What is this [thing] called blend? If it is a blend with the entire nature *(sarvātman)*, [then] there is no difference [between the two things that have blended]. If it is a blend with [only] a part, what is the difference between inherence and conjunction *(saṃyoga)*? [None!]
[Objection: There is a difference, namely, in the case of conjunction the things] are established as separate and [in the case of inherence they are established] as non-separate *(yutāyutasiddhitva)*.[19]
[Reply: If so, then] there would be inherence also among the parts of a tree, etc.
[Objection: There is inherence] when [the relation] conditions the cognition 'here' *(ihabuddhinibandhanatva)*.
[Reply:] No, because [this] would apply exactly to conjunction, for there is [e.g.] the cognition '[Here] on the head there is a horn.'
[Objection:] To be established as non-separate *(ayutasiddhi)* consists in the fact of inhering in one's own parts characterized by inherence *(svasam-avāyyavayavasamavetatva)*; in the opposite case [things] are established as separate.
[Reply:] Even so, there is no inherence because of the cognition of difference [between the so-called parts characterized by inherence and the so-called inhering whole]. Nor does a thing which lacks parts (i.e., the whole as assumed by you) blend with a part [of itself with something else, i.e., its assumed parts]. If there were a blend with a part [of itself], there would be a cognition of the difference [between the blended parts and whole]. Nor is it correct [to assume that] the difference [between the relations *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*] is due to the fact that [in the first case one relatum] is [invariably] followed upon [by the other] and [in the second case the two relata] are not [invariably] followed upon [by each other] *(anvitānanvitatva)*, because the

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[18] $P_{(Pe)}$ 86a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 72a2-3 translates this sentence as a rhetorical question: ... *gaṅ gaṅ gi raṅ bźin yin pa de de ñid du ji ste mi rtogs te* |. It is possible that *kasmān na pratīyate* from the previous line was mistakenly reread here.

[19] Cf. *PDhS* 773.3-4.

fact that [what is inhered in invariably] follows upon [that which inheres] *(anvaya)* is not apprehended by perception *(pratyakṣa)*. And when there is no perception,[20] there is no inference *(anumāna)*. Thus, there is no cognition of the fact that [something inhered in invariably] follows upon [something inhering, and thus inherence is not established]. [Therefore, it is impossible that the continuity is different from the continuing thing and yet not perceived as different because it inheres in that thing. Thus the continuity is not different from the continuing thing.] Therefore, a special (e.g., continuing) thing arises because of a special assisting cause, [there is] no [such thing] called continuity. This is established. And thus the relationship between support and what rests on it *(āśrayāśrayibhāva)* is only a special relationship between cause and effect *(kāryakāraṇabhāvaviśeṣa)*. And the body is not the material cause [of cognition] *(upādānakāraṇa)*. Therefore, [the cognition] does not cease when the [body] ceases."

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[20] Read *pratyakṣābhāve*.

avināśaprasaṅgaḥ sa nāśahetor mato yadi ||64||
tulyaḥ prasaṅgas tatrāpi kiṃ punaḥ sthitihetunā |(65ab)

"The undesired consequence of non-destruction [of a thing would result if one assumes that it continues to exist because of the cause of continuity]. If [you] maintain that this (i.e., the destruction) is due to a cause of destruction, the same undesired consequence [as pointed out in 63d-64b applies] in this [case] too. Of what use is the cause of continuity?!"

1) Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 126, construes *tatrāpi* with *kiṃ punaḥ sthitihetunā* and translates *sthitihetu* as "something that causes a thing to come to an end."
$D_{(Pe)}$ 36b7-8 = $D_{(De)}$ 32b3-4 and M 30.23f. seem to construe *kiṃ punaḥ sthitihetunā* with v. 65cd.

2) P 80.20-31:[1] "And if the body [were] a support because it effects continuity, then that which[2] has continuity [would] not be destroyed. Therefore, ... (v. 64cd-65cd).
For as long as [the entity] that causes the continuity *(sthāpaka)* is present destruction is impossible.
[Objection:] As long as [the entity] that causes the continuity is present there is no destruction, [but only] if a cause of destruction would not be [present]. Destruction [results] from the presence of a cause of destruction. Thus, the undesired consequence of non-destruction [as long as the cause of continuity is present] does not [result].[3]
[Reply: Having this objection in mind Dharmakīrti] says: *If [you maintain that] this,* [i.e.] the destruction, *is due to the cause of destruction,* this is not [correct, for] *in this [case] too the same undesired consequence [applies]. In this [case] too,* [i.e.] in [the case of] destruction, exactly *the same undesired*

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[1] Prajñākaragupta's commentary on this verse is summarized in *NAVV* 50.6-8.

[2] Read *yasya* instead of *āśrayasya;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 86b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 72b1: *de'i tshe gaṅ la gnas pa'i yod pa de ni mi 'jig pa'i phyir ... .*

[3] Read *nāvināśa-*; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 86b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 72b2: *'jig pa med par thal bar mi 'gyur ro.*

consequence [applies, because] there is nothing called destruction which is different from the thing [to be destroyed].

> 488. And if [it] were different, the cause of that [thing to be destroyed would be the cause of destruction]; [thus] what is accomplished by that [alleged cause of destruction] for a thing [to be destroyed]? [Nothing!][4]

For it is not [the case that] when a destruction different [from the thing] is effected [the thing] is at all destroyed. Thus, the cause of destruction does not accomplish anything. Consequently, because it is not destroyed [by the cause of destruction, the thing would] continue to exist by itself (i.e., not because of any other cause). Thus, *of what use is the cause of continuity?!* The cause of continuity does not accomplish anything.[5] Or if destruction is due to a cause of destruction, [then] as long as a cause of destruction is absent [the thing would] continue to exist by itself. Thus, *of what use is the cause of continuity?!"*

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[4] These two *pādas* are nothing but a repetition of Dharmakīrti's v. 64ab with the slight change of *'pi* to *ca*. However, the subject now is destruction rather than continuity. This change is significant, for Prajñākaragupta does not accept the concession implied by *api*. Cf. n. 10 on vv. 63-64ab above.

[5] Read *na kiñcitkaraḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 86b7 = $P_{(De)}$ 72b4: ... *cuṅ zad kyaṅ byed pa ma yin no* ||.

ā nāśakāgamāt[1] *sthānaṃ tataś ced vastudharmatā* ‖65 ‖
nāśasya saty abādho[2] *'sāv*[3] *iti kiṃ sthitihetunā* |(66ab)

[1] PV$_P$: *anāśa-*, Mi: *ānāśa-*
[2] Mi: *satyabādho*
[3] Mi: *'sav*

"[Objection:] Until the arrival of [an entity] that causes destruction, the continuity is due to that [cause of continuity].
[Reply: By this you admit that] the destruction is a property of the thing. [Thus,] when [the thing] is present, the [destruction] is without obstruction [by the cause of continuity]. Thus, of what use is the cause of continuity?!"

1) Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 126, translates *ā nāśakāgamāt sthānaṃ tataś cet* by "It might be argued that a thing endures until it encounters what destroys it." This, however, seems to miss the point, for *tataḥ*, I think, refers to the cause of continuity. Cf. P 80.35: *tataḥ sthitikāra-ṇāt;* cf. also R 329b6 = 658.6: ... *snar sems kyi gnas pa lus las yin źe na* ... "Before [the cause of destruction comes or arises,] the continuity of cognition is due to the body." Cf. also M 31.9: *tata āśrayāt*. Similarly, his translation of *saty abādho 'sau* as "While a thing exists, it has nothing harming it," assumes that the thing, rather than the destruction, is the subject of *abādhaḥ*. However, *vastu* being neuter, it cannot be referred to by *'bādho 'sau;* it is possible that Hayes relates *asau* to *bhāva* in 64d. This partially overlaps with Prajñākaragupta's second (less probable) alternative interpretation of *saty abādho 'sau* (cf. below).

2) P 80.34-81.11: "[Objection:] Without [the entity] that causes continuity *(sthāpaka)*, destruction would [occur] even without [an entity] that causes destruction *(nāśaka)*. But when [the entity] that causes continuity is present, [the thing] is not destroyed without a cause of destruction.[1] Therefore, [something] is [an entity] that causes continuity because it effects continuity before [the appearance of an entity] that causes destruction. Thus, [the cause of continuity] is not useless.

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[1] Delete *nāśake*; P$_{(Pe)}$ 87a1 = P$_{(De)}$ 72b6 has no equivalent for it.

[Reply:] Wouldn't it in this manner follow that destruction does not have a cause?! Consequently, a thing is of such kind (i.e., being destroyed without the cause of continuity) because of its own cause alone *(svahetor eva)*, [and] therefore, *the destruction is a property of the thing. [Thus,] when present,* [i.e.] when the thing[2] exists, *the [destruction] is without obstruction.* The own nature of a thing cannot be changed by anything.[3] Thus, *of what use is the cause of continuity?!*
[Objection:][4] Without the cause of continuity [the thing] is destroyed [by its own nature]. But when the cause of continuity is present, [this] destruction is warded off. [Thus, even if we admit that a thing is destroyed by its own nature, and not by a cause of destruction, the cause of continuity has a function.]
[Reply:] Wouldn't this warding off of destruction, in its turn, be entirely different from the destruction? And thus, [the cause of continuity] is of no significance for the destruction. Consequently, [the thing] would simply be destroyed [by its own nature]; how could it last?[5]
[Objection: A thing] that perishes[6] at every moment arises differently (i.e., as something that lasts for more than a moment)(?) because of [the entity] that causes continuity. [Thus, even if we admit in general that a thing is destroyed at every moment, the cause of continuity has a function.]

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[2] Prajñākaragupta uses the masculine noun *padārtha* in his explication of the elliptical absolute locative *sati*, not the neuter noun *vastu* that was introduced in 65d. This may be due to the fact that in his second, alternative interpretation of *saty abādho 'sau* the pronoun *asau* is supposed to refer to the thing, not to the destruction. Similarly, the masculine forms *vinaśvaraḥ* in l. 5, *sa* in l. 6 and *anāśaḥ* in l. 7 (twice) can be explained as somehow preparing this switch. Accordingly, I understand also the two following occurrences of *anāśaḥ* in ll. 8-9 as *bahuvrīhi* compounds relating to a masculine noun such as *padārtha*, and not as *tatpuruṣa (karmadhāraya)* compounds; cf. also n. 11.

[3] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 37a3 = $D_{(De)}$ 32b6-7: *dṅos po'i raṅ bźin rnam pa gźan du bya bar mi nus pa de ltar na | raṅ bźin ñid kyis 'jig par 'gyur ro ||.* "The own nature of a thing cannot be changed. Thus, destruction would occur by [its] very own nature."

[4] P 81.3-7 is paraphrased in *NAVV* 50.9-14.

[5] The argument is not clear to me. The translation is therefore only tentative.

[6] Cf. n. 2 above.

[Reply:] For it (i.e., for the cause of continuity that changes the perishable thing)[7] too, destruction is without a cause (i.e., spontaneous). Thus, this very destruction at every moment [applies also to the cause of continuity; it cannot function for more than a moment]. And inasmuch as the [perishable thing] has [allegedly] arisen differently because of [the entity] that causes continuity, this [entity from which it arises] is simply the cause [of the thing], not [an entity] that causes continuity [and can be conceived as something different from the cause of the thing].

Or [v. $66a_2$-b can be understood as follows]: If [you say that] until[8] the arrival of [an entity] that causes destruction continuity is due to [the entity] that causes continuity, [then the thing] is without destruction.[9] [This] *being* so, [i.e.] when [a thing] without destruction (i.e., that does not perish spontaneously) has arisen, *this [thing] is without obstruction.*[10] *Thus, of what use is the cause of continuity?* If [you say that it] is without destruction only at the time of the existence of [the entity] that causes continuity, [then] this being so, at every moment the respectively later [thing] is without destruction[11] due to [the entity] that causes continuity. But what causes the

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[7] One might consider to read *tasyāpi hetoḥ* (i.e., *sthitihetor* or *anyathābhāvahetor*); cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 87a5 = $P_{(De)}$ 73a2: *de'i rgyu 'jig pa yaṅ ...* . However, it could also be assumed that **hetoḥ* reflects a gloss on *tasya* that was mistaken for part of the text.

[8] Read *ā nāśaka-*.

[9] Cf. n. 2 above. If one would understand *anāśaḥ* as a *tatpuruṣa (karmadhāraya)* compound, it would become somewhat redundant and give the impression of a gloss on *sthānam*. - Note that the translation of this sentence differs from the understanding of the Tibetan translators.

[10] This translation is based on the following interpretation: Prajñākaragupta alternatively understands *sati* as an ellipsis for *evaṃ sati*, i.e., *sati* is a *pratīka* here. This *pratīka* is explicated with *anāśa utpanna iti*, i.e., with an absolute locative *anāśa utpanne*, concluded by *iti*; cf. the similar structure of explication in P 81.1-2: *sati vidyamāne padārthe 'bādho 'sau*. However, the ambiguity of *sandhi* and the various functions of *iti* allow for the following, equally meaningful translation that presupposes that *anāśa utpanna* are nominative forms and *iti* is used to convey a reason; this also corresponds to the Tibetan translation: "... [then], this being so, [a thing] without destruction has arisen. Thus, ..."

[11] Read *'nāśaḥ*; $P_{(Pe)}$ 87a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 73a3-4: ... *skad cig so sor mi 'jig pa* ... . Of course, one could also understand the two occurrences of *anāśaḥ* in this sentence as *tatpuruṣa (karmadhāraya)* compounds, not as *bahuvrīhis*. However, this would imply that Prajñākaragupta plays

continuity of [the entity] that causes continuity? If [you say that] it is caused by its own cause *(svahetukṛta)*, this will be so for the [thing] to be caused to continue (i.e., it too will continue to exist because of its own cause, not because of the cause of continuity). Therefore, of what use is [the entity] that causes of continuity?!
[Objection:] For some things continuity is due to [the entity] that causes continuity, for some [other] things [the continuity] is due to themselves; thus there is a distinction [that accounts for a function of the cause of continuity]. [Reply: If it is] so, then why is it not accepted that the continuity of the cognition too is due to [the cognition] itself?"

4) M 30.23-31.14 on 65b-66b: "Furthermore, if the destruction is caused by a cause of destruction, then *of what use is the cause of continuity,* [i.e.] the support *(āśraya)?!* As long as the cause of destruction does not occur [the thing] will continue by itself. And the [cause of continuity] is not capable of protecting [the thing] from the [cause of destruction] once it has occurred [because the thing is destroyed by the cause of destruction]. Thus, of what use is this assumed [cause]?! For *if* it is maintained that *until the arrival of [an entity] that causes destruction,* [i.e.] until [an entity] that causes destruction arrives, *the continuity is due to that* support, then in this manner [it follows that the thing by itself is incapable of continuing, and thus] *the destruction is a property of the thing.* If a thing perishes [by its own nature], it may be made to continue by [its] support until the occurrence of [an entity] that causes destruction. But otherwise (i.e., if the thing does not have a perishable nature) it possesses continuity by itself; of what use is the support?! *When this* is the case, *the [destruction] is without obstruction. Thus, of what use is the cause of continuity?!* [That is,] when the thing exists, *the* destruction *is without obstruction,* [i.e.] is devoid of obstruction, because [it] is the own nature [of the thing]. *Thus, of what use is the cause of continuity,* although assumed [by you]?!"

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with these two possible interpretations of *anāśa* in ll. 7-9; cf. also n. 2 above.

Note that the Tibetan translation presents a different understanding, taking *aparāpara* as the predicate of the sentence. However, it also seems to presuppose that *anāśaḥ* is not a *tatpuruṣa (karmadhāraya)* compound.

yathā jalāder ādhāra iti cet tulyam atra ca ||66||
pratikṣaṇavināśe hi bhāvānāṃ bhāvasantateḥ |
tathotpatteḥ sa hetutvād[1] *āśrayo 'yuktam anyathā* ||67||
syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhataḥ |
agatīnāṃ kim ādhārair guṇasāmānyakarmaṇām ||68||

[1] Mi, PV_P and PV_M: *sahetutvād*, but cf. PV_{Tib}: *rgyu yin phyir de rten yin;* cf. also PV_D and Devendrabuddhi's gloss in $D_{(Pe)}$ 37b1 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a4: *rgyu ñid yin pa'i gtan tshigs kyi phyir | snod la sogs pa de rten yin* |; cf. also P 81.33 and R 330a4 = 659.4 (read *rgyu* instead of *rgyun)*. In M 31.19 too one has to read *sa hetutvād*, because otherwise the relative in l. 18 would have no correlative.

"[Objection: The body is the sustainer of the cognition] just as [the earth or a pot, etc., are] the sustainer of water, etc.
[Reply:] The same [applies] here as well. For when things perish at every moment something *(sa)* [is called] support [not because it sustains their momentary existence, but] because [it] is the cause for the arising in like manner of a series of things (i.e., as located at a certain place, namely, in or on the support); [the designation as support] is not correct in any other manner.
[Something] may be the sustainer of water, etc., because [it] prevents [their] movement. [But] of what use are sustainers for qualities, universals and actions that lack movement?"

1) I interpret *tathotpatteḥ* as a genitive. Prajñākaragupta's understanding is not unambiguous. According to him too *tathotpatteḥ* could be a genitive, but he rearranges the word order of 67c-d_1 and thereby separates *tathotpatteḥ* even further from *hetutvāt.* Thus, one could understand "... something is [called] support for the arising in such a manner ... ." On the other hand, *tathotpatteḥ* in P is preceded by *ataḥ* ("for the following reason"); therefore Prajñākaragupta could have interpreted it as an ablative. This second interpretation seems to be corroborated by the Tibetan translation; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a1: ... *de ltar skye ba'i phyir* ... .

2) Since the cause referred to in 67c must be the assisting cause *(sahakārin* or *upakāraka)* one is tempted to read *sahetutvāt* and interpret *sahetu* as equivalent to *sahakārin.* In this case one may consider to interpret *tathotpat-*

teḥ as a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *bhāvasantateḥ*. Thus, one could translate: "... [something is called] support, because [it] is a co-producer of a series of things that arises in like manner; ... ." However, *sahetu* is not recorded in this meaning by any of the dictionaries available to me, but only in the meaning of "having a cause," "accompanied by a cause," etc. Nevertheless, special formations with *sa-*, such as in *sapatnī* ("co-wife") and *sabrahmacārin* ("co-student," "fellow-student"), indicate at least the theoretical possibility that Dharmakīrti uses *sahetu* in the special sense referred to above. Of course, such an assumption will have to be corroborated by parallel passages. So far I failed to find even a single case for such a usage of *sahetu*.

3) None of the commentators makes explicit what is meant by "the same." $D_{(Pe)}$ 37a7 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a2-3 and M 31.16 explain it as "everything that was said above" *(sṅa ma de thams cad 'dir yaṅ bzla bar bya ba yin no* ‖; *prāguktaṃ sakalam)*. By this they probably mean everything from v. 63 onwards; cf. also P 81.14 and 19.

4) Manorathanandin sees a change of scope from v. 67 to 68 (31.21-22): *evaṃ sāmānyenāśrayāśrayibhāvadūṣaṇam abhidhāya [dravyadūṣaṇādau]*[1] *viśeṣe dūṣaṇam āha.* "Having stated in this way the critique of the relationship between support and supported in general, [Dharmakīrti] pronounces [with v. 68] criticism in a particular [case]." Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, on the other hand, introduce v. 68 with 'further' *(gźan yaṅ, api ca)* and seem to interpret it as an additional argument against 66c. R 330b5 (= 660.5) introduces v. 68 as an alternative under the presupposition that even something that is not a cause can be a support: *yaṅ na rgyu ma yin pa yaṅ rten yin no źe bya ba 'di khas len na ... .*

5) Verse 68 is quoted and criticized in *NBhū* p. 125.1f.

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[1] I assume that *dravyadūṣaṇādau* is an interpolation because *-dūṣaṇa-* seems redundant. Furthermore, to single out the criticism of substance among further specific criticisms (*-ādi*) is problematic because according to Vaiśeṣika categoriology substances certainly possess movement, i.e., cannot be subsumed under things "that lack movement."

6) P 81.12-82.15: "[Objection:] A certain spot on the ground *(bhūpradeśa)* is observed to be a sustainer *(ādhāra)*[2] of water, etc.[3] And what is observed cannot be sublated also by reason of conceptual construction.[4] Therefore, the skillful formulation *(vācoyukti)*[5] [in v. 63, namely,] *'because both existing and non-existing [things] do not rest on [anything as their support]'* is useless, because [it] is sublated by [something] observed.[6]
[Reply:] On the above [objection] as well he says: ... (vv. 66cd-68).
It is indeed correct that in both alternatives of existence and inexistence [of water, etc.] the ground, etc., are not sustainers of water, etc., also.[7] Therefore, the example is not observed *(adṛṣṭo dṛṣṭāntaḥ).*
[Objection:] Since [the ground, etc.] are observed to be sustainers, how is [it] not observed?
[Reply:] You [only] imagine [that something is] observed in respect to [something] not observed.[8] A [well-known] rule [says][9]: In respect to an

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[2] As far as I can see, *ādhāra* is only a special case of *āśraya;* in the Tibetan translation here it is usually rendered as *rten,* only rarely as *gẑi.*

[3] Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1.

[4] Sāṅkṛityāyana suggests to read *vikalpakāraṇena* instead of *vikalpanaṃ tenāpi* on the basis of the Tibetan translation. However, **vikalpahetunāpi* seems to be more suitable as underlying the present corruption. I understand the hypothetical *-hetunā* as a periphrastic case-ending.

[5] Literally: "the [appropriate] arrangement/fitting/joining together of speech."

[6] Cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 37a7 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a3: *gal te rten daṅ brten pa'i tha sñad mthoṅ ba ji ltar na ston par nus pa ẑe na* | ... .

[7] Read *-ābhāvo;* $P_{(Pe)}$ 87b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 73a7 presents a slightly different construction: *chu la sogs pa la yaṅ sa gẑi la sogs pa yod pa daṅ med pa'i phyogs dag gi rten du mi 'thad pa'i phyir dpe mthoṅ ba med do* ‖.

[8] This translation follows the interpretation of the Tibetan translators; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 78b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 73b1: *ma mthoṅ ba ñid la khyed mthoṅ bar mṅon par rlom pa yin no* ‖ ($P_{(Pe)}$: *pa yin te* |). However, one could also interpret *adṛṣṭa* as a nominative and construe two phrases: "[It] is not observed at all. You [only] imagine [that it is] observed."

[9] Prajñākaragupta seems to refer to *KV* on 1.4.45: *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kriyāśrayabhūtayor dhāraṇakriyāṃ prati ya ādhāras tatkārakam adhikaraṇasaṃjñaṃ bhavati.* Cf. also Jinendrabuddhi's commentary *Nyāsa* thereon (p. 561.26-29).

action, that which is the sustainer because it holds/bears agent and object [is expressed by the locative case-ending]. And holding/bearing [is effected] for [something that would otherwise be] falling *(patat)*.[10] But what[ever] falls is not held and what[ever] is held is not seen to fall, for falling and non-falling are in mutual contradiction to each other *(parasparavirodha)*.
[Objection: There is no mutual contradiction because the same thing can] fall earlier and not fall later.
[Reply:] Then that which falls is not [the same as that which is] held, for [they] are not apprehended by perception *(pratyakṣa)* as one. One and the same agent of remaining *(avasthātṛ)*[11] is not apprehended as pervading *(vyāpin)* falling and [its] opposite (i.e., non-falling). And [if it] is not pervading [both states], how is it an agent of remaining? For [only] when one apprehends '[It] remains also now,' an agent of remaining is apprehended as such.
[Objection:] It is apprehended as pervading gradually *(krameṇa)*.[12]

The Tibetan translation ($P_{(Pe)}$ 87b5 = $P_{(De)}$ 73b1) has no equivalent to *dhāraṇāt,* but the Sanskrit reading is corroborated by *Nyāsa* 561.28: ... *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kriyāśrayayor dhāraṇāt.* Together with the fact that Jinendrabuddhi quotes only *kriyāṃ prati ya ādhāraḥ*, not *dhāraṇa-kriyāṃ prati* ... (cf. also the close paraphrase *Nyāsa* 561.30-31: *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kriyādhāra-bhūtayor dhāraṇāt kriyāyā abhimukho ya ādhāraḥ* ...), this reading corroborates that *KV* 84.9 has to be corrected to read ... *dhāraṇāt kriyāṃ prati* ... (cf. also variant 9 recorded from two sources: *dhāraṇāṃ*), a correction necessitated by reasons of content. This would mean that Prajñākaragupta's formulation is based entirely on the *KV* itself and does not necessarily draw on the *Nyāsa*; thus, the tempting conjecture of *nyāsaḥ* for *nyāyaḥ* becomes less likely. Besides, it would imply an early corruption of the text because the Tibetan translation clearly presupposes *nyāyaḥ* (*lugs*).

The examples given by the *KV* for sustainers of agent and object are "He sits on the mat *(kaṭa āste)*" and "He cooks [rice] in the pot *(sthālyāṃ pacati)*" respectively. Cf. also *VP Sādhanasamuddeśa* p. 348, v. 148.

I am indebted for the above references to the kindness of Prof. T. Yagi, Kyoto.

[10] Cf. *NAVV* 50.15-18.

[11] I assume that *avasthātṛ* is used here as a close equivalent to *sthātṛ* in v. 63d. However, in this context remaining at the same place and remaining the same through different states *(avasthā)*, such as falling and non-falling, seem to be emphasized more than mere continuity in time.

[12] That is, one and the same thing is apprehended as pervading different states one after the other, namely, falling and non-falling.

[Reply:] One should reflect on what is meant by gradation. The designation 'gradation' [refers] only to being and non-being. And this [designation refers] to [being and non-being] that [must] belong to different times. Further, being and non-being [could belong] either to the apprehended *(grāhya)* or to the apprehender *(grāhaka)*. If the apprehended is connected to both being and non-being, [it] is not one.[13] If the apprehender is gradual [by connection to being and non-being], the apprehended too [would be] that (i.e., gradual). Consequently [in this case too], the agent of remaining that is the apprehended [object] is not one. Therefore, a certain [thing] has been apprehended that is past,[14] a certain [other thing] is being apprehended that is present,[15] a certain [other thing] has its apprehension in the future. Therefore, gradation [belongs] merely [to] the realm of conceptual construction *(vikalpagocara)*. How [could] gradation be perceptible, so that it [could] be said on the basis of perception *(upalambha)* that there is a relation between sustainer and sustained? And thus, the following is the meaning [of the statement in v. 63] *'because both existing and non-existing [things] do not rest on [anything as their support]'*[16]: The relationship between sustainer and sustained is not at all observed. Therefore, this is only a conceptual construction of the relation between sustainer and sustained.

[Objection:][17] How then could there be even a conceptual construction of sustainer and sustained without seeing this [relationship before]?[18]

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[13] Read: *-saṅgame naikatvam;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a2 = $P_{(De)}$ 73b4: ... *'brel na ni gcig ñid ma yin no* ‖.

[14] Read *gṛhītam atītaṃ.*

[15] Insert *idānīntanaṃ* or similar; $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a3 = $P_{(De)}$ 73b5: ... *da ltar 'dzin te* ‖.

[16] Read *cānāśrayāt.*

[17] This objection and the reply thereon are summarized in *NAVV* 50.19-21.

[18] $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a5 = $P_{(De)}$ 73b7 has two equivalents for *katham* that may be due to corruption within the transmission of the Tibetan text itself: *'o na ji ltar rten daṅ brten pa'i dṅos por rtog pa yaṅ de mthoṅ ba med par ji ltar 'gyur źe na* |.

[Reply: If this were so] then it [would] follow that there could be no erroneous conceptual construction.[19]

Moreover, the arising of *things* that perish *at every moment* [and that normally would] arise at respectively different places at the place of the material [cause] is effected by a junction with a sustainer.[20] Therefore *something,* such as the ground, etc.,[21] *[is called] support* (i.e., sustainer) *for the arising in such a manner, because it is [its] cause.*[22] [Something] is called sustainer when there is a special state of the cause itself,[23] inasmuch as one imposes a unity of the previous and the posterior. For when the unity is superimposed, one does not apprehend the arising (i.e., one does not perceive that what seems as a lasting object is actually a succession of things that arise one after the other), and one superimposes the apprehension of the previous [moment on that of the present moment].[24] Thus, [this is] a false conceptual construction *(mithyāvikalpa)* due to the capacity[25] of beginningless traces *(anādivāsanā).* Precisely for this [reason], [i.e.] because [this false conceptual construction] has become active due to the respectively previous traces,

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[19] I construe *bhavitavyam* with *-kalpanayā,* following the Tibetan translation.

[20] Cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 37a8f. = $D_{(De)}$ 33a4f.

[21] Read *bhūtalā-*.

[22] If one understands *tathotpatteḥ* as an ablative, one should translate: "Therefore, [i.e.] *because of the arising in such a manner, something,* such as the ground, etc., *[is called] support* (i.e., sustainer) *because it is the cause [of this arising]."* This seems to be corroborated by the Tibetan translation; cf. n. 1) above.

[23] Perhaps one should read *-sthāyām* since the locative is used in a similar formulation in P 80.1-2: *sarvātmanotpāde kāraṇam ucyate, kasyacid dharmasyotpāda ādhārādiḥ.* $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a2 *(... gnas skabs khyad par can gyi rgyu ñid la ...)* seems to presuppose an interpretation of *viśiṣṭāvastha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *hetu;* however, in this case the text should read *viśiṣṭāvasthasya,* not *viśiṣṭāvasthāyāḥ.* The translation has therefore to be viewed as clarifying that one speaks of 'support' in respect to the cause, and not in respect to its special state, although "special state" appears in the locative case.

[24] Perhaps one has to read *grahaṇaṃ* instead of *kāraṇaṃ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a2: ... *sṅa ma 'dzin par yaṅ sgro btags pa'i phyir* |.

[25] Read *-sāmarthyena;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a2: ... *bag chags kyi mthu las* ... .

the other world is well-established as a beginningless series [of cognition]. Thus, an undesired consequence has resulted [for you].[26] To explain:

> 489. Every mental conceptual construction arises from a previous cognition[27] without having an external object *(nirālambanabhāvena),* just like the conceptual construction of water in respect to sunrays.

The conceptual construction of unity in respect to the previous and the posterior does not follow the existence of an external object *(ālambanabhāvānvayin),* because the unity does not exist.[28]
[Objection: Even without real unity the conceptual construction does refer to and arise from externals objects, because it] may arise from more than one thing, for it is observed[29] that [the conceptual construction is] the effect of these [several things that have been apprehended before one after the other]. [Reply:] This is not true. For the conceptual construction of water in respect to sunrays does not depend on (or: is not conditioned by) that much alone (i.e., on previous and posterior instances of sunrays alone), for [it] arises from traces [left by] the previous seeing of water. And the [apparent] unity [of the alleged gradual object] has not been perceived before either. Therefore, in another [previous] life as well this [same] conceptual construction of unity is preceded by the apprehension of unity in another [previous] life, [and] that [previous conceptual construction] too is so. Thus, [one obtains] a beginningless succession of conceptual constructions.[30] Therefore, the

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[26] Read *aniṣṭam;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a3: *mi 'dod pa.* The conjecture, however, is not absolutely necessary, for one may also interpret: "... a desired [consequence] has resulted [for us]."

[27] Read *-jñāna-* instead of *-hetu-?* Cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88b1 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a3: *sṅon gyi śes pa las 'byuṅ ste* |. Metrically both *hetu* and *jñāna* are acceptable; the Skt reading also makes sense, because in the present context Prajñākaragupta emphasizes that a trace *(vāsanā)* (rather than a cognition) is the cause of conceptual construction. Cf. P 82.1-2: *anādivāsanāsāmarthye-* <*na*> *mithyāvikalpaḥ.*

[28] Note that this sentence is translated as a half-verse in the Tibetan translation.

[29] Read *dṛṣṭeḥ;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88b3 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a4: ... *mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro źe na* |.

[30] Read *-kalpanāparamparety;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 88b4 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a5: ... *rtog pa brgyud pa yin pas* ($P_{(Pe)}$: *pa)* ... .

beginningless series of a living being is established *(anādiprāṇisantānasiddhi)*. In the same manner the cognition that is connected to the apprehension of the Self, etc. *(ātmādigrahayoginī)*, which arises in such a manner as having a beginningless series, is not cut off even by another [thing/cognition] (or: even at a later [time]). Thus, *saṃsāra* has neither beginning nor end.
Moreover, ... (v. 68).
For it is correct [to say that] for water, etc., the cause which prevents movement is the sustainer,[31] but *of what use are sustainers for qualities, universals and actions that lack movement*, [i.e.] that are devoid of action? And consciousness *(caitanya)* is either a quality or a universal or otherwise an action. In all [these] modes [consciousness] is devoid of action. Therefore, no purpose [is served] by a sustainer for it. Therefore, the cognition that does not have to be sustained[32] is not destroyed by the destruction of the sustainer. It only abides together [with the body for a while] *(sahasthānamātraka)*.[33] And how [it] abides together [with it] has been explained above (cf. v. 62)."

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[31] Delete *ādhātur* which has no equivalent in $P_{(Pe)}$ 88b6 = $P_{(De)}$ 74a7. Cf. also R 330b5 = 660.5.

[32] Read *'nādheyasya.*

[33] This paragraph is summarized in *NAVV* 50.22-25.

etena samavāyaś ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam |
vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyāder[1] *nirastam anapāśrayāt* ||69||

[1] Mi: *jātyādern*

"By that (i.e., by the rejection of the relation between sustainer and sustained) inherence and the cause characterized by inherence [as well as] the fact that the universal, etc., are situated in [certain individuals] are rejected, because [things] do not have a support."

1) I fail to see the difference between *(an)apāśraya* and *āśraya* in this context; neither the Tibetan translation *(rten med phyir)* nor any of the commentators seem to make a distinction between the two words. Cf. also *PV* III 151.

2) The interpretation of this verse by the commentators illustrates nicely their ambivalence concerning the identity of the opponent discussed in some detail in chapter V above. On the one hand, while commenting on the first half of the verse they mention *ātman,* etc., as an example for *samavāyikāraṇa;* cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 37b4 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a7: *bdag la sogs pa 'phrod pa 'du ba can rgyu daṅ* |, and M 31.26f.: *samavāyikāraṇaṃ ca svasamavetakāryajanakaṃ, yathā – ātmādi buddhyādīnām.* Thus, it would seem that the opponent must be a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. On the other hand, while commenting on the second half of the verse they seem to bring the Cārvāka back into the discussion; cf. $D_{(Pe)}$ 37b5-6 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a7f.: *'byuṅ ba rnams la brten nas sems ñid gnas pa'am* | *'byuṅ ba las gyur ba'i gzugs źes bya ba* ..., and M 32.8-9: *vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyādeḥ kāsucid eva vyaktiṣu gotvaṃ vartate keṣucic ca dehākārapariṇateṣu caitanyam ityādi nirastam.* Prajñākaragupta's comments (cf. below) concerning the first half of the verse are not conclusive, for he does not specify in what the cognition is supposed to inhere. It is reasonable to assume, however, that he does not follow D because the opponent implies that the cognition, just as a quality, would be destroyed when its cause characterized by inherence is destroyed. Thus, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent is ruled out, for the soul cannot be destroyed. While commenting on the second half of the verse, the body is explicitly mentioned, and thus he gives the impression

of having a materialist in mind as the target of the verse. Similarly R 331a4-5 = 661.4-5 repeats P 82.28-29.

3) P 82.16-31: "[Objection:] Just as a quality inheres [in a substance] even though [it] lacks movement, in the same manner the cognition too inheres [in the body(?)]; and an inhering quality does not last without the cause characterized by inherence. [Thus,] when the [cause] is destroyed, [the quality] must be destroyed.
[Reply: No,] without obstruction of movement, etc., there is no relationship between sustainer and sustained *(ādhārādheyabhāva),* [and] without relationship between sustainer and sustained there is no inherence, because, as [you] say [yourself]:[1] 'Inherence is the [necessary] condition[2] for the cognition 'here'[3] regarding things that are established inseparately[4] [and] stand in a relationship of sustainer and sustained.'[5] [Dharmakīrti] says exactly that [with the following verse]: ... (v. 69).
Even though the universal, etc.,[6] inhere [in individuals], it is not [the case that they] do not exist without a [certain] individual that [serves as] sustainer [because they continue to exist in other individuals].
[Objection:] Because the universal is eternal, it is not inexistent when [its] sustainer does not exist.

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[1] *yataḥ ... iti vacanāt* seems to be a contaminated construction.

[2] Since *nibandhana* is a neuter noun, either one has to emend the text to read *-nibandhanaṃ* or assume that it is not used as a noun, but as an adjective here, in the yet unattested meaning "conditioning."

[3] Read *ihabuddhi-*.

[4] Read *'yutasiddhānām.*

[5] Cf. *PDhS* 773.3-4: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ;* cf. also $D_{(Pe)}$ 37b3-4 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a6-7: *rten daṅ brten pa'i dṅos po dgag pa bśad ma thag pa des ni tha mi dad par grub pa dag gi rten daṅ brten pa'i dṅos po'i mtshan ñid can | 'phrod pa 'du ba daṅ |.*

[6] Read *jātyāder*; cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 89a4 = $P_{(De)}$ 74b4: *rigs la sogs pa ...* . $D_{(Pe)}$ 37b5 = $D_{(De)}$ 33a7 subsumes *dharmas* residing in a *dharmin* under *-ādi* in v. 69c: *sogs pa smos pa ni chos can 'di la chos 'di gnas pa ...* . R 331a2-3 = 661.2-3 includes *ākāśa,* movement, numbers, etc.: *sogs pa'i sgras ni nam mkha' daṅ | 'gro ba daṅ gcig pa ñid la sogs pa'o* **|**.

[Reply:] The cognition too [is not inexistent when its alleged sustainer does not exist] because [it] is bound to another cause. Thus, it is the same [in both cases].[7] But there is no relationship between sustainer and sustained. Precisely *by that,* [i.e.] by the rejection of the relationship between sustainer and sustained, [i.e.] because of [that] rejection, *inherence* is rejected *and the cause characterized by inherence* is rejected. If [the cause characterized by inherence] is a cause, there is no relationship between sustainer and sustained [between it and its effect]. If it is not a cause, it is not the cause characterized by inherence [either]. And if it is claimed that *the universal, etc., are situated in [certain individuals]* even without [the individual] being[8] a cause, that too is rejected.

Or [one can explain v. 69cd as follows]: Even if [they] inhere [in other things] it is rejected *that* [the universal, etc.] *are situated,* [i.e., that they] are situated there alone (i.e., are restricted). For even though the universal rests on[9] an individual, [it] is not situated there alone, because it follows (i.e., is connected with) another individual too. In the same manner, even if consciousness rests on [a body],[10] when [one] (i.e., the present) body is absent, it will follow another body (i.e., be connected with a future body). Thus, the other world is not unproved *(na paralokāsiddhiḥ).* Even if one body is absent, the arising[11] of such a cognition (i.e., a cognition that can follow or move to another body) is not contradicted, just like a conforming cognition [such as "(This is) a cow"] with regard to another individual as well [is not contradicted, by which cognition you want to prove that a universal is connected with another individual as well].

Therefore, except for the relationship between cause and effect there is no relationship whatsoever between support and what rests on it."

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7 The Tibetan translation has no equivalent for *iti*: "Because the cognition too is bound to another cause, it is the same [in both cases]."

8 $P_{(Pe)}$ 89a7 = $P_{(De)}$ 74b6 (... *rgyu med par ...),* however, corresponds to the smoother reading **kāraṇam antareṇa*. It also lacks an equivalent for *api*.

9 $P_{(Pe)}$ 89a8 = $P_{(De)}$ 74b7 *('phrod pa 'dus pa)* presupposes *samavetatve* instead of *samāśritatve*. The same discrepancy occurs in the next sentence.

10 Cf. the previous note.

11 Read *-utpādo* instead of *-upādāno;* cf. $P_{(Pe)}$ 89b2 = $P_{(De)}$ 75a1: ... *blo skye ba ni* ... .

parato bhāvanāśaś cet tasya kiṃ sthitihetunā |
sa vinaśyed vināpy anyair aśaktāḥ[1] *sthitihetavaḥ* ||70||
sthitimān sāśrayaḥ[2] *sarvaḥ sarvotpattā*[3] *ca sāśrayaḥ* |
tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya na vināśaḥ kadācana ||71||
svayaṃ vinaśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ |
svayaṃ na naśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ ||72||

[1] PV$_P$: *anyairnna śaktāḥ;* Mi: *anyairn na śaktāḥ*
[2] PV$_M$: *sthitimān nāśrayaḥ*
[3] PV$_P$, PV$_M$ and Mi: *sarvotpattau*, but PV$_{Tib}$, PV$_{P(Tib)}$, PV$_R$ and PV$_D$: *skye ba can kun;* cf. also M 32.17-18: *sarvotpattā[v a]<ca> sarvaś cotpadyamānaḥ ...*

"If a thing is destroyed because of another [thing], of what use is the cause of continuity for it?
[If] it would be destroyed [by itself] even without other [things involved], the causes of continuity are incapable.
Everything that has a support lasts, and every agent of arising has a support. Therefore, no thing [would] ever be destroyed.
If [a thing] has by itself a nature that is perishable, what other [thing could] cause it to continue?
If [a thing] does not have by itself a nature that is perishable, what other [thing should] cause it to continue?"

1) These verses are translated by Hayes, "Dharmakīrti on Rebirth," p. 127. I am not sure whether we interpret v. 70 in the same manner.

2) P does not comment on these verses, which he merely characterizes as summarizing verses *(saṅgrahaśloka);* cf. also M 32.11.

3) M 32.15-22 on v. 71: "Moreover, *every* thing *that has a support lasts* [as long as the support lasts].[1] Among these, whatever things have an eternal support, such as pleasure, etc., that rest on the Soul, all [these] would last eternally, because [the entity] that causes [their] continuity continues forever. Certain [other things] have a non-eternal support, for instance a white

[1] Read *sthitimān sāśrayaḥ.*

[colour], etc.,[2] that rest on a substance which is [itself] a result *(kārya-dravya)* [and as such non-eternal]. *And every agent of arising,*[3] [i.e.] and everything that arises, *has a support.* Thus, substance, etc., too have a support. And their support too, [i.e.] a part like a half of a pot *(kapāla)*, etc., inheres in [its] parts,[4] and these [parts as further wholes] in other [parts], and so on until the atoms that are the final support. [And] because the [atoms] are eternal, the double atom *(dvyaṇuka)* that rests on them is eternal. Thus, by this succession the quality[5] too would be eternal. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti] says: *Therefore, no thing,* such as the cognition, etc., white [colour], etc., would *ever be destroyed.*"[6]

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[2] Read *śuklādiḥ* instead of *śuklatvādiḥ?* Cf. also M 32.22.

[3] Read *sarvotpattā ca sarvaś* instead of *sarvotpattāv asarvaś.* The agent noun *utpattṛ* is not recorded in any of the dictionaries available to me, but there is no reason why it should not be formed on the analogy of e.g., *pratipattṛ*. Dharmakīrti also uses the rather rare *sthātṛ* in the present context.

[4] Maybe one should read *avayaveṣu* instead of *avayaviṣu.* If this conjecture is not accepted, one can also translate: "... inheres in [further] wholes [as its parts], and these [wholes] in other [parts], ..."

[5] Read *guṇo* instead of *guṇe.*

[6] This interpretation of v. 71 is based on $D_{(Pe)}$ 38a3-5 = $D_{(De)}$ 33b5-7, without the introduction to 71cd (ll. 5-6 = l. 7): *gaṅ gi phyir sems la sogs pa 'byuṅ ba'i chos rnams kyaṅ 'byuṅ ba rnams kyi raṅ bźin 'jig pa med pa'i phyir gnas pa de ltar na 'jig pa med pa ñid yin pa de'i phyir* ... . "Because properties of the elements too, such as the cognition, etc., [would] last, that is, be without destruction, because the own nature of the elements is without destruction, *therefore* ... ."

1. Corrections and Conjectures to the Sanskrit Text of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*

The vast majority of the following conjectures is based on the Tibetan translation of which the relevant passages are quoted in the notes to the translation. False punctuation (i.e., *daṇḍas* at the wrong places) and irregular *sandhi* (e.g., *ṃ* at the end of a sentence) have not been noted, because they are too numerous and mostly trivial. All conjectures are, of course, tentative, but to distinguish various degrees of probability I sometimes add "?" to indicate that a conjecture is probable but not at all certain. The uncertainty involved is mainly of two kinds that are not mutually exclusive: Either the conjecture is not absolutely necessary and the text can also be read as it stands, or the conjecture is necessary but the suggested emendation is not the only one possible. Numbers refer to pages and lines of Sāṅkṛityāyana's edition.

53.8-9	*burddher: buddher*
53.15	*karuṇābhyāsāt: abhyāsāt sā*
53.16	Lacuna (before and after *duḥkha?)*
53.18	Delete *sva-*.
53.21	*matatrayam: etat trayam?*
53.24	*āśrayaṇasya: buddher āśrayatvasya*
54.4-5	*viṣayendriya(śarīra) sañjñā: śarīraviṣayendriyasañjñā*
54.5	*viśeṣa(saṃbhūta): viśeṣaḥ; śarādi-: śarīrādi-*
54.11	Transpose *rasa* and *śabda?*
54.13	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 3.
53.14	*rūpādīnyabhidheyaṃ: rūpādīnīty abhidheyaṃ*
54.21	*-śarīrādy-:* delete -ādy-? Join *anvaya* to the compound *vyatireka-*.
54.29	*anyathā mātā-: anyathāmātā-*
54.30	*nirapekṣān: nirapekṣāṇāṃ; yuktaṃ: na yuktaṃ* (as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 7)
54.31	*mātāpitrādiśarīram: mātāpitṛśarīram?*
55.2	*anumānaparicchedād: pramāṇaparicchedād?*
55.5	*abhyāsambhavi-: abhyāsasambhavi-*
55.11	*bhyāsād (hi): tathābhyāsād*
55.13	*jñāyate: jāyate*

55.14	*tathā sthitiḥ: tathā sthitaḥ* or *tathāsthitiḥ*
55.15	*iha janma-: ihajanma-*
55.16	*atītābhyasasyā-: atītābhyāsasyā-*
55.18-20	Delete *-pūrvakatvam api ... deśāntarābhyāsa-*.
55.20	*tautopākhyānam: bhautopākhyānam*
55.21	*tautaḥ: bhautaḥ; sambhavaṃ: sambhavaḥ*
55.22	*sthitiḥ: sthiteḥ*
55.26	*sakala: sakalaṃ*
56.1	*samānajātīyabhāva-: samānajātīya-?*
56.6	*anu'māna-: anumāna-*
56.7	*acāpalatvāt: acāpalāt?*
56.8	Lacuna after *tatas tato,* cf. the translation in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 2, in which, however, delete *iva,* and read *prabandha* or *anubandha,* rather than *pratibandha; dhūmamad: dhūmād.*
56.9	*ca: ceti*
56.10	*sāpāty: sāpīty;* take *anādi* outside the compound.
56.14	*-prabuddhaś: -prabuddhasya; -ābhimukhī: -ābhimukkhī-*
56.22	*tadabhāvāt: yadabhāvāt;*
56.24	*ayam eva: ayam eva vyāghāto?*
57.1	*asākalyena: asākalye na*
57.2	Delete *iti cet?*
57.3	Second *darsānaṃ: niścayaḥ?*
57.4	*anvaya-: advaya-*
57.6	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 3.
57.7	*vijñāpti-: vijñapti-*
57.9	*upalpava* (x3): *upaplava; evam: eva; praśamasya: praśama-*
57.12	Delete *saṃsārasya?*
57.13	*upalpava: upaplava*
57.13-14	*bāhyarthatvevā nādir: bāhyārthatve vānādir*
57.16	*viśeṣaḥ: viśeṣāḥ*
57.23	*vibhāgena: avibhāgena*
57.24	*yadi: yat;* also read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 6.
57.25	*parimnā: parisrāvya*
57.26	*vyavasthāpitām: vyavasthāpitam*
57.27	*vailakṣyaṇyaṃ: vailakṣaṇyaṃ*
57.30	*-rūpa bījāt: -rūpabījāt; dṛṣṭo: iṣṭo; (')niyataḥ: niyataḥ*
57.31	*santy atra: sarvatra*
58.6	Delete one *na* (probably after *manovijñānaṃ).*

58.9	*aivaṣṭā: eveṣṭā*
58.20	*prāsāda-: prasāda-*
58.23	*kasya cit: kasyacit*
58.28	Lacuna after *pratyabhijñāyamāno;* delete *sti* and add **nānyathāstīty avagamaḥ,* after which the section from p. 59.4-7 has to be inserted, and *naitad asti* should be added.
58.30	Read *vikāreṇa* and delete *iti?*
59.1	Delete *na.*
59.4-7	has to be moved to p. 58.28, cf. above.
59.7	*mano dainyādi: manodainyādi*
59.14	*vāk: ca* or *vā?*
59.15	*-rūpā buddhim: -rūpāṃ buddhim* or *-rūpabuddhim*
59.16	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 2.
59.17	*śarīrendriyāṇāṃ: indriyāṇāṃ*
59.17	*tuṣṇā: tṛṣṇā*
59.24	*ātmagrahas tāsāṃ:* perhaps *ātmagrahagrastā sā*
60.1	*api: iti*
60.10	*anyonyahetukatvam: anyonyahetutvam?*
60.13	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 2.
60.23	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 4.
60.26	Delete *(na).*
60.28	*tathā bhūtena: tathābhūtena*
61.3	*tat kāryaṃ: tatkāryam?*
61.4	*kramavataḥ kāraṇaṃ: kramavat kāraṇam*
61.7	*-lakṣaṇatāyāḥ: -tāyāḥ*
61.9	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 5, but delete second *na.*
61.12	*samarthopi: samarthe 'pi*
61.14	*tasyāparatantratve: tasya paratantratve*
61.17	*samartha: samarthe*
61.19	Delete *ca (?na).*
61.20f.	All signs above the line are missing in my edition (i.e., *i ī o au* read like ā; *e* reads like *a,* etc.), but they can easily be guessed.
61.21	*yaś ca svayam eva na bhavati: *yaś ca yena na (ni)vāryate* or similar
61.23	*-kṣaṇātpattas: -kṣaṇotpattitas*
61.26	*diśaṣa-: viśeṣa-*
61.27	*'nityatāvyatirikta-: 'nityatā| vyatirikta-*
62.2	*-anitya[tva?]m|*

62.7	*apekṣyatve: apekṣyatvaṃ*
62.26	*vijñānam aihikād api: vijñānam aihikam| aihikavijñānād api*
63.12	*parasparaparihāralakṣaṇo: parasparaparihāraṣthitilakṣaṇo*
63.16	*aikatra: ekatra*
63.18	*pratisāndhir: pratisandhir*
63.22	*arhannahyabhyu-: arhann abhyu-*
63.29	*kva cittena-: kvacit tena-*
64.2	Insert *tad āha* before the verse.
64.7	*viparyayāsiddhiḥ: viparyayasiddhiḥ*
64.8	*athāhetur: atha hetu-* or *hetor*
64.10	*-cittatvād: -cittatvād ity; uyanyastaḥ: upanyastaḥ*
64.11	*hetutve tu: hetuḥ, hetutvenoktaṃ* or similar?
64.13	*pratibodhe: pratiṣedhe*
64.16	*hetulyavaikalya-: hetuvaikalya-*
64.28	*-sāri hi mano: -sāriṇi sati*
64.29	*-sāri manaḥ svabhāvam: -sārimanaḥsvabhāvam*
65.1	*vanhir: vahnir; dhūmajanana-: dhūmabhasmajanana-*
65.2	Delete *ca.*
65.5	*tadvyāpārī: tadvyāpāro*
65.9	*puro vyava-: purovyava-*
65.10	*-ākāracakṣurvijñānavijñānaṃ: -ākāraṃ*
65.16	Delete first (|); *samudāyasyakābhāve: samudāyasyaikābhāve.*
65.25	*cetanataḥ: cetayantaḥ*
65.26	*paribaddhatve: pratibaddhatve; yasyāt: syāt*
65.28	*yakṣākṣāṇāṃ: yathākṣāṇāṃ*
65.32	*viśleṣādi nāma na stimita-: viṣaśleṣmādinā manasas timita-*, or better: *manasaḥ stimita-*
65.34	*ālambamānā: ālambyamānā*
66.3	*vedyate: vidyate*
66.8	*nivartakaḥ: nirvartakaḥ, nivartakaṃ: nirvartakam*
66.9	*nivartakatvaṃ: nirvartakatvam*
66.12	*nirvartako: nirvartanena nirvartyaphalasya nirvartako; nityaṃ: katham upakāriṇī. nityaṃ* (or similar)
66.14	*iti: iti yuktaṃ*
66.14-15	*tannivṛttyāpi: tannivṛttāv api(?)*
66.16	*āsta eva: āstaiva*
70.1	*dravatā lakṣaṇa-: dravatādilakṣaṇa-*

70.8 *bhasmāva-: bhasmādyava-; dehetu tathā bhūta: dehe tu tathābhūta*
70.12 Delete *atra.*
70.13 *prāṇapānau: prāṇāpānau*
70.14 *utpanno: utpannau*
70.20 *ato: atas tau*
70.22 *svāpa-: svāpādi-*
70.23 *na hi tatra tathābhāva eva hi: na hi tatkāraṇaṃ tadabhāve bhavati?* followed by a lacuna.
70.27 *na svarūpaṃ na svarūpam: na svarūpam| svarūpam*
70.31 *anivṛttir: nivṛttir*
71.1 *'tibarddhamāne: 'bhivardhamāne*
71.8 *cetaḥ kāraṇe: cetaḥkāraṇe*
71.12 *pūrvacittasattāmātrakād: pūrvacittasantānasattāmātrakād??; saṃskārabījasañjñitasya: saṃskāravāsanāsañjñitasya??*
71.14 *siddha-: middha-*
71.15 *siddha-:middha-;vāsanāprabodhacitratvāt:vāsanāprabodhapratyayacitratvāt?*
71.16 *vosanā-: vāsanā-; -tvād dhi ni-: -tvād vini-?*
71.17 *anyatho-: anyathā-*
71.18 *siddha-: middha-*
71.19 Insert *tatra* after *yuktam*
71.20 *ca: vā?*
71.23 *-vala-: -bala- ; prapaścaḥ: prapañcaḥ; -kṛtāṃ: -kṛtā*
71.24 *-pravaṇa-: -prabala-*
71.26 *nāsatyāḥ: nāsatyā*
71.27 *-otsaṅgo-: -otsargo-*
71.31 *eva: ekam eva?*
71.33 *itiṣyate: itīṣyate*
72.1 *bālādibhāvena: bālādivilakṣaṇabhāvena*
72.2 *-valāc: -balāc*
72.5 *sañcāropi: sañcāro 'py asatyaḥ?*
72.7 Read *jagratā nopalabhyata; nopalabhya: nopalabhyata.*
72.12 The word order is doubtful. *sādharaṇopalambhe ca* reflects probably a correction or a later interpolation in the margin, to be inserted before *tatra.*
72.13 *paro 'satyatodayaḥ: paraḥ satyatodayaḥ*
72.19 *maraṇāntaraṃ: maraṇānantaraṃ; pratīta: pratītam*

72.21	*-rūpañ: -rūpaś*
72.22	*-saṃskṛtacittam* is uncertain.
72.23	*iha śarīre: ihaśarīre; anumā-: anumāna-*
72.24	*anumāt: anumānāt*
72.31	*grāmānta-: grāmāntara-*
72.32	*aparas tathābhūto grāmāntarād : aparais tathābhūtadeśād*
72.33f.	*-ābhirasādeva lokād: -ābhiramād devādilokād*
73.4	Insert *yathā* before *deśa-*.
73.7	*-sañcāratyāgau satya-: -sañcāre 'tyāgasatya-?*
73.8	*svapna-: 'svapna-*
73.9	*tu: tad? kṛtā: kṛtam*
73.10	*śarīram antareṇa: śarīra(pari?)tyāgam antareṇa*
73.11	*satya-: 'satya-*
73.17	*-janmanaḥ* seems corrupt.
73.20	*śarīraparityāgaḥ: śarīrāparityāgaḥ*
73.27-28	*tathā cāto: yathā cāto*
73.31	*svapnān na vi-: svapnād avi-*
73.32	*yadi: iti*
74.1	*-ādiviśeṣaḥ: -ādimātraviśeṣaḥ?*
74.7	*ta: na*
74.8	*anivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ: nānivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ* or perhaps *anivṛttiprasaṅgo na*
74.11	*-vikāradarśanāt: -vikārādarśanāt*
74.15	*viguṇatve: 'viguṇatve; gṛhe py apunar: dṛṣṭāpi punar-?? gṛhyeta punar-??*
74.16	*vaiguṇye vinivartate: vaiguṇyavinivartane*
74.19	*-taratva-: -tara-?*
74.28	*cikitsā-: na cikitsā-;* lacuna after *-pravartanāt.*
74.30	Delete *api?*
74.31	*doṣānivartya-: doṣā nivartya-*
75.3	*apunarbhāva-: apunarbhāvi-?*
75.4	*suvarṇo: suvarṇe;* lacuna after *tathā*, probably *tathābhūtātathābhūtavikārakāri.*
75.4-5	*atrānyasya: atrādyasya*
75.5	*vāyor: vā yo; sonyo: so 'lpo*
75.6	*abhidravatāpi: atidravatāpi*
75.16	*tathā: tadā*
75.19	*rahitam: rahitatvam*

75.20	*suptasyāpi: suptād api??*
75.28	*tathā vidhāḥ: tathāvidhāḥ*
75.29	*samāne hi: samāne 'pi; buddhayo: buddhyādayo?*
75.34	*vidyamānatā: vidyamānatā *buddhyabhāvāt? sahakaraṇa-: sahakāryakaraṇa-?*
76.7	*prabodhosya: prabodho 'sya*
76.9	*-sparśavijñānādikam: -sparśādijñānarūpam?*
76.11	*saṃskārā: saṃskārād*
76.12	*sukhādi: sukhādi-*
76.13	*-kāriṇāṃ (śa)strādi-: -kāriśastrādi-*
76.15	*prasaṅgāt tu: prasaṅga iti*
76.19	*kṛteḥ: kṛtaḥ; sa: syāt*
76.22	*pratyāneyatvavikāram: pratyāneyatvam? pratyāneyavikāratvam?*
76.26	*susādhyatā: asādhyatā; -nivartanaṃ sam-: -nivartanasam-; cā'bhāvād: cābhāvād, durlabhatvād* or *ca durlabhatvād, abhāvād?*
76.27	Read perhaps *atha* or similar after iti; lacuna after *-ujjīvanam: *tad asad yatah.*
76.30	*asādhyaṃ: asādhyatvaṃ; āyuḥ: āyuḥ-*
77.2	*doṣavikāra-: doṣe vikāra-*
77.6	Insert **taddaṃsācchedato vā* after *mantrādinā* and delete *ca. daṃśadeśopasaṃhārāt: daṃśadeśa upasaṃhārāt?*
77.16	*vikāras: vikārāt; cāvśyaṃ: nāvaśyaṃ* or *ca nāvaśyaṃ*
77.17	*tad-: tat tad-*
77.20	*avasthā: avasthāviśeṣas*
77.21	*tasyāś: tasya?; ato: ato na; 'syā: 'sya?*
77.27	*tadvikāreṇa: tadavikāreṇa,* or *vikārāt: avikārāt?*
77.28	*punaḥ: na punaḥ*
78.3	*anyatātra: anyathātra; prasiddhā: prasiddhaṃ; -upādepya-: -upādeya-*
78.5	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1; *nivṛttāv: tannivṛttāv.*
78.10	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 2; *-dratvayoḥ: -dravatvayoḥ.*
78.13	*sahakārya-: saha kārya-*
78.17	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 4.
78.19	Delete *na.*
79.1	*jñānasyānasya: jñānasya| anyasya*
79.2	*jñanā-: jñānā-*
79.6	*savijñānasya: sa vijñānasya*
79.10	*nispṛhatā: niḥspṛhatā; saṅgataḥ: saṅgatam?*

79.11	*nisprhatayā: niḥsprhatayā*
79.12	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1; *na dāno-: nopādāno-.*
79.15	*cittasya: citrāder (cittasya?)*
79.19	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 3.
79.27	Perhaps a small lacuna between 63d and 64a.
79.30-31	*-nirāśaṃsattvāt: -nirāśaṃsatvāt*
80.9	*sthiter iti: sthitir iti; aparāsthitir: aparā sthitir*
80.14	*iha buddhi-: ihabuddhi-*
80.18	*pratkṣā-: pratyakṣā-*
80.21	*tadāśrayasya: tadā yasya*
80.26	*na vināśa-: nāvināśa-*
80.30	*nākiñcit-: na kiñcit-*
80.34	Delete *nāśake.*
81.5	*tasyāpi: tasyāpi hetor??*
81.7	*ānāśaka-: ā nāśaka-*
81.9	*nāśaḥ: 'nāśaḥ*
81.12	Read as in Sāṅkṛityāyana's n. 1; *vikalpanaṃ tenāpi: vikalpahetu-nāpi.*
81.19	*-bhāyo: -bhāvo*
81.21	Delete *dhāraṇāt??*
81.27	Read *saṅgame naikatvam.*
81.28	*gṛhītātīṃtaṃ: gṛhītam atītaṃ*; insert *idānīṃtanaṃ* or similar before *kiñcit gṛhyate.*
81.30	*ca nāśrayāt: cānāśrayāt*
81.33	*bhūtalā: bhūtalā-*
81.34	*viśiṣṭāvasthāyā: viśiṣṭāvasthāyām?*
82.1	*kāraṇam: grahaṇam? sāmarthye: sāmarthyena*
82.2-3	*-itīṣṭam: -ity aniṣṭam*
82.4	*-hetu-: -jñāna-?*
82.6	*-syādṛṣṭeḥ: -sya dṛṣṭeḥ*
82.8	*-kalpanā parasparety: kalpanāparamparety*
82.12	Delete *ādhātur.*
82.14	*nādheyasya: 'nādheyasya*
82.18	*yuta-: 'yuta-*
82.19	*iha buddhi: ihabuddhi-; -nibandhanaḥ: -nibandhanaṃ?*
82.22	*jāter: jātyāder*
82.26	*kāraṇatvam antareṇāpi: kāraṇam antareṇa?*
82.28	*samāśritatve, āśritatve: samavetatve??*
82.30	*-buddhyupādāno: buddhyutpādo*

2. A Concordance between the Sanskrit Text and the Tibetan Translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*

This concordance covers only the commentary on verses 34-72. S stands for Sāṅkṛityāyana's edition, P for Peking, D for Derge. The first word of the first line in Peking is used as the converging point.

P	S	D
54b	53.2	46a4
55a	53.14	46b3
55b	53.29	47a2
56a	54.8	47a7
56b	54.25	47b6
57a	55.8	48a5
57b	55.26	48b3
58a	56.8 in fn.2	49a2
58b	56.19	49a7
59a	57.1	49a6
59b	57.12	50a4
60a	57.27	50b3
60b	58.11	51al
61a	58.25	5la7
61b	59.3	51b5
62a	59.22	52a4
62b	60.5	52b3
63a	60.22	53a2
63b	61.5	53b1
64a	61.20	53b6
64b	62.4	54a5
65a	62.23	54b3
65b	63.7	55a2
66a	63.19	55a7
66b	64.4	55b6
67a	64.16	56a5
67b	64.29	56b3
68a	65.13	57a2
68b	65.26	57b1
69a	66.5	57b7
69b	66.18	58a5
70a	66.33	58b4

70b	67.16	59a3
71a	67.28	59b1
71b	68.13	59b7
72a	68.27	60a6
72b	69.8	60b4
73a	69.23	61a3
73b	70.8	61b1
74a	70.20	61b7
74b	70.30	62a6
75a	71.12	62b4
75b	71.23	63a3
76a	72.2	63b2
76b	72.14	63b7
77a	72.25	64a6
77b	73.4	64b5

3. Correspondence between the Peking and Derge Recensions of Devendrabuddhi's *Pañjikā*

The correspondence is given only for the commentary on verses 34-72. The references indicate the first *pratīka* of each verse as it occurs (i.e., even if the first *pratīka* is not the beginning of the verse).

kārikā	Peking	Derge
34	18a1	16a3
35	19a3	17a3
36	20a3	18a1
37	20b5	18b2
38	22a1	19b3
39	23a1	20b1
40	23b6	21a5
41	24a3	21b2
42	24b7	22a4
43	25a4	22b1
44	25b6	23a2
45	26a2	23a5
46	26a6	23bl
47	26b8	24a2
48	27a8	24b2
49	28b3	25b1
50	30a1	26b4
51	30a4	26b6
52	30b6	27a7
53	3lb4	28a4
54	31b8	28a7
55	32a6	28b4
56	32b3	28b7
57	32b5	29a2
58	33a5	29b1
59	33b5	29b7
60	34b2	30b3
61	35a1	31a2
62	35a4	31a4
63	35b5	31b4
64	36a5	32a3
65	36b3	32b1

66	37a2	32b6
67	37a8	33a4
68	37b2	33a5
69	37b4	33a7
70	37b7	33b2
71	38a3	33b5
72	38a7	34a1

4. Variants and Corrections to Miyasaka's Edition of the Tibetan Translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā*

Unlike PV_D and PV_R the Tibetan translation of Dharmakīrti's verses that are embedded in Prajñākaragupta's commentary is remarkably similar to that in PV_{Tib}. My assumption is that after Sa paṇ revised rṄog's translation an unknown hand replaced the older translation by rṄog with the new one by Sa paṇ. In any case, a truly critical edition of the Tibetan translation of the *PV* will have to take into account these further materials which should be considered as further recensions next to the four usual recensions (Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone) that were used by Miyasaka. I also take this opportunity to correct some typographical errors that crept into Miyasaka's edition. Some corrections were already pointed out by Steinkellner in *Verse-Index of Dharmakīrti's Works*, Appendix I, pp. 219ff. However, only two corrections are suggested there for the verses dealt with here (for the second, v. 51d, read *rdub: rṅub* instead of *rṅub: rdub).*

34a	*thugs rjes: thugs rje*
34b	*blo ni lus la: blo lus la ni*[1]
34c	*goms pas: goms pa*
35b	*rdub: rṅub* (Skt: *apāna)*
36d	*gaṅ gis:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *gaṅ gi,* $P_{(De)}$ *gaṅ źig* (both inferior for *yena)*
37a	*pa: pa'i*
38b	*ltos pa med par: ltos med par ni*
38c	*ji ltar: ci ltar*
39a	*dbaṅ rnams:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *dbaṅ po rnams,* but $P_{(De)}$: *dbaṅ rnams*
39d	*dag tu: rtag tu*[2]
40c	*rgyu yin pas: rgyu mtshan yin* (Skt: *nimitta)*
41a	*de 'dra'i 'phen byed yod gyur na* । : *de 'dra ba źig 'phen byed 'gyur* ।
41b	*phyis kyaṅ de 'drar 'gyur ba yin* । : *de 'dra phyis kyaṅ 'gyur ba yin* ।
42a	*gal te: gal te'aṅ* (Skt: *yady api); med par blo: med pa'i blo*
42b	*med par: med phyir*
42c	*rgyu ñid pas: rgyu mtshan ñid*
42d	*de phyir: des kyaṅ* (Skt: *tato 'pi)*

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[1] This *pāda* appears twice in the commentary ($P_{(Pe)}$ 54b4 and 55a5); in the second time the word order is identical to the one in Miyasaka's edition.

[2] *rtag tu* is probably a corruption that occurred during the transmission of the Tibetan text; it has no equivalent such as *nityam* in the Skt.

43d *de'i yaṅ: de yi* (Skt: *tasyāpi); rin pa: rim pa* (Skt: *krama)*
44b *re re: re rer*
47b *bcas las: bcas la*
50 The *pādas* appear in a different order: c, a, b, d.
50a *'ga' źig: gaṅ źig; rgyun la: rgyun gyi*
50b *sla ste: bla ste*
51a *ñid: yin*
51d *rdub: rṅub* (Skt: *apāna)*
52a *ni:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *na,* but $P_{(De)}$: *ni*
52c *yul: phul*
53a *thal ba: thal bar*
54a *sdoṅ bu:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *sdoṅ po,* but $P_{(De)}$: *sdoṅ bu*
54c *śi bas ñes pa ñams: śi ba ñes pas mñam*
55a *ldog: log*
56a *'byuṅ bar:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *'gyur ro bar,* $P_{(De)}$ *'gyur ba; ni:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *na,* but $P_{(De)}$: *ni*
56c *ldog: bzlog*
58d *yin na: gso na*
59a *ldog: log*
59c *bas na: ba na*
61c *de de'i ñer len: de yi ñer len*
61d *ba glaṅ: ba laṅ; ba med: ba men* (Skt: *gavaya)*
62c *gnas:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *nas,* but $P_{(De)}$: *gnas*
64c *'jigs pa: 'jig pa*
64d *las:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *la,* but $P_{(De)}$: *las*
65a *de la'aṅ: de la* (Skt: *tatrāpi); thal bar: thal ba*
65b *byas: bya*
66a *yod pa 'di gnod med phyir daṅ: yod la 'di gnos* ($P_{(De)}$: *gnod) med pa'i phyir*
66d *la'aṅ: la*
68a *'bo ba yis: bo ba yi*
68d This *pāda* is translated twice; at the second time: ... *la rten ci źig dgos* instead of ... *la ni rten ci dgos.*
69a *'dis ni:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *'di ni,* but $P_{(De)}$: *'dis ni* (Skt: *tena)*

69c *rnam:* $P_{(Pe)}$: *rnams*, but $P_{(De)}$: *rnam*[3]
70c *de: des*
72b *daṅ: gaṅ* (Skt: *kaḥ)*

[3] Both variants make sense, as *rnam* translates *vi-* in *vyavasthitatvam* and *rnams* could correspond to the implicit plural of *jātyādeḥ*. *rnam* is, of course, the better variant, since otherwise *vyavasthitatvam* would be translated by *gnas ñid* alone.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

1. Journals and Series

ABORI: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

AKM: Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes herausgegeben von der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

ANIS: Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien

BB: Bibliotheca Buddhica

BBhS: Bauddha Bharati Series

BKGA: Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens

BM: Bibliothèque du Muséon, Université de Louvain

BSOAS: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

BST: Buddhist Sanskrit Texts

BVS: Bhāratīya Vidyā Series

CalSS: Calcutta Sanskrit Series

CSS: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series

GJG: Gaṅganātha Jhā Granthamālā

GOS: Gaekwad's Oriental Series

GS: Glasenapp-Stiftung

HOS: Harvard Oriental Series

IR: Indological Review

IT: Indologica Taurinensia

JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society

JAS: Jaikrishnadas Ayurveda Series

JBORS: Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society

JEĀS: Journal of the European Āyurvedic Society

JGJRI: Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute

JIABS: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

JIP: Journal of Indian Philosophy

JMJG: Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā

JRAS: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

KSS: Kashi Sanskrit Series

MCB: Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques

MCDJG: Māṇik Chandra Digambara Jain Granthamālā

MGOS: Madras Government Oriental Series

MIS: Mithila Institute Series

MKB: Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus

NB: Nanto Bukkyō

PBhS: Prachya Bharati Series

PDNRL: Publications of the De Nobili Research Library

PEFEO: Publications de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient

PIBHB: Publications de l'Institut belge des Hautes Etudes bouddhiques

PTS: Pali Text Society

ŚĀJG: Śrī Ātmānand Jain Granthamālā

SAS: Sanskrit Academy Series

ŚĀSS: Śrī Āgamodaya Samiti Series

ŚGPJG: Śrigoḍīpārśvajainagranthamālā

SJGM: Sanātanajainagranthamālā

SOR: Serie Orientale Roma

SPhBMS: Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series

SPR: Studies in Philosophy and Religion

StII: Studien zu Indologie und Iranistik

TP: T'oung Pao

TSWS: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series

TTP: The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition

VKSKSO: Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften)

WSTB: Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde

WZKM: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes

WZKS: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens

WZKSO: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens

2. Primary Sources

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AK(Bh)	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan. TSWS 8. 2nd ed. , Patna 1975
AK dLVP	cf. La Vallée Poussin
AK(S)	*Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)* in *AKV*
AKV	*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* in *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Ed. D. Śāstri. BBhS 5-6. 2nd ed. Patna 1977
AD	*Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣaprabhāvṛtti*. Ed. P.S. Jaini. TSWS 4. 2nd ed. Patna 1977
AN	*The Aṅguttara-Nikāya*. Part I. Ed. R. Morris. 2nd ed. rev. by A.K. Warder. PTS 3. London 1961.
AS	*Abhidharmasamuccaya*. Ed. P. Pradhan. Santiniketan 1950.
ASBh	*Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣyam*. Ed. N. Tatia. TSWS 17. Patna 1976
AH	*Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* of Vāgbhaṭa. Ed. H.P. Vaidya. Bombay 1939
ĀNṬ	*Āvaśyakaniryuktiṭīkā in Śrī Āvaśyaka Sūtra with Niryukti (gloss) by Śrutakevalin Śrī Bhadrabāhusvāmin along with the Commentary by Śrī Malayagirisūri. ŚĀSS 56, 60, Bombay 1928, 1930*
ĀP	*Āptaparīkṣā* of Vidyānanda. Ed. G. Jain. SJGM 1. Kāśī 1913
ĀM	*Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. Ed. G. Jain. SJGM 10. Kāśī 1914
ĀVD	Āyurvedadīpikā in *CS*
AiUp	*Aitareyopaniṣad* in *Eighteen Principle Upaniṣads*. Vol. I. Ed. V.P. Limaye and R.D. Vadekar. Poona 1958
Kathāvatthu	ed. A.C. Taylor, 2 vols, PTS. London 1894-97

KV — *Kāśikā, A Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar by Vāmana and Jayāditya*. Ed. A. Sharṁa, K. Deshpande and D.G. Padhye. SAS 17, 20. Heyderabad 1969, 1970

KS — *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* in E. Lamotte, "Le Traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa", *NCB* 4, 1936, pp. 151-288

CS — *The Cāraka Saṃhitā of Agniveśa revised by Caraka and Dṛḍhabala With the Āyurveda-Dīpikā Commentary of Cakrapāṇidatta And with 'Vidyotinī' Hindī Commentary By Kāśinātha Śāstrī*. Ed. Gaṅgāsahāya Pandeya. 2 vols. KSS 194. 2nd ed. Varanasi 1983

ChUp — *Chāndogyopaniṣad* cf. *AiUp*

JTBh — *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* of Yaśovijaya. Ed. and trans. D. Bhargava. Delhi 1973

JM — *Jayamaṅgalā* in *Sāṃkhyakārikā of Śrīmad Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Māṭharavṛtti of Māṭharācārya and the Jayamaṅgala of Śrī Śaṅkara*. Ed. S. Vaṅgiya. CSS 56. 2nd ed. Varanasi 1970

JMā — *The Jātaka-Mālā*. Ed. H. Kern. HOS 1. Cambridge 1981

JMāṬ — *Jātakamālāṭīkā (Skyes pa'i rabs kyi rgyud kyi rgya cher bśad pa)* of Dharmakīrti. TTP No. 5651

TAV — *Tattvārthavārttika* of Akalaṅka Deva. Ed. M.K. Jain. JMJG 10. 2nd ed. Delhi 1982

TUS — *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa. Ed. R. Parikh and S. Sanghavi. GOS 87. Baroda 1940. Cf. also Franco 1994.

TBV — *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* of Abhayadevasūri, in *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa* of Siddhasena. Ed. S. Sanghavi and B. Doshi. 5 vols., Ahmedabad 1921-31

TBh — *Tarkabhāṣa* of Mokṣākaragupta. Ed. H.R.R. Iyengar. Mysore 1952

TRD — *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratna. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. JMJG Saṃskṛta Granthāṃka 36. 2nd ed. Delhi 1981

TrBh — *Triṃśikābhāṣya* of Sthiramati; cf. Lévi 1925

TS(P)	*Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. Ed. D. Shastri. BBhS 2. Vāraṇasī 1968
TS (GOS)	*Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. Ed. E. Krishnamacharya. GOS 30-31. Baroda 1926
TS(P)$_{Tib}$	Tibetan translation of *TS*. TTS 5764
TS(P)$_{MS}$	microfilm reproduction of the Jaisalmer ms of *TS(P)*,kept at the Śrījinabhadrasūrijñānabhaṇḍār
D	*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* of Devendrabuddhi. Pe = TTP 5717; De = Derge 4217
DANC	*Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśrama With the Commentary Nyāyānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Kṣamāśrama.* Ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji. Part 1. ŚĀJG 92. Bhavnagar 1966
Dhātupāṭha	in *AA*
DhPr	*Dharmottarapradīpa* in *NB*
NAṬ	*Nandyadhyayanaṭīkā* of Malayagiri in *Śrīmannandīsūtram (Śrīmanmalayagiryācāryapraṇītavṛttiyutam)*. Bombay 1924
NAVV	*Nyāyāvatāravārtika-Vṛtti* of Śānti Sūri. Ed. D. Malwaniya. Singhi Jain Series. Bombay 1949
Nirukta	of Yāska. Cf. Sarup
NKan	*Nyāyakandalī* of Śridhara, in *PDhS*
NKC	*Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya.* Ed. M.K. Jain. MCDJG 38-39. Bombay 1938, 1941
NB	*Nyāyabindu* in *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa.* Ed. D. Malvania. TSWS 2. 2nd ed., Patna 1972
NBṬ	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara in *NB*
NBṬ$_{Vi}$	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Vinītadeva. Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin. BB 11. St. Petersburg 1909

NBṬṬ	*Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī*. Ed. Th. Stcherbatsky. BB 11. St. Petersburg 1909
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya*, in *NS*
NBhū	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña. Ed. Yogīndrānanda. Varanasi 1968
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta. Ed. V.K.S. Varadacharya. University of Mysore, Oriental Research Institute Series Nos. 110, 139. Mysore 1969, 1983
NMGBh	*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara. Ed. N. Shah. L.D. Series 35. Ahmedabad 1972
Nyāyamukha	cf. Tucci 1930
Nyāsa	*Nyāsa or Pañcikā Commentary of Ācārya Jinendrabuddhipāda and Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra on the Kāśikāvṛtti [Commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini] of Vāmana-Jayāditya*. Part I (Chapter First). Ed. Swami Dwarika Das Shastri and Pt. Kalika Prasad Shukla. Prachya Bharati Series 2. Varanasi 1965.
NR	*Nyāyaratna* of Pārthasārathimiśra, in *ŚV*
NV	*Nyāyavārttika*, in *NS*
NVTṬ	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *NS*
NVTP	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi* of Udayana, in *Nyāyadarśana* of Gautama. Ed. A. Thakur. MIS 20. Darbhanga 1967
NS	*Nyāyasūtra* in *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. CalSS 18, 29. Calcutta 1936, 1944
P	*Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta. Ed. R. Sāṅkṛityāyana. Patna 1953
$P_{(De)}$	Tibetan translation of P. Derge 4221
$P_{(Pe)}$	Tibetan translation of P. TTP 5719

PKM	*Prameyakamala-Mārtaṇḍa by Shri Prabha Chandra.* Ed. M.K. Jain. MCDJG 36. 2nd ed. Bombay 1941
PDhS	*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Praśastapāda. Ed. D.J. Sharma. GJG 1. 2nd ed. Vārāṇasī 1977
PP	*Prajñāpradīpa (Śes pa sgron ma)* of Bhāvaviveka. TTP No. 5253
PM	*Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra. Ed. and trans. S. Mookerjee in collaboration with N. Tatia. PBhS 11. Varanasi 1970
PYBhV	*Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa of Śaṅkara-Bhagavadpāda.* Ed. R. Shastri and K. Shastri. MGOS XCLV. Madras 1952
PrP	*Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Shastri. Benares 1961
PV	*Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti. Ed. Y Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2. Naritasan Shinshoji 1971/72. Cf. also D, P, R and M
PV_{Tib}	Tibetan translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* in *PV*
PV_{D}	*PV* in D
PV_{P}	*PV* in P
$PV_{P(Tib)}$	Tibetan translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* in $P_{(Pe)}$ and $P_{(De)}$
PV_{M}	*PV in M*
PV_{R}	*PV* in R
PVin I	cf. Vetter 1966
PVin II	cf. Steinkellner 1973
PVin III	*Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti. Chapter III. TTP 5710
PVṬ	*Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* of Śākyabuddhi. TTP 5718
PVSV	*The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti.* Ed. R. Gnoli. SOR XXIII. Roma 1960

PVSVṬ	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* of Karṇakagomin. Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad 1943
PS	*Pramāṇasamuccaya.* Appendix B in Kitagawa 1965
PSP	*Le Traité des Cinq Agrégats (Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa de Vasubandhu).* Traduit et Annoté par J. Dantinne. PIBHB. Serie "Etudes et Textes" No 7. Bruxelles 1980
BA	*Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva with the Commentary *Pañjikā* of Prajñākaramati. Ed. P.L. Vaidya. BSS 12. Darbhanga 1960
BS	*Bṛhaspatisūtra,* fragments in Namai 1976
M	*Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin. Ed. D. Shastri. BBhS 3. Vārāṇasī 1968
M(S)	*Pramānavārttikavṛtti.* Ed. R. Sāṅkṛityāyana. *JBORS* 24 (Appendix), 1938
Manu	*Manu-Smṛti with Nine Commentaries.* Ed. J.H. Dave. BVS 29, 33, 37-40. Bombay 1972-1984
MBh	*Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. Ed. F. Kielhorn. 3 vols. Bombay 1980-1985
MBhā	*Mahābhārata.* Ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al. BORI, Poona 1933-1966
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti.* Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St. Petersbourg 1903-1913
MHK	*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* of Bhāviveka, cf. Ejima
YD	*Yuktidīpikā.* Ed. R.C. Pandeya. Delhi 1967
YBh	*Yogabhāṣya* in *PYBhV*
R	*Pramāṇavārttikaṛtti* of Ravigupta. Derge 4224; the first reference refers to the Tokyo reprint, the second to the Taipei reprint
Vādavidhi	cf. Frauwallner 1957

Viṃś	*Viṃśatikā* of Vasubandhu, cf. Lévi 1925
VP	*Vākyapādīya (Sādhanasamuddeśa)* in *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja.* Kāṇḍa III, Part 1. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Deccan College Monograph Series 21. Poona 1963
VS	*Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda.* Ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji. GOS 136. Baroda 1961
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika of Kumārila with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthsārathimiśra.* Ed. D. Shastri. BBhS 3. Varanasi 1978
ṢDS	*Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri, with the Commentaries Tarkarahasyadīpikā of Guṇaratnasūri and Laghuvṛtti of Somatilaka Sūri and an Avacurṇi.* Ed. M.K. Jain. JMJG Sanskrit Grantha 36. 2nd ed. Delhi 1981
Suś	*Suśrutasaṃhita of Suśruta with the Nibandhanasaṅgraha Commentary of Śrī Ḍalhaṇāchārya and the Nyāyacandrikā Pañjikā of Śrī Gayadāsāchārya on Nidānasthāna.* Ed. J. Trikamji. JAS 34. 4th ed. Varanasi 1980
SK	*Sāṅkhyakārikā* in *YD, JM* and Srinivasan
SKBh	*Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya* of Gauḍapāda, in *Sāṅkhya-Karikā.* Ed. J. Śāstrī. Delhi 1975
SKV	Sūtrakṛtāṅgavivaraṇa in *Sūtrakṛtāṅgam* with *Niryukti* of Bhadrabāhu and *Vivaraṇa* of Śīlāṅka. ŚGPJG 4, 7. Bombay 1950, 1953
STK	*Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī,* in Srinivasan
SBhT	*Svāyaṃbhūvatantra,* cf. Filliozat 1991
SRK	*The Subhāṣitaratnakośa compiled by Vidyākara.* Ed. D.D. Kosambi and V.V. Gokhale. HOS 42. Cambridge 1957
SS	*Sarvajñasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī. Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti.* Ed. A. Thakur. TSWS 3. Patna 1957

SSāra *The Siddhasāra of Ravigupta.* Vol. 1. The Sanskrit text. Ed. R.E. Emmerick. Wiesbaden 1980

HB *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti, cf. Steinkellner 1967

HBṬĀ *Hetubinduṭīkāloka* of Durveka Miśra. Ed. S. Sanghavi and Muni Jinavijayaji. GOS CXIII. Baroda 1949

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— cf. dLVP

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INDICES

1. Index of Sanskrit Words

Words preceded by a hyphen indicate the qualificands of adjectives or *bahuvrīhi*-compounds. Proper names such as Uddyotakara, Kambalāśvatara, Aviddhakarṇa, Cārvāka, etc., are mentioned only if they appear in a quoted Sanskrit text.

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